A common mechanism underlies changes of mind about decisions and confidence
A common mechanism underlies changes of mind about decisions and confidence
Ronald van den Berg
Kavi Anandalingam
Ariel Zylberberg
Roozbeh Kiani
Michael N Shadlen
Daniel M Wolpert
-
Stay current on the latest in life science and biomedical research from eLife.
Sign up for alerts at elife.elifesciences.org
Ronald van den Berg1, Kavitha Anandalingam1, Ariel Zylberberg2, Roozbeh Kiani3,
Michael N. Shadlen2* and Daniel M. Wolpert1*
*These authors contributed equally
1. Computational and Biological Learning Laboratory, Department of Engineering, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge, UK 2. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Kavli Institute and
Department of Neuroscience, Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University,
New York, New York, USA 3. Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York,
NY 10003, USA
Abstract
Decisions are accompanied by a degree of confidence that a selected option is correct. A
sequential sampling framework explains the speed and accuracy of decisions and extends
naturally to the confidence that the decision rendered is likely to be correct. However,
discrepancies between confidence and accuracy suggest that confidence might be supported by
mechanisms dissociated from the decision process. Here we show that this discrepancy can arise
naturally because of simple processing delays. When participants were asked to report choice
and confidence simultaneously, their confidence, reaction time and a perceptual decision about
motion were explained by bounded evidence accumulation. However, we also observed revisions
of the initial choice and/or confidence. These changes of mind were explained by a continuation
of the mechanism that led to the initial choice. Our findings extend the sequential sampling
framework to vacillation about confidence and invites caution in interpreting dissociations
between confidence and accuracy.
Introduction
Many decisions benefit from the acquisition of multiple samples of evidence acquired
sequentially in time. In that case, a decision maker must decide not only about the proposition in
question but also about when to terminate deliberation. The ensuing tradeoff between speed and
accuracy is explained by sequential sampling with optional stopping models in which evidence is
accumulated to some stopping criterion or bound
(Link, 1975; Ratcliff and Rouder, 1998)
. The
mechanism receives experimental support from human psychophysics and neural recordings in
monkeys and rats
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Brunton et al., 2013; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013;
Hanks et al., 2015)
. The same framework also explains the confidence that a decision is correct
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Kiani et al., 2014a)
. This is because the quantity that is accumulated,
termed a decision variable (DV), when combined with elapsed decision time, maps to the
probability that a decision rendered on its value will be correct
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009;
Drugowitsch et al., 2014)
. The attribution of confidence is important for guiding subsequent
decisions, learning from mistakes and exploring alternatives. Thus, when the decision maker
terminates deliberation, the choice is accompanied by a degree of certainty (i.e., confidence),
based on the same stream of evidence that supported that decision
(Fetsch et al., 2014)
.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
This last point remains controversial, however, for there are many instances when the confidence
in a decision and the decision itself are dissociable. For example, human decision makers tend to
overestimate their certainty about choices based on truly ambiguous evidence
(Fischoff et al.,
1982; Baranski and Petrusic, 1994; Erev et al., 1994; Drugowitsch et al., 2014; Kiani et al.,
2014a)
, and they can perform above chance level yet report they are guessing (Kunimoto et al.,
2001). These and other observations have led psychologists to suggest that confidence and
choice may be guided by different sources of evidence
(Pleskac and Busemeyer, 2010;
Zylberberg et al., 2012; Moran et al., 2015)
, or that the evaluation of the same evidence differs
fundamentally in the way that it affects choice and confidence
(Fleming and Dolan, 2012;
Maniscalco and Lau, 2012; De Martino et al., 2013; Ratcliff and Starns, 2013)
. The latter
distinction is captured by the notion of a 1st order confidence that is based rationally on the
evidence in support of the decision and a 2nd order confidence that can depart from this
evidence. As this distinction rests on a proper understanding of the mechanism that supports
choice and confidence, it is possible that some of the observations taken as support for higher
order explanations of confidence are simply accounted for by deficiencies of the theory of 1st
order choices.
Naturally, if a decision maker acquires additional information after committing to a choice, she
might wish to revise a decision, or the (...truncated)