CPL § 30.30(4)(g): Court Congestion Not "Exceptional Circumstance" Excusing Prosecutor's Failure to Be Ready for Trial
Keeley, Wayne J. (
CPL § 30.30(4)(g ): Court Congestion Not "Exceptional Circumstance" Excusing Prosecutor 's Failure to Be Ready for Trial
Wayne J. Keeley 0
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
CPL § 30.30(4)(g): Court congestion not "exceptional
circumstance" excusing prosecutor'sfailure to be ready for trial
CPL section 30.30 places the burden upon the prosecutor to be
ready for trial within certain prescribed time limits.2 8 Absent
"exceptional circumstances," failure to be ready justifies dismissal of
an action upon timely motion by the defendant. 29 It had been
unCPL § 30.30(1) (Supp. 1979-1980) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion [for dismissal of
information or indictment] must be granted where the people are not ready for
trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;,
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than
three months and none of which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein
the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is
a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more
than three months and none of which is a crime punishable by a
sentence of imprisonment of more than three months;
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein
the defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is
a violation and none of which is a crime.
Id.
The genesis of the statute may be found in a criminal defendant's right to a speedy
trial, a guarantee fundamental to the common law tradition of England, see Magna Carta,
25 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1297), and the United States. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38
(1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966); U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right is made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967); People v. Garcia, 51
App. Div. 2d 329, 331, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271, 273 (1st Dep't 1976), afl'd mem., 41 N.Y.2d 861,
362 N.E.2d 260, 393 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977). Notably, the Supreme Court has declined to
provide uniform guidelines for the implementation of the right, leaving it to the states to
formulate individual rules consistent with constitutional standards. See Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 523 (1972).
CPL section 30.30 was enacted to facilitate prompt disposition of criminal actions.
Memorandum of State Executive Department, Crime Control Council, reprinted in [1972]
N.Y. Laws 3259 (McKinney). It was believed that the promotion of swift and certain
punishment would serve as an effective deterrent to crime. Id.; see People v. Mollette, 87 Misc.
2d 236, 241, 383 N.Y.S.2d 817, 822 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1976). Additionally, the
facilitation of speedy trials would insulate defendants from prolonged imprisonment and obviate
the anxiety and suspicion which may derive from unprosecuted accusations of crime. People
v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271, 275-76, 342 N.E.2d 525, 528, 379 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740 (1975).
2*CPL § 30.30(1) (Supp. 1979-1980). The presence of "exceptional circumstances" may
affect a defendant's 30.30 ready trial right in two ways. Under CPL section 30.30(3)(b), a
clear whether docket congestion" is an exceptional circumstance
excusing delay which would otherwise require dismissal.3 '
Recently, however, in People v. Brothers,82 the Court of Appeals held
that "court congestion does not excuse the People's failure to be
ready for trial,"3 3 but indicated in dicta that a subsequent plea of
guilty may operate as a waiver of the statutory entitlement to
34
dismissal.
The defendant in Brothers was arrested on New Year's Day,
defendant's motion to dismiss may be denied where the People were ready for trial within
the time specified but exceptional circumstances subsequently rendered the People unready.
CPL § 30.30(3)(b) (Supp. 1979-1980). Further, CPL section 30.30(4)(g) provides that the
period of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances extends the time within which the
prosecutor must be ready for trial. CPL § 30.30(4)(g) (Supp. 1979-1980).
What constitutes "exceptional circumstances" excusing prosecutorial delay is a
discretionary determination by the court made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., People v.
Washington, 43 N.Y.2d (...truncated)