Francisco Suárez: On Preaching the Gospel to People Like the American Indians
Fordham International Law Journal
John P. Doyle
Copyright c 1991 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Francisco Sua´ rez: On Preaching the Gospel to
People Like the American Indians
John P. Doyle
In this Article, I will trace Sua´rez’s thoughts on the natural equality of all men as well as the
natural character and equality of their republics. Then, in a context of natural law and the limits of
state power, I will consider Sua´rez’s positions on the jus gentium (law of nations) and war. Next, I
will consider Sua´rez’s divisions of non-Christians and his views on preaching the Gospel to people
like the American Indians.
As is well known, the century following Columbus's
discovery of the New World was, for Spain, El Siglo de Oro (The
Century of Gold). The appellation was well deserved. In just
about every area, Spain led the way. Politically, first with the
Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella, and then with the
Habsburg monarchies of the Emperor Charles V (1516-1556)
and his son King Philip II (1556-1598), Spanish hegemony was
at its zenith.' For most of the century, Spain's military might
in Western Europe was unequalled. Its ability to project that
might across thousands of sea-miles to the Americas, the
Philippine Islands, and the Far East was astonishing even as we
contemplate it today. In ecclesiastical politics, in theology, and
in spirituality, Spanish influence was clear before, during, and
after the Council of Trent (1545-1563).2 In broader fields of
university education, humanistic learning, literature, and art,
Spaniards excelled.3 With the 1534 founding and then the
ex* Professor of Philosophy, St. Louis University.
•* The footnotes of this Article contain extensive Latin quotations from
Suirez's writings. The bulk of Suirez's writings are not widely available in English.
Translations for much of the Latin in succeeding footnotes can be found in
SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS OF FRANCISCO SUAREZ, SJ., Vol. II, The
Translations, prepared by Gwladys L. Williams, et al., in 20 THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (James Brown Scott, ed., 1944). The author, while conversant
with the James Brown Scott translation, is not in full agreement with all of the
translations; consequently, we are providing cross-references, rather than
translations. Wherever available, such cross-references have been indicated by page
references to this volume in brackets following the quotations.
1. For an overview here, see generally JOHN LYNCH, SPAIN UNDER THE
HABSBURGS. VOLUME ONE: EMPIRE AND ABSOLUTISM, 1516-1598 (2d ed. 1981).
2. Some names here might include: Cardinal Xim~nes de Cisneros (1436-1517),
St. Thomas of Villanueva (1488-1555), St. Teresa of Avila (1515-1562), St. John of
the Cross (1542-1591), Andr~s de Vega (1498-1560), and Alfonso Salmer6n
3. In theology and philosophy, leading all others is the "Spanish Socrates,"
pansion of the Jesuits, by the end of the sixteenth century that
excellence and influence was waxing stronger.
Throughout the golden century, however, ethical doubts
festered with regard to the newly encountered peoples and
territories. By what right had the Spaniards assumed dominion
over the nations and lands of the Americas? Was it in any
manner moral for one nation without provocation simply to
impose its rule upon another? Asked in an exclusively
European context, a query like this would receive a negative reply.
But what of barbarous unbelievers? Could they not be
conquered for their own good? That is to say, could they not and
should they not be subjected to the Spaniards in order to
receive civilization and Christianity? Indeed, did not the
Spaniards have a natural imperative, rooted in humanity itself,
to civilize such people, as well as a supernatural one, rooted in
Catholic Faith, to evangelize them?
By the time Francisco Suairez came to address them, the
main questions raised by the evangelization of the American
Indians were pretty much settled for Catholic theologians.
The renowned "Father of International Law," Francisco de
Vitoria, O.P., in his famous Relectiones de Indis, delivered at
Salamanca in January and June of 1539, had laid down what
became the common view.4 In brief, for Vitoria and his
successors the Indians were human beings, lords of their own lives
ard possessions, and it was not lawful to subjugate and despoil
them without just cause-even in order to civilize and to
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546). Among the Dominican successors of Vitoria,
deserving special reference are Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Melchior Cano
(15091560), and Domingo Bafiez (1528-1604). Of the Jesuits, one must mention Francisco
de Toledo, also known as Toletus (1533-1596), Gabriel Vizquez (1549-1604), Luis
de Molina (1535-1600), and, of course, Francisco Suirez (1548-1617). Others
outside this context include Antonio de Nebrija (1442-1522), Juan Luis Vives
(14921540), and Miguel de Cervantes (1547-1616). In art, there is first the adopted
Spaniard El Greco (1541-1614), and in the 17th century Francisco de Zurbarin
(15981664) and Velfisquez (1599-1661) as well.
4. For the critical text of the Relectiones de Indis, see Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio
de Indis, o libertad de los Indios, in 5 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE (Luciano Perefia and
J.M. P6rez Prendes eds., edici6n bilingue 1961) [hereinafter CORPUS HISPANORUM DE
PACE], and Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de lureBelli o paz dindmica. Escuela espaniolade la
paz. Primerageneracidn1526-1560, in 6 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE (Luciano Perefia
et al. eds., 1981). For a recent English translation, see FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,
POLITICAL WRITINGS 233 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds., 1991).
As we shall see, this squares with the beliefs of Sufirez.
While the position Suirez took was general and made almost
no mention of the American Indians, its application to them is
unmistakable. In this Article, I will trace Suairez's thoughts on
the natural equality of all men as well as the natural character
and equality of their republics. Then, in a context of natural
law and the limits of state power, I will consider Suirez's
positions on thejus gentium (law of nations) and war. Important at
that juncture is Suirez's emphasis on the international
character of thejus gentium and its influence on his attitudes towards
non-Christians and their political arrangements. Next, I will
consider Suirez's divisions of non-Christians and his views on
preaching the Gospel to people like the American Indians.
Here his questions concern the Church's right to preach the
Gospel to all nations and especially the extent of that right
when it comes to non-Christian peoples and rulers not subject
to Christian power. But first let me fill in some of the
background on Sufirez himself and on the sources for this Article.
I. SUAREZ-THE MAN, HIS WORK, AND HIS INFLUENCE
Francisco Suirez was born at Granada in Spain on January
5, 1548.' In the autumn of 1561 he enrolled at what was then
the finest university in the world, Salamanca.6 Here he studied
law until at sixteen years of age he heard the call of God and
entered, onJune 16, 1564, into the fledgling Society ofJesus.7
After three months in the novitiate at Medina del Campo, his
Jesuit superiors sent him back to the Society's College at
Salamanca to begin at seventeen the study of philosophy. 8 In
October 1566, following his first vows as ajesuit, Sufirez went on to
theological studies, still at Salamanca. 9
At that time the Jesuits did not have enough theologians
to staff the faculties under which their students were enrolled,
so Sua'rez's class received a rather eclectic, but nevertheless
first-rate, training from professors on the University faculty of
theology.' 0 Chief among Suirez's mentors here was the
Dominican, Juan Mancio (1497-1576), who was himself first a
pupil and then, in Salamanca's principal chair (cathedra de prima)
of theology, a successor of the great Vitoria."
Following his theological studies, Suirez in 1570 began to
teach philosophy, initially at Salamanca as a Scholastic tutor,1 2
and then as a regular professor at the Jesuit college in
Segovia.' 3 It was here that he was ordained a priest in March of
1572.1' After ordination, he continued to lecture in
philosophy until September 1574, when, at the Jesuit college in
Valladolid, he commenced his main life's work as a theology
teacher. 5 Later he taught his subject at Avila (1575), Segovia
(1575), Valladolid again (1576), Rome (1580), Alcalat (1585),
and Salamanca (1593).16
Meanwhile, in 1581 Philip II of Spain had united the
kingdoms of Spain and Portugal. 17 Sixteen years later, Suirez,
complying with a request by Philip to the Jesuits, assumed the
9. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 84.
10. FICHTER, supra note 5, at 79.
11. Id. at 79-80 explains that
[p]erhaps in no other university in the world is there to be found so brilliant
a succession of professors as that which filled the principal chair of theology
at Salamanca during the sixteenth century. Suirez' teacher, Mancio, was the
fifth of the line which started with the great Francis Vittorio in 1526, and
ended with the controversial Dominic Bafiez in 1604. In the order in which
they followed Vittorio these outstanding Dominican scholars were: Melchior
Cano, Dominic de Soto, Peter de Sotomayor, John Mancio, Bartholomew de
Medina, and Dominic Bafiez. All of these men enter intimately into the life
of Francis Suirez; those before Mancio, his teacher, because of their
influence on his development; those after Mancio because he knew them
personally and was sometimes at odds with them.
12. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 118.
13. Id. at 130; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 94.
14. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 133; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 96.
15. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 149; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 107.
16. See generally FICHTER, supra note 5, at 107-98.
17. See LYNCH, supra note 1, at 322-30.
principal chair of theology at the University of Coimbra. "
Here he remained, teaching and participating in theological
discussions, until his retirement at the end of the academic
year, 1614-15. Two years later, on September 25, 1617, he
died in Lisbon.'"
From 1590 on, Suarez's literary production was
Herculean, with volume after volume appearing in his own lifetime
or published posthumously by his friend and literary executor,
Baltasar Alvarez.2 ° One can see the extent of this labor in any
of the several editions of Suirez's Opera Omnia published after
1617. The most accessible of these, and the one to which I will
refer in this Article, comprises twenty-six volumes of text, most
running close to 1000 pages, in quarto! 2 1 One author, who
"conservatively estimated" Suairez's output at "upwards of
twenty-one million words," has commented:
This would account for more than two hundred and eighty
novels of seventy-five thousand words apiece. Truly a
gigantic task for any author, but when we consider that all of
Suirez's work was done in the highly precise and technical
fields of theology, philosophy, and law, the comparison
between him and a modern novelist limps badly. Prolific is a
weak adjective to apply to him.22
Among the volumes of his writings, the great majority are
naturally of a theological character. This, however, is not to
say that they lack importance outside the field of theology
it18. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 335; FiCHTER, supra note 5, at 208.
19. 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 223; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 325-27.
20. In this connection,
Suarez laissait un certain nombre d'ouvrages tout prrparrs pour
l'impression; mais l'apparition de tel d'entre eux se trouvait diffhre sine die
par l'interdiction de rien publier sur le sujet des controverses de auxiliis. Les
autres, pendant les dix ans qui suivirent la mort de Suarez, furent presque
tous 6ditrs par le P. Balthazar Alvarrs, son collgue et son ami, qui 6dita
aussi les cours que Suarez avait laissrs sans pouvoir lui-m~me en faire la
MONNOT, supra note 5, col. 2641. For a succinct account of the controversy, "de
auxiris," in which, however, the name of Suirez is unfortunately omitted, see Antonio
Astrain, Congregatio de Auxiliis, in 4 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 238-39 (1913). On
Baltasar Alvarez, see CARLOS SOMMERVOGEL, 1 BIBLIOTH9QUE DE LA COMPAGNIE DE
Jfsus 221-22 (1890).
21. See FRANCISCUS SUkREZ, S.J., OPERA OMNIA (Carolus Berton, ed., 1856-66 &
Supp. 1878) [hereinafter OPERA OMNIA]. Unless otherwise noted, later references to
and citations of Suirez will be from this edition.
