Think Twice: Review of Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman (2011)
Kelly, Anne. "Think Twice: Review of Th inking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman (
inking , Fast and Slow by
Anne Kelly 0
0 Dakota Wesleyan University
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Anne Kelly is a professor of behavioral sciences and chair of the psychology department at Dakota Wesleyan
University. Her research focuses on the causes, treatment and prevention of suicide, the psychological
mechanisms underlying suicide ideation, and the cognitive and social factors that influence detection of
suicide risk in others.
This book review is available in Numeracy: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/numeracy/vol10/iss2/art15
In his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize-winning psychologist
Daniel Kahneman significantly sharpens our understanding of human
decisionmaking and the systems of thinking that underlie it. He offers a compelling
critique of the belief that we are, generally, rational decision makers, and, in its
place, presents a much fuller theory that, while acknowledging our ability to think
rationally, emphasizes our vulnerability to cognitive processes that lead to lazy
thinking and faulty belief.
The theory that Kahneman presents had its origin in research he undertook
and published with Amos Tversky and others in the 1970s. Having first noticed
that people’s decisions were prone to mistakes, the researchers sought to isolate
and analyze the participants’ intuitive thinking and often-incorrect judgments.
This research changed widely held assumptions about human nature, according to
which behavior normally and usually proceeded from reason, except for those
occasions on which reason was overcome by emotion. People used slow and
deliberate thinking to evaluate possible solutions before making decisions, so said
the near-consensus view. Tversky and Kahneman argued, however, that, while we
can and do use reason, we often fall back on a type of thinking that is quick,
requires less effort than rational thought, and is prone to error. Although these
intuitive judgments were the focus of their research and its findings, they did not
deny that rational thinking has a place, but, instead, argued that depending on
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, both thought processes influenced decision-making.
In Thinking Fast and Slow, Kahneman described these dual modes, or processes,
as System 1 and System 2.
System 2 will here be considered first, because it is the very model of
reasoned deliberation Kahneman and colleagues challenged and then refined. It is
the familiar model and, as it is the loftiest, it is the one with which most people
self-identify.
This kind of thinking attempts objectivity, and, in it, we take our time to
weigh explicitly known evidence and consider alternatives before choosing a
solution. When we use System 2, we are less likely to make mistakes.
Unfortunately, it requires selective and sustained attention, which can be depleted
by difficult cognitive reasoning as well as changes in motivation and self-control.
Sometimes, people are too lazy to use System 2 thinking. It is at these moments,
and when circumstances do not allow for deliberation, that we fall back on
System 1.
System 1 thinking is associated with intuition. It operates quickly and
requires less cognitive effort, thus providing certain advantages. It is efficient in
that it speeds up the decision-making process, often necessary, Kahneman argues,
considering the many decisions we have to make every day in a world that
bombards us with information. This type of intuitive thinking is governed by
heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that we use to think and act quickly. Judgments
and decisions we make with heuristics can be good—or good enough—but
heuristics can also lead to incorrect judgments. Kahneman cites examples of these
heuristics. Among those he cites are the representativeness heuristic and the
availability heuristic.
The representativeness heuristic is used when making judgments about the
probability of an event. It allows us automatically and easily, but sometimes
erroneously, to identify causal connections between events. We prefer an ordered
existence of causation and pattern to one of chance and random sequence, and,
when such order is not present, we will intuitively impose it. With this distortion,
subsequent mistakes are more likely. Kahneman illustrates his point using the
example of the sex of six babies born in sequence at a hospital, which is, of
course, random. The events are independent of each other, and the sex of one
baby does not determine and cannot predict the sex of another. When asked to
consider the possible birth gender sequences of BBBGGG, GGGGGG, and
BGBBGB, we intuitively do not think that these three are equally likely. People
tend to judge the last sequ (...truncated)