Normative Differences in Chinese and European Discourses on Global Security: Obstacles and Opportunities for Cooperation
Normative Differences in Chinese and European Discourses on Global Security: Obstacles and Opportunities for Cooperation
Salvatore Finamore 0
0 Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge , Cambridge , UK
This article attempts to provide an answer to the puzzle of how to account for the variations in levels and effectiveness of security cooperation between the EU and China, particularly given the apparently structural nature of the main factors affecting their security relationship. The hypothesis put forward in this study is that normative differences and overlaps could hold explanatory value in this regard, on the basis of theoretical premises grounded in social constructivism. To this purpose, the article contributes a detailed discussion of the normative positions held, respectively, by the EU and China, particularly with regard to definitions of threats and priorities, positions on national sovereignty and non-interference, and views on multilateralism and multipolarity. The impact of these normative positions is illustrated and discussed with reference to some salient cases of EU-China security cooperation, such as the Iranian nuclear issue, the ratification of the CTBT, and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. While underlining the importance of norms as an explanatory variable, the article also points to the relevance of the interplay between norms and interests, as well as their interaction with other structural factors-particularly the role of the United States as the main security actor in international affairs.
EU-China relations; Multipolarity; Non-interference; Security; Sovereignty
1 Introduction
China’s role in international security has undoubtedly grown over the past decades,
to the point where Beijing has become an unavoidable partner in any matters of
global concern. While in 1999 Gerald Segal could still ask whether China mattered
from a military point of view (Segal 1999, p. 29), the answer to that question would
appear obvious nowadays. China’s military expenditure accounted for only 4.5% of
global defence spending in 1999. Rising steadily on par with China’s impressive
economic growth, that figure reached over 12% in 2014 according to SIPRI
estimates (Perlo-Freeman et al. 2015, pp. 2–3), ranking Beijing at the second place
for highest military expenditure after the United States and with an ever growing
defence budget. As the European Commission noted already in its 1995
Communication A long term policy for China–Europe relations, it is ‘‘impossible
to address the central global issues’’ of our time without China’s cooperation:
‘‘China is not only a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security
Council, but also one of the world’s biggest arms producers and exporters. Her role
across the whole security spectrum is central to global, as well as regional security’’
(European Commission 1995).
In spite of the importance the EU attributes to China in global security, there
seems to be a widespread scholarly perception that ‘‘in comparison with the political
and economic relations between China and [the] EU, the relations in the field of
conventional security are both relatively insignificant and complex’’ (Wang 2011,
p. 37). While security in general may be safely regarded as a relatively
underdeveloped field of cooperation in EU–China relations, it is also necessary to
consider the variations which may be observed in specific instances, and attempt to
explain them. There are at least three factors which have been explored in the
academic literature and which can easily be argued to have a strong impact on EU–
China security cooperation.
The first factor to be considered in this regard is that EU decision-making on
matters of security and defence is largely conducted according to intergovernmental
procedures which leave little room of manoeuvre for supranational institutions. EU
member states have retained a significant margin of autonomy and decisional power
in this issue area, instead of delegating it to the supranational authority of the
European Commission. The Council of the European Union and the European
Council are the key actors in this field, ‘‘with the main powers remaining in state
hands’’ (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, p. 157). Although several studies point to a
gradual move away from pure intergovernmentalism (e.g. Howorth 2012;
NorheimMartinsen 2010; Sjursen 2011), the level of integration within this policy area is still
not comparable to the delegation of sovereign powers to which the member states
have agreed on other subject matters. This would expectedly result in increased
difficulties for the European Union to speak with a common voice to Beijing on
issues of international security.
A second factor which can be expected to influence security relations between
the EU and China is the relative distance between the two, resulting in the fact that
European and Chinese primary geostrategic interests have few areas of (...truncated)