22. FiCHTER, supra note 5, at 327.
self. Quite the contrary. Some of this majority have had
widespread influence even up to our time, especially in areas of
philosophy and jurisprudence. For particular mention here, let
me single out the De Legibus Seu de Deo Legislatore (On Laws or
on God the Lawgiver) (De Legibus), published at Coimbra in
1612, and the Defensio Fidei Catholicae (A Defense of the
Catholic Faith) (Defensio Fidei), published at Coimbra in 1613. About
both of these I will say more in the immediately following
section. But to emphasize the importance of Suirez's output,
especially for modern international law, one may recall that, in
the opinion of Hugo Grotius, our Jesuit doctor was a
philosopher and theologian of such penetration "that he hardly had
an equal. ' 23
II. THE SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE
As already mentioned, for Catholic theologians the
question of the evangelization of the Indians was largely settled in
the wake of Vitoria.24 While there is no mistaking the fact that
he was thinking of Vitoria and the American experience,
Suirez, to my knowledge, unambiguously referred to the
American Indians and their conquest only once, apart from
citations of the titles of Vitoria's works. Moreover, he made no
reference to the well-known advocate of the Indians,
Bartolom6 de las Casas,25 to Las Casas's celebrated encounter
with Sepfilveda in 1550-51,26 or to people such as his Jesuit
order-brother Jos6 de Acosta. 27 In this, he moves-even more
strikingly than Vitoria did earlier-away from a case-by-case
consideration of particulars and toward principles involved at a
more universal level. 28 He does this almost entirely in eight
First and most important is the Tractatus defide (Treatise on
Faith) (De Fide). Originally composed in 1583 at the Jesuit
Collegium Romanum 29 as lectures on the opening questions of
Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae I-I, this treatise was
recently edited from four manuscripts and published in three
parts.30 The second of these parts contains the one
unambiguous reference just mentioned.3 ' The De Fide itself was revised
again for lectures at Coimbra in 1613-14, Surez's last year of
teaching.3 2 Finally, all that the master left behind was
combined and published by Alvarez in a 1621 volume, which also
included shorter treatments of hope and charity from the
period of Sua'rez's Roman teaching.33 Along the way, the
menCORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4. Luciano Perefia, in his "Estudio
preliminar" to this work, tells us that at one point Suirez, with a letter to the Cardinal
Archbishop of Toledo, did play some role in a dispute involving Acosta. Luciano
Perefia, Estudio preliminar,in 23 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4, at 25 &
n.35 (1984). I have not as yet been able to see a copy of this letter. De Scorraille has
translated some parts ofthis letter and has summarized the part which directly relates
to evangelization. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 267. However, in neither the
translations nor in the summary is there any mention of Acosta. Henri Bernard, SJ.,
La th orie du protectoratcivil des missions en pays indigeine. Ses anticidents et sa justification
thiologiquepar Suarez, in 1937 NOUVELLE R. THtOLOGIQUE 261, also links Suirez with
Acosta but offers only the De Scorraille summary to support that linkage.
33. 2 DR SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 163. For Alvarez's own rather cryptic
FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL
tioned reference was unfortunately removed, perhaps by
Alvarez, but more probably by Suarez himself.
The treatise on charity in the Alvarez volume3 4 is also
important for our present purposes. More specifically,
Disputation XIII (De Bello) of that treatise contains Suairez's teaching
on just war.3 5 Delivered at Rome in the spring of 1584,36 the
treatises on charity and hope were apparently not revised, at
least in any significant way, before their 1621 publication.3"
Nevertheless, the disputation on war is an obviously mature
piece of work. Its particular relevance here may be seen
immediately if one recalls that the second of Vitoria's Relectiones de
Indis was on the right of war.3"
Next in order of importance for us is the already
mentioned De Legibus. The fruit of Suairez's teaching at Coimbra
between 1601 and 1603, the De Legibus was edited by its author
in 1612 and published that same year at Coimbra.3 9 In the
Proemium to the work, Suirez contended that, inasmuch as all
paternal and legislative authority is derived from God, the
universal Father and Lawgiver, a discussion of all law is not
surprisingly within the province of a theologian.4" This was
furments about its provenance, see 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at vi-vii, 154, 219,
34. See Franciscus Suirez, SJ., Tractatus tertiusde Caritate [hereinafter De Caritate],
in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 634-763.
35. Id. at 737-63.
36. See Ory, supra note 29, at 142, 149; Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 308.
37. Balthasar Alvarez, SJ., Ad lectores pro auctore, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at vi ("Licet vero reliquas de spe et charitate disputationes antequam ad
Conimbricensem hanc Academiam vocaretur, in Hispania vel Italia pressius (nimirum pro
schola) explanaret, non possunt tamen auctoris martem et artem non olere.") .
The only revisions that I have noticed are cross-references to some of Suirez's own
works later than 1584.
38. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
39. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at xx; 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 156;
see 5-6 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21 (reprinting De Legibus). For a modem critical
edition, see Francisco Sufirez, De/ egibus, in 11-17, 21-22 CORPus HISPANORUM DE PACE,
supra note 4.
40. Franciscus Suirez, SJ., Tractatus de legibus et legislatore Deo, Proemium, in 5
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at ix [hereinafter De Legibus]. Suirez stated
Nulli mirum videri debet si homini theologiam profitenti leges incidant
disputandae .... Haec tamen non magni momenti sunt, et unico fere verbo
diluuntur, considerando sicut omnem paternitatem, ita etiam omnem
legislatorem a Deo derivari, omniumque legum auctoritatem in eum esse ultimo
refundendam. . . . Non immerito igitur sub hac saltem ratione omnium
legum discussio est theologicae facultatis ....
ther evident inasmuch as law is the rule of conscience and it is
the business of theology to provide for consciences.4 And
finally, to Suirez the Catholic faith taught not only how the
commands of God must be obeyed, but also how all natural,
civil, and ecclesiastical law must be observed. Accordingly, it
was a task of the theologian to consider the various kinds of
Closely allied with the De legibus, both in the time and
place of its composition as well as in much that it treats, is the
Defensio fidei catholicaeadversus anglicanaesectae errores, cum
responsione ad apologiamprojuramentofidelitatis et praefationem monitoriam
serenissimiJacobi Angliae Regis (A Defense of the Catholic Faith
Against the Errors of the Anglican Sect, with a Reply to the
"Apology" for the "Oath of Fidelity" and the "Warning
Preface" of James, the Most Serene King of England), which
appeared at Coimbra in 1613. 41 In the year of its appearance this
work was condemned by the English King James I and publicly
burned in London, for the reason that in it Suirez had
opposed the absolute right of kings and had defended the
indirect power of the papacy over temporal rulers, as well as the
legitimate resistance of the citizenry against a tyrannical
monarch-even to the point of tyrannicide in the case of a monarch
whom the Pope deposes for heresy.44
In fifth place is a work that is broadly classifed as
Scriptural commentary, the De opere sex dierum (On the Work of the
Six Days [of Genesis]).4 5 Stemming from lectures given in
Spain during the 1570s,46 the De opere sex dierum was revised by
Suirez and was ready at the time of his death for publication
by Alvarez in 1621 at Lyons.4 7 Of special interest here is Book
V, chapter 7, entitled "On Political Life in the State of
Next is the Tractatus de Baptismo (Treatise on Baptism).
Originally composed as lectures at Alcali in 1585, the work
was published at Salamanca a decade later.49 Most important
in the present context is Disputation 25, sections 3 and 4.50 In
that place, Suirez is concerned with the widely discussed
medieval question of baptizing children in contravention of the
desires of their unbelieving parents.
Finally are two works that are partially parallel. Edited in
1958 from a single manuscript 51 is a series of questions
entitled De Justitia et Jure (On Justice and Right).52 Representing
lectures dictated by Suirez most probably at Rome in the
summer of 1584, 53 these questions in part anticipate material
published by the master himself in 1599 under the title Disputatio
de justitia qua Deus reddit praemia meritis et poenas pro peccatis (A
Disputation on the Justice by Which God Gives Rewards for
Merit and Punishments for Sin).54
III. SOME PRELIMINARY POINTS OF DOCTRINE
A. The NaturalCondition of Human Beings
Any sixteenth century discussion of the Indians of the New
World was bound to take place, at least in part, against the
background of Aristotle's division of men into those fitted by
nature to rule and those who were by nature "slaves." 55
Picked up and benignly interpreted by Thomas Aquinas,5 6 the
Aristotelian division of human beings was at hand for the
academic discussions of the nature of the newly discovered people
of America and the consequent attitudes of Europeans toward
them.5 7 Most probably the first Scholastic doctor to address
such questions was the Scottish theologian John Major
(14691550).58 Writing in 1510, Major regarded the Indians of the
New World as being among the natural slaves to which
Aristotle alluded. By implication, then, they were naturally
destined to be ruled by more advanced Europeans. 59 Cardinal
Cajetan opposed this opinion of Major in 151760 as did
Vitoria6 1 and his disciples quite explicitly later.6 2
Suairez was, of course, very much aware of Aristotle's
division of men and the division of sixteenth century Scholastics
55. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, 1254a18-1255a2, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
relative to it.6 3 His own view was simple and direct. It was
incredible, he believed, to say that all the people (homines) in
any region or province have been born "monstrous and in a
way that contradicts the natural disposition" of human beings
to be free. 64 In fact, he believed all men were equally capable
of dominion over themselves and their possessions inasmuch
as all were made in the image of God. 65 No natural law or
positive divine law existed by which some could be excluded from
this privilege, and no conditions were required for dominion
that may not be found in all human beings.6 6
B. The Natural and Yet Voluntary Origin of the State67
Indeed, from the very beginning of the human race in the
Garden of Paradise, man was by nature free.6 8 Had man not
sinned, there would have been no want in Paradise. As a
result, even though one man might in charity have served
another, no one would have been slave to any other. 69 And yet
Suairez affirmed that even if men had remained sinless in the
Garden, some political power to direct and to govern would
have eventually existed. 70 For, as Aristotle well put it, man is
63. For places in which he has referred to it, see SUAREZ, DE JUSTITIA ETJURE,
supra note 52, at 77, question 6; Franciscus Sufirez, S.J., Tractatus de Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no. 2 [hereinafter De Fide]; Sufirez, De
Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, no. 5.
64. SUAREZ, DEJUSTITIA ETJURE, supra note 52, at 77 ("Dicere autem generaliter
in aliqua regione aut provincia omnes homines nasci monstrosos et contra naturalem
dispositionem incredibile est.").
65. See, e.g., id. ("Quia omnes homines sunt ad imaginem Dei facti, ratione cuius
sunt capaces dominii, Gen. 1 (2)."); see also Franciscus Sufirez, S.J., Defensiofidei, in 24
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 203, III, ch. 1, no. 2.
66. SUAREZ, DE JUSTITIA ET JURE, supra note 52, at 77 ("Neque est aliquod jus
naturale vel positivum divinum, quo aliqui sint exclusi. Neque conditiones ullae ad
dominium requiruntur, quae non in omnibus hominibus inveniantur.").
67. For Suirez's teaching on the state, see HEINRICH ROMMEN, LA TEORiA DEL
ESTADO Y DE LA COMMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL EN FRANCISCO SUAREZ (V. Garcia Yebra
trans. from the German, 1951).
68. See SUAREZ, De operesex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 416, V, ch.
7, no. 10 ("libertas est homini naturalis, et magna ejus perfectio"); see also SUAREZ, De
Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 180, III, ch. 2, no. 3.
69. SUAREZ, De operesex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 415, V, ch. 7,
no. 10; id. at 417, no. 16.
