Anti-Elite/Establishment Rhetoric and Party Positioning on European Integration
Anti-Elite/Establishment Rhetoric and Party Positioning on European Integration
Jonathan Polk 0 1
Jan Rovny 0 1
European Union 0 1
0 CEE and LIEPP, Sciences Po , Paris, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, 75337 Paris Cedex 07 , France
1 Department of Political Science and Centre for European Research, University of Gothenburg , Box 711, Gothenburg , Sweden
This article addresses the relationship between the salience of anti-elite/ establishment rhetoric for political parties and party positions on European integration. Anti-establishment rhetoric is a feature of populism, which is increasingly influential in contemporary European politics. For populist parties across the continent, in several ways the European Union (EU) represents the pinnacle of elitedriven, establishment-based politics. Previous research has demonstrated that party EU positions are systematically related to their positions on the left-right ideological scale but that this varies from Western to Eastern Europe. Here, we show that parties that place more emphasis on anti-elite/establishment rhetoric are more likely to oppose European integration, and that this holds across the East/West geographical divide and controlling for a variety of other party characteristics.
Political parties; Anti-establishment parties
The authors acknowledge funding from the following organizations and Grants: The European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (no. 649281); a public Grant overseen by the French
National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the ‘‘Investissements d’Avenir’’ program LIEPP
(ANR-11LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02); Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsra˚a˚det), Grant no.
421-2012-1188; Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant no. P13-1090:1.
This article examines the relationship between a rejection of established political
practices and resistance to the European Union (EU). Anti-elite/establishment
rhetoric is central to populist
(Mudde 2004, 2007)
and challenger parties
and De Vries 2015)
across Europe. One needs to look no further than the recent
referendum on ‘Brexit’ in the United Kingdom to recognize the influence of
antielite/establishment rhetoric on contemporary European politics (Hobolt 2016). The
2014 wave of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on party positioning in Europe
included new questions intended to measure two features of populism across the
political parties of Europe. One question focused on the salience of reducing
political corruption, and a second addressed the salience of anti-elite and/or
antiestablishment rhetoric for political parties.
Although these concepts have been treated similarly in previous scholarship
and often overlap in particular parties, we provided evidence that they are
conceptually and empirically differentiable to a larger degree than one might
(Polk et al. 2017)
. More specifically, we found that political
parties with extreme left positions on the economic left–right dimension or
extreme conservative positions on the cultural dimension were more likely to
emphasize anti-elite/establishment rhetoric, but we found less support for a
connection between the ideological positioning of a party and the salience of
reducing political corruption.1
The relationship between extreme positions on the economic left or the
cultural right and anti-elite salience is strikingly similar to what we know about
the connection between the ideological positioning of political parties and their
stances on European integration. Here too, parties of the extreme economic left
and parties with extremely conservative cultural positions are much more likely
to oppose European integration
(Taggart 1998; Marks et al. 2006; Kriesi 2007;
Hooghe and Marks 2009)
. Not surprisingly, simple bi-variate analysis of the
2014 CHES data shows a strong relationship between opposition to the European
Union (EU) and the importance of anti-establishment rhetoric for political parties
in Europe. This article provides a more focused and systematic analysis of
parties’ EU positions and their discourse on established political practices and
We begin by surveying the discussion surrounding the importance of anti-elite,
anti-establishment appeals for populist parties, both left and right, and then move
on to explain how the European Union represents conventional, consensus-based,
elite decision-making for parties of both families. Our analysis of the parties
contained in the 2014 CHES wave supports our hypothesis that parties that
emphasize anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric are also more likely to resist
1 Our use of the word extreme is intended to describe the positions of parties on ideological scales and
should not be interpreted as having normative implications.
2 Populism, Anti-Elite/Establishment Rhetoric, and European
Populism scholarship clusters into at least three distinct research traditions and has
been used to understand the politics of a wide range of geographic regions
(Bonikowski and Gidron 2016)
. But whether understood as a leadership strategy
(Weyland 2001), as a thin ideology
(Mudde 2004; Abts and Rummens 2007;
, or primarily as a discursive style attributable to particular types of
political speech rather than certain actors
(Jagers and Walgrave 2007;
DeeganKrause and Haughton 2009; Aslanidis 2016, but see also Rooduijn et al. 2014)
definitions of populism in politics are necessarily based on a moral division between
the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’
(Bonikowski and Gidron 2016, 7)
In the European context, the conceptualization of populism as a thin ideology has
been influential in no small part due to Cas Mudde’s studies of populism and the
radical right party family
(Mudde 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013)
. We draw
inspiration from Mudde’s definition of populism as ‘‘an ideology that considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be
an expression of the volonte´ ge´ne´rale (general will) of the people’’ (2004, 543).
