Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act

Fordham Law Review, Apr 2015

The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) explicitly authorizes a private cause of action for U.S. nationals who suffer an injury “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” ATA civil litigation has increased dramatically following September 11, 2001—and banks, because of their deep pockets, have emerged as an increasingly popular target. Courts are divided concerning the scope of liability under the statute, specifically over whether the ATA authorizes a cause of action premised on secondary liability. Under a secondary liability theory, a plaintiff could argue that a bank, through providing financial services to a terrorist client, aided and abetted an act of international terrorism. This Note examines the conflict over secondary liability under the ATA, applies this conflict to banks specifically, and concludes that the legislative history of the ATA civil provision is not enough to support such a cause of action. This Note ultimately finds, however, that the absence of any kind of secondary liability route for plaintiffs diminishes the ATA‟s power as a deterrent against terrorism financing and also has interesting repercussions for primary liability cases. As a result, this Note argues that Congress should amend the ATA to explicitly permit secondary liability. However, in order to guard against excessive suits against innocent banks, courts should only permit claims premised upon secondary liability in extreme cases where the bank manifested intent or extreme recklessness in their dealings with terrorist clients.

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Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act

Issue Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondar y Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act Alison Bitterly 0 0 Fordham University School of Law Recommended Citation - Article 17 Alison Bitterly* The Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) explicitly authorizes a private cause of action for U.S. nationals who suffer an injury “by reason of an act of international terrorism.” ATA civil litigation has increased dramatically following September 11, 2001—and banks, because of their deep pockets, have emerged as an increasingly popular target. Courts are divided concerning the scope of liability under the statute, specifically over whether the ATA authorizes a cause of action premised on secondary liability. Under a secondary liability theory, a plaintiff could argue that a bank, through providing financial services to a terrorist client, aided and abetted an act of international terrorism. This Note examines the conflict over secondary liability under the ATA, applies this conflict to banks specifically, and concludes that the legislative history of the ATA civil provision is not enough to support such a cause of action. This Note ultimately finds, however, that the absence of any kind of secondary liability route for plaintiffs diminishes the ATA‟s power as a deterrent against terrorism financing and also has interesting repercussions for primary liability cases. As a result, this Note argues that Congress should amend the ATA to explicitly permit secondary liability. However, in order to guard against excessive suits against innocent banks, courts should only permit claims premised upon secondary liability in extreme cases where the bank manifested intent or extreme recklessness in their dealings with terrorist clients. INTRODUCTION Bank A handles millions of accounts worldwide. It provides routine financial services to clients across six continents. As a result of a bank employee‘s negligence, the bank transfers funds through a computerized system to a U.S.-designated terrorist group in the Middle East. This money is used to procure a suicide vest, which a member of the group puts on and detonates in a street in Iraq. One of the innocent bystanders killed is an American. Bank B does not possess the same level of business as Bank A. Instead, it knowingly provides both routine and nonroutine services to a terrorist organization. For instance, Bank B delivers personalized payments to the 2015] families of suicide bombers after their deaths. The terrorist group linked to the bank launches an attack abroad that kills an American. Bank C conducts business with many countries—including Iran, a country on the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list (―SST list‖).1 The extensive business with Iran is in violation of U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) sanctions.2 Some of the funds the bank transfers to Iran are traced to the terrorist group Hezbollah. The group launches an attack in Israel that kills an American citizen.3 The civil provision of the Antiterrorism Act4 (ATA) expressly provides U.S. nationals with a private right of action for injury to person, property, or business, ―by reason of an act of international terrorism.‖5 In enacting the ATA, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), the government has enlisted private plaintiffs in the fight against terrorism, and § 2333(a) has become yet another weapon in the United States‘ counterterrorism arsenal.6 Although it is clear that the ATA permits plaintiffs to name as defendants the terrorist organizations or persons directly responsible for committing an act fitting within the definition of international terrorism,7 U.S. federal courts are split over whether the ATA provides for suits under a secondary liability theory.8 As secondary liability often presents a different set of 1. See infra Part I.C.2. 2. See infra Part I.B.2 for further discussion on OFAC and its regulation of U.S. financial transactions involving foreign nations. 3. These hypothetical scenarios bear some resemblance to the three categories of Antiterrorist Act (ATA) banking cases addressed in 2 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:42 (1986). 4. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 , Pub. L. No. 102-572, Title X, § 1003(a)(4), 106 Stat. 4522 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1992)); Antiterrorism Act of 1990 , Pub. L. No. 101-519; 104 Stat. 2250 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338 (1990)). The 1990 Act was removed for technical reasons and re instated in 1992 with the same language. See infra note 50. 5. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). This Note will refer to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) as the ATA civil provision, as the ATA private cause of action, or simply as § 2333(a). The entirety of the ATA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331–2338, which contains the civil and criminal provisions that this Note will collectively refer to as the ATA. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339A–D contains the material support provisions, which were added in later years, and are discussed as part of the ATA in this Note. See infra Part I.A.3. This Note will collectively refer to the material support amendments as the ―material support law.‖ 6. See Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 1, In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-318) (―Both Congress and other federal courts have confirmed that the provision of the ATA at issue is essential to deterring and punishing the financing and material sponsorship of terrorism.‖); see also Debra Strauss, Enlisting the U.S. Courts in a New Front: Dismantling the International Business Holdings of Terrorist Groups Through Federal Statutory and Common-Law Suits, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 679, 739 (2005) (―The testimony supporting [the ATA] legislation placed much emphasis on the deterrent effect that these statutes would have on the commission of acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens.‖). 7. See infra Part I.A.1 for greater consideration of this definition, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 8. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that at the time of the 2010 Wultz ruling ―circuits [were] split on the issue‖ of ATA secondary liability) . With regard to banks, this Note will typically refer to aiding and abetting liability (a form of secondary liability) and the more general concept of secondary liability interchangeably. requirements than primary liability, the availability of secondary liability is of great importance to terrorism victim plaintiffs.9 In many cases, an aiding and abetting suit against a bank, based upon allegations that the bank provided financial services to a client terrorist group, may be a victim‘s best chance for relief where suing under a primary liability theory is not possible.10 In addition, as this Note discusses, the outcome of the secondary liability debate also could have powerful ramifications for the application of primary liability in banking cases. Under the varying standards applied across circuits today, ATA litigation against the above hypothetical banks could engender inconsistent results.11 In understanding these disparate outcomes in ATA banking cases, it is helpful to consider banks as entities possessing ―mental states‖ across a spectrum—ranging from negligence, to knowledge, to recklessness, to intent—despite the fact that these are institutions rather than individuals. Courts are in conflict over what the requisite mental state should be for both secondary liability and primary liability.12 In the case of Bank A—where the bank is merely negligent—it is likely (and arguably proper) that the bank will avoid liability; primary liability is not a viable option for plaintiffs, and success under a secondary liability theory is uncertain at best.13 Courts are much more likely to find Bank B liable under primary liability because, regardless of the requisite mental state for liability, Bank B arguably demonstrated intent to aid the terrorist group. It is Bank C that illustrates the most ambiguous case. In doing business with a state sponsor of terrorism, was the bank demonstrating intent to aid terrorists? At what point should a bank know that its services are aiding a terrorist organization? This Note considers these questions and examines where the scope of ATA liability for banks stands today. Although the ATA private cause of action has been in place for over twenty years, plaintiffs did not begin to take full advantage of its potential until its second decade of life.14 The September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States precipitated both a spike in terrorism-related lawsuits and the 2015] U.S. government‘s increased efforts to stanch the flow of funding to terrorism groups abroad.15 The phrase ―terrorism financing‖ typically refers to the act of knowingly providing some resource to an individual or organization that takes part in terrorist activity.16 The U.S. government has estimated that plotting and executing the September 11 attacks required only between $400,000 and $500,000.17 Actual terrorist operations constituted a comparatively small portion of al Qaeda‘s budget at the time.18 The organization required funding for training, salaries for jihadists, and arms and vehicles before attacks could even be carried out.19 It is often difficult for governments to differentiate between funds used for attacks and funds used to support a terrorist group‘s social or political purposes.20 Furthermore, terrorist funding often comes from legitimate sources—such as charities and donors—as opposed to criminal activities.21 An extensive and long-established fundraising network fueled al Qaeda‘s spread.22 Although al Qaeda as an organization likely did not use formal financial practices to transfer or store money after 1996, al Qaeda fundraisers continued to work within the means of traditional financial systems.23 It is likely that some of the banks linked to al Qaeda supporters were aware of their ties with terrorist organization fundraisers.24 The lack of financial regulation in Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular contributed to al Qaeda‘s pre–September 11 financing success, and al Qaeda cells worldwide took advantage of susceptibilities within formal banking systems.25 The United States began to take terrorism funding more seriously follow ing the 1998 bombings on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania.26 President Bill Clinton‘s National Security Council recommended that the United States issue sanctions against al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act27 (IEEPA), which authorized the President to levy sanctions against countries or entities that posed a national security threat to the United States. Under the IEEPA, OFAC froze al Qaeda assets within the U.S. financial system.28 After the United States formally designated al Qaeda a terrorist organization in October 1999, banks were legally required to seize the group‘s funds and block its transactions.29 This Note explores private suits against banks for their alleged involvement in terrorist attacks overseas, with a particular focus on secondary liability. Part I presents background on the ATA‘s language and legislative history, as well as a discussion of secondary liability in general and the ways in which courts have applied this form of liability in other areas of the law. Part I also discusses the distinction between routine and nonroutine bank services and addresses several other aspects of banking regulation. Part II delves into the conflict over whether secondary liability applies under the ATA‘s private cause of action and briefly addresses this issue‘s relevance to primary liability. Part III argues that the absence of secondary liability under the ATA produces some intolerable consequences. As a result, Part III argues that Congress should amend the ATA to permit a secondary liability private cause of action in extreme cases where a bank manifests recklessness or intent—for example, by conducting extensive business with a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism. I. THE ANTITERRORISM ACT, SECONDARY LIABILITY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM SUITS AGAINST BANKS Part I.A focuses on the ATA itself, including the material support for terrorism crime that courts have sometimes incorporated into § 2333(a) via a theory of primary liability.30 Part I.B clarifies the important characteristics of these types of liability, as well as highlights how courts have handled similar secondary liability issues in private securities fraud suits and civil suits brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Finally, Part I.C provides some background related to ATA banking cases in particular, focusing on the difference between routine and nonroutine banking services and the United States‘ implementation of lists to monitor terrorist individuals, groups, and sovereign states. A. The Antiterrorism Act This section summarizes the ATA civil provision‘s language and legislative history. This discussion is at the heart of the secondary liability issue and provides a necessary context for understanding how courts have responded to increased ATA litigation targeting banks. This section also addresses the ATA‘s material support law, which plaintiffs have sometimes used as the basis for primary liability in banking cases. 28. See NAT‘L COMM‘N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 17, at 185. 29. See id. at 185 n.81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B) . See infra Part I.C for an explanation of how OFAC utilizes lists to identify terrorist threats. 30. This Note, although focused on secondary liability, seeks to demonstrate that secondary and primary liability are closely intertwined in ATA banking cases. 2015] 1. The ATA‘s Statutory Language The ATA explicitly establishes a civil remedy for victims of international terrorism.31 Section 2333(a) states: Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including attorney‘s fees.32 The statute expressly empowers U.S. nationals to file a claim.33 However, the phrasing of ―by reason of an act of international terrorism‖ is somewhat ambiguous.34 For instance, some courts have held that this language requires the fulfillment of a proximate cause element.35 Other areas of the ATA help illuminate the civil provision‘s language. Section 2331(1) defines ―international terrorism‖ as activities that: (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum . . . .36 This provision defines international terrorism in terms of ―acts‖ that ―involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life‖ that are in violation of U.S. criminal law, or would be if committed within U.S. jurisdiction.37 Individuals must also commit these acts with the intent to coerce or intimidate civilians or a government, or affect government conduct.38 Finally, the act must occur primarily outside of the United States or ―transcend national boundaries.‖39 In addition, the ATA civil provision does not identify whom a private individual may sue—the language is open-ended.40 The definition of terrorism in § 2331(1) also does not describe the terrorism actor, instead it focuses on the nature of the acts.41 As a result, victims of terrorist attacks abroad have attempted to use this provision to hold banks, corporations, and countries liable for terrorist acts.42 Such cases have succeeded on some occasions, particularly when the defendant was a state sponsor of terrorism.43 Section 2333(a)‘s ambiguous language has consequently opened the door for plaintiffs to sue also under the theory that banks are secondarily liable for acts of international terrorism.44 2. The ATA‘s Legislative History The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to ―define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the 2015] Law of Nations.