70. Id. at 416 n. 1I ("Secundo dicimus, dominium directivum, seu gubernativum
futurum fuisse inter homines in statu innocentiae."); see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 179, III, ch. 1, no. 12. Note however that this power was
not conferred by nature upon any one man, even Adam. See id. at 180, ch. 2, no. 3.
by nature a political animal. 7 ' Thus, coming together into a
city-state was not the result of sin, but was instead essential to
human beings and consonant with their perfection.7 2 In fine,
the state, political authority, governance and subjection were
not punishment for sin but rather arose from nature. 73
Important for this Article is the point that, in such a naturally
emanating state a common rule of faith, in fact a common Church,
would be most fitting. 74 Finally, while a human community as
such has political power naturally, it could exercise it in
different ways voluntarily.7 5
This last thought is uppermost in both the De Legibus and
the Defensio Fidei. At its very origin, Sua'rez believed, the state
is natural but also voluntary.7 6 As Su'trez saw it, free men,
naturally impelled to political association, must nevertheless
agree to it. Accordingly, the state itself arises out of a social
contract, or, better, "a consensus," either explicit or tacit,
freely entered upon by all.7 7 Furthermore, it is the prerogative
of those entering it to limit the contract in greater or lesser
degree. 78 For this reason, men are not forced by nature to
71. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 414, III, ch.
7, no. 5; see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 176, III, ch. 1, no.
3 ("Primum est hominem esse animal sociale et naturaliter recteque appetere in
communitate vivere."); see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 55, 1253a2.
72. SUAREZ, De operesex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 415, V, ch. 7,
no. 6 ("conjunctio hominum in unam civitatem, non per accidens tantum ratione
peccati, aut corruptionis naturae, sed per se convenit homini in quocumque statu, et
ad perfectionem ejus pertinet").
73. Id.; see id. at 416, no. 12.
74. Id. at 415 no. 7 ("Nam oporteret homines habere communem regulam fidei
etiam externam, ut eamdem fidem conservare perpetuo possent, et secundum illam
colere Deum, non solum privatim, sed etiam cultu publico totius communitatis, seu
Ecclesiae. Haec autem ecclesiastica unitas supponit communitatem civilem statui
hominum accommodatam."). For a fuller understanding of this point, see SUAREZ,
De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 331-32, V, ch. 2, nos. 3-4. For much
the same thought, see OBRAS DE VITORIA, supra note 58, at 280, question 4, no. 1.
75. See SUAREZ, De operesex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 416, V, ch.
7, no. 13.
76. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no. 1
("licet haec potestas absolute sit de jure naturae, determinatio ejus ad certum
modurn potestatis et regiminis est ex arbitrio humano" ).
77. SUAREZ, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 414, V, ch. 7,
no. 3; see SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 182-83, III, ch. 3,
nos. 1, 6, 7; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 210, 212, III,
ch. 2, nos. 11-12, 19.
78. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no.
choose any particular form of state, 79 and in fact there are
different kinds of states existing in different regions.80 But,
important for our present purpose, Sufirez believed that there is a
natural equality among all of these states and the political
power they exercise. 8 ' Concretely, this will mean that civil
power, precisely as such, will not be greater in Christian
princes than in pagan princes.8 2
While democracy had a certain natural priority,8" in
practice democracy was not the best kind of government for
Sufrez. Rather, he believed that this label belonged to some
form of monarchy.8 4 What form a monarchy took and how
much power any monarch would have would depend upon the
terms of the initial grant of the people.8 5 In this way, civil
authority or power was ultimately from nature, and nature's God,
but immediately in different ways through the people.8 6
1. ("est major vel minorjuxta varias consuetudines etjudicia hominum: pendet ergo
tota haec res ex humano consilio et arbitrio") .
79. Id. ("Stando ergo in jure naturali non coguntur homines eligere
determinatum unum ex his modis gubernationis.") .
80. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 208, III, ch. 2, no.
81. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 739, disp. 13, § 2,
no. 1 ("in omnibus enim est eadem ratio") .
82. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11, no. 9
("potestas haec ut nunc est in principibus Christianis, in se non est major, nec
alterius naturae quam fuerit in principibus ethnicis"); see id. at 189, ch. 5, no. 7 ("sequitur
reges gentium priusquam ad Ecclesiam veniant esse veros reges, si justo titulo regna
possident" ); see also SUAREZ, De Caritale, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at
740, disp. 13, § 2, no. 4. ("quae omnia, cum in lege naturali fundata sint, communia
sunt Christianis et infidelibus"); id. at 747, § 5, no. 3; SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no. 3 [hereinafter De Fide]; id. at 451, § 5,
no. 8; SUAREZ, Defensio Fidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 348, III, ch. 30, no.
4; Suirez, De Fide I, supra note 30, at 196, disp. 5, question 2.
83. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 208-09, III, § 2,
nos. 8-9. For Suirez's general teaching here, see generally Antonio Alvarez de
Linera, La Democracia en ladoctina de Sudrez, 4 PENSAMIENTO 509 (1948).
84. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 184, III, ch. 4, no.
85. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 212, III, ch. 2,
86. See id. at 211 ("Deus est qui distribuit regna et principatus politicos, sed per
homines, seu consensus populorum, vel aliam similem institutionem humanam."); id.
n.17; SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 435, disp. 25, § 4, no.
C. Limitations on State Power
On a number of occasions, Suirez spoke of the state as
"supreme in its own order."8 7 This means that the state as
such has power to enact laws from which there is no appeal to
any tribunal beyond itself8 s As we shall see, even when Suirez
considered thejus gentium as a law among the nations, it was
not coupled with any notion of a super-government or a world
court to which one might look to overturn a sovereign state's
laws. Yet, the supremacy of a state or a prince was not
Although the people in theory retained power over their
government, Sufirez believed that ordinarily the gift of political
power is all but irrevocable. 90 At the same time, we already
noted the fact that people could transfer political power to a
greater or lesser degree.9 ' In accord with this, as the common
good demands, that power could be in different times and
different circumstances changed or limited.9 2 Connected here is
the mentioned power of the Pope to depose a tyrannical
87. 'E.g., SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 225, III, ch.
5, no. 2; id. at 226 no. 6; id. at 350, ch. 30, no. 11; SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 177, III, ch. 1, no. 6; see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA,
supra note 21, at 443, disp. 18, § 2, no. 6; id. at 449, § 4, no. 3. On the meaning of
"supreme in its own order," see Luis SANCHEZ AGESTA, ESPARJA AL ENCUENTRO DE
EUROPA 96-108 (1971).
88. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 740, disp. 13, § 2,
no. 4 ("signum supremi jurisdictionis est, quando apud talem principem,
rempublicamve, est tribunal, in quo terminantur omnes causae illius principatus, neque
appellatur ad aliud tribunal superius") .
89. For Suirez's general doctrine here, see Georges Jarlot, Les idees politiques de
Suarez et lepouvoir absolu, in 18 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE, cahier 1, at 64 (1949). For
reference to the Spanish encounter with the peoples of the New World, see id. at 71
72. At this place, I note that Suirez explicitly opposed the doctrines of Machiavelli.
See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 215, III, ch. 12, no. 2.
90. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 186-87, III, ch. 4,
nos. 6, 11.
91. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see infra note 92 and accompanying
92. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 216, III, ch. 3,
no. 13 ("Potestas autem regia vel cujusvis supremi tribunalis temporalis, potuit a
principio major vel minor constitui, et successu temporum poterit mutari aut minui,
prout ad bonum commune expediens fuerit, per eum qui ad hoc habuerit
potestatem."). In context, the one "who would have power for this" is the Pope. See
SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 183-84, lII, ch. 3, nos. 7-8.
93. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 183-84, III, ch. 3,
Other limitations occurred inasmuch as state power
stopped short of the private zone of families and individuals,9 4
for these are by nature prior to the state.95 Moreover, human
beings are not just citizens of this world. While not denying a
republic's legitimate concern for the virtue of its members,
Sua'rez suggested that even at a natural level, each person aims
at a final happiness that transcends the reach of civil power and
civil laws.9 6 And beyond this natural destiny, in fact God gave
men a supernatural revelation and a Church, through which
He called all to a supernatural goal of union with Himself.9 7
Much less, then, will state power and laws reach to this level of
human reality. 98 An example of this limitation is furnished by
Sua'rez's dismissal of any right of Christian temporal rulers to
forcibly baptize the children of non-apostate unbelievers,
whether these are politically subject to them or not.99 At the
same time, he did think that Christian lawgivers could, and in
part should, look to the supernatural destiny of men and
should relate their very activity of lawmaking to it. 0 0 In
agreenos. 7-8; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. For Suirez's view on the
deposition and execution of tyrants, see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 675-82, VI, ch. 4.
94. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11,
no. 8 ("Potestas autem civilis per se ordinatur ad gubernationem politicam, . . . et
ideo per se non dirigit oeconomicum regimen, nisi in his quae redundant in
commune bonum civitatis, et illud possunt impedire aut promovere: reliqua enim quae
ad privatam familiam spectant, non per leges civiles, sed per uniuscujusque
patrisfamilias prudentiam ordinantur. Ergo simili proportione ac ratione non spectat ad
leges civiles monastica directio, seu privata honestas singulorum, ut tales sunt, sed
solum ea morum rectitudo per has leges constituitur, quae bono civili vel necessaria,
vel valde utilis est."); see also SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21,
at 436, disp. 25, § 4, no. 6.
95. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 176, III, ch. 1,no.
96. Id. at 214, ch. 11, no. 8 ("Ad felicitatem autem etiam naturalem
uniuscujusque hominis, ut singularis persona est, non sufficit virtus illa civilis .... ergo non
spectat felicitas privata ad finem proprium legis civilis seu potestatis legislativae mere
97. On the distinction between natural and supernatural happiness as the goal
of human existence, see SUAREZ, SJ., De ultimofine hominis, in 4 OPERA OMNIA, supra
note 21, at 43-44, disp. 4, § 3, nos. 1-4.
98. See SUAREZ, De Legibus in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, III, ch. 11,
no. 9 ("dico potestatem hanc civilem ... non extendi in materia vel actibus suis ad
finem supernaturalem seu spiritualem vitae futurae vel praesentis").
99. SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 435, disp. 25, § 4,
100. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 214, 111, ch. 11, no.
ment with this, on a number of occasions he assigned a
"ministerial" role to civil power with respect to the higher order of
Christian life and religion. 10 '
This last brings us to the question of Church and state.
For Suirez, as we have seen, while temporal power was
ultimately from God, immediately its origin was natural and
human.10 2 In contrast, the power of the Church was directly of
divine origin, "from the special promise and grant of
Christ." 10 3 Although there were in fact many temporal states
throughout the world, there is only one Church. 0 4 Between
any state and the Church there was a clear difference of
purpose. While the end of a state is the common temporal good,
which Sua'rez called "political happiness" and which does
involve the natural moral goodness of its members, 10 5 the end of
Church power is the eternal salvation of its members.10 6
Although each is "supreme in its own order,"' l0 7 the
fundamental relation between the two is hierarchical. According to
Suirez, just as the body is to the soul, so the temporal state
should be subordinate to the Church. 08 The power of the
state was directly and exclusively within the temporal order. 0 9
9 ("licet ipsi legislatores fideles in suis legibus ferendis, intueri possint et ex parte
debeant supernaturalem finem, et actum ipsum ferendi legem in supernaturalem
101. See, e.g., SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 438,
disp. 25, § 4, no. 10; SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 455, disp.