Here, the ideology is described as thin because although populism stresses a
zerosum competition between the people and elites, privileging the former over the
latter, it is adaptable to and in need of additional proposals about how best to
implement the will of the people throughout society (Stanley 2008). At the same
time, we agree with Aslanidis’s (2016) argument that a working definition of
populism does not require the thin ideology component to be applicable to
antiimmigration parties of the radical right as well as parties of the political left
2007, 2017; Otjes and Louwerse 2015; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015)
, and we join
Aslanidis and others
(e.g., Bonikowski and Gidron 2016)
in focusing on the
discursive aspect of populism.
The electoral successes of SYRIZA in Greece
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis
, Podemos in Spain
(Kioupkiolis 2016; Ramiro and Gomez 2016)
, and Beppe
Grillo’s Five Star Movement in Italy
(Lanzone and Woods 2015)
examples that populism is not exclusive to the extreme right in contemporary
European politics (Aslanidis this issue). Arising during the aftermath of the
recession that began in Europe in 2009, these parties grew within countries that
were particularly hard hit by the economic crisis, and stridently criticized what they
saw as excessive austerity measures imposed on the people of their countries by
external lenders and international institutions
(Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser
. In addition to the International Monetary Fund, the European institutions: the
European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the Eurogroup received the
brunt of the populist left’s disdain.2 For the parties of the populist left, these
European institutions constitute a political class out of touch with the concerns and
difficulties of most European citizens.
2 See, for example, Varoufakis, Yannis. September 8, 2015. ‘‘How Europe Crushed Greece’’. The New
Criticism of the European Union from the extreme left is not new. The earliest
years of the European integration project were generally characterized by a
‘‘permissive consensus’’ on the part of public opinion
(Lindberg and Scheingold
. But where it existed, political opposition to the EU prior to the Maastricht
Treaty tended to come from parties of the left over concerns about a potential race to
the bottom in regulatory and social policy as a consequence of the push for the
creation of the single market
(Kriesi 2007, 86)
. After Maastricht, the permissive
consensus of public opinion on the EU gave way to what
Hooghe and Marks (2009)
have referred to as a ‘‘constraining dissensus’’. Increasingly, opposition to the EU
became concentrated in the parties of the extreme right, which were primarily
concerned about the cultural effects of European integration on its member states.
For the parties of the populist radical right, European bureaucrats, institutions, and
other political actors facilitated migration, cosmopolitan attitudes, and other factors
that undermined national distinctiveness and sovereignty
Although euroskepticism on the political left has tended to focus on the
economic effects of integration whereas right-wing euroskepticism more often
stresses its supposed deleterious cultural impact
(Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and
, both types of resistance to the EU within the European public were
spurred on by populist parties of the radical left and radical right
(De Vries and
. Despite sometimes stark contrasts in other aspects of their policy
preferences, including the possibility of inclusionary versus exclusionary
(Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013)
, populist parties of the radical left and
radical right share a skepticism if not outright disdain for the European Union as
the epitome of a political class that has more in common with one another,
whether center-left or center-right, than with the citizens of Europe
A major corollary to the idea that European integration initially proceeded
amidst a permissive consensus from citizens has been that support for the EU
among the public, although not initially salient, is considerably lower than it has
been from the political elite
(van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Hooghe and Marks
2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012)
. Mainstream politicians and political
parties of the center-left and center-right have both been the drivers of the
European Union, making the EU an elite-led, politically centrist project.
