Dorr on the language of ontology
Dorr on the language of ontology
Chris Daly 0
David Liggins 0
David Liggins 0
0 Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester , Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL , UK
In the 'ordinary business of life', everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: 'There are some beautiful chairs in my favourite furniture shop'. Within the context of philosophical debate, some philosophers also make claims about what there is. For instance, some ontologists claim that there are chairs; other ontologists claim that there are no chairs. What is the relation between ontologists' philosophical claims about what there is and ordinary claims about what there is? According to Cian Dorr, ontologists' claims and denials of existence belong to 'a sort of professional jargon'. Dorr claims, for example, that (1) 'There are prime numbers between 20 and 30' can be used superficially or used fundamentally. Ordinary uses of (1) are superficial: we use the sentence to assert a boring, well-known truth. (Perhaps this truth is so well-known that only primary school teachers ever actually assert it.) But in the ontology room, (1) is used fundamentally, to assert that numbers are (as Dorr puts it) 'part of the ultimate furniture of reality': and this is a substantial metaphysical doctrine, not a boring truth. In this paper, we will show that none of Dorr's arguments for these claims succeeds. 1. In the 'ordinary business of life', everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: 'There are some beautiful chairs in my favourite furniture shop'. Within the context of philosophical debate, some philosophers also
Dorr; Metaontology; Charity
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make claims about what there is. For instance, some ontologists claim that there are
chairs; other ontologists claim that there are no chairs. What is the relation between
ontologists’ philosophical claims about what there is and ordinary claims about
what there is?
A number of philosophers have recently claimed that there is a special ‘language
of ontology’ and that sentences about what there is have different uses in different
contexts. These philosophers include David Chalmers, Peter van Inwagen and Cian
Dorr
(Chalmers 2009; van Inwagen 2014, Introduction and Dorr 2005, 2008)
. Dorr’s
important work has not yet received the attention it deserves and the particular lines
of argument which he offers raise a number of important issues of their own. For
these reasons, in this paper we will concentrate evaluating Dorr’s arguments.
Dorr (2005, 2008) offers an answer to the above fundamental metaontological
question: the question of the relation between ontologists’ philosophical claims
about what there is and ordinary claims about what there is. According to Dorr, each
of the sentences that (what he calls) foundational ontologists use to state their
theories has at least two uses. Dorr claims, for example, that
(1) There are prime numbers between 20 and 30
can be used superficially or used fundamentally. Ordinary uses of (1) are superficial:
we use the sentence to assert a boring, well-known truth. (Perhaps this truth is so
well-known that only primary school teachers ever actually assert it.) Roughly
speaking, an ordinary use of a sentence is a use of that sentence made outside of the
context of the ontology seminar room. In the ontology room, however, (1) is used
fundamentally, to assert that prime numbers are (as Dorr puts it) ‘part of the ultimate
furniture of reality’ (2008: 34): and this is a substantial metaphysical doctrine, not a
boring truth. Foundational ontologists’ claims and denials of existence belong—
Dorr tells us—to ‘a sort of professional jargon’ (2005: 249).
Similarly, Dorr maintains that (1)’s negation:
(~1) There are no prime numbers between 20 and 30
can be used either superficially—to assert the negation of the boring truth—or
fundamentally—to assert the negation of the substantial metaphysical doctrine
(itself a substantial metaphysical doctrine).
According to Dorr, the boring truth asserted in superficial uses of (1) is consistent
with the substantial metaphysical doctrine asserted in fundamental uses of (~1). So
one can deny that prime numbers are part of the ultimate furniture of reality without
having to think that primary school teachers are feeding our children falsehoods.
One way to develop this idea would be to claim that the linguistic meanings of
(1) and (~1) change between the two contexts. But Dorr does not make this further
claim. He is prepared to allow that that some pragmatic process accounts for the
difference in what is asserted whilst the linguistic meaning remains unchanged
(2005: 278 note 27; 2008: 34–5). With this clarification made, let us call Dorr’s
view contextualism.
Dorr is aware that contextualism threatens to render some philosophical debates
obscure. If foundational ontologists’ existential assertions are not to be interpreted
in the ordinary fashion, then how should th (...truncated)