18, § 5, no. 9; SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 205, III, ch.
1, no. 7.
102. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 236, III, ch.
6, no. 17 ("potestas ecclesiastica est de jure divino positivo, et ex speciali
promissione et concessione Christi"); id. at 239, ch. 7, no. 4.
104. See id. at 228, III, ch. 5, no. 11; id. at 234, ch. 6, no. 11.
105. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 55, I, ch. 13, no. 7
("finis humanae reipublicae est vera felicitas politica, quae sine moribus honestis esse
non potest"); id. at 30, ch. 7, no. 4. On the end of the state, see ROMMEN, supra note
67, at 201-24.
106. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 236-37, III,
ch. 6, no. 17 ("Potestas autem ecclesiastica ad aeternam salutem consequendam
ordinatur"); see also SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 362, IV,
ch. 8, no. 2.
107. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 350, III, ch.
30, no. 11.
108. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 366, IV, ch. 9,
no. 3 ("ergo necesse est ut ei subdatur temporalis potestas, sicut corpus animae").
109. Id. at 223, III, ch. 13, no. 3.
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
That of the Church is directly within the spiritual order.1 10
Indirectly, however, the Church had power over a Christian state
even in temporal matters."' Conversely, civil power, at least
in Christian states, should be indirectly dependent upon and at
the service of the higher goal of the Church." 2 Suirez
acknowledged in this a certain inequality between Christian and
infidel princes inasmuch as the latter are not in principle
subject even indirectly to the Church. However, he considered it a
plus for Christian states and sovereigns that their power is
raised to a new height in its subordination to the Church."'
Yet another limitation on the power of the temporal state
came from the existence of other states. As each was
''supreme in its own order," none had an unconditioned right
to encroach upon another. The power and laws of one end
where those of another begin." 14
D. The Jus Gentium or The Law of Nations 115
1. Some Background
Despite their diversity, states, to Sufirez, were not so
independent or exclusive of one another as to be subject to no
common law. Instead, he believed that however much it is
divided into various peoples and kingdoms, the human race itself
had a unity that was not only specific but also "quasi-political
and moral." ' 1 6 An indication of this was a natural impulse,
110. Id. at 366, IV, ch. 9, no. 3.
111. d. at 192-93, III, ch. 6, nos. 3-4; see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 309-10, III, ch. 22, nos. 5-7.
112. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 224-25, III,
ch. 5, no. 2; id. at 351, ch. 30, no. 11; see also supra note 101 and accompanying text.
113. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 348-49, III,
ch. 30, no. 5 ("[e]t non est imperfectio, sed potius excellentia illius potestatis,
ideoque non addit gravamen vel impedimentum"); id. at 349, nos. 3-6.
114. See SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 300, III, ch. 31,
no. 8; id. at 301, ch. 32, no. 4.
115. On this subject, the best overall treatment I know is SANTIAGO RAMiREZ,
O.P., EL DERECHO DE GENTES: EXAMEN CRiTICO DE LA FILOSOFiA DEL DERECHO DE
GENTES DESDE ARISTOTELES HASTA FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1955). Santiago Ramirez's
treatment of Suirez at pages 172-78, however, is rather brief and I think too critical.
For a fuller and more laudatory view of Suirez here, see ROMMEN, supra note 67, at
116. SUAREZ, De Legibus, in 5 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 169, II, ch. 19, no. 9
genus quantumvis in varios populos et regna divisum, semper
unitatem non solum specificam, sed etiam quasi politicam et
The second opinion held that the Church or Christian
princes could compel unbelievers subject to them to accept the
faith. This opinion was held principally by Duns Scotus in IV
Sentences, disputation 4, question 6. It is founded initially on
the arguments supporting the first opinion. To this could be
added the example of the practice of the Church-in the case
of Spain. Spanish kings have used this power. For example,
Ferdinand forced the Moors to accept the Christian faith, and
King Sisebutus did the same centuries earlier with the Jews.
And for that, this latter king was praised at the Fourth Council
of Toledo in the year 633 (chapter 56) and is referred to in the
Decretum Gratiani (chapter DeJudaeis,dist. 45), as well as in the
Decretales GregoriiIX (chapter Majores, para. ult. De Baptismo). In
other places also this opinion is favored. 28 9
For this second opinion, a particular argument could be
added as regards subject unbelievers. Advocates contend that
this coercion does not contradict the faith, and the Church
lacks neither the power (potestas) nor a reason to coerce such
unbelievers. That such coercion is not contradictory of the
faith would thus be proven from the example of heretics whom
the Church had forced to adopt the faith. That that power
would not be lacking is proven inasmuch as such unbelievers
were here supposed to be subjects of Christian princes, who
then would have power to force them, especially in matters
necessary for their salvation. Again, a lower prince could force
a subject to obey the law of a higher prince-in this case the
law of the heavenly Prince. A prince could force his subjects
not to blaspheme the Christian religion or to do any injury to
it, but these unbelievers by not believing would then be
blaspheming the faith proposed to them, and could be
punished and forced to convert. Also, those supporting this
position expected many good results from coercion, either for the
289. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 2. For the authorities cited, see 1 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI 161-62 (Aemilius
Friedberg ed., 1879-81) (citing Decretum Gratiani,DeJudaeis,I, disp. 45, ch. 5); 2 id. at
646 (citing Decretales Gregorii IX, Majores, lib. 3, tit. 42, ch. 3); J.D. MANSI, 10
SACRORUM CONCILIORUM NOVA COLLECTIO 633 (1759) (citing CONCILIUM
TOLENTANUM IV). For Ferdinand's order of March 14, 1502 forcing the Moors to
choose between conversion and expulsion, as well as for treatment of the Moors in
Spain in the sixteenth century, see Rafael Benitez Sinchez-Blanco & Eugenio Ciscar
Pallar~s, La Iglesia ante la conversidn y la expulsidn de los moriscos, in 4 HISTORIA DE LA
IGLESIA EN ESPAI&A, supra note 251, at 253-307.
parents or children and generations to come. Accordingly, the
argument here was that it is better for these unbelievers even
to feign a conversion to Christianity rather than remain in
worse error.2 90
The third opinion was common among theologians and
was also Suirez's own view. Under this view, non-apostate
unbelievers, whether subjects or non-subjects, could not be
forced to accept the faith, even though it might have been
sufficiently proposed to them. 29' This was the position of Thomas
Aquinas2 92 and also, among others, of Vitoria, in his
Relectio(nes) de Indis. Suirez explained it through its parts: first as
regards non-subject unbelievers and then with regard to those
who are subject. Again, he first spoke about direct coercion
and then about indirect coercion.293
It was, he said, intrinsically evil to force non-subject
unbelievers to accept the Christian faith. Such coercion, he
believed, could not be employed without legitimate power
(potestas)-otherwise, any act of violence could be justified. The
Church, however, did not have legitimate power with regard to
these unbelievers, because Christ did not give it such power.
Had he granted power to force these unbelievers to hear the
faith, he certainly did not grant power to force them to accept
it. Secondly, this could be proven by "negative
authority"for neither in the tradition and practice of the Church nor in
Scripture is there any evidence of such power. For that
passage of Luke, "Compel them to enter," has a quite different
sense, which we will see below. Third, Suirez thought it could
be proven positively from the words of St. Paul: "What to me
are those who are outside? For God will judge them. '2"9 4 This
doubtless is because they are not subject to Christian
jurisdiction, which is the way Pope Innocent III in the Decretals
(chap290. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 444, disp. 18, § 3,
291. Id. at 445 n.4 ("Nihilominus tertia et communis sententia Theologorum
est, infideles non apostatas, tam subditos quam non subditos, ad fidem suscipiendam
cogi non posse, etiamsi sufficientem illius propositionem habuerint.") ; see
SUAREZ, De Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 429, disp. 25, § 3, no. 1.
292. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, 111, question 10,
arts. 8, 12.
293. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3, no.
294. 1 Corinthians 5:12-13.
ters Majores and Gaudemus) understood it. Also the Council of
Trent, Session fourteen, chapter two, has said: "The Church
exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered by
baptism. "295 Again, Christ, in Matthew, instructed the Apostles
that they should not carry a staff or a sword-in which place St.
Jerome noted that he prohibited instruments of coercion and
taught peace.2 96 And at the end of the same passage, Christ
said: "To those who do not receive you it will be requited on
the day of judgment, "297 signifying that God reserved
punishment of this sin for Himself.
The same thing is proven according to Suirez on the basis
of canon law. This coercion was prohibited with respect to the
Jews in the Decretals (chapter Sicut Judaei) and in the Decretum
(chapters Sincere and deJudaeis, dist. 45). And in the Decretals
(chapter Majores), about Baptism, it is said to be against the
Christian religion. If this power had been given by Christ,
reasoned Suirez, it would not be found immediately in temporal
princes but in the bishops and the popes. But these have not
said that they have such power nor have they ever used it.298
Finally, argued Suirez, this way of drawing men to the
faith was not fitting. Instead, much more appropriately, the
first acceptance and profession of the faith should be
completely spontaneous. This should be so that the efficacy of the
divine word and the grace of God might be shown in this work.
It is especially the work of God, as Christ has said, and
therefore St. Paul has said: "The weapons of this army are not
carnal."2 99 Again, that way of coercion is exposed to many
disadvantages. Most likely it would lead to many simulated
conversions and innumerable sacrileges. Moreover, the unbelievers
would be scandalized and they would blaspheme the Christian
religion, if they were forced into it.3 0 0
That the Church has no special supernatural power
regarding non-subject unbelievers needs no proof here-for he
is supposing that they are not its subjects. Therefore, it has no
other power over them. For in Sufirez's view, there existed no
other power immediately from God, or as a right of nature.
Instead, he considered all temporal power in human republics
to be by means of human convention and the jus gentium.
Hence no republic or prince had this power with respect to
foreigners, but only with respect to members of that republic.
These unbelievers not only were not members of the Church,
but were also supposed not to be members of any civil republic
subject to a Christian prince. Therefore, no temporal power of
Christians extended to them.3 0 '
Nor could the Church directly coerce unbelievers
temporally subject to it to accept the faith. Such direct coercion
required power and jurisdiction, and from what has been said it
is evident that the Church does not have such jurisdiction.
The Church is not forbidden to have civil power over these
subject unbelievers, for they could be members of a civil
republic over which the Church might exercise such power, such
as in the case of the Papal States. Nevertheless, to Suirez that
power did not extend to punishing subjects for the sin of not
accepting the faith if it has been sufficiently proposed to
them. °2 Suirez believed that power as it is given immediately
to men is ordained only for such natural ends as peace in the
republic and the natural justice and honesty compatible with
that, but that this sin of infidelity is altogether outside that
or300. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 446, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 6. For allusions to dissembling on the part of "new Christians," see SUAREZ, De
Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 440-41, disp. 25, § 5, nos. 3-4. For
other references to this verse of Corinthians, see supra note 247 and accompanying
301. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18, § 3,
no. 6; Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 201-02, disp. 5, question 2.
302. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 446, disp. 18, § 3, no.
