Populism in Search of its Model
Populism in Search of its Model
Dwayne Woods 0 1
Model Ideology 0 1
Movement Discourse 0 1
0 Department of Political Science, Purdue University , West Lafayette, IN , USA
1 & Dwayne Woods
This article makes the case that populism needs to be understood in the context of a model. The key argument formulated in this article is that the phenomenon of populism does not lend itself to taut theoretical formulations. Consequently, the explanatory and the inferential reaches of populism are largely descriptive. However, ''mere description'' within the context of a model is more than enough to produce rich understandings of populism and, under the right modeling conditions, even predictions of populist discourse eruptions and movements.
With the shock of the Brexit referendum in Great Britain and the election of Donald
Trump to the presidency in the United States, populism has regained notoriety. An
inverse dynamic, however, has emerged between the growing popular use of the
term by the media and its use by the public and social scientists. Many social
scientists are convinced that the popularity of populism is indicative of a concept
that lacks a precise definition and is not grounded in any rigorous theorizing. They
see its popularity as a sign of conceptual promiscuousness, that it is now a cliche´,
and that any written or oral presentation on populism should begin with the
proverbial assertion that the concept has been poorly or inappropriately defined
(Me´ny and Surel 2002)
. As Ernesto
, pp. 143) emphatically has stated,
‘‘few [terms] have been defined with less precision… We know intuitively to what
we are referring when we call a movement or an ideology populist, but we have the
greatest difficulty in translating the intuition into concepts.’’
, pp. 76)
asserts that this lack of clarity and conceptual coherence undermines the concept’s
utility: ‘‘such usage may be appropriate for journalistic purposes, but it is inadequate
for social scientific analysis.’’ He adds that ‘‘the fundamental problem is that most
academic discussions of populism continue to rely on folk theories. Everyday usage
of the term is overly general, applying to any person, movement, or regime that
makes claims by appealing to ordinary (i.e., non-elite) people.’’1
The crux of these critical reflections is that the conceptual net of populism is too
broad and its theoretical core too shallow
. As a consequence, a
myriad of political discourses and disparate political and social movements are too
easily classified as populist.
Gidron and Bonikoski (2013
, pp. 1) articulate such a
critique in their assessment of the extant literature:
In recent years, populism has attracted considerable interest from social
scientists and political commentators despite the fact that, ‘[t]he mercurial
nature of populism has often exasperated those attempting to take it seriously.’
Indeed, the term ‘populism’ is both widely used and widely contested. It has
been defined based on political, economic, social, and discursive features and
analyzed from myriad theoretical perspectives including structuralism,
poststructuralism, modernization theory, social movement theory, party politics,
political psychology, political economy, and democratic theory and a variety
of methodological approaches, such as archival research, discourse analysis,
and formal modeling. As observed by
, ‘to each his own
definition of populism, according to the academic axe he grinds.’
Obviously, what is asserted in these critical reflections on populism is that the
concept of populism needs a tauter theoretical definition and a more precise way to
categorize populist movements.
The argument developed herein for this special issue of the Chinese Political
Science Review on ‘‘Populism in the Age of Globalization’’ is that most of the
criticisms are misguided. They conflate competing interpretive views of populism
with the broader conceptual model of populism. The contention here is that
populism is an example of a successful and effective conceptual model whose
fundamental problem arises from those working on populism not recognizing the
distinction between conceptual models and theories. Interestingly, the effectiveness
of populism as a model emerged by default; it is the outgrowth of the misplaced
attempts to develop a more precise theoretical definition
. In doing so,
what the literature unintentionally achieved is the articulation of a model that
encapsulates many key dimensions of populism. This is underscored in the diversity
of the essays in this special issue on populism. The articles explore populism from
1 Many of the references and some of the language in this article are drawn from a previous article
different angles and differ on how they define, measure, and study it. However, if
these articles are viewed as part of a broader model, they underscore that populism
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that requires more than one definition of it and
different levels of analysis.
This article is organized into three sections. First, there is a brief overview of
what constitutes a model and why models are useful. Second, a model of populism
is presented. Finally, there is a discussion on what a model of populism suggests
should be future areas of conceptual exploration and debate.
