Why we need binarism to go beyond it
0
E. Ibsch (&) Kastanjelaan 177, 1185 MV Amstelveen,
The Netherlands
In answer to the criticism of binary distinctions of the last decades, my theoretical argument in this paper is that on the cognitive level we are strongly in need of binarism. In my approach binarism is not identical with ontological dualism. It pertains to world orientation, because without the cognitive tools of differentiation life would be characterized by entropy. In order to define their place in the world individuals are in continuous search for identity and difference. A following step is to be vigilant from an ethical perspective not to grant a one-sided value to one of the binary concepts at the expense of the other. It is the concern of cultural stereotyping which has elicited the criticism of binary distinctions. However, ethical commitment cannot do without the tools of cognition. Coming to literature, I discuss the binary terms of (historical) fact and fiction. Analyzing Romain Gary's La Danse de Gengis Cohn, a satirical Holocaust novel, I want to demonstrate that it is the tension between fact and fiction that allows for ambiguity and irony, intellectual strategies that go beyond binarism while accepting it as an indispensible cognitive tool.
-
In the humanities it is nowadays fashionable to criticize binarism, the underlying
motivation being moral concern. It is not surprising that in particular literary scholars working
in the field of feminist or postcolonial research usually are reluctant to accept binary
distinctions. Their argument goes as follows: Binarism essentially implies evaluation and
this unquestionably results in granting high value to one of the binary concepts at the
expense of the other, the opposite one. Still more disturbing is the observation that in the
course of time the respective evaluative positions of the terms settle and eventually turn
into cultural and political stereotypes. The question, however, is whether such ethical
commitment sufficiently legitimizes the denial of binarism or, to put it otherwise, whether
there are no other means to do justice to ethical involvement.
Thinking about the problem of the semantics of binarism, my feeling is that at the
cognitive level we cannot do without it, but that at the same time the combination of the
cognitive and emotional capacities of human beings may help to avoid one-sided value
attributions. In the following paragraphs I will try to develop my argument.
To begin with, binarism in my approach is not identical with ontological dualism or
theological Manichaeism. Both refer to the existence of two antithetical worlds that are
irreconcilably opposed to each other. The cognitive view, on the contrary, pertains to world
orientation and it is exactly this quality that contributes to overcome the ontological
oppositions. Without the cognitive tools of differentiation life would be characterized by
entropy. In order to define their place in the world individuals are in continuous search for
identity and difference. Well-known for his system-theoretical approach in the sociology of
knowledge, Niklas Luhmann argues in his book Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik (The
structure of society and semantics) as follows: Without distinction no observation, no
meaning, no action, and consequently no world, because the world can only be defined as
an entity by way of differentiation (Luhmann 1989, p. 355). He quotes George Spencer
Brown who in his contribution to logic invites human beings to fulfill their primary task,
namely to draw a distinction (p. 354). Only if individuals accept this task, the unmarked
space of the world can be transformed into a recognizable order of identities and
differences. What is valid for the world as a whole is valid for individuals as well. Luhmann
argues that a person needs differentiation in order to achieve individuality. Identity is
possible only through the experience of difference (p. 242).
Linguists and literary scholars will recall the structuralist linguist Ferdinand de Saussure
who with respect to semantic entities writes: Cest la difference qui fait le caracte`re,
comme elle fait la valeur de lunite (Saussure 1976, p. 168). It is true, linguistic
structuralism has not remained uncontested in the course of time. However, even Jacques
Derrida, one of the critics of Saussure, in his philosophical reflections on the neographism
differance (with an a) relies heavily on pairs of oppositions, be it only for their
strategic convenience and in order to undertake their deconstruction at the currently most
decisive point (Derrida 1982, p. 12). To give you some examples of Derridas use of
binary oppositions in his Margins of Philosophy: The sign represents the presence in the
absence; differance as temporization, differance as spacing; to be not identical, to be
other, discernable; structural versus historical, and so on, and so forth. In his later writings
which are characterized by a strong ethical commitment Derridas criticism (...truncated)