7 ("nihilominus tamen illa potestas non extenditur ad hunc actum puniendi subditos
propter peccatum non suscipiendi fidem ipsis sufficienter propositam" ).
der and end.3 °3
Nevertheless, indirect coercion to accept the Faith is not
intrinsically evil, Sua'rez believed, if it is done with proper
limitations. Coercion is indirect when a right abridged or a
punishment suffered under one title, or on account of one fault, is
secondarily ordered by the one inflicting that punishment to
induce the one receiving it to do something else. But in the
present case there is power to punish or to coerce for some
just end, and to Suarez the other secondary end of conversion
to the faith is not bad; indeed of itself it is good. Therefore,
also that indirect coercion of itself is not bad but indeed it can
be good. °4
The question now is with what limitations should indirect
coercion be employed. Suirez found two. One is that in
imposing the burden, or in inflicting evil, one must not overstep
the bounds ofjustice. So, for example, a tribute or a penalty
may be increased for just reason up to a certain point, beyond
which it would become excessive. Similarly, Catholic princes
could, if they have just reason, exclude unbelievers from their
kingdom-for example, if they were harming the faithful. Or,
if they were conquered in a just war, they might by that title be
expelled and, as it were, punished by exile. Or if they were
guests or travelers, they might be denied permanent residence.
In such cases a Christian prince could refuse to permit
unbelievers to dwell in his kingdom, unless they were converted,
and then that would be a kind of indirect coercion. However,
it was necessary in all cases that the exclusion or expulsion be
for just reason. 05
A second necessary condition was that the outcome of
conversion be pursued prudently. This coercion, even though
indirect, carries with it the danger of false conversion.
Therefore, one must completely avoid admitting these unbelievers to
the faith, or to the Sacraments, without sufficient examination
and the moral certitude that the conversion is real. But care for
this belongs more to the pastors of the Church than to
tempo303. Id. at 446-47 ("quia ilia potestas sicut est proxime ab hominibus, ita solum
ordinatur ad naturalem finem, et praesertim ad servandam pacem reipublicae, et
naturalem justitiam, ac honestatem ad ilium finem convenientem. At vero illud
peccatum infidelitatis est omnino extra ilium ordinem et finem . ) .
304. Id. at 447, no. 8.
305. Id. no. 9.
ral princes.3 0 6
At this point, Suirez replied to the arguments of those
who said it is licit to force unbelievers to the faith. Their first
argument was taken from Christ's words: "Compel them to
enter." Suirez believes the correct interpretation of this to be
that these words refer to the situation at the end of the
worldwhen those who are left will be compelled by signs and
miracles and by the efficacy of the word of God. Their second
argument is taken from the power to punish sins. To this Suirez
replied that God did not give anyone power to punish all the
sins of others, or else the human race could not be governed in
peace and justice. Instead, he said, God reserved some
matters for his own judgment, and that among these was infidelity.
To the argument that forced conversion would result in those
coming after being more easily and more faithfully converted,
his reply was that one should not do evil to gain a good result.
But he also believed that experience shows that through
coercion that result is not achieved-indeed, just the opposite
happens. 30 7
Turning to the arguments of the second opinion, Sua'rez
answered as follows. In these arguments, the best examples
adduced of the kings of Spain concerned indirect compulsion
employed with a just title, such as it was employed by their
Catholic Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella. As regards King
Sisebutus, who apparently acted to excess, what was praised
was his intention but not his deed. To the argument about a
superior law: this would be true with respect to subjects if
there were a commission from a supreme prince. Here,
however, Sua'rez noted that God had not committed such power to
men. Finally, he believed, it was not enough to present faith as
evidently credible; in order to justify coercion, there was also
required empowerment, which would be lacking in this case. 08
306. Id.; see Suirez, De Fide M, supra note 30, at 192, disp. 5, question 1. For
more on what Suirez required of evangelists, see SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 135, disp. 4, § 5, no. 10.
307. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 448, disp. 18, § 3, no.
308. Id. no. 13.
936 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
D. May Infidels Be Forced to Abandon Their Errors or Their False
Religious Practices When These Are Contrary Not Only to
the Faith but Also to Reason? 30 9
Sua'rez's question at this point presupposes an earlier
division of the subject matter of faith.3 t0 One part related to
entirely supernatural mysteries while the other related to things
naturally knowable. Coinciding with this division, infidelity
was twofold: a person could disbelieve only supernatural
truths or he could also disbelieve matters naturally knowable.
Up to this point, Sulirez had treated only the first kind of
infidelity. But now he considered the second as well. More
precisely, the question is whether unbelievers could be forced to
believe that which is reasonably right, or right merely on the
basis of human, as opposed to divine, faith. Coupled with this
was the question of whether unbelievers could be forced to
abandon external religious rites, such as idolatry, which are
contrary to that. Once more, the distinction between
unbelievers who are temporally subject and those who are not so
subject applies.3 1 '
In his answer, Sua'rez stated that Major and Sepfilveda had
argued that non-subject pagans could be forced to worship
one God and to abandon idolatrous rites. If they were
unwilling, they could be justly punished and deprived of their liberty
and their kingdoms. The basis of this argument was that a
Christian republic could defend the honor of God and impede
and avenge blasphemies against God. Major and Sepfilveda
supported this argument with a reference to Thomas
Aquinas, 3 12 but they also offered an argument from reason. One
man could rightly defend the honor or the life of another, and
therefore, much more could a man defend the honor of
God. 3 This rule applied particularly if pagans were
sacrificing adults and children to their gods; they could be forced to
stop, at least for the reason of a "defense of innocents."
309. Id. at 448, § 4 ("Utrum infideles cogi possint ut errores suos vel falsos ritus,
non solum fidei, sed etiam rationi contrarios, derelinquant.") .
310. Id. at 429, disp. 17, § 2, no. 1.
311. Id. at 448-49, disp. 18, § 4, no. 1.
312. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-I1, question 94,
art. 3, ad. 1.
313. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no.
Therefore, Christian princes could do the same with respect to
any pagans for the reason of a defense of God's honor. 314
Finally, they held, certain peoples are so barbarous and so
illadapted to gaining knowledge of God by themselves that they
seem as it were by nature born to slavery, as Aristotle said.
Therefore, particularly on this account, they could be coerced
to a true knowledge of God and good morals. 5
In common with that of most other theologians, Suarez's
own reply to the question of forcing non-subject unbelievers to
abandon their errors was negative. A persuasive argument for
this might be taken, he thought, from the fact that God did not
permit the Israelites to war on the inhabitants of the Promised
Land because of their idolatry, but rather because of the injury
of their refusing peaceful transit through their territory. From
this, he said, there follows a general rule, which would
preclude an otherwise unmerited forcing of non-subject
unbelievers to abandon their idolatry: "it is not lawful for any prince to
make war 'on these nations,' except to repel or to avenge an
injury done by them to him or his people. 3 1 6
The reasoning then is the same as that touched upon
above. To Suirez, there was in the Church no jurisdiction over
these non-subject unbelievers, and coercion or punishment
without jurisdiction was not just. Therefore, even as one
private person could not punish or coerce another private person,
or one Christian king punish or coerce another, or one
unbelieving king punish or coerce another, so neither could the
Church punish an unbelieving republic, which is "in its own
314. Id. ("Confirmatur primo, quia si gentiles sacrificent homines vel infantes
Diis suis, possunt cogi ne id faciant, saltem propter defensionem innocentium; ergo
idem facere principes christiani respectu quorumcumque gentilium, propter
defensionem honoris Dei.") .
315. Id. ("Denique confirmatur, quia quaedam gentes sunt ita barbarae et
ineptae ad Dei cognitionem per se obtinendam, ut videantur quasi a natura genitae ad
servitutem, ut dixit Aristoteles, I Polit., cap. 1 et 3; ergo vel hoc titulo cogi possunt
ad veram cognitionem et honestos mores.") [768-69]. Note Suirez's hesitation here
in stating an opinion that he himself will reject. With his use of "quasi" and
"videantur," he appears to suggest that Major and Sepfilveda did not really believe what they
316. Id. n.3 ("[U]nde ibi colligitur generalis regula, non esse licitum principi
bellum facere his nationibus, nisi ad propulsandam vel vindicandam injuriam sibi aut
suis factam; ergo sola ratio tollendi idolatriam non est sufficiens ad justam
coactionem.") ; see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 743,
disp. 13, § 4, no. 1; id. at 747, § 5,no. 2.
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJO URNAL [Vol. 15:879
order supreme," on account of the republic's transgressions,
despite the fact that these may be against natural reason.' 1 7
It is hardly relevant that such transgressions could be
against God. For, as noted earlier, God did not set men up as
judges to avenge injuries to Him in all things with respect to all
men. Instead, in this He wished to preserve an order.
Accordingly, said Sua'rez, so that subjects would obey their princes
and lest otherwise greater evils would follow, God reserved for
himself judgment of supreme princes even in these matters
which belong to the natural order.3 t8
To the argument of Major and Septilveda about
blasphemy, Suairez replied that although idolatry is not properly
blasphemy, an occasion for a just war could arise from
blasphemy in some circumstances. This might be, for example,
when these non-subject unbelievers blaspheme not just God,
but do so in contempt of the Church, and injure Christians in
the process.31 9 Likewise, Christian princes need not be
defending God's honor to prevent human sacrifices. For to
intervene and wage war on this count, it is enough "to be defending
innocent persons. ' 's32 That is to say, in order to prevent these
unbelievers from sacrificing children to their gods, to wage war
would be lawful as a matter of charity-indeed, it was a
com317. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 449, disp. 18, § 4, no.
3. Suirez stated:
mand, if it could be done successfully.3 2 ' Suirez added that
this may be done not only to liberate children, but also
adults-even if they themselves consented and wished to be
sacrificed to idols. For in this, he thought, these adults were
worse than madmen. Moreover, to Sua'rez they were not the
lords of their own lives, for which reason anyone could be
constrained by another not to kill himself.3 22
A limitation on this power, he said, was that it applied only
when the killings are unjust. For if these unbelievers
customarily sacrificed to their idols only criminals justly condemned to
death, Sua'rez believed, they could not be compelled to desist
on the basis of that alone. While such a custom might be a sin
of idolatry it would not be a sin against justice, and so the
"defense of the innocent" reason would not be present3. 2 3
As for Aristotle's dictum about natural 'slaves, this would
be appropriate, Suarez said, if there were men so uncivilized
that they would not dwell together in one republic and could
not be governed. For then, not by any title of religion, but by a
title, so to speak, of "defense of human nature," they could be
forced into some polity. Up to that time, however, Suirez
thought, people so barbarous had not been found. 2 4
In the De Caritate, he had gone farther, or at least into
slightly more detail. Thus, in the context of asking whether
321. Id. at 449-50 ("nam ad defendendos innocentes, licitum est vim inferre his
infidelibus, ne sacrificent infantes Diis suis, quia hoc juxta ordinem charitatis licet,
imo praeceptum est, si commode fieri possit") ; see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12
OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5, nos. 2-3; Suirez, De Fide II, supra
note 30, at 204, disp. 5, question 2 (referring also to cannibalism).
322. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
4 ("Addo etiam id fieri posse non solum ad liberandos infantes, sed etiam adultos,
etiamsi ipsi consentiant et velint sacrificari idolis, quia in hoc pejores quam amentes
sunt, et quia non sunt domini propriae vitae, propter quod quilibet potest ab alio
cogi ne se occidat.") ; Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 204, disp. 5, question
323. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
4 ("Limitandum autem hoc est, quando talis occisio est injusta; nam si infideles
haberent consuetudinem sacrificandi idolis solos malefactores juste damnatos ad
mortem, non possent illo solo titulo compelli; quia in eo non contra justitiam, sed
tantum contra religionem peccant, et ita cessat defensio innocentis.") .