2 What is a Model?
At the most fundamental level, a model is a representation of something that
provides a structure. Models serve many purposes and come in many varieties
(Morgan and Morrison 1999; Morton 1999; Nersessian 1999; Taagepera 2008;
. Economists rely generally on formal models that they sometimes
confuse with theories (Rodrik 2015). Other social sciences are less sure about
whether they are engaged in modeling or theoretical construction. Since it is
difficult to precisely define what a model is, social scientists have a hard time
distinguishing between the models and theories. The difficulty in separating the two
leads to a conflation in which models are treated as theories and theories are viewed
as generating predictions and hypotheses that require empirical confirmation.
Although the distinction between the two is difficult, it is useful to view models and
theories as distinct from each other. In Isaak’s (1969, pp. 174–175) perspective,
‘‘the basic argument is that models, unlike theories, do not explain anything and are
not abstractions or idealized representations in any general sense.’’
There are three broad ways of thinking about models. First, there is the syntactic view
in which models are understood as consisting of statements from which predictions can
be deduced and tested to determine whether or not they are confirmed. The syntactic
notion of models comes close to the hypothetico-deductive tradition that has been
associated with Karl Popper. Models are essentially theories that produce predictions or
hypotheses that can be confirmed or falsified. In contrast to this definition of models,
Clarke and Primo (2012)
argue that models are like maps that are neither true nor false,
but derive their role from their utility. In the semantic view advocated by Clarke and
Primo among others, models are ‘‘representations of selected parts of the world.’’ A third
definition of models is what James
calls the predicate view; it sees
models as ‘‘linguistic entities—specifically, definitions or conceptions—that are distinct
from but can be incorporated into theories.’’ Johnson (2014, pp. 557) posits that in this
view, models are not statements themselves or assertions about the world and so are
neither true nor false except in a trivial sense. Indeed: ‘‘It is a category mistake to ask
whether they are true or attempt to test them.’’ The primary purpose of models is
conceptual exploration. Like Johnson, I endorse this view of models.
The main virtue of the predicate notion of models is that, unlike the syntactic or
the semantic view, it clearly differentiates models and theories. As Johnson notes,
the predicate view keeps the two distinct and it offers a view of how we use models
primarily for conceptual exploration
(Johnson 2014, pp. 557)
. Loosely speaking,
models are conceptual sorting tools that allow us to articulate a considerably more
concrete conception of things. In other words, as
, pp. 45) argues in a
recent paper, ‘‘when making a model we do not abstract from reality, as economists
and political scientists tend to imagine, but move in very nearly the opposite
direction. We move from the relatively abstract and general to the relatively
concrete and particular.’’ As heuristic devices, models help us organize ‘‘our study
of an unfamiliar situation or area.’’ Models open the door to how we should theorize
about something concrete
. I would add that models also help us
determine what can and cannot be formulated as a theory.
As stated, models are not theories. A theory can be defined as a set of ideas that
provide an explanation of a phenomenon or an empirical generalization
. In sum, ‘‘a theory is set of generalizations containing concepts with which we
are directly acquainted and those which are operationally defined; but in addition,
and more important, theoretical concepts that although not directly tied to
observations are logically related to those concepts that are’’
. The central criterion for assessing a theory ‘‘is to determine how well it
is doing what it is expected to do.’’ In an ideal context, ‘‘social science theories
should be able to explain empirical generalizations because it is more general, more
inclusive than they are’’
(Isaak 1969, pp. 173–174)
. More telling,
theories explain and organize existing knowledge. They also suggest potential
knowledge by general hypotheses. A theory can, on the basis of its highly
abstract generalizations, often predict an empirical generalization-predict that
a particular relationship holds. The hypothesis can then be tested and accepted
or rejected. Thus, it can be said that in addition to its explanatory and
organizational functions, theory has a heuristic one – to suggest, to generalize
(Isaak 1969, pp. 173)
Generally speaking, in the social sciences, we do not have theories of this nature
.2 What we have is the ability to explore phenomena in the context
of models—they can be formal or non-formal. Models are exploratory devices that
have a great deal of heuristic value. As Isaak (1969, pp. 176) states, ‘‘if models are
mainly heuristic value, if their primary function within the scientific enterprise is to
suggest relationships between concepts—to generate hypotheses—then they belong
to the realm of scientific discovery and not explanation.’’