Comparison of the positions of party leadership with the preferences of party
voters on European integration from 2014–2015 shows that parties are
substantially more in favor of integration than their voters for all major European party
families, and that only the radical left and the radical right families are more
euroskeptic than their voters (Bakker et al. 2016, 11). For this reason, public
attitudes on European integration have been referred to as a ‘sleeping giant’ with
the latent capacity to disrupt domestic political competition if mobilized by
(van der Eijk and Franklin 2004)
. Although some have
referred to this potential giant of politicized integration as ‘fast asleep’, the
argument about the lack of EU politicization focuses on the unwillingness of
mainstream parties to take this issue up because of its divisiveness
). This, in turn, facilitates a potential crisis in representation
2014; Lanzone and Woods 2015)
on the EU, which has been capitalized on by
(De Vries 2007; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016)
At least one previous analysis reports evidence that party-based euroskepticism
from the radical left and radical right does not function according to entirely
(Halikiopoulou et al.] 2012)
. Rather than stressing the economic
argument for the radical left and cultural argument for the radical right as many do,
these authors argue that a shared nationalism undergirds these party families’
opposition to the EU. It is the nationalist positions of these parties that can help
make sense of otherwise odd partnerships such as the current governing coalition in
Greece between the radical left SYRIZA and radical right ANEL.3 Here, we offer a
different yet complementary mechanism for euroskepticism on the left and right
sides of the scale that is shared by populists of both ideological stripes, the salience
of anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric.
Hypothesis 1: Political parties that emphasize anti-elite, anti-establishment
rhetoric will more likely oppose European integration.
We anticipate two additional items related to our central hypothesis. First, our
expectation is that the proposed relationship between the importance of anti-elite
rhetoric and EU position will hold in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe.
The general ideological positioning of a political party structures its stance on
(Hooghe et al. 2002)
, but the communist legacy in Central and
Eastern Europe means that the left–right and socio-cultural positioning of parties
differ in East and West (Marks et al. 2006). Subsequent research has uncovered
substantial intra-regional variation in the extent to which the economic,
sociocultural, and European integration dimensions are interrelated with one another
(Bakker et al. 2012; Rovny and Edwards 2012; Rovny 2014)
. For much the same
Marks et al. (2006)
expected traditional, authoritarian, and nationalist
parties to oppose integration across the regions of Europe, we suspect parties that
emphasize anti-establishment discourse will resist the EU in both West and East.
Our second expectation pertains to the propensity for these anti-elite,
antiestablishment appeals to cluster at the extremes of the economic left and cultural
(Polk et al. 2017)
. Importantly for this paper, others have identified a group of
otherwise ideologically moderate anti-establishment reform parties in Eastern
(Hanley and Sikk 2016)
and the strong presence of protest voting against
incumbents (Pop-Eleches 2010). So while a strong correlation exists between
economic leftism, cultural rightism, and anti-elite sentiment, ideological extremity
does not appear to be a perfect predictor of anti-establishment salience for parties in
Our subsequent empirical analysis takes this into consideration. We seek to parse
out the extent to which variance on EU support is explained by ideological
placement on economic and cultural matters, and the extent to which anti-elitism
independently accounts for EU support. In the next section, we move on to describe
the data with which we test these expectations.
3 For more on this coalition, see Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser (2016).
3 Measuring Populism and EU Party Positions in the 2014 Chapel Hill
Political scientists have devised a number of approaches to estimating party policy
positions. Without question, analyzing the content of party manifestos is the most
widely used method
(see, e.g., Volkens et al. 2016)
. Increasingly, party politics
scholars have also turned to expert surveys as a supplement to manifesto-based
(e.g., Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006; Rohrschneider
and Whitefield 2012)
. Expert surveys and manifestos each have their strengths and
weaknesses as sources of information on party positions
(for a fuller discussion see
Budge 2000; Steenbergen and Marks 2007; Marks et al. 2007; McDonald et al.
. One important strength of expert surveys is that they allow researchers to
access party positions on topics that may not be covered in party manifestos.
European integration is just such an issue because, as mentioned above, mainstream
party leaders are often considerably more positive about the EU than their voters
and the EU potentially splits their electorates, making it an unattractive topic to
address in manifestos. For these reasons, we rely on expert survey placements of
parties for the independent and dependent variables in our analysis.
In total, 337 political scientists that focus on political parties, the politics of
European integration, or both received the 2014 wave of the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey (CHES).4 The responses to this survey ultimately yielded information on the
political ideology, stance on European integration, and positioning on a variety of
policy issues for 268 parties within Europe. All 28 member states of the European
Union are covered by the survey, in addition to Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey.5
We take our independent variable from a new item included in the 2014 CHES
about the ‘‘salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric’’ for the leadership
of political parties across Europe.6 Experts were asked to indicate the importance of
this type of rhetoric for all parties in their country of expertize, and those responses
could range from 0 (not at all important) to 10 (very important). The mean value for
this variable across the data is 4.9, with a standard deviation of 2.64, a minimum
value of 0.5, and a maximum placement of 10. Cross-validation of this survey
question with an independent measure of populism
(Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011)
shows an acceptable level concept validity
(see Polk et al. 2017, 3–4 for details)
In Fig. 1 we present our independent variable, the salience of anti-elite and
antiestablishment rhetoric, for political parties in two Western European countries,
Germany and the Netherlands. We include all parties that received more than 3% of
4 The 2014 data have been integrated with previous waves of the survey to create a single trend file that
covers five time points between 1999 and 2014
(Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017)
. The CHES data are
available for public download at chesdata.eu.