‖45 This clause, known sometimes as the Define and Punish Clause, has served as a basis for antiterrorism legislation.46 The ATA was first enacted in 1987 .47 At that point, the legislation was predominantly focused on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).48 The act designated the PLO as a terrorist organization and instituted certain restrictions on transactions and dealings with the group.49 In 1990, Congress enacted a second version of the ATA that created several new provisions, including the ATA‘s civil provision and the detailed definition of international terrorism that remains part of the ATA today.50 Congress continued to pass further antiterrorism legislation over the years, particularly following the September 11 attacks.51 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic52 was the first case in which a court considered civil liability for terrorist acts and likely helped spark the movement toward a private cause of action for victims of international terrorism.53 In this case, the plaintiffs sued the Libyan government, the PLO, and PLO-linked nongovernmental organizations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).54 The ATS had recently emerged as a tool for providing redress to victims of crimes in violation of international norms.55 However, on appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court‘s dismissal of the case, holding that under the ATS there was no private cause of action for victims of international terrorism.56 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro57 also sheds light on the genesis of the ATA‘s private cause of action. In 1985, members of the PLO commandeered the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, on its journey through the eastern Mediterranean Sea.58 The perpetrators murdered Leon Klinghoffer, a U.S. citizen, during the attack.59 The Klinghoffer family was able to bring its claims against the PLO in U.S. federal court only because the crime took place in international waters and therefore was subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction.60 If the terrorist act had occurred on land, it is unlikely that any court would have upheld jurisdiction in the wake of TelOren.61 Congressiona l records from 1991 indicate that Klinghoffer was instrumental in spurring Congress‘s enactment of a private cause of action for terrorism cases.62 In enacting the ATA, Congress sought to provide a more reliable form of relief for U.S. victims of international terrorism.63 Courts have also scrutinized the legislative history of the ATA in order to better understand § 2333(a)‘s language.64 In a 1991 statement before the Senate, Senator Charles Grassley, one of the ATA‘s sponsors, noted that the statute enabled plaintiffs to circumvent ―jurisdictional hurdles‖ and ―empower[ed] victims with all the weapons available in civil litigation.‖65 He also stated that the ATA ―accords victims of terrorism the remedies of 2015] American tort law, including treble damages and attorney‘s fees.‖66 Previously, Senator Grassley had stated that, with the ATA, ―terrorists will be held accountable where it hurts them most: at their lifeline, their funds.‖67 In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Wendy Perdue advocated for the inclusion of a civil remedy that not only held liable terrorist organizations, but also ―the organizations, businesses and nations‖ that aided these organizations and likely had reachable assets.68 However, Perdue acknowledged that § 2333(a) would likely lead to confusion regarding the subject of secondary liability.69 Senator Grassley brought these concerns to the attention of Joseph A. Morris, then–General Counsel of the Information Agency, who also testified at the ATA Senate hearings.70 Morris responded that ―as drafted [the ATA] is powerfully broad‖ and that it was intended to ―bring [in] all of the substantive law of the American tort law system.‖71 Morris added that traditional tort law had a principle similar to criminal law‘s doctrine of aiding and abetting; he claimed that this principle would therefore apply to the ATA civil provision and suggested that the provision could be used against negligent defendants.72 Finally, a July 1992 post-enactment Senate Committee Report discussed the purpose of the ATA, noting that in providing for compensatory and treble damages and ―impos[ing] . . . liability at any point along the causal chain of terrorism,‖ the ATA ―would interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money‖ to terrorist organizations.73 Currently, there is a potentially game-changing bill before Congress called the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act74 (JASTA). If passed in its current form, the bill would explicitly permit a private ATA cause of action predicated upon a theory of secondary liability.75 The bill would amend § 2333 by adding the following: ―In an action arising under subsection (a), liability may be asserted as to the person or persons who committed such act of international terrorism or any person or entity that aided, abetted, or conspired with the person or persons who committed such an act of international terrorism.‖76 However, the bill is not entirely focused on the secondary liability issue—a significant portion of the text revolves around stripping sovereign immunity from countries that engage in acts of terrorism, regardless of whether they are considered a state sponsor of terrorism.77 JASTA passed the Senate in December 2014 and in January 2015 was referred to the House Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.78 3. The Crime of Material Support to Terrorism In its current form, the material support law is the product of multiple attempts to cut off the flow of money and resources to international terrorist organizations.79 The material support law was first codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A in reaction to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings.80 At the time, the law did not criminalize material support to terrorist groups where the funding party did not specifically intend the groups to use the support for terrorist attacks or operations.81 date); Abecassis v. Wyatt, No. H-09-3884, 2013 WL 5231543, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013) . 74. See H.R. 3143, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/ bill/113th-congress/house-bill/3143/all-actions. 75. See id. 76. See id. 77. See id. The passage of JASTA would consequently permit plaintiffs to go after countries such as Saudi Arabia, which is not on the SST list but has faced accusations of funding the September 11 attacks. Id. 78. See id.; see also S. 1535, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress. gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1535/actions. 79. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2005) (―The material support law is one part of a matrix of terrorism-support laws that have accrued over many years through the painstaking efforts of individuals in the executive and legislative branches intent on putting a stop to the phenomenon of U.S. persons providing support, well-intentioned or otherwise, to foreign terrorist organizations.‖). 80. Id. at 12; see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 , Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994)). The law was since amended to define ―material support or resources‖ as including the provision of services and items falling into four categories: (1) funding; (2) tangible equipment; (3) logistical support; and (4) personnel. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339(A)(b) (2012); see also Chesney, supra note 79, at 12 n.69. 81. See Chesney, supra note 79, at 13. Under this original version of the material support law, an individual could donate to a terrorist group as such as Hezbollah, for example, as long as she believed that the money would only be used for the group‘s social or political activities. Id. 2015] To expand the reach of the law, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.82 The new law, while applying only to those providing material support to groups designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Secretary of State, does not require specific intent to aid acts of terrorism.83 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation of § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.84 Section 2339B also contains a civil liability provision.85 However, this provision does not extend to private plaintiffs—only the government can bring an action for civil fines in addition to criminal liability.86 Therefore, any chance of relief for private plaintiffs who were victims of terrorist attacks lies solely in § 2333(a).87 Civil remedies for criminal acts can serve as a useful deterrent to criminal activity.88 In addition, some courts have suggested using the material support law as the base crime in suits against entities that allegedly provided money or other resources to terrorist organizations.89 The Supreme Court in Holder confirmed that § 2339B did not require that the defendant specifically intend to further terrorist activities—it was sufficient for a party to know that the group in question was a terrorist group.90 As Part III discusses, this aspect of Holder is in tension with the ATA‘s definition of international terrorism.91 B. Secondary Versus Primary Liability, and Why the Difference Matters This section explains how courts have applied—or chosen not to apply— secondary liability in different areas of the law.92 This section also briefly addresses the ways in which victims of terrorism can harness the material support provision in primary liability causes of action. As Part II demonstrates, courts have invoked the following theories frequently in discussing whether or not banks should be held secondarily liable under the ATA civil provision. 