3 A Model of Populism
In not explicitly thinking about populism in the context of a model, the literature has
generated more obfuscation and confusion than is necessary. The perennial claim
that populism is hard to define turns out not to be correct in the context of a model.
Different theories and definitions purport to capture populism, but it is obvious that
the types of populist manifestations and empirical patterns they identify vary.
Within a model, the disparate conceptualizations allow us to evaluate and compare
2 I am agnostic as to whether this claim is true in general; however, I believe it applies to populism.
plausible mechanisms and patterns of populism. To evaluate these conceptions;
however, we first need to understand that the explanatory target only makes sense
within a model. Precisely what manifestations count as populism? Do any specific
social and economic dynamics qualify as dynamics of populism? As is now obvious,
populism designates not a single unambiguous concept, but a cluster of concepts
and measures. Thus, how and why they relate is determined by a model of populism,
a model that represents a conceptual sorting mechanism whose purpose is to help
identify what kind of populism is at issue. The different descriptive explanations
offered in the literature may not in fact be in competition because the explananda
(Bramson et al. 2017)
If models are heuristic devises that structure the way we explore things, then we need
to begin by asking what type of model is populism. The response is overwhelming in the
literature that populism is an inductive model. In this respect, a model of populism has
emerged as a type of ‘‘reasoning by analogy’’
(Nersessian 1999, pp. 20)
. Populism as a
concept seems to have arisen from inductive conceptualizing of analogous historical
events that required some type of characterization and identification. The emergence of
grassroots movements in nineteenth century United States and Russia contributed to the
ideographic identification of populism as a type of popular social mobilization in which
the ideal of the people as ‘‘sovereign’’ and ‘‘indivisible’’ predominated against small
elite. Populist manifestations in Latin America in the mid-twentieth century reinforced
the centrality of the people and the element of anti-elitism in how populism appeared to
operate as a social movement. Thus, the purpose and the utility of the model are directly
linked to efforts to interpret and explore a phenomenon whose manifestations have been
contextual, but persistent
Three broad waves of populism have been identified: agrarian populism, Latin
American populism, and new-right populism. Agrarian populism is to be found in the
Russian intellectual Narodniki in the second half of the nineteenth century, in the
egalitarian struggle on behalf of Russian peasants. Also, the American People’s Party,
which pleaded against capitalism in favor of agrarian socio-economic interests around
the turn of the 20th century, is generally considered as an example of agrarian populism.
Houwen (2011, pp. 8, 9) observes that ‘‘the term ‘populism’ arises at the end of the 19th
century, during an era in which the notion of ‘‘the people’’ becomes a key word of
modern politics and ‘democracy’ tends to be positively valued again.’’ Moreover, it was
used to characterize the American Peoples Party founded in 1892. Notably, the Peoples
Party appealed to the unprivileged position of the ordinary people and reclaimed the
power of the people as a whole…’’
(Houwen 2011, pp. 9)
The Latin American variant of populism prospered in the 1940s and 1950s with
the authoritarian regimes of Pe´ron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil
. These nationalist, charismatic leaders claimed to embody the people and to
govern on their behalf against external nefarious forces.
A fourth wave of populism appeared in the 1990s. This wave of populism
emerged in Europe, primarily as a kind of new-right populism. New-right populism
typically focuses on issues such as immigration, taxes, crime, and nationalism.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, several Eastern Europe countries
witnessed the emergence or resurgence of populist movements. In Latin America, a
type of neoliberal and left-wing populism surged. Resurgence of populism in North
America has drawn scholarly attention. From the first two waves, two of the three
defining elements in most conceptions of populism emerged: first, the centrality of
the people and second, a strong anti-elitism. Within the model of populism, these
two core elements of populism have remained the primary reason that the concept is
invoked to explain populist movements and leaders in disparate places such as Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Iran, India, and Russia.
An inductive model of populism is significant for two reasons. First, the model
indicates that the factors behind the rise of populism are non-structural. What this
means is that there is no underlying structural element—such as capitalism,
globalization, and demography—that engenders populist manifestations
, pp. 11) captures this nicely:
In the absence of a general theory of populism, the scholarly literature has
explained its emergence as the passive consequence of macro-level
socioeconomic developments. Read in this way, populism is the straightforward
consequence of globalisation and its unwanted effects: outsourcing, relentless
automation, lost jobs, and stagnant middle-class incomes. But it is an
all-toocommon misperception to describe populist voters as mere losers of the
process of modernisation with a misguided sense of blame attribution.