5 Huber and Inglehart (1995) suggest that there should be at least five completed surveys per country.
Since there were fewer than five completed surveys for Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta in the 2014 CHES
data, we drop these countries from our analysis.
6 Note that for Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p 151) anti-elitism is a necessary but not sufficient aspect of
populism. For a party to be counted as populist, according to these authors, the party must combine
antiestablishment/elitism with an emphasis on the will of the people. See the study by Selway and Hawkins in
this issue for an example of research stressing this former component of populism.
the vote in the national legislative elections immediately preceding the 2014 CHES
wave. As is clear from the bar graphs, populist rhetoric is considerably important to
parties of the political left, such as Die Linke and SP, as well as parties of the
political right, e.g., Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Geert Wilders’ Freedom
Party (PVV). In both countries, established mainstream players, e.g., CDU, SPD,
PvdA, and CDA, place much less emphasis on anti-elite discourse.
We also take the dependent variable for our study from the 2014 CHES. It is the
question about the ‘‘overall orientation of the party leadership towards European
integration in 2014’’. Responses to this question could range between 1 (strongly
opposed) to 7 (strongly in favor). The mean value for this item in the 2014 data is
4.93, a standard deviation of 1.74, minimum value of 1.05, and a maximum
placement of 7.
Figure 2 displays the bi-variate correlation between the party-based salience of
anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric and party positions on European
integration, our independent and dependent variables. The left panel shows this
relationship for the parties of Western Europe and the right panel does the same
for Central and Eastern European parties. As the scatterplots make clear, a similar
pattern exists in both regions. In both East and West, there is a strong relationship
between parties that stress anti-establishment discourse and anti-EU positions. In the
older member states the correlation is (r ¼ 0:76) and in the newer EU members it
is (r ¼ 0:69). This provides preliminary empirical support for our hypothesis, but
this relationship could also be spurious—actually driven by, for example, left/right
position—and thus requires additional, more careful analysis.
In the next section, we present a more detailed examination of the relationship
between the salience of anti-elite/anti-establishment for political parties across
European countries and the positions these parties take on European integration.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that determining the direction of causality
is difficult with cross-sectional data. While we have argued that anti-elite,
antiestablishment rhetoric leads to lower support for European integration, it is at least
plausible that the causal arrow flows the other way. The results from the regressions
in the next section should thus be taken as an additional, more robust piece of
evidence for a correlation between populist discourse and party-based
euroskepticism, but also findings in need of additional research.
4 Anti-Elite/Establishment Salience and Support for European integration
In addition to the salience of anti-elite rhetoric, a variety of other characteristics of
political parties is known to effect their stance on European integration. As
mentioned above, the economic left–right position
(Hooghe et al. 2002)
sociocultural position of a party (Marks et al. 2006) need to be taken into consideration in
any model of EU positioning. We include both variables from the CHES data in our
analysis. Since the relationship between ideological extremity and opposition to the
EU is also well established, we further include squared terms for a party’s economic
and Gal–Tan positions.7
Parties in government are known to be more supportive of the EU than their
(Hobolt et al. 2009)
. Since the EU has been a project of established
, we include a dichotomous variable that indicates
whether a party is in or out of government. Furthermore, to account for party
history, we include a continuous variable of party age taken from the Party Facts
(Do¨ring and Regel 2016)
. Since age tends to have non-linear effect we also
include a squared term for age. Finally, it is well known that levels of EU support
differ at the country-level across Europe. Countries that have entered the EU shortly
after escaping from authoritarian rule—be it southern European countries in the
aftermath of right-wing authoritarianism, or eastern Europe after the fall of
communism—are likely to be more enthusiastic about European integration. It is
likely that countries with lower levels of Quality of Government are more
supportive of EU integration as they see the EU as a positive anchor in terms of
democratic and governance practices (see Sa´nchez-Cuenca 2000; Rohrschneider
7 Gal–Tan is the CHES terminology for the socio-cultural dimension. It represents a continuum from
Green, Alternative, Libertarian (Gal) parties to those that are more Traditional, Nationalist, Authoritarian
for similar arguments at the individual-level). We use the PRS
Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) country-level measure of quality
of government, which is the mean value of the ICRG variables on corruption, law
and order, and bureaucratic quality. We obtained the variable from the Quality of
Government (QoG) Institute’s Basic Dataset
(Dahlberg et al. 2016)
Given that parties are nested within their party systems that differ due to
historical and other idiosyncratic factors, we estimate a hierarchical linear model
with country-level random intercepts uj. Our full model is the following:
EUpositionij ¼ b0 þ b1
Anti Elite Salienceij þ b2
econ left rightij
Before estimating the full model, we consider simpler models. Table 1 presents the
results of our multi-level models. Models 1 and 2 in the table predict EU support as
a function of ideological variables, omitting anti-elitism as a predictor. These
models demonstrate the strong association between both economic left–right and
cultural ‘Gal–Tan’ placement and EU support. Model 2 further suggests that all the
proposed control variables exert the expected effects.