324. Id. no. 5 ("Dictum vero Aristotelis . . . haberet locum, si essent aliqui
homines adeo rudes, ut nec in unam rempublicam convenirent, nec possent
gubernari; tunc enim non titulo religionis, sed titulo, ut ita dicam, defensionis
humanae naturae ad aliquam politiam compelli; hactenus tamen, ut existimo, tam
barbarae gentes inventae non sunt.") .
Christians could make war upon barbarian unbelievers, under
the title that they were "by nature slaves" who should be ruled
by wiser men, Sufirez said:
This title cannot be general, first, because it is evident that
many infidels are more naturally gifted and more adapted
for political affairs than are Christians. Second, in order
that this title have validity, it is not enough to think that
some nation has inferior natural talent. Rather it must be so
miserable that it ordinarily lives more in the manner of
beasts than of men-such as they are said to be who,
inasmuch as they have no human polity, go about completely
naked, eat human flesh, etc. And if there are any
suchthey can be warred against-not so that they may be killed,
but that they may be educated in a human way, and they
may be ruled with justice. Rarely, however, or never should
such a claim be admitted, except where innocent people are
being killed and similar injuries are taking place. 2 5
Sufirez never identified by name the non-subject infidels
he had in mind when he wrote this in 1584. But of the passage
quoted three things may be said. First, Suairez seemed loathe
to admit a situation that would be at complete variance from
what we have already witnessed him say is the natural
condition of mankind, i.e., its coming together in political societies.
Second, if such a situation did exist, any right that it could
engender to enforce the natural law would not be proper to
Christians but would be shared by every ruler who would want
to do so. 326 And, third, any motive of simply getting out to the
325. SUAREZ, De Caritate, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 747, disp. 13, § 5,
no. 5. The original reads:
At enim hic titulus primum non potest esse generalis, nam evidens est
multos esse infideles ingeniosiores fidelibus, et aptiores ad res politicas.
Secundo, ut hic titulus habeat locum, non satis est existimare aliquam
nationem esse ingenio inferiorem, sed esse ita inopem, ut regulariter potius
ferarum more quam hominum vivat, quales dicuntur ii qui, cum nullam
habeant humanam politiam, nudi prorsus incedunt, carnibus vescuntur
humanis, etc. Et si qui tales sunt, debellari poterunt, non ut interficiantur,
sed ut humano modo instituantur, et juste regantur. Raro tamen aut
nunquam admittendus est talis titulus, nisi ubi intercedunt occisiones hominum
innocentium, et similes injuriae ....
Id. [825-26] On the rarity of obligation connected with the "defense of the
innocent" title itself, which seldom can be pursued without a costly war, see Suirez, De
Fide II, supra note 30, at 205, disp. 5, question 2.
326. SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5,
no. 5 ("intelligitur hunc titulum, si quis est, non esse proprium Christianorum; sed
New World and civilizing "savages" hardly appealed to Suirez
as a just reason for making war. Again, for war some injury to
Christians on the part of those barbarian infidels was obviously
necessary-which injury, as is also obvious, could be supplied
by their resistance to the Gospel.
But what of subject unbelievers? These, he believed, could
be forced by Christian princes to profess a (natural) worship of
the true God and to abjure errors which, beyond being
contrary to the faith, are also against the order of natural reason.
This is what Thomas Aquinas and other theologians believed,
and, Sufirez thought, it could be supported from Scripture. 27
Again, this could be shown, he believed, from the practice of
the Church. Christian emperors, given the opportunity,
followed this practice, as did, for instance, Constantine,
Jovinianus, Justinian, and Theodosius. This was further approved by
St. Augustine and St. Ambrose and many Church councils,
such as those in Africa and in Spain. 28
But in Sufirez's view it was also confirmed by reason. For
the princes in question had jurisdiction over these subject
unbelievers and such coercion did not exceed that jurisdiction.
This last was proven because by reason and by natural law, it
was appropriate that a true worship of God be preserved
within the republic. Therefore, he reasoned, there is in the
republic directive power to govern men to that end. Equally, the
republic has coercive power to punish contrary transgressions.
For directive power is inefficacious and of little use (outside
the Garden of Paradise) without coercive power. But this
power, insofar as it is natural, resides in Christian princes as
well. To be sure, he believed it to be in accord with the
ultimately divine origin of power in the state, that it has been
granted especially as ordered toward the honor and worship of
the one God, whose ministers then, as St. Paul said, all human
eumdem pertinere ad omnem regem, qui velit servare legem naturae, ex qua praecise
considerata hic titulus oritur") .
327. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OMNIA OPERA, supra note 21, at 450, disp. 18, § 4, no.
6 ("et probari potest primo ex Deuteronom., decimotertio, ubi Deus praecipit
interfici hujusmodi infideles propter talia delicta, nimirum quando sunt aliquo modo
subjecti .... ) . See Deuteronomy 13:12-16.
328. Id. no, 6. For Suirez's sources here, see Suirez, De FideI, supra note 30, at
196, disp. 5, question 2; id. nn. hz, ia, ib, ih, ii, il(editor's notes).
princes are.3 29 To Sufirez,
[t]his is confirmed inasmuch as the purpose of this power is
to keep the republic in peace and justice, which cannot be
done unless it is brought to live in accord with virtue. But
men cannot live according to moral and natural virtue
without true religion and the worship of the one God.
Therefore, the natural power and jurisdiction of a human republic
extends also to this end.33 °
The first inference from this doctrine is that even a pagan
(ethnicus) king, if he has knowledge of the one God, could
pressure (cogere) his subjects toward believing in the same, either by
their own reasoning or, if they are incapable of that, by their
putting human faith in those wiser than themselves.
Consequently, he could force them to forego their idols as well as
their superstitions contrary to natural reason. 33' This is
because in such a king there would be the whole power, which
according to natural reason belongs to a human republic.332
Second, to Suirez it followed that princes of this kind not only
could, but were obliged to use their power in this way, which is
in line with its purpose and for the good of their subjects.
Further, he said, it followed that this obligation was greater in
Christian princes, because they have a greater knowledge of
the truth, and in Christian kingdoms this coercion was more
necessary for the good of the faithful themselves. Hence, to
Sufirez, Christian princes were obliged to enact laws
prohibiting transgressions of this kind, because in orderly fashion they
could not punish these unless first they prohibited them with
329. Romans 13:4, 13:6; see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note
21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no. 6.
330. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 450-51, disp. 18, § 4,
no. 7. The original reads:
Et confirmatur, nam finis hujus potestatis est continere rempublicam in pace
etjustitia, quod fieri non potest, nisi etiam inducatur ut secundum virtutem
vivat; non possunt autem honines vivere secundum virtutem moralem et
naturalem, sine vera religione et cultu unius Dei; ergo potestas naturalis et
jurisdictio reipublicae humanae etiam ad hunc finem extenditur.
Id. ; see Suirez, De Fide II, supra note 30, at 196, disp. 5, question 2.
331. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.
8; see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748, disp. 13, § 5, no.
332. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.
8 ("Probatur, quia in tali rege est tota potestas, quae secundum rationem naturalem
humanae reipublicae convenit.") .
Should then the religious rites of unbelievers be tolerated
under Christian rule? With regard to this question, Sua'rez
followed Thomas Aquinas and distinguished two kinds of infidel
rites. 3 34 Some-for example, idolatry-were against natural
reason and against God, as He is known by the natural light.
(One easily thinks also of the human sacrifices connected with
the religion of the Aztecs.) Others were, indeed, superstitious
in comparison with the Christian faith, but not, however,
intrinsically evil or contrary to natural reason. Sua'rez mentions
here "the rites of the Jews and perhaps many rites of the
Saracens." He saw no room for tolerance for the first kind of
rites, because he thought in such tolerance there was no
benefit either for the infidels or for the republic. However, there
were, he felt, cases in which Christian princes, unable to root
out such practices without great loss to the kingdom and to
other Christian subjects, could look the other way and permit
them. This, he said, had a basis in the words of Christ: "Let
the cockle grow along with the wheat, etc."'' Also, he said,
the Church for this reason tolerated serious sins among the
faithful themselves, lest greater troubles follow; for prudence
teaches that, of many evils, the lesser should be chosen. And
charity demands that correction not take place without effect;
therefore, much less, should coercion take place when it comes
with greater damage.3 36
With respect to rites opposed not to natural law and
reason but only to the Christian faith, Sufirez thought that even
unbelievers subject to Christian rule should not be forced to
abandon them because such rites were not intrinsically evil
under natural law. Hence, the power of a temporal prince did
not extend directly to their prohibition. The only reason to
prohibit them would have been that they were contrary to the
faith. But this is not reason enough with respect to these
unbe333. Id. Also see SUAREZ, De Caritate,in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 748,
disp. 13, § 5, no. 7, for the defense of innocents and the avenging of injuries as
belonging in a special way to Christian princes.
334. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-LI, question 10,
335. Matthew 13:29.
336. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4,
no. 9; Suirez, De Fide 11, supra note 30, at 199-201, disp. 5, question 2.
lievers, who are not subject to the spiritual power of the
Church. 3 7
E. May Those Infidels Be Dispossessedof All Power Which They
Have Over Faithful Christians?3 .
The question here principally concerns the political power
of rulers, and it goes to the heart of the Spanish conquest of
the New World. Again, it can be discussed with respect to
rulers subject and non-subject to the spiritual power of the
Church. Also in both, subject and non-subject, distinction can
be made as regards the deprivation of this power. This
deprivation can be direct because of the infidelity of the rulers
themselves or indirect because of the faith of their subjects. 3 9
First, with regard to unbelieving princes, a number of
whose subjects are converted to the faith, Suirez said that they
could not be directly deprived by the Church of their power and
jurisdiction over those Christian subjects. This view, he said,
was common, and taken especially from Thomas Aquinas.34 °
The reasoning is as follows. Either those princes could be
deprived of their power because now de facto by divine law they
would not have it, or, even though they do have it, they could
be justly stripped of it because of their unbelief. But neither of
these can be said.34 '
It is most certain to Sua'rez that these princes could not be
deprived of this jurisdiction for the reason that defacto by
divine law they do not have it. This was proven, he said, in the
Defensio Fidei. Briefly, the reasoning was that Christ did not
deprive these princes of this power. Neither did the fact of
baptism exempt a Christian from the power of his king, even
though that king might be an infidel. Anything else would be
337. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 451, disp. 18, § 4, no.
338. Id. at 452, § 5 ("Utrum isti infideles privari possint omni superiori
potestate, quam habent in Christianos seu fideles.") .
339. Id. no. 1.
340. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, supra note 56, II-II, question 10,
341. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
4 ("Fundamentum hujus veritatis est, quia vel isti principes possunt privari de facto
hac jurisdictione et potestate, quia ipso jure divino illam non habent, vel quia, licet
illam habeant, propter infidelitatem sunt ilia indigni, et ideo juste possunt ab ilia
dejici; neutrum autem horum dici potest") .
against Scripture and the tradition of the Church. 4 2
For Suarez, the best philosophical argument for this
position was that given by Thomas Aquinas. Political power, it was
argued, arose ultimately from natural law and thejus gentium,
but faith derived from divine supernatural law. But one law
did not destroy or affect the other. Neither was the natural law
founded upon divine positive law. Rather, it was something
presupposed as a kind of substratum for this. Accordingly,
political (positiva) power was not founded upon faith, in such a
way that someone would lose it on account of infidelity. On
the other side, political subjection did not contradict faith, or
the baptismal character, and therefore it is not lost by the fact
of baptism. 4 3
It followed evidently that unbelieving princes in
possession of political power could not be stripped of that power
because of their unbelief. For, Suitrez reasoned, those princes
could not, without just title, be rightly deprived of their
possessions. But among their possessions was this power that they
were supposed to have over Christian subjects, and unbelief
was not a just title by which they could be deprived of it. For if
unbelief was considered precisely as an absence of faith, it did
not destroy the foundation of political power. But if unbelief
was considered a sin worthy of punishment, it was not the
business of the Church to punish these unbelievers, over whom it
did not have jurisdiction. 44
At this point Suirez suggested that the Church could
indirectly deprive unbelieving princes of their power over Christian
subjects. Such could be done if the benefit or the defense of
those subjects required it.3 45 He touched upon this, he said, in
342. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 218-19, III,
ch. 4 & nos. 4-7.
343. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
3. On Christian liberty vis-d-vis political power and subjection to it, see SUAREZ,
Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 223, III, ch. 4, no. 18.
344. See SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5,
345. Id. at 454 no. 6 ("Nihilominus dicendum est secundo, posse Ecclesiam
indirecte privare hos principes infideles sua potestate in subditos fideles, si ad bonum
vel defensionem eorum necessariam fuerit.") . Note that the condition was the
good of the subjects and not that of the Church.
the Defensio Fidei.346 The reason is that baptised Christians
were subjects of the Church in spiritual things, and
consequently the Church had power to rule them insofar as was
necessary, "or very much fitting," for the good of their souls.
Accordingly, if for this end it would have been necessary to
liberate them from the power of unbelieving rulers, the power to
do this was in the Church. This is comparable to the case of
"the Pauline privilege,"'3 47 in which the Church for the good of
the faith of a Christian spouse could dissolve his or her
marriage to an implacable pagan. 48 Indeed, said Sua'rez, the
Church's right was stronger in the case before us, because the
marriage bond is more indissoluble than the bond of political
Continuing, Suirez saw two ways Christian subjects could
be liberated from the power of unbelieving princes. The first
was by a simple change of residence on the part of those
subjects, who might pass to a Christian kingdom. This, he said,
was a most just and easy way, one which was open to any
Christian on his own authority, because he was not obliged always to
remain in the same country. Hence, if a prince were to block
Christian subjects from transit of this sort, he could be forced
to grant it by Christian princes who could then justly war
against him in defense of the faithful, inasmuch as these were
being deprived of a right which they wished to exercise.35 °
The second way would be to deprive a nonbelieving
prince either of his kingdom or of power over Christians
remaining in his territory, which itself could hardly be
accomplished without a change of princes. This was the more
difficult way, one which Sua'rez believed had to be exercised with
346. SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 321, III, ch. 23,
347. See 1 Corinthians7:15.
348. Id.; see SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 321, III,
ch. 23, no. 22; id. at 220, ch. 4, no. 9; Suirez, De Fide III,supranote 30, at 205, disp. 6,
question 3. On the "Pauline privilege," see CODE OF CANON LAw: LATIN-ENGLISH
EDITION 412-15, canons 1143-47 (1983).
349. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
6 ("ergo multo magis in nostro casu, quia vinculum matrimonii de se magis est
indissolubile, quam politicae subjectionis") ; SUAREZ, Defensio fidei, in 24 OPERA
OMNIA, supra note 21, at 220, III, ch. 4, no. 9. This is evidently a corollary from the
primary natural character of the family. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
350. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 453, disp. 18, § 5, no.
7; Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 208, disp. 6, question 3.
great caution.3 5 1 Thus, conditions had to be taken into
account here. For example, he thought, the number of the
faithful involved would have to be large, or, if it were small, they
should be unable to change residence. Again, the hope of
success should be morally certain, "lest wanting to get rid of the
cockle, they root out the wheat. 3 5 2
As to the need for some injury inflicted by a nonbelieving
prince, Sufirez agreed with Thomas Aquinas that even before
an actual injury there was in the Church power to remove
princes of this kind on account of "the moral danger" to the
faithful. This, he said, was the position he took in Book III,
chapter 30, number 6 of the Defensio fidei.3 5 I suggest that,
although this position does not contradict Sua'rez's stand
above against "anticipated security," to a casual observer the
two together might be paradoxical.
A final question here is: In whom does this indirect power
reside? It is, Suirez said, evident that such power must be
public and not private. His reasoning seems plain enough.
We are talking about a power to wage war, which always
requires a proper public authority. Ultimately, Sufirez said, this
power resided in either the Pope or any supreme Catholic
king. It would be in the Pope "by virtue of his supreme
spiritual jurisdiction in order to secure and defend the salvation of
souls. '3 54 In a temporal king, who does not have such
jurisdiction, it would exist only for the defense of his "neighbors,"
351. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
8 ("hic modus difficilior est; et ideo, quamvis ad ilium non desit potestas, nihilominus
ad executionem ejus magna circumspectio necessaria est") .
352. Id.; see also MATrHEW 13:29.
353. See SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 349, Ill, ch.
30, no. 6; see also SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18,
§ 5, no. 8; Suirez, De Fide III, supra note 30, at 208-09, disp. 6, question 3. Note that
in the Defensiofidei passage Suirez also said that the indirect power involved here is
not immediately over an unbelieving prince but over their Christian subjects and in
defense of their rights: "At vero circa principes ethnicos non est per
modumjurisdictionis in ipsos principes, sed in eorum subditos christianos, propter quos tuendos
potest infideles arcere, vel in officio continere, et ideo quidquid circa illos operatur,
est per modum defensionis fidelium, non per modum vindictae, aut punitionis
infideHum." SUAREZ, Defensiofidei, in 24 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 349, III, ch. 30, no.
354. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454, disp. 18, § 5, no.
9 ("In Pontifice est ex vi jurisdictionis supremae spiritualis ad procurandam et
defendendam salutem animarum; . . .").
especially Christians.355 Hence, a temporal sovereign could
not exercise this power by his own authority unless the
unbelieving king brought force against his Christian subjects. The
Pope, however, or a king who is acting as his instrument, very
well could move before an injury because his power
ofjurisdiction would extend to prevent evils, lest they occur3. 56
As we have seen, with one exception, Suarez did not
mention the American Indians and the Spanish conquest of the
New World. Although his doctrine regarding the
evangelization of non-apostate unbelievers is consistent overall with that
of Vitoria, it is noteworthy that he nowhere asked Vitoria's
principal question about the legitimacy of Spanish claims to
rule the lands and peoples of America.3 57 The natural
inference from this is that, both in 1583 and then later in 1614,
Sufirez had no pressing problem about the morality of the
conquest and the continued occupation of American territories.
He apparently accepted the "facts on the ground" and
contented himself with a largely speculative inquiry about the right
and the limits of preaching the Gospel.
It does seem obvious that the question in its historical
setting was applicable to the American Indians and their
conquest. It was further relevant to the then-current case of the
Philippine Islands, to which the absence of any reference by
Sufirez is also remarkable.3 58 Again, after the 1581 merger of
Spain and Portugal, the question related to Africa, India, and
355. Id. ("in rege vero temporali, solum est per modum defensionis
proximorum, praesertim fidelium,.. ").
356. SUAREZ, De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 454-55, disp. 18, § 5,
357. See, e.g., 2 RELECTiO DE INDIS RECENTER INVENTIS PRIOR 667 (Te6filo
Urdfinoz ed.) ("Supposito ergo quod [isti barbari] erant veri domini, superest videre quo
titulo potuerint hispani venire in possessionem illorum vel illius regionis. Et primo
referam titulos qui possint praetendi, sed non idonei nec legitimi. Secundo, ponam
alios titulos legitimos quibus potuerint barbari venire in ditionem hispanorum.").
358. This seems even more so inasmuch as Suirez's younger brother, Gaspar de
Toledo, also a Jesuit, died in 1581 on a missionary voyage from Acapulco to Manila.
De Scorraille's comment on his passing is quite relevant to our present concern:
"Quand on voulut rassembler ce qu'il laissait, on ne trouva qu'un livre, le Contemptus
mundi, son chapelet et ses instruments de penitence. II avait appris de Xavier et de
ses imitateurs que, pour les conqu~tes qu'il ambitionnait ces armes suffisaient." I DE
SCORRAILLE, supra note 5, at 181.
the Far East, including Indonesia, Southeast Asia, China and
Japan. 59 At the same time, the Spanish experience in
America, whether in 1583 or in 1614, would have been the
longest and the most prominent for a Spanish Jesuit, even for
one transplanted to Coimbra. It is that experience which
springs to mind wherever there is talk of naked barbarians,
human sacrifice, cannibalism, the right of intervention in
defense of innocents, or the experience of gains in number and
devotion of Christian descendents.
As for the internal developments we have witnessed in
Sua'rez between 1583 and 1614, the impression they leave us
with is that over time his views changed in ways both positive
and negative. The absence of any mention of the American
Indians after 1583 seems negative. Even though what he wrote
in 1614 clearly applied to them, today most would like it better
if he had been more specific. In this connection, his retreat
from the specificity of the De Caritat3e 60 was disappointing.
Again, his shift on the "Roman example" seems to us a
negative. Logically and historically it is understandable. But for a
modern lover of Sua'rez, as I confess I am, to defend it and its
implications for people in the conquered regions of the New
World is not easy. In contrast, the development of his position
on "anticipated security" seems positive and easy to praise.
When compared with the opposite view that he rejected, it was
a step, however modest, toward a more peaceful and just
Other thoughts concern the clear difference between
Suirez and Vitoria on the issue of the authority to make war.
To me Vitoria's position appears to be in fact supernational. I
have no wish to overstate the case, but on this one particular, I
think Vitoria is closer to that outlook so much associated with
medieval Christendom, which especially after the work of
Arquilli~re has been often called "Augustinian. "61 Contrariwise,
Suirz's position here appears more international. He
recognized the reality of many nations, non-Christian as well as
359. For an initial consideration of what is involved here, I would recommend
the article by Henri Bernard, discussed supra notes 27 and 257 and accompanying
360. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
361. See H.-X. ARQUILLIRE, L'AUGUSTINISME POLITIQUE: ESSAI SUR LA
FORMATION DES TH9ORIES POLITIQUES DU MOYEN-AGE (2d ed. 1955).
Christian, each "supreme in its own order." Consequently, he
also recognized that there is no supernational temporal power
beyond that which has been explicitly or tacitly agreed to by
those many nations according to thejus gentium interse. When
authority is then needed to justify the use of force among such
nations, it would be found in each one of them itself.
Specifically, it would be based upon each one's right to seek
satisfaction from those who have injured it in some serious way. In the
present matter of preaching the Gospel, while the Church is
not a temporal state, it is, as we have noted, 362 a "spiritual
republic," which in the temporal order can be injured and which
indirectly can seek satisfaction under the jus gentium inter se.
The universal and transcendent character of the Church
provides a basis for the particular right of sending and defending
preachers; but this last is to be done, it seems, primarily
according to the provisions of thejus gentium inter se.
It is easy to be cynical about Suairez's concern for
preaching the Gospel. Surely to many it will seem little more than a
cloak for European expansionism. I would not deny all traces
of that. But simply to reduce Suirez to some kind of
imperialistic dupe or pawn would be most unfair. It would also be
untrue. One need not read many pages of Sufirez in order to
realize how unlikely he was to be duped. And as for his being a
willing pawn or a duplicitous tool, if we quite reasonably take
account of the faith of a man like Suirez, as well as his
overriding conviction about the importance and the necessity of belief
in the Christian Gospel, 363 even when we disagree with him we
should be able to understand his position and to respect it as
But more than this, there is an obvious, enduring,
positive, and universally admirable side to what he has written.
There is no denying that Suirez, along with Vitoria and other
Spaniards of the time, was conscientiously concerned for both
the rule of law and the welfare of the newly encountered
peoples. Coupled with that, he clearly accepted the dignity and
the natural equality of all human beings. In this, he also
accepted and affirmed a properly spiritual dimension in every
human life and community. Human beings and their political
362. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
institutions are something more than material objects to be
coveted and seized. Even barbarians, along with their political
choices, are to be respected as equals, at the levels of nature
and thejus gentium, to the persons and choices of Spaniards or
Not separate from this, though Suirez embraced the
medieval thought of subjection, albeit indirect, of the temporal
power of Christian sovereigns to the spiritual power of the
Pope, he recognized the reality of nations not subject to the
Pope, of nations which had not done injury to Christians.
While a present-day critic may not be too impressed by a new
injury of not receiving preachers, most likely that critic would
expect nations today to be open to receive peaceful legates, to
accord them a hearing, and not to mistreat them. From
Suirez's viewpoint an expectation of that kind would be the
simple corollary of people's natural freedom and their right to
choose their own polity. That is to say, the very fact of
freedom implies an obligation for both individuals and states to
exercise it in a responsible and moral manner.
Two final points should be added on this. First, as we
have seen aboves 6 law for Sufrez provides the rule of
conscience and morality. In the present case, the weight of this
may be well gauged from the role assigned to both the natural
law and the jus gentium. And second, while one might be
tempted to say that turnabout is fair play, in this instance
Sufirez would not agree. While he did accept the natural
equality of all peoples and states, he was absolutely convinced
that Christianity alone is the true religion. For that reason, his
whole argument proceeded from a Christian perpective. From
that perspective, it was objectively right for Christians to send
and defend missionaries to pagans, but not vice versa. 65
While twentieth century critics might be more impartial here
than sixteenth century Suirez, the inner logic of his position
should be apparent even to those who reject it.
5. See 1 RAOUL DE SCORRAILLE, S.J., FRANgOIS SUAREZ DE LA COMPAGNIE DEJASUS 3 ( 1911 ). This work is still the chief source on Suirez's life . In English, see JOSEPH FICHTER, MAN OF SPAIN, FRANCIS SUAREZ 6 ( 1940 ). For a briefer but still accurate presentation, see P . MONNOT, Suarez, Francois.L Vie et oeuvres, in 14 DICTIONNAIRE DE THiOLOGIE CATHOLIQUE, 20 partie, cols. 2638 - 49 ( 1941 ). On Sufirez's ancestry , see Jos6 de Duenas, S.J. , Los Sudrez de Toledo, in 133 RAZ6N Y FE 91 (mimero extraordinario 1948 ).
6. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 30; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 29.
7. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 45-46; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 48- 50 . It is cited as "a matter of later history" that Sufirez asked to remain a lay brother in the Society of Jesus "since he himself was convinced that he could not successfully complete even the fundamental course in philosophy." Id. at 52.
8. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 52; FICHTER, supra note 5, at 53.
23. See 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 ,at 437. For some of Suirez's influence on Grotius as well as on international law generally, see J. Larequi , S.J. , Influencia suarecianaen lafilosofib de Grocio, in 88 RAz6N Y FE 525 , 525 - 38 ( 1929 ) ; Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, El derecho internacionaly FranciscoSudrez, in 2 ACTAS DEL IV CENTENARIO DEL NACIMIENTO DE FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1548- 1948 ), at 331 ( 1949 ).
24. See supra note 4 and accompanying text .
25. See B. DE LAS CASAS, IN DEFENSE OF THE INDIANS: THE DEFENSE OF THE MOST REVEREND LORD , DON FRAY BARTOLOM9 DE LAS CASAS , OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS, LATE BISHOP OF CHIAPA, AGAINST THE PERSECUTORS AND SLANDERERS OF THE PEOPLES OF THE NEW WORLD DISCOVERED ACROSS THE SEAS (Stafford Poole , C.M. ed. &trans. , 1974 ); see also B. de Las Casas, De regia potestate, o, Derecho de autodeterminacicn,in 8 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4.
26. See generally LEWIS HANKE , ALL MANKIND IS ONE: A STUDY OF THE DISPUTATION BETWEEN BARTOLOMt DE LAS CASAS AND JUAN GINCS DE SEPOLVEDA IN 1550 ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS ( 1974 ). See V. Beltrin de Heredia , O.P. , El maestro Domingo de Solo en lacontroversiade Las Casas con Sepilveda , in 45 CIENCIA TOMISTA 35-49 , 177 - 93 ( 1932 ).
27. See Acosta , De procurandaIndorum salute: pacificacidn y colonizacidn, in 23-24
28. For this thought in connection with Vitoria, see GUILLERMO FRAILE & TE6- FILO URDANOz, 1 HISTORIA DE LA FILOSOiA ESPANOLA 293- 94 ( 1985 ). In my opinion it is even more fitting with respect to Suirez.
29. On the Jesuit College in Rome, see RICCARDO G. VILLOSLADA, S.J. , STORIA DEL COLLEGIO ROMANO DAL SUO INIZIO (1551) ALLA SOPPRESSIONE DELLA COMPAGNIA Di GEsO ( 1773 ) ( 1954 ). For Suirez's teaching at the Jesuit College, see Nikolaus Ory, SJ ., Suarez in Rom: seine r6nische Lehrt6.tigkeitauf Grund handschrifilicher Uberlieferung, in 82 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR KATHOLISCHE THEOLOGIE 133 ( 1959 ), and more recently F6lix Rodriguez , La docencia romana de Sudrez ( 1580 - 1585 ), in 7 CUADERNOS SALMANTINOS DE FILOSOFiA 295 ( 1980 ).
30. See Franciscus Suirez , S.J. , De Fide , Secunda Pars, 1583 , in 33 ARCHivo TEOL6GICO GRANADINO 191 (Karl Deuringer ed., 1970 ) [hereinafter De Fide 1I]; Franciscus Sufirez , S.J. , De Fide , Secunda Pars, 1583 , in 32 ARCHIVO TEOL6Gico GRANADINO 79 (Karl Deuringer ed., 1969 ) [hereinafter De FideII]; Franciscus Suirez, SJ., LECTIONES DE FIDE, ANNO 1583, in COLLEGIO ROMANO HABITAS (Carolus Deuringer ed ., 1967 ) [hereinafter De Fide].
31. Suirez , De Fide II , supra note 30, at 131.
32. See MONNOT , supra note 5 , col. 2647; see also 2 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at
45. See FRANCISCUS SUAREZ, S.J., De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21 , at 1-460.
46. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 149.
47. See MONNOT , supra note 5 , col. 2645 .
48. See generally Su(irez, De opere sex dierum, in 3 OPERA OMNIA , supra note 21, at 413- 19 ( "Quod genus vitae corporalis, seu politicae, homines in statu innocentiae profiterentur" ).
49. See 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 246, 328 - 29 ; MONNOT, supra note 5, col. 2643 .
50. See Franciscus Suirez , S.J. , Tractatus de Baptismo, in 21 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21 , at 428-36 [hereinafter De Baptismo].
51. Codex 534 of the Archivio Universitd Gregoriana .
52. See generally FRANCISCUS SUAREZ , DIE GERECHTIGKEITSLEHRE DES JUNGEN SUAREZ: EDITION UND UNTERSUCHUNG SEINER ROMISCHEN VORLESUNGEN "DE IUSTITIA ET lURE " (Joachim Giers ed., 1958 ) [hereinafter DE JUSTITIA ET JURE ] .
53. Id . at 27. For the problems encountered both by Giers and Ory in dating this treatise , see Rodriguez, supra note 29 , at 308-10.
54. 1 DE SCORRAILLE, supra note 5 , at 319. The text appears in 11 FRANCISCUS SUAREZ , S.J. , OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21 , at 514-82.
56. See THOMAS AQUINAS , IN LIBROS POLITICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO I , lectio III , & nos. 56 - 74 (R. Spiazzi , O.P. ed., 1951 ); see also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS II-II, question 57, art . 3, ad . 2 ( Anton C . Pegis ed. & Laurence Shapcote , O.P. trans. , 1945 ).
57. To English readers this subject is perhaps best known from the work of Lewis K. Hanke . See, e.g., LEWIS K. HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS ( 1959 ) ; LEWIS K. HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA ( 1945 ); HANKE, supra note 26.
58. See OBRAS DE FRANCISCO DE VITORIA: RELECCIONES TEOL6GICAS 498- 99 (T. Urdinoz ed., 1960 ) [hereinafter OBRAS DE VITORIA] ("La primera obra teol6gica conocida que plantea expresamente el tema de la legitimidad de la conquista de los pueblos infieles que 'los espafioles encontraron en el mar Atldntico' es del nominalista Maior o Juan Mair . Se trata de su Libro I de los Sentencias, publicado en 1510.").
59. For this, seeJOHN MAJOR, COMMENTARIA IN II SENT ., disp. 44, question 3; id. question 9 , no. 4; see URDANOZ , supra note 58 , at 499 n. 13 ( citing MAJOR ).
60. THOMAS AQUINAS , SUMMA THEOLOGIAE , supra note 56 , II-II, question 66, art. 8, no. 1, where Major and the American Indians are plainly implied, even though neither is mentioned by name .
61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. On the issue as between Major and Vitoria , see Pedro de Leturia, Maiory Vitoria ante la Conquistade America, in 11 ESTUDIOS ECLESIASTICos 44 ( 1932 ).
62. See Demetrio Ramos et al., Franciscode Vitoria y la escuela de Salamanca: La Etica en la conquista de Amyi'ca, in 25 CORPUS HISPANORUM DE PACE, supra note 4.
295. See SUAREZ , De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18 , § 3, no. 5. For the authorities cited, see 1 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI , Supra note 289, at 646 (citing Majores) ; id . at 723-24 (citing DecretalesGregoriiIX , Gaudemus, lib. 4, tit. 19, cl . 8); Concilium Tridentinum, sess . XIV, ch . 2, inENCHIRIDION SYMBOLORUM 392 n. 1671 ( Henricus Denzinger & Adolfus Sch6nmetzer eds., 1963 ).
296. Matthew 10 : 10; for Jerome, see S. Hieronymi Presbyteri Commentariorum, in Matheum Libri IV, in 77 CORPUS CHRISTIANORUM , SERIES LATINA 66 (D. Hurst & M. Adriaen, eds., 1969 ) ( "Qui habemus auxilium, baculi praesidium cur quaeramus?").
297. Matthew 10 : 10 .
298. See SUAREZ , De Fide, in 12 OPERA OMNIA, supra note 21, at 445, disp. 18 , § 3, no. 5. For references, see 2 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI, supra note 289, at 774 (discussing Decretales Gregorii IX, SicutJudaei, lib . 3, tit. 42, ch . 3). I note that "Sincere," discussed in the text accompanying note note 298 should be "Qui sincera." See 1 CORPUS JURIS CANONICI, supra note 289, at 160 (discussing Decretum Gratiani,I, disp . 45, ch . 3); supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing Dejudaeis and Maiores) .
299. 1 Corinthians 1 : 36 ,