Explanations citing austerity and income polarization may account for anger
and frustration but they need to be balanced out with the central role of
ideology and an analysis of the will of populist leaders to gain power and
change social reality. Populist parties are not mere consequences of
socioeconomic changes but actively shape their destinies.
This is not to say that in specific places and under certain conditions structural
factors do not contribute to the rise of populism movements, parties, or leaders, but
it does indicate that there is no strong correlative relationship in which one can
specify how a crisis of capitalism or globalization gives rise to populism. If this is
the case, then efforts to theorize populism as a linear phenomenon or illustrative of
some specifiable data generating process is a waste of time. Thus, context matters
and any attempts at comparative cross-national analysis of populism must address
this contextual fact and rely on the model to figure out how to generalize outside of
(Houle and Kenny 2016)
, pp. 2) puts it, ‘‘populism obtains when a certain
political entrepreneur is able to polarize politics by creating a cleavage based on the
interaction between ‘the people’ versus some establishment,’ thus forging a…
political movement.’’ In this respect, the model of populism highlights the centrality
of power and the politics of achieving it. This is what William
, pp. 9,
10) defined as heresthetics; that is, a political strategy by which a person or group
manipulates the context and decision-making process to win or disrupts the rules in
their favor to win.3 From Riker we learn that all institutional equilibria are
3 This logic is also at the heart of what
, pp. 9, 10) coins ‘‘heresthetics.’’ Heresthetics refers to
a political strategy by which parties structure political competition in such a way that they gain leverage
from competing on a pre-existing dimension on which advantages are already held or by introducing an
issue dimension that allows them to reshuffle the current structure of party competition to their advantage.
susceptible to generic instability.4 Populism is often a source of this instability.
states that ‘‘what we have learned is simply this: disequilibrium, or the
potential that the status quo be upset, is the characteristic feature of politics.’’ In
has provided the best theorizing within the conceptual
narrative of a populist model of the centrality of power and the strategy to win.
Finally, a model of populism evokes crisis
. Crisis and heresthetics
are related. In his study of populism and crisis,
underscores the fact
that populist manifestations do not only arise in response to crises, but that populism
acts as a trigger to crisis. If a core dimension of populism is the disruption of the
status quo, then crises are instrumental to any populist leader or movement as they
seek to disrupt the status quo.
4 The Purpose of a Model
Since the purpose of models is to explore and seek out some conceptual clarity, we
should expect competing and complementary theories and descriptions of why the
non-structural basis to populism lends itself to contextualized manifestations of the
phenomenon, and how populism intersects with power and institutional stability and
. I argue that the model of populism has contributed to
effective descriptive analyses
. We know a lot about populism and
what engenders it.
However, in conflating theories and models, the literature has failed to recognize
the development of an effective descriptive analysis of populism. At this point, three
distinct descriptive analyses have emerged that help us understand, measure, and,
ceteris paribus, even predict, to some degree, the rise of populist leaders, discourses,
and movements. These descriptive analyses conceptualize populism as a ‘‘thin
ideology,’’ as political strategy, and as communication style. My contention is that
within a model of populism these descriptive analyses have fared better than others
because an inductive model of populism imposes certain limitations on how we go
about explaining it!
5 Populism as Ideology
Within any narrative or fable of populism, the people matter
Mu¨ ller (2016
, pp. 5) argues, ‘‘populism… is a particular moralistic imagination of
politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully
unified—but … ultimately fictional—people against elites.’’ At the most general
level, this is the bedrock of the populist notion and it is a recurrent theme in populist
rhetoric and claims to legitimacy. Beyond the abstract claim to ‘‘the people,’’ there
is obviously a great deal of variation in interpretations of what constitutes ‘‘the
Hobolt and de Vries (2015
: 1166) point out, ‘‘Riker uses the metaphor of the market to explain why
losers in the political game will try to find some alternative that beats the current winner. The model of
issue evolution has been successfully applied to explain the rise of issues, such as slavery, racial
segregation, abortion, and ‘culture wars issues’ in the U.S. context.’’.
people.’’ Context, history, and leadership style play key roles in giving content to
the abstraction of ‘‘the people’’ in populism. There was a degree of natural
legitimacy attached to ‘‘the people’’ and illegitimacy to ‘‘the elite.’’ Both ‘‘the
people’’ and ‘‘the elite’’ were rather nebulous ideation categories, but they
nevertheless serve as nodal points. While ‘‘the people’’ versus ‘‘the elite’’ anchors
the concept of populism as an ideology, the analytical use of the concept of
populism as a way to understand and explain an ideological system is limited.
For this reason, populism is seen as a ‘‘thin ideology.’’
Mudde and Kaltwasser
, pp. 3) formulate it as follows
In theory, populism is an independent ideology, unattached to any particular
other ideology. In practice, populism is almost always combined with one or
more other ideological features. Which ideological features attach to populism
depend upon the socio- political context within which the populist actors
mobilize. Seen in this light, the rise and consolidation of populism is highly
determined by national, regional, and historical circumstances, since the latter
influence the shape of political ideologies, particularly when it comes to
addressing ‘‘the people’’ living in a given territory in a particular point of time.
At the same time, while populism does take a different shape in Europe and
Latin America, populist actors always favor a particular type of politics, which
is not anti-democratic per se but, rather, at odds with liberal democracy.
In a model of populism, it is inconceivable that we could make sense of it without
defining in some way these ideological characteristics
(Woods 2010; Elchardus and
5.1 Populism as Political Strategy
In the now extensive literature on populism, a great deal of attention is paid to the
political strategies of individuals and their use of populist ideology to mobilize ‘‘the
people’’ against those in power
. In some cases, such as Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand, populism becomes the
ideological vehicle through which a charismatic leader seeks or exercises
government power based on direct, unmediated support from large numbers of
(Hawkins and Selway 2017)
. Within the model of populism the
theory that looks at populism as political strategy focuses on shifts in the role of
individuals in mobilizing and structuring populist movements. Oftentimes, a
charismatic personality embodies ‘‘the people’’ and seeks to act as a vox populi to
right the wrongs that ‘‘the people’’ have suffered at the hands of something external
to them. Overall, as
Helstro¨ m (2013
, pp. 9) notes,
populism as style refers to a certain way of doing politics. …The populist style
typically relies on the charismatic leadership to partly bypass established ways
of doing politics via, e.g., party politics. Populist politics encourages direct
channels for popular participation. The charismatic leader embodies the
popular will in his or her persona. In this regard, the populist politician
mobilizes voters along feelings of resentment, aiming to represent the
common sense of the ordinary people vis-a`-vis the political institutions and the
established (indirect) ways of doing politics.
By giving analytical primacy to populism as a political strategy, both conceptual
and empirical foci turn to the populist leader. Ideology is often displaced with more
attention going to the leader and the attachment forged between him and ‘‘the
people.’’ The populist style has been attributed to dissimilar political figures such as
Vladimir Putin in Russia, Shinawatra in Thailand, Bossi in Italy, and Wilders in the
Netherlands. What ties these dissimilar political figures together is that populism as
a political strategy evokes a style that connects to a certain personalization of
politics and the Rikerian heresthetics of power politics and the disruption of
5.2 Populism as Discursive Style
While some effort in the populist literature has been undertaken to separate the
thinideological aspect of populism from its discursive style, as several of the articles in
this issue and other studies have shown, the two are integral to each other. Carlos
la Torre (2000
, pp. 4) defines populism as a ‘‘rhetoric that constructs politics as the
moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy.’’ As
argued earlier, the binaries of populism ‘‘us versus them,’’ ‘‘the people’’ versus ‘‘the
elite’’ anchors populism, even when it links to other ideologies, to a certain
discursive style and form of mobilization. Basically, across all populist movements
these binary elements predominate. Whether or not these binary elements are
captured in the core beliefs of political actors as expressive of an ideology, or rather
as a form of political expression that is employed selectively and strategically by
both right and left, liberals and conservatives, depends on the context
Despite some similarities between the ideological and discursive approaches, the
differences between them carry significant conceptual and methodological
implications and push researchers toward different modes of empirical inquiry
and Walgrave 2007; Bonikoski 2017; Aslanidis 2017b)
. The most important
implications concern the units of analysis and measurement scales employed in the
study of populism: considering populism as a discursive style lends itself to its
operationalization as a gradational property of specific instances of political
expression rather than as an essential attribute of political parties or political leaders
that can be captured by a simple populist/non-populist dichotomy. Since political
actors can shape and reshape their rhetorical style more easily than their official
ideology, this definition makes it possible to more closely trace variations in levels
and types of populist politics between political actors.
