Love's Labor's Lost - Judicial Tenure among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000

California Law Review, Sep 2017

By Albert Yoon, Published on 07/31/03

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Love's Labor's Lost - Judicial Tenure among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000

Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure 0 Copyright © 2003 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California t Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law, Northwestern University Department of Political Science (by courtesy). B.A., Yale University; J.D., Ph.D. (Political Science), Stanford University. I am grateful for the generous support of Northwestern University School of Law in making this research possible. A special thanks to Adam Waskowski and Brian Doughtery for their research assistance and Pegeen Bassett for her library reference support. I am indebted to Steve Saltzgiver at the Federal Judicial Center and Sheldon Goldman for providing data. This Article , USA 1 benefited greatly from the comments of Richard Brooks, Tom DeLeire, Tracey George, Nancy King , Helen Levy, Tom Merrill, Richard Posner, Robert Rasmussen, Jim Speta, Robert Sitkoff, Kent Syverud, Emerson Tiller, Robert Weisberg, Christopher Yoo, and participants at the 2002 Law & 2 Note: Data provided by Sheldon Goldman, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts , USA - V. Is Compensation Affecting Tenure? ........................... ..................... 1055 Society Conference and the 2003 Legal Theory Workshop at Vanderbilt University Law School. Any remaining errors are my own. Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000 Albert Yoon Jurists and legal scholars have long decried the diminishing real salariesoffederaljudges, claimingthat this decline has adversely affected the willingness offederaljudges to remain on the bench. Using dataprovided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, this Article analyzes the tenure trends offederal judges who retiredfrom the bench during 1945-2000. Using time-series regression analysis, this Article shows that, contrary to these claims, tenure trends remainedfairly stable over this periodfor both district and circuit courts. Indeed, the only observable trends were towards longer tenure. The data reveals, however, that recent judicial appointees are wealthier than their predecessors, which may reflect apossible selection effect in members of the bar willing to join the federal bench. Moreover, while judicial salaries have diminished, expenditureswithin thefederaljudiciaryare growing at a geometric rate,suggestingthatjudges may enjoy increasingnonsalarybenefits. INTRODUCTION "It's a privilege to do this job.' U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer, describing his experience on the bench. "It's not the sort of situation you want.... I went out and got a job to take care of my grandchildren."2 Edward B. Davis, former Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida, describing his experience on the bench and why he left. For most members of the legal profession, becoming a federal judge signifies the culmination of a legal career. After years of distinguished service, typically in private practice, government, or a state judgeship, occasionally an attorney is recognized by a presidential nomination for a federal judgeship, and, in most cases, Senate confirmation. A federal judgeship offers the opportunity to serve the public, directly shape the law, and develop the minds of subsequent generations of attorneys through the mentorship of judicial clerks. These benefits are accompanied by lifetime tenure and respect from the legal community. What could be the detraction? For some members of the federal judiciary, however, most notably U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissatisfaction is brewing and has been for some time.3 Federal judges now hear more cases annually on average than they did ten years ago,4 and their annual salaries adjusted for inflation have steadily declined over that period. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist contends that this diminution in real salary is prompting federal judges to leave the bench in unprecedented rates.' Other judges6 and government officials7 have echoed this claim. Despite the salience of this issue for at least the last thirty years, there has been a surprising scarcity of scholarship exploring judicial tenure and, specifically, the factors that influence the length of time a federal judge serves on the bench.8 This Article seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it explores whether the beliefs of Chief Justice Rehnquist and other critics of the causal connection between federal judicial salaries and judicial departure are empirically valid. Second, and more importantly, it examines the trends in judicial service among lower federal court judges over the past half century, focusing on the factors that influence the length of a federal judge's service prior to retirement. This empirical inquiry is important, independent of the findings: if Chief Justice Rehnquist's claims are correct, then the results may further motivate Congress and the public to accommodate the judges' request for salary increases; if the claims prove inco (...truncated)


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Albert Yoon. Love's Labor's Lost - Judicial Tenure among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000, California Law Review, 2018, Volume 91, Issue 4,