1. The Nature of Secondary Liability It is crucial to consider the differences between secondary and primary liability in both civil and criminal law. Many states have accepted the definition of secondary civil liability articulated in the Second Restatement of Torts, although this acceptance is by no means unanimous.93 According to the Restatement, an individual may be secondarily liable for a tort when that individual (a) commits a tortious act ―in concert‖ with a principal, (b) knows that the principal‘s conduct is tortious and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the principal, or (c) gives such ―substantial assistance‖ to the principal and separately breaches a duty to the third person.94 This Note is primarily concerned with subsection (b) of the Restatement‘s definition, which serves as the civil equivalent of aiding and abetting liability.95 The Restatement establishes a three-pronged test for aiding and abetting liability: (1) the principal committed tortious conduct; (2) the aider had knowledge of the principal‘s conduct; and (3) the aider gave substantial assistance or encouragement to the principal.96 However, the Restatement does not explicitly mention any mental state requirement.97 There is no single universal test for civil aiding and abetting liability.98 Nevertheless, in 1983, the D.C. Circuit in Halberstam v. Welch99 provided some clarity. The Supreme Court would later describe Halberstam as a ―comprehensive opinion on the subject‖ of civil aiding and abetting 2015] liability.100 In Halberstam, the court relied on the Restatement‘s view when upholding civil aiding and abetting liability and conspiracy liability in a case where a woman had both knowingly and substantially assisted in a murder.101 The woman had acted as a banker, bookkeeper, and secretary for the murderer with the knowledge that her activities helped him in the commission of illegal acts.102 The court did not require that the prosecution demonstrate that the defendant specifically intended the principal to commit murder.103 On the other hand, criminal secondary liability, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2, is more clear-cut.104 This statute provides that ―whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.‖105 An aider must manifest specific intent to be liable for aiding and abetting a crime; this differs from criminal conspiracy liability (another form of secondary liability), and of course civil aiding and abetting liability.106 Criminal aiding and abetting also does not require a completed crime, whereas civil aiding and abetting requires the actual commission of a tort.107 However, as the next section demonstrates, courts have interpreted the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver108 as barring the application of § 2(a) to private causes of action.109 2. Statutory Secondary Liability Analogies: Securities Fraud and RICO This section considers two statutory analogies that courts have commonly invoked in evaluating the viability of secondary liability suits against banks under the ATA. a. Central Bank and Secondary Liability in Securities Fraud C ases In 1994 , the Supreme Court held in Central Bank that section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 110 did not provide for secondary liability claims in private securities fraud suits.111 As a result, the plaintiffs were unable to sue on the theory that the defendant, the Central Bank of Denver, had aided and abetted the other defendants in committing securities fraud.112 The plaintiffs, the First Interstate Bank of Denver and Jack K. Naber, had purchased $2.1 million in bonds from the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority.113 The Central Bank of Denver served as the indenture trustee for the bonds at issue, and the public building authority defaulted soon afterward.114 Before the default, the bank discovered that the land used to secure the bonds was possibly insufficient, thereby necessitating a new appraisal on the bonds.115 However, no such appraisal ever took place.116 The District of Colorado granted the Central Bank of Denver‘s motion for summary judgment; however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision on the basis that the circuit had previously permitted private aiding and abetting actions under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.117 It is illegal to ―directly or indirectly‖ engage in conduct meeting the elements of securities fraud under section 10(b), as well as Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.118 Other federal courts had also permitted private 2015] aiding and abetting claims under section 10(b).119 These interpretations relied upon the argument that Congress had enacted the 1934 Act to meet broad policy objectives, and that permitting private secondary liability actions would be in line with such objectives.120 The tide began to turn in the years before the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank holding, as some federal appellate courts began to question other circuits‘ earlier rulings in favor of secondary liability.121 In its Central Bank decision, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the split among the circuits respecting a private cause of action for secondary liability under section 10(b).122 The Supreme Court itself had previously inferred a private right of action in securities fraud cases.123 However, Congress never advised courts on how far to extend private liability.124 Therefore, in Central Bank the Court was extremely hesitant to infer a private right of action based on secondary liability without clear statutory language establishing any private right in the first place.125 Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that Congress did not intend to create an aiding and abetting private cause of action under section 10(b).126 The plaintiffs in Central Bank used the ―directly or indirectly‖ language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to assert that the statutory text supported secondary liability.127 The Court found this argument unpersuasive.128 The Court also looked to those sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts that did expressly provide for a private right of action to further support its conclusion.129 Finding that these sections failed to address aiding and abetting liability, the Court concluded that Congress had not intended aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).130 Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs‘ argument that the Acts‘ legislative history supported an aiding and abetting private cause of action, finding that neither section 10(b)‘s text nor history implied that aiding and abetting was included in the Act.131 The plaintiffs argued that Congress had intended to imbue the 1933 and 1934 Acts with general tort law principles and asserted that aiding and abetting liability was ―well established in both civil and criminal actions by 1934.‖132 After analyzing aiding and abetting liability under both tort and criminal law theory, the Court dispatched this argument as well.133 The Court, in the end, found that there was no general presumption in favor of aiding and abetting liability and that the plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence of congressional intent to rebut this presumption.134 As Part II discusses in detail, since Central Bank many courts have analogized private securities fraud suits to private suits under the ATA civil provision.135 Part II demonstrates how Central Bank has served as the cornerstone for arguments against holding banks secondarily liable under the ATA, while proponents of secondary liability have instead attempted to distinguish section 10(b) from § 2333(a).136 b. RICO and Secondary Liability In 1970, Congress enacted RICO via the Organized Crime Control Act.137 The statute provides for both criminal and civil penalties on entities or individuals engaged in racketeering activity, which the law broadly defines to include many kinds of criminal activity.138 At the time, the law primarily targeted organized crime throughout the United States.139 RICO makes illegal many kinds of racketeering activity performed ―directly or indirectly,‖ including, under certain circumstances, investing income derived from racketeering or participating in the conducting of an 2015] enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.140 The RICO civil provision states that ―[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.