In keeping with
) argument that conceptions of populism need to be
cognizant of levels of analysis, there are recent studies that are attempting to
measure populism not only through discourse or content analysis, or focusing on the
strategic behavior of elites, but at the individual level
experimental and simulation methods are being developed to add to the exploratory
toolbox of the inductive model of populism.
Muis and Scholte (2013)
employed agent-based modeling to tease out the mechanisms by which populist
parties evolve and adapt in their search for winning positions. They argued that
agent-based modeling is a fruitful tool to systematically map out the implications of
hypotheses on the behavior of parties, voters, and their interactions. The agent-based
modeling should be complemented with game-theoretic methodology in some
instances as a way to sharpen our focus on the underlying strategic or
decisiontheoretic logic of populist leaders.
6 Good Models are Useful Models
My central thesis is that there is not a problem with how to define populism since it
is not a singular phenomenon and that too much ‘‘ink’’ has been wasted on
articulating the right definition. While there is no singular definition of populism,
this does not mean that populism cannot be defined. It can and it has been. The most
useful definitions of populism have arisen in an inductive model of the phenomenon
that the literature failed to explicitly develop but has generated nonetheless by
default. By providing a disambiguation of populism into three distinct descriptive
explananda as part of a broader model, I have sought to facilitate how we should
think about populism. In doing so, I have made three bold claims. First, populism
cannot be adequately conceptualized outside of a model. Second, there is no theory
of populism; there are ‘‘mere descriptions’’ of it and descriptive explanations of its
(Golder and Golder 2016)
. Finally, despite the uneasiness
that academics have about the concept, the implicit inductive modeling of populism
has resulted in a rich descriptive and empirical literature that suggests that we have
accumulated a great deal of knowledge about it. In this respect, since a good model
is judged by how useful it is, the inductive model of populism has proven to be quite
As the articles in this special issue show, the future direction of work on
populism lies in moving beyond how it is defined and whether it is a ‘‘thin
ideology,’’ discourse, or movement and towards deeper explorations for why
populism is such a contextual phenomenon, and in what ways, as Aslanidis (2017a)
suggests, the literature can move beyond its biases. Moreover, there are other
aspects of populism that remain unexplored. For instance, why does the ideational
core, i.e., the ‘‘thin ideology, of populism need to piggy back on other ideological
. Providing some understanding of the affinity of
populism with other ideologies is a lot more useful than arguments that it is not a
thin or thick ideology
. In other words, what is it about populism that
engenders such an eclectic affinity with other ideologies? Also, what is the
relationship between populism, broadly understood as an ideology, discursive
phenomenon, and movement, to political regimes and representation
? There is little evidence that permits us to think about populism as a regime
type. Nonetheless, populist discourse, ideology, and movements affect political
regimes and modes of representation
(Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017; Norris
and Inglehart 2017)
. The nature of the effects appears also to be contextual. The
centrality of populism under Chavez and the popular socialist regime he presided
over is quite different from the effects of the populism in Orba´n’s Hungary.
The upshot is that an inductive model of populism has resulted in a large and
diverse literature and, as shown in this special issue, is producing a conceptually and
empirically rich understanding of an elusive phenomenon. Without abusing the
analogy, populism is a little like the quantum in quantum mechanics. We know its
there, we know its real, but it has the odd character of being in more than one place
at the same time and nowhere. However, as Weinberg argued, the model of quantum
physics has helped to produce great insights despite doubts regarding extant theories
Dwayne Woods is Professor in the Department of Political Science at Purdue University and a Visiting
Chair Scholar at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. He studies populist social movements, ideas, and
parties, Western European and African politics, economic development, and comparative methodology.
His articles have been published in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics,
Migration Studies, Journal of Modern African Politics, and West European Politics. His most recent
publication ‘‘Let the Data Speak: Inductive Constructivism and National Identities’’ appeared in Nations
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