Models 3 and 4 introduce the predictor of key theoretical interest for
us—antielite salience. The effect of this predictor is strongly negative, suggesting that
antielitism is associated with greatly reduced EU support. Strikingly, when this
predictor enters the model, the impact of all other independent variables drop in
magnitude, and most lose their statistical significance. Indeed only economic left–
right, and Quality of Government remain significant. Anti-elitism entirely displaces
the explanatory power of partisan cultural positioning, and significantly (though not
completely) reduces the effect of economic placement. It also trumps
nonideological partisan characteristics, such as government participation, and age. In
short, these results support our theoretical suggestion that it is primarily anti-elitism
that is the core underlying mechanism associating diverse types of parties in their
EU outlooks. These results are largely comparable across Eastern and Western
Europe (for details see the Appendix).
Figure 3 provides a closer look at the effect of economic and cultural ideology on
EU support. The lefthand column reports results from model 2, while the righthand
column reports results from model 4 which includes anti-elite salience. We can see
that in the absence of anti-elite salience (model 2), extreme left and extreme Tan
parties are extensively opposed to EU integration. However, when we control for
anti-elite salience, these effects diminish—in the case of Gal–Tan towards
insignificance. Figure 4 finally presents the effect of anti-elitism on EU support
taken from model 4, which controls for all the factors discussed. It demonstrates the
extensive and negative effect, while other predictors are held constant. Again, these
findings require some qualification because the cross-sectional nature of the data
complicates causal inference. Yet, at the same time, they provide consistent support
for a strong relationship between our central variables of interest.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
*** p \ 0.01, ** p \ 0.05, * p \ 0.1
In this article, we provided evidence that political parties that emphasize anti-elite
and anti-establishment discourse are more likely to oppose European integration.
This contributes to our understanding of populism, party politics, and European
Union studies in several ways. In showing that anti-elite/establishment rhetoric is a
common characteristic of euroskepticism from parties of the political right and left,
we avoid a tendency in the European populism scholarship to focus on the radical
right party family and/or the normative ramifications of populism (Aslanidis this
Anti-elite and anti-establishment discourse is central to populist parties across
Europe. This type of rhetoric, while not exclusive to ideologically extreme parties,
is concentrated among parties of the extreme economic left and extreme cultural
right. The same is also true for party-based opposition to European integration,
which led us to expect that parties that emphasize anti-elite/establishment rhetoric
will also be more likely to oppose the EU. Yet, prior to this analysis we did not
know if the salience of anti-elite rhetoric was systematically related to
euroskepticism independent of other qualities of political parties, such as ideological
position, governing status, and party age. Our results point to a strong and
independent relationship between this form of populist discourse and the anti-EU
Our finding that the connection between anti-elitism and EU positioning exists
for parties independent of their left–right position potentially complements research
on the existence of non-extreme, anti-establishment reform parties in Central and
(Hanley and Sikk 2016)
. More generally, the strength of this
relationship across both Eastern and Western Europe further contributes to the
stream of scholarship which suggests that although there are important differences
between Eastern and Western Europe, European politics can and should still be
approached from a common theoretical lens
(Marks et al. 2006; Rohrschneider and
Of course, our analysis raises many additional questions. First, as mentioned
earlier, the cross-sectional nature of the data complicates our ability to make causal
claims about the direction of the relationship between anti-elite rhetoric and anti-EU
positions. Future waves of the CHES and alternative sources of data will allow more
leverage on this question. Second, our results have interesting implications for
questions surrounding the effect of government participation on populist parties that
have defined themselves as anti-elite and anti-establishment. The European Union
provides parties in government a unique opportunity to potentially externalize the
costs associated with governing
(Hobolt and Tilley 2014)
. Fidesz in Hungary and
Law and Justice in Poland are recent examples of parties in government that have
been able to maintain some anti-elite populist stances while themselves
participating within the political establishment. Future work could both look more carefully at
if and how populist discourse changes once these parties are in government (see
Peruzzotti this issue for a related topic) and the reference point for questions asking
about the elite and the establishment.
Additional research should also seek to parse out the associations between the
diverse predictors in our model and views of European integration. As our earlier
(Polk et al. 2017)
suggests, partisan ideological placements, government
participation, and party age are significant predictors of anti-elite and
antiestablishment rhetoric, which in turn—as this paper demonstrates—is an important,
independent predictor of partisan euroskepticism. This more complex set of
relationships between party characteristics and views of Europe invites further
research analyzing the structural associations between these variables.
Acknowledgements Versions of this paper were presented at the ‘‘Workshop on Populism in the Age of
Globalization’’, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, and the Centre
for European Research at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU). We thank participants of both groups
and Maurits Meijers for comments and helpful suggestions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
See Table 2.
Table 2 Multi-level regression
model predicting EU position
across east and west
Level 1 fixed effects
Jonathan Polk is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Centre for
European Research (CERGU) at the University of Gothenburg. His interests include political parties,
European politics, representation, and political participation in economically advanced democracies. His
research has been published in Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research,
European Union Politics, Journal of Politics, Party Politics, and among other outlets. He is also one of the
principal investigators of the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on party positioning.
Jan Rovny is an Assistant Professor at the Centre d’e´tudes europe´ennes and LIEPP at Sciences Po, Paris.
His research concentrates on political competition in Europe with the aim of uncovering the ideological
conflict lines in different countries. His work has been published in various journals, such as European
Journal of Political Research, European Political Science Review, European Union Politics, Party
Politics, and World Politics. He is also one of the principal investigators of the Chapel Hill Expert
Surveys on party positioning.
Abts , Koen, and Stefan Rummens . 2007 . Populism versus democracy . Political Studies 55 ( 2 ): 405 - 424 .
Aslanidis , Paris. 2016 . Is populism an ideology? A refutation and a new perspective . Political Studies 64 ( 1S ): 88 - 104 .
Aslanidis , Paris. 2017 . Academic Biases in Populist Scholarship. Chinese Political Science Review 2 ( 3 ): Aslanidis, Paris, and Cristo´bal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2016 . Dealing with populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece . Democratization 23 ( 6 ): 1077 - 1091 .
Bakker , R., S. Jolly , and J. Polk . 2012 . Complexity in the European party space: exploring dimensionality with experts . European Union Politics 13 ( 2 ): 219 - 245 .
Bakker , Ryan, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2015 . Measuring party positions in Europe The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999 - 2010 . Party Politics 21 ( 1 ): 143 - 152 .
Bakker , Ryan, Seth Jolly , and Jonathan Polk . 2016 . Multidimensional congruence and European Parliament electoral performance . In American Political Science Association Annual Meeting.
Benoit , Kenneth, and Michael Laver . 2006 . Party policy in modern democracies . Routledge.
Bonikowski , Bart, and Noam Gidron . 2016 . Multiple traditions in populism research: toward a theoretical synthesis . APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter 26 ( 2 ): 7 - 14 .
Budge , Ian. 2000 . Expert judgements of party policy positions: uses and limitations in political research . European Journal of Political Research 37 ( 1 ): 103 - 113 .
Dahlberg , Stefan, So¨ren Homberg, Bo Rothstein, Anna Khomenko, and Richard Svensson. 2016 . ''The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, version Jan16 .'' University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute . http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
De Vries , Catherine E. 2007 . Sleeping giant: fact or fairytale? How European integration affects national elections . European Union Politics 8 ( 3 ): 363 - 385 .