‖141 Although prosecutors did not initially harness the full potential of RICO, today the law is used against various types of crime and not necessarily organized crime.142 The initial targeting of mob crime has been expanded to include white collar crime and terrorism.143 There is ongoing debate over whether civil RICO should be primarily applied to organized crime groups or further extended to include corporate entities, such as banks.144 In recent years, some courts have sought to limit civil RICO‘s breadth.145 As with the ATA, and as Part II discusses further, courts have limited the application of aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits using the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling, comparing the RICO civil provision to private securities fraud suits under section 10(b).146 For example, in 1996, a court in the Southern District of New York held that civil aiding and abetting liability was not permissible under the RICO civil provision, finding, as the Supreme Court did in Central Bank, that the provision‘s silence on secondary liability was likely intentional.147 The Third Circuit, in Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust,148 also held that courts should not infer aiding and abetting liability in civil RICO suits.149 2015] relief.157 However, the fact that a bank provided services considered to be routine commercial transactions does not per se exempt a bank from liability.158 Although some routine banking services might qualify to establish primary liability for material support to terrorism, courts must still consider whether the services met the threshold for ―substantial assistance‖ when evaluating under a secondary liability theory.159 In other words, although the routine nature of a bank‘s actions is not necessarily dispositive, activities that are regarded as typical day-to-day services can demonstrate that the bank had no knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist act.160 Alternatively, the presence of more unusual and specific services can suggest just the opposite—that the bank knew that its services were aiding terrorism.161 The court in Linde v. Arab Bank162 found that the defendant bank‘s alleged actions far exceeded what is considered routine.163 The Jordan-based Arab Bank has been at the center of many civil suits aimed at bringing justice to terrorism victims.164 In Linde, the plaintiffs, who were victims or family of victims killed in Hamas-orchestrated terrorist attacks, filed a lawsuit charging the Arab Bank with violating § 2333(a).165 The plaintiffs alleged that the banks had knowingly provided banking services to Hamas, charities that financially supported the terrorist groups Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, as well as the Saudi Committee in Support of the Intifada al Quds, a group that the plaintiffs alleged provided martyr insurance to the families of Hamas suicide bombers.166 In a similar case, Almog v. Arab Bank,167 the plaintiffs also alleged the bank‘s involvement with the Saudi Committee.168 In both cases, the Arab Bank argued that such services were merely routine—and in both cases, the court did not agree.169 The court in Almog explained that the difference between routine and nonroutine was tied to the ―knowing and intentional nature of the Bank‘s activities.‖170 This conclusion supports the understanding that the type of services that a bank provides a terrorist group is not automatically indicative of knowledge or intent but can help create a strong presumption of the institution‘s mental state.171 2. Reliance on List-Making Post–September 11 After September 11, the United States succeeded in enacting some of the changes to the financial system that it had struggled to implement before the terrorist attacks.172 The government was assertive in identifying terrorism‘s financial backers and freezing these entities‘ assets.173 In 2004, the 9/11 Commission reported that the majority of U.S. financial institutions had cooperated extensively with the government to patch up vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system.174 Yet, with these successes came other consequences—terrorist organizations proved adaptable at finding other methods of raising money where traditional systems had failed.175 Following the USA PATRIOT A ct‘s enactment in 2001 ,176 the Treasury Department promulgated several regulations to more stringently monitor money laundering and terrorism financing.177 Post–September 11, the U.S. approach to regulating terrorism financing has largely centered upon a practice of list-making.178 The U.S. Secretary of State places groups on the Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations list (―FTOs list‖), while OFAC, under IEEPA authority, maintains the Specially Designated Global Terrorists list (―SDGT list‖).179 The SDGT list was born out of an executive order that grants OFAC the authority to freeze the bank accounts and block the assets of entities appearing on this list.180 It applies only to U.S. persons and U.S. financial institutions.181 The SDGT list incorporates the State Department‘s FTO list as well as numerous other individuals and groups.182 OFAC also maintains a master list called the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (―SDN list‖), which combines OFAC and State Department lists, including the SST list.183 The SST list was created under the authority of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, which empowers the Secretary of State to designate certain countries as state sponsors of terrorism.184 A country is designated a state sponsor of terrorism when the U.S. Secretary of State determines that the country‘s government ―repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.‖185 As of early 2015, the SST list includes only Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Cuba.186 OFAC has consequently enacted counterterrorism sanctions against these countries.187 3. Are Banks the Best Chance of Redress for Victims of Terrorism? The ATA‘s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to provide victims of international terrorism with tools for civil redress.188 Parts of this history directly address terrorism financing.189 In an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs-petitioners in Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute (Boim I),190 the United States argued that secondary liability would better promote Congress‘s objective of compensating terrorism victims and deterring international terrorism.191 In enacting the ATA, Congress may have intended to deter not only terrorist organizations themselves but also terrorism‘s financial backers.192 Secondary liability for banks under the ATA arguably provides the best chance of redress for terrorism victims.193 This argument is typically based on the understanding that banks have ―deep pockets‖ and therefore are capable of paying damages awards.194 Notably, most plaintiffs have been unable to collect court judgments against state sponsors of terrorism.195 State defendants have generally defaulted, and their assets have typically been unreachable.196 For example, in 2012 in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran,197 a federal district court ordered Iran and Syria (both U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism)198 to pay the plaintiffs $300 million in punitive damages.199 Given that the likelihood of recovery from terrorist states is dim, victims may prefer a judgment against a bank.200 The court in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (Boim III) noted the difficulty in collecting judgments against terrorists or their organizations directly.201 The court concluded that suing the financial backers of terrorism would have a more powerful deterrent effect and would serve to ―cut the terrorists‘ lifeline.‖202 In addition, the court found that providing financial aid to a terrorist group, while not inherently violent, could be considered dangerous to human life, as ―[g]iving money to Hamas‖ was ―like giving a loaded gun to a child.‖203 Boim I also noted that 2015] it would be ―bizarre‖ for Congress to enact a statute where collecting damages would be so unlikely.204 Finally, the burden of proof in civil suits is lower than in criminal cases.205 Thus, civil suits likely provide a better opportunity to hold terrorism aiders and abettors accountable than criminal prosecutions.206 There are also potential arguments against propping up banks as a potential target in terrorism suits.207 U.S. plaintiffs suing foreign banks may lead to complicated issues of international diplomacy.208 One argument is that Congress did not intend for banks to be included as a potential defendant class under § 2333(a).209 Furthermore, banks have defended themselves against civil suits by arguing that they complied with the regulations of the country where the bank was located.210 Finally, in pursuing banks under a secondary liability theory, there exists a risk that courts could impose unjust costs on innocent financial institutions that provide necessary economic services to society.211 II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON ATA SECONDARY LIABILITY This part looks closer at the split among federal courts on ATA secondary liability in private civil suits. Part II.A presents the most significant case law in favor of secondary liability, focusing on Wultz and Boim I.212 Part II.B then presents the case law holding against secondary liability, with a focus on the Second Circuit‘s ruling in Rothstein v. UBS AG213 and the Seventh Circuit‘s overturning of Boim I in Boim III, its en banc rehearing of the case. A. The Case Law Permitting Private ATA Suits Under a Secondary Liability Theory This section addresses those courts that have held in favor of secondary liability. Although the defendant in the Boim case was a charity, and not a bank, courts have applied the Boim I and Boim III rulings on secondary liability to cases involving banks.214 While the Seventh Circuit eventually shifted its stance in Boim III, its original holding in Boim I laid the framework for other holdings permitting secondary liability. This section focuses on the D.C. District Court‘s ruling in Wultz. The Boim story began with the 1996 killing of David Boim, a dual American and Israeli citizen, near Jerusalem.215 In 2000, David‘s parents filed a lawsuit against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development and other defendants.216 The family alleged that Hamas was responsible for David‘s death and that the