Theory of Mind: Social Maneuvers and Theory of Mind
y of Mind: Social Maneuvers and Theor y of
David Sally
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr Part of the Law Commons Repository Citation David Sally, Th eory of Mind: Social Maneuvers and Th eory of Mind, 87 Marq. L. Rev. (2004). Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol87/iss4/27
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DAVID SALLY*
Our social lives are distinguished by specific maneuvers-the white lie,
the bluff, the fantasy, the hint, the apology, the outburst, the ironic remark, the
faux pas. Most adults perform, interpret, and anticipate these interpersonal
maneuvers with such ease that we are rarely cognizant of the underlying,
enabling mental capacity, a capacity that has been named Theory of Mind
(ToM). Those of us with children know, however, that we must be wary of
sarcasm for fear of misinterpretation, must be explicit because indirect
commands are often ineffectual, must decipher playground episodes or
cinematic dramas that seem senseless to young minds, and must muffle the
honesty of a toddler when a friend and host who burned the meat and
overcooked the vegetables asks, "How's your dinner?" Parental experience
coincides with scientific research on ToM that has discovered that this
capability normally is innate and develops throughout childhood, and that this
developmental path sometimes goes awry and sometimes proceeds faster and
farther.
Because social maneuvering is fundamental to most negotiations, anyone
studying bargaining should be interested in the advances developmental
psychologists, animal behaviorists, and cognitive neuroscientists have made in
understanding ToM. I will summarize some of these findings here, and my
intention, discemable if you apply your ToM, is to intrigue the reader enough
that a cross-disciplinary conversation will begin and continue into the
foreseeable future.
I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT TOM?
Theory of mind seems to be a wondrous ability. It seems to be ESP
without the invisible brain waves, communing through the ether without the
mysticism, divination without the crystal ball. That we can read the contents
of someone's mind-her intentions, emotions, wants, beliefs-with an
accuracy significantly greater than guessing is rather remarkable. However,
ToM has both mundane cognitive roots and non-human manifestations. In
fact, the phrase "theory of mind" was first used in an article describing
"Ph.D. University of Chicago; A.B. Harvard.
MAR QUE7TE LA W REVIEW
chimpanzees' abilities to perceive the intentions behind various actions.'
One comprehensive model of the mundane roots of ToM is that advanced
by Andrew Meltzoff and Alison Gopnik. They suggest that the human brain
is endowed with "a fundamental cross-modal representational system that
connects self and other.",3 This innate cognitive ability is manifest in an
amazing finding: neonates as young as forty-five minutes old are able to
differentially imitate facial expressions.4 If you stick your tongue out at them,
they will try to razz you back; if you make an "0" mouth at them, they will
ogle their lips back at you. Imitation is the cornerstone that supports other
developmental milestones: At nine months, infants point, grunt, scream and
generally try to guide the intentions of other people; 5 at eighteen months,
toddlers understand that other people may want things that they do not;6 at
twenty-four months, children are pretending, a cognitive activity that calls for
multiple mental states; 7 at thirty months, they can take the other's visual
perspective, recognizing that an object may be visible to them but hidden
from another person in the room.8
Finally, by about the age of four, young children can lie. 9
Or, at least,
1. See David Premack & Guy Woodruff, Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?, 1
BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 515 (1978).
2. See ALISON GOPNIK & ANDREW N. MELTZOFF, WORDS, THOUGHTS, AND THEORIES
(1997).
5. See ELIZABETH BATES ET
COMMUNICATION ININFANCY (1979).
AL.,
THE
EMERGENCE
OF SYMBOLS:
COGNITION6. In one study, babies watched a grown-up point to one of two plates that were piled with
crackers or broccoli, and then "mrnmm" or "eeewwww." The grown-up would then hold out her
hand. Toddlers "gave her broccoli when she had previously expressed a desire for the broccoli and
crackers when she expressed a desire for crackers, despite their own unalterable conviction that
broccoli is yucky." GOPNIK & MELZOFF, supra note 2, at 150. For the study, see Betty M.
Repacholi and Alison Gopnik, Early Reasoning About Desires: Evidence from 14- and 18- Month
Olds, 33 DEV. PSYCHOL. 12 (1977).
7. See Alan M. Leslie, Pretense and Representation: The Origins of "'Theory of Mind," 94
PSYCHOL. REV. 4124 (1987); Peter Carruthers, Autism as Mind-Blindness: An Elaboration and
Partial Defense, in THEORIES OF THEORIES OF MIND 265 (Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith eds.,
1996) ("You cannot enjoy supposing or imagining without being conscious of your (mental) activity.
In general, enjoying (...truncated)