De Vries , Catherine E., and Erica E. Edwards . 2009 . Taking europe to its extremes extremist parties and public Euroscepticism . Party Politics 15 ( 1 ): 5 - 28 .
Deegan-Krause , Kevin, and Tim Haughton . 2009 . Toward a more useful conceptualization of populism: types and degrees of populist appeals in the case of Slovakia . Politics and Policy 37 ( 4 ): 821 - 841 .
Do¨ring, Holger , and Sven Regel . 2016 . Party Facts: An online platform about political parties . http:// www.partyfacts.org.
Green-Pedersen , Christoffer . 2012 . A giant fast asleep? Party incentives and the politicisation of European integration . Political Studies 60 ( 1 ): 115 - 130 .
Halikiopoulou , Daphne, Kyriaki Nanou , and Sofia Vasilopoulou. 2012 . The paradox of nationalism: the common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism . European Journal of Political Research 51 ( 4 ): 504 - 539 .
Hanley , Sea´n, and Allan Sikk . 2016 . Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the breakthroughs of anti-establishment reform parties in eastern Europe . Party Politics 22 ( 5 ): 522 - 533 .
Hobolt , Sara B. 2012 . ''Citizen satisfaction with democracy in the European Union .' ' JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50 ( s1 ): 88 - 105 .
Hobolt , Sara B. 2016 . ''The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent .' ' Journal of European Public Policy 1 -19.
Hobolt , Sara B. , and Catherine E. De Vries . 2015 . Issue entrepreneurship and multiparty competition . Comparative Political Studies 48 ( 9 ): 1159 - 1185 .
Hobolt , Sara B. , Jae-Jae Spoon , and James Tilley . 2009 . A vote against Europe? Explaining defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections . British Journal of Political Science 39 ( 01 ): 93 - 115 .
Hobolt , Sara B , and James Tilley. 2014 . Blaming europe? Responsibility without accountability in the european union . Oxford University Press.
Hooghe , Liesbet, and Gary Marks . 2009 . A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus . British Journal of Political Science 39 ( 01 ): 1 - 23 .
Hooghe , Liesbet, Gary Marks , and Carole J. Wilson . 2002 . Does left/right structure party positions on European integration? Comparative Political Studies 35 ( 8 ): 965 - 989 .
Hooghe , Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine De Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Vachudova . 2010 . Reliability and validity of measuring party positions: the Chapel Hill expert surveys of 2002 and 2006 . European Journal of Political Research 49 ( 5 ): 687 - 703 .
Huber , John, and Ronald Inglehart. 1995 . Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in 42 societies . Party Politics 1 ( 1 ): 73 - 111 .
Jagers , Jan, and Stefaan Walgrave . 2007 . Populism as political communication style: an empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium . European Journal of Political Research 46 ( 3 ): 319 - 345 .
Kioupkiolis , Alexandros. 2016 . Podemos: the ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in contemporary Spain . Journal of Political Ideologies 21 ( 2 ): 99 - 120 .
Kriesi , Hanspeter. 2007 . The role of European integration in national election campaigns . European Union Politics 8 ( 1 ): 83 - 108 .
Kriesi , Hanspeter. 2014 . The populist challenge . West European Politics 37 ( 2 ): 361 - 378 .
Lanzone , Liza, and Dwayne Woods . 2015 . Riding the Populist Web: Contextualizing the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy . Politics and Governance 3 ( 2 ).
Lindberg , Leon N , and Stuart A Scheingold. 1970 . Europe's would-be polity: patterns of change in the European community . Prentice Hall.
March , Luke. 2007 . From vanguard of the proletariat to vox populi: left-populism as a'shadow'of contemporary socialism . SAIS Review 27 ( 1 ): 63 - 77 .
March , Luke. 2017 . ''Left and right populism compared: The British case . '' The British Journal of Politics and International Relations p. 1369148117701753 .
Marks , Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Marco Steenbergen, and Ryan Bakker . 2007 . Crossvalidating data on party positioning on European integration . Electoral Studies 26 ( 1 ): 23 - 38 .
Marks , Gary, Liesbet Hooghe, Moira Nelson, and Erica Edwards . 2006 . Party competition and European integration in the East and West: Different structure, same causality . Comparative Political Studies 39 ( 2 ): 155 - 175 .
McDonald , Michael D. , Silvia M. Mendes , and Myunghee Kim . 2007 . Cross-Temporal and CrossNational Comparisons of Party Left-Right Positions . Electoral Studies 26 : 62 - 75 .
Mudde , Cas. 2004 . The populist zeitgeist . Government and Opposition 39 ( 4 ): 542 - 563 .
Mudde , Cas. 2007 . Populist radical right parties in Europe . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Mudde , Cas, and Cristo´bal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013 . Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America . Government and Opposition 48 ( 02 ): 147 - 174 .
Otjes , Simon, and Tom Louwerse. 2015 . Populists in parliament: comparing left-wing and right-wing populism in the Netherlands . Political Studies 63 ( 1 ): 60 - 79 .
Peruzotti , Enrique. 2017 . The globalization of populism: trends and threats . Chinese Political Science Review 2 ( 3 ).
Polk , Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Gijs Schumacher , et al. 2017 . Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data . Research and Politics 4 ( 1 ): 2053168016686915 .
Pop-Eleches , Grigore . 2010 . Throwing out the bums: protest voting and unorthodox parties after communism . World Politics 62 ( 02 ): 221 - 260 .
Ramiro , Luis, and Raul Gomez . 2016 . ''Radical-left populism during the great recession: Podemos and its competition with the established radical left .'' Political Studies p. 0032321716647400 .
Rohrschneider , Robert. 2002 . ''The democracy deficit and mass support for an EU-wide government .'' American Journal of Political Science 463 -475.
Rohrschneider , Robert, and Stephen Whitefield . 2012 . The strain of representation: how parties represent diverse voters in western and eastern Europe . Oxford University Press.
Rohrschneider , Robert, and Stephen Whitefield . 2016 . Responding to growing European Unionskepticism? The stances of political parties toward European integration in Western and Eastern Europe following the financial crisis . European Union Politics 17 ( 1 ): 138 - 161 .
Rooduijn , Matthijs, Sarah L. de Lange, and Wouter Van Der Brug . 2014 . A populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe . Party Politics 20 ( 4 ): 563 - 575 .
Rooduijn , Matthijs, and Teun Pauwels . 2011 . Measuring populism: comparing two methods of content analysis . West European Politics 34 ( 6 ): 1272 - 1283 .
Rooduijn , Matthijs, and Tjitske Akkerman . 2015 . ''Flank attacks Populism and left-right radicalism in Western Europe .'' Party Politics 1354068815596514.
Rovny , Jan. 2014 . Communism, federalism, and ethnic minorities: explaining party competition patterns in Eastern Europe . World Politics 66 ( 4 ): 669 - 708 .
Rovny , Jan, and Erica E. Edwards . 2012 . Struggle over dimensionality: political competition in Western and Eastern Europe . East European Politics and Societies 26 ( 1 ).
Sa´nchez- Cuenca , Ignacio . 2000 . The political basis of support for European integration . European Union Politics 1 ( 2 ): 147 - 171 .
Selway , Joel, and Kirk Hawkins . 2017 . Thaksin the Populist? What the day say: a qualitative coding of Thai political leaders speeches . Chinese Political Science Review 2 ( 3 ).
Sitter , Nick. 2001 . The politics of opposition and European integration in Scandinavia: is Euro-scepticism a government-opposition dynamic? West European Politics 24 ( 4 ): 22 - 39 .
Stanley , Ben. 2008 . The thin ideology of populism . Journal of Political Ideologies 13 ( 1 ): 95 - 110 .
Stavrakakis , Yannis, and Giorgos Katsambekis . 2014 . Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case of SYRIZA . Journal of Political Ideologies 19 ( 2 ): 119 - 142 .
Steenbergen , Marco, and Gary Marks . 2007 . Evaluating expert judgments . European Journal of Political Research 46 ( 3 ): 347 - 366 .
Taggart , Paul. 1998 . A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems . European Journal of Political Research 33 ( 3 ): 363 - 388 .
van der Eijk , Cees, and Mark N. Franklin . 2004 . Potential for Contestation on European Matters at National Elections in Europe . In European Integration and Political Conflict, ed. Gary Marks, and Marco R. Steenbergen , 32 - 50 . New York: Cambridge University Press.
Volkens , Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Theres Matthieß, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, and Annika Werner . 2016 . The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR) . Version 2016a . Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung (WZB).
Weyland , Kurt. 2001 . ''Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics . '' Comparative Politics 1-22.