defendants had provided financial support to the organization in violation of § 2333(a).217 The district court denied the defendants‘ motion to dismiss the complaint, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court‘s ruling, finding that the ATA civil provision provided for a secondary liability private cause of action.218 The Wultz court frequently refers to the Boim I ruling.219 In 2006, sixteen-year-old Daniel Wultz was eating at a restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel, with his father when a member of PIJ approached the restaurant.220 When a security guard at the restaurant‘s entrance stopped the man, he detonated five kilograms of explosives, killing himself and ten others, including Daniel.221 In 2008, Daniel‘s parents filed a $300 million civil suit under the ATA against Iran, Syria, and Bank of China.222 The plaintiffs argued that Bank of China aided and abetted PIJ in its execution of the terrorist attack that killed their son.223 Under this theory, the plaintiffs contended that Bank of China should be held liable because its provision of financial services to the 2015] PIJ furthered an act of international terrorism.224 The plaintiffs claimed that prior to the attack that killed Daniel, Bank of China had executed dozens of wire transfers for a PIJ agent that amounted to millions of dollars.225 They also contended that the bank had known that it was providing services to a terrorist group but had persisted with its actions anyway.226 Bank of China contended that an aiding and abetting cause of action did not exist under the ATA and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.227 The Wultz court held for the plaintiffs.228 The court‘s ruling hinged on its determination that courts should treat the ATA civil provision differently than the Supreme Court had treated the 1934 Act‘s section 10(b) in Central Bank.229 The Wultz court noted that it was wary of inferring aiding and abetting liability following Central Bank.230 Nevertheless, the court drew the same line between the ATA and private securities fraud suits that the Boim I court had drawn previously.231 Bank of China argued that the court should interpret Central Bank as totally precluding any secondary liability reading when such a theory was not explicitly laid out in the statute.232 The court agreed that there was a general presumption against aiding and abetting liability when the statute did not expressly provide for such liability.233 However, the court determined that this presumption was rebuttable where there was strong evidence of congressional intent to permit secondary liability.234 Wultz‘s rationale for rebutting Central Bank‘s presumption arose directly from Boim I‘s analysis.235 Boim I found that Central Bank‘s holding ―provide[d] guidance but [was] not determinative‖ because it addressed a statute that only inferred a private right of action, whereas § 2333(a)‘s private right of action was explicit.236 Such reasoning suggests that the difference between implied and express private rights of action is sufficient to distinguish Central Bank from ATA civil litigation.237 Wultz likewise determined that Congress had intended for the ATA to be construed broadly using traditional tort law principles; for this reason, the D.C. District Court permitted the aiding and abetting claim against Bank of China.238 This argument is closely linked with those courts‘ assertions that the ATA is distinguishable from the 1933 and 1934 Acts and is therefore outside of Central Bank‘s control.239 The court in Boim I insisted that the ATA‘s legislative history evinces clear intent to incorporate the full apparatus of traditional tort law into the ATA.240 Wultz also relied on Senator Grassley‘s statement that the ATA provides victims of international terrorism with ―all the weapons‖ available to civil plaintiffs241 as well as the ―remedies of American tort law‖242 as evidence that Congress intended to include secondary liability in the statute.243 Logic would seem to dictate that if Congress intended the ATA to incorporate all of the elements of traditional tort law, then it must have intended aiding and abetting theory—viable under traditional tort law—to apply to cases involving banks and international terrorism.244 The legislature‘s discussion of the ―causal chain of terrorism‖ would necessarily include aiders and abettors.245 The court in Goldberg v. UBS AG246 noted that the ATA‘s legislative history and language reflect an intention to give U.S. nationals broad opportunities for relief.247 The courts in Wultz and Boim I also made such a connection, arguing that Congress‘s intent supported an accurate interpretation of the ATA‘s language.248 Wultz found that the ATA civil provision did not place any limits on a potential defendant because the language only required that the plaintiff be injured ―by reason of an act of international terrorism.‖249 In supporting this conclusion, the court cited 236. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002). 237. Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (discussing the Wultz argument in favor of distinguishing ATA cases from Central Bank). 238. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1019. 239. See supra Part II.A. 240. Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511 (1991)). 241. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 242. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 243. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 4511). 244. See, e.g., id. at 55; Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 9–10. 245. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 17. 246. 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) . 247. Id. at 422 (finding that the ATA‘s ―legislative history as well as the language of the statute‖ suggested an intent to provide plaintiffs with ―broad remedies in a procedurally privileged U.S. forum‖). However, Goldberg did not rule directly on the question of whether the ATA provided for secondary liability. 248. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 249. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. This ―by reason of‖ language is common to a number of statutes, including RICO; in such cases, courts have found this 2015] Molzof v. United States250 for the proposition that a statute‘s language should be discerned in light of the common law principles Congress intended to apply to the statute.251 Boim I similarly looked to the ATA‘s language in considering secondary liability.252 The court focused on the definition of international terrorism provided at § 2331(1) and the meaning of the word ―involve‖ in the context of § 2333(a).253 Wultz concurred with Boim I‘s conclusion that this definition, and the pointed reference to criminal law, meant that Congress intended to make the ATA‘s civil provision ―at least as extensive as criminal liability.‖254 Boim I and Wultz therefore concluded that where criminal secondary liability would be available (through 18 U.S.C. § 2), civil secondary liability must follow.255 Once the Wultz court determined that secondary liability existed under the ATA, it applied the standard to evaluating civil aiding and abetting liability established in Halberstam.256 In following the Halberstam approach, which incorporated the Restatement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (1) was ―generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that‖ the assistance was provided and (2) ―knowingly and substantially‖ assisted in the violation.257 In applying tort law principles to a secondary liability claim, the Wultz court emphasized the importance of establishing a causal link between Bank of China and the terrorist attack in question.258 The court noted that where there was no allegation that a bank had direct ties to a terrorist group or had the requisite knowledge that it was aiding a terrorist group, the ―mere provision of routine banking services that benefited‖ the group in a ―general, nondescript manner‖ would not establish jurisdiction over the bank.259 While this point directly addresses jurisdiction, it also suggests that a simply negligent bank does not form a strong enough nexus between a defendant bank and the terrorist act to warrant ATA liability.260 On the other hand, the court would likely require that a bank manifest some degree of knowledge.261 Such a connection is also necessary to establish that the language to establish a proximate cause requirement when a plaintiff pleads primary liability. See supra note 35. 250. 502 U.S. 301 (1992). 251. Id. at 305–07. 252. Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002) (―We look to the language in order to determine what Congress intended, and we also look to the statute‘s structure, subject matter, context and history for this same purpose.‖). 253. Id. at 1009–10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (1992). 254. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020). 255. See Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1020; Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 256. See supra Part I.B.1; see also Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57. 257. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ); see also supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (discussing Halberstam‘s facts and the Supreme Court‘s description of the opinion as ―comprehensive‖). 258. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 34. 259. Id. (quoting In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456, 488–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ). 260. Id. 261. Id. bank knowingly provided substantial assistance to those who carried out the terrorist attack.262 The Wultz court contrasted the case against Bank of China263 with Licci v. American Express Bank.264 In Licci, the court dismissed negligence claims under the ATA civil provision on the basis that the defendant bank had only provided routine banking services, including wire transfers, that allegedly aided Hamas in executing a terrorist attack.265 The Licci court found that it was not reasonably foreseeable that routine banking services would result in rocket attacks in Israel.266 The Wultz court rejected Bank of China‘s argument that its case was analogous to Licci, because the plaintiffs alleged that Bank of China had provided banking services to PIJ with the knowledge that the services would aid the group in carrying out terrorist attacks.267 The court found that this allegation of knowledge suggested the bank had conducted nonroutine services, therefore fulfilling the proximate cause element.268 The Wultz court‘s analysis therefore permits ATA secondary liability and suggests that, for a claim predicated upon such a theory to succeed against a bank, the bank in question must manifest a more culpable mental state than negligence.269 B. Courts Against Secondary Liability Under the ATA This section examines courts that have come out on the other side, holding that no such claim is possible under the ATA. This section begins with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Boim III, in which the court rejected Boim I‘s attempt to distinguish the ATA from Central Bank and instead offered a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory that plaintiffs could potentially use to hold banks liable under a primary liability theory—albeit one that bears some resemblance to secondary liability. This section then shifts its focus to the Second Circuit‘s recent ruling against secondary liability in Rothstein v. UBS AG, where the court found no space for a secondary liability cause of action and required a showing of proximate cause for primary liability claims. 262. Id. at 66. The Wultz court found that whether such a connection existed was a factual matter for trial, as the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded the connection in the complaint. Id. 263. Id. 264. 704 F. Supp. 2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) , vacated in part by Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 732 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2013) . 265. Id. at 410–11. 266. Id. 267. Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 66. 268. Id. (―The banking services allegedly provided by BOC to the PIJ are, therefore, by no means the routine sort of services provided by the correspondent bank to the Lebanese bank [in Licci].‖). 269. Id. at 57. 2015] 1. The Seventh Circuit in Boim III The defendants again appealed after the Boim I ruling, at which point the Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court.270 Finally, the plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing with the Seventh Circuit en banc.271 The en banc court in Boim III then held that the ATA did not provide a secondary liability cause of action, overruling the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Boim I.272 However, Boim III‘s approach to primary liability has left the door open to liability for banks using a statutory chain of incorporations by reference, an approach that has similar characteristics to secondary liability.273 Courts have found that it is Central Bank‘s reasoning—not its subject matter—that applies to ATA cases where a plaintiff seeks to use a secondary liability theory.274 Judge Richard Posner, in his opinion for Boim III, disagreed with the finding in Boim I that the instant case was distinguishable from Central Bank.275 In his opinion, the Boim I court gave too much weight to the fact that a private cause of action in section 10(b) cases was implicit while the ATA‘s was explicit.276 Judge Posner considered this comparison irrelevant because the Central Bank holding extended to government suits as well as private suits.277 Judge Posner noted that section 10(b) expressly authorized SEC suits.278 He therefore concluded that, in the context of the ATA, ―statutory silence on the subject of secondary liability means there is none.‖279 As support for this finding, Judge Posner cited congressional action taken shortly after the Supreme Court‘s Central Bank ruling.280 The year following the ruling, Congress enacted a law that permitted the SEC to pursue those who aided and abetted securities fraud.281 Judge Posner concluded that this legislation demonstrated that, even though the SEC possessed an express cause of action, secondary liability was not permissible until Congress expressly authorized such liability.282 Furthermore, in 2008 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its Central Bank holding and stated clearly that the decision also applied to SEC suits, not merely private actions.283 In its dismissal of the secondary liability interpretation, Boim III offered as an alternative the ―chain of incorporations‖ theory of primary liability available under the material support provision.284 This court, as well as many others, has concluded that the material support crime as pleaded under § 2339B constitutes an act of ―international terrorism.‖285 Boim III‘s logic presupposes a seamless combination of the ATA civil provision, the material support provisions, and the ATA‘s definition of international terrorism under § 2331(1). The court argued that Congress had intended courts to play these provisions off of one another.286 According to the court in Boim III, in using the material support crime in conjunction with § 2333(a), plaintiffs would be combining the secondary liability nature of the material support provision (which explicitly incorporates criminal secondary liability) with a primary liability theory under the ATA civil provision.287 According to Judge Posner ―primary liability in the form of material support to terrorism has the character of secondary liability.‖288 Thus, he argued, Congress had in fact expressly imposed liability on a class of aiders and abettors via a statutory ―chain of incorporations by reference.‖289 Under this theory, a plaintiff begins at § 2333(a), which provides that a plaintiff must have been injured ―by reason of an act of international terrorism.‖290 A plaintiff could then move to § 2339B, which prohibits knowingly providing support to a terrorist organization or attempting or conspiring to do so.291 Furthermore, because the Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project held that the material support provision‘s knowledge requirement only extended to kno wledge that the material 2015 ] support would go to a designated terrorist organization, a defendant need not know that its support was specifically going toward terrorist acts.292 Other courts have considered this possibility as a potential alternative to permitting secondary liability under the ATA on the basis of the statute‘s language and legislative history.293 For instance, in September 2014, the Second Circuit in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank294 reversed the Eastern District of New York‘s grant of summary judgment to National Westminster Bank of Scotland (―Natwest‖), in a case where the material support law served as the basis for primary liability under the ATA.295 The plaintiffs had accused Natwest of providing material support to Hamas via transferring funds and maintaining accounts on behalf of a group called Interpal.296 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded to the lower court on the basis that the court should have incorporated into § 2333(a) the mental state required of material support criminal suits—in other words, knowledge that the group was a terrorist organization, as established in Humanitarian Law Project.297 While Interpal was located on OFAC‘s SDGT list, neither the British government nor the European Union had designated the group as a terrorist organization.298 As the SDGT only applies to U.S. financial institutions and U.S. persons,299 it remains unclear whether OFAC sanctions against a state sponsor of terrorism or the presence of a group or individual on an OFAC list serves as constructive notice for foreign banks providing services to such entities.300 Perhaps, as the district court in Weiss suggested, such a question is ―better suited for the political branches of government.‖301 2. The Second Circuit‘s Take on Secondary Liability Until 2012, the Second Circuit served as fertile ground for secondary liability suits against banks.302 Then, two decisions, one in the Second Circuit and one in the Eastern District of New York, took apart secondary liability but in different ways. In Rothstein, the Second Circuit overturned years of case law and indicated a turning of the tide against secondary liability. In Gill v. Arab Bank,303 a court in the Eastern District found Congress did not intend for secondary liability under the ATA. a. Rothstein Raises the Bar The plaintiffs in Rothstein were U.S. citizens who pleaded that they had been injured, or their relatives had been injured, in terrorist attacks in Israel spanning from July 30, 1997 to July 22, 2006.304 Hamas and Hezbollah were responsible for the attacks, which consisted of five bombings and multiple rocket launchings.305 The plaintiffs alleged that UBS AG , a Swiss bank with U.S. offices, had facilitated U.S. currency transactions with Iran,306 which, in turn, funded Hamas, Hezbollah, and PIJ with the intent to aid in the commission of terrorist attacks.307 They brought a claim under § 2333(a) that the bank had aided and abetted international terrorism.308 In 2013, the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the district court to dismiss plaintiffs‘ secondary liability claim against UBS, finding that such a claim predicated upon § 2333(a) did not exist.309 Rothstein found that the ATA‘s implementation of criminal provisions established a form of aiding and abetting liability but did not expressly address Boim III‘s ―chain of incorporations‖ approach.310 The court observed that, given Congress‘s express provision for secondary liability in other areas of the law, the civil provision‘s silence on the issue was likely intentional.311 The court noted that Congress could take action to explicitly create a secondary liability private cause of action under § 2333(a) in the future.312 The court also dismissed the plaintiffs‘ attempt to hold UBS liable under a primary liability theory, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated 2015] the necessary proximate cause linking the bank with the terrorist attacks.313 The court supported this holding by analogizing the ATA‘s language to the language in the RICO civil provision, which also incorporated the ―by reason of‖ phrase.314 This finding contrasts with Boim III, which made no mention of a proximate cause requirement.315 b. Gill v. Arab Bank In Gill, a case out of the Eastern District of New York, the court methodically dismantled the Wultz and Boim I approach to secondary liability. The Gill court instead sided with Boim III, finding little difference conceptually between ATA cases and Central Bank.316 The Gill court viewed the issue as whether federal courts have the power to infer secondary liability in a civil statute where Congress made no mention of it.317 The court in Gill gave greater consideration to Wultz and Boim I‘s emphasis on the ATA‘s legislative history than did the courts in Boim III or Rothstein.318 The Gill court cautiously weighed the argument that Congress intended the ATA private cause of action to include secondary liability and ultimately dismissed this analysis.319 The court argued that Wultz‘s reliance on legislative history was ―contrary to the realities of the legislative process.‖320 The court claimed that Wultz wrongfully assumed that Congress, in enacting the ATA, acted on a unified front on a point of law that was not addressed in the statute‘s text itself.321 The court also scrutinized certain aspects of the congressional record.322 For instance, in his testimony, Joseph Morris indicated that he believed secondary liability could be found when an entity was negligent.323 However, Gill noted that this understanding of the law was inconsistent with the ATA‘s provision of treble damages, which are generally not available in negligence cases.324 Gill also suggested that to apply § 2333(a) to all aspects of civil litigation would be unreasonable—and argued that 313. Id. at 88–89. 314. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 315. See generally Boim III, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008) . In addition, Judge Diane Wood in Boim III suggested that the majority‘s holding would permit plaintiffs to charge banks without any demonstration of proximate cause. Id. at 724 (Wood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 316. Gill v. Arab Bank, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 500 (E.D.N.Y 2012) . 317. Id. at 497. 318. Id. at 501. 319. Id. at 500–01 (finding that it was ―irrelevant‖ that Central Bank‘s private right of action was implied). 320. Id. at 501 (citing Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992)). 321. Id. 322. Id. 323. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 324. Gill, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 501. even proponents of secondary liability have essentially recognized this fact, as they have not attempted to pursue the tort theory of strict liability.325 Gill also challenged Boim I‘s assertion that Congress intended § 2333(a) to be as extensive as criminal liability in terrorism cases.326 The court argued that, instead, Congress‘s enactment of a general criminal secondary liability statute shows that Congress knows how to provide for such liability if it wants to.327 According to the court, the absence of such a statutory provision demonstrated that Congress did not intend to create secondary liability under the ATA.328 III. RESOLVING THE SECONDARY LIABILITY CONUNDRUM The case law on secondary liability under the ATA has posed a number of questions: Are these banks innocent institutions wrongfully swept up in litigation over heinous crimes they did not commit? Or are banks part of the larger problem of terrorism financing, and the most practical source of relief for terrorism victims? Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions depend on the specific facts of each case. While ATA cases involving banks vary,329 organizing them into three general categories allows for helpful analysis of the secondary liability issue: (1) cases where the defendant bank engaged in routine financial services and demonstrated negligence, at most; (2) cases where the bank‘s activities extended beyond routine services to the point where the bank could potentially be liable under a primary liability theory; and (3) cases where the connection between the terrorist group and the bank was likely too tenuous for primary liability, yet the bank intentionally and extensively engaged with a state sponsor of terrorism or a party on OFAC‘s SDGT list.330 Part III of this Note argues that the language of the ATA civil provision does not extend to secondary liability, and therefore banks, under current law, cannot be charged with aiding and abetting terrorist attacks. Part III.A explains why legislative history does not rebut the presumption against secondary liability that the Supreme Court established in Central Bank.331 Terrorism victims will therefore have no course of redress against the first category of banking cases, as primary liability will not be an option without the kinds of red flags that indicate the bank‘s knowledge that it is directly aiding a terrorist entity. Part III.A also demonstrates why the ATA currently does not provide for bank liability in the second or third category of banking cases. The absence of a viable cause of action in these cases, where the defendant bank‘s conduct goes far beyond routine financial services, is arguably undesirable. Accordingly, Part III.B suggests that 325. Id. 326. See id. (citing Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002)). 327. Id. 328. Id. 329. See supra Introduction. 330. See supra Introduction. 331. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 2015] Congress amend the ATA to expressly permit secondary liability suits. This Note proposes that such an amendment should incorporate a mental state threshold of extreme recklessness or intent, and that courts should apply the Halberstam standard of requiring ―substantial assistance‖ to the tortfeasor.332 While this concept is embedded within JASTA, that bill has other features upon which this Note does not directly comment.333 This Note refrains from completely endorsing JASTA and only speaks to the secondary liability issue under the ATA. A. The ATA Does Not Provide a Viable Avenue for Holding Banks Liable for Acts of International Terrorism Part III.A addresses why courts should not follow the Wultz court‘s finding that the ATA civil provision permits secondary liability private actions. This section additionally explains the often-overlooked implications of the ATA‘s definition of ―international terrorism‖ at § 2331(1).334 As this section demonstrates, this definition includes an intent requirement that is at odds with a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory based upon the ATA‘s material support provision. As a result, only defendant banks that have committed acts that conform to the current definition of ―international terrorism‖ should be held liable under the ATA. 1. The ATA‘s Legislative History Does Not Overcome the Central Bank Presumption Against Secondary Liability Wultz, in permitting secondary liability claims under the ATA, relied heavily upon legislative history.335 In particular, Wultz relied on Senator Grassley‘s statement that the purpose of the ATA was to supply terrorism victims with all of the weapons available to civil plaintiffs under traditional tort law theory.336 As a sponsor of the ATA, Grassley‘s statement should bear some weight, and aiding and abetting liability is a traditional tort law principle.337 However, the presumption against secondary liability that the Supreme Court established in Central Bank is difficult to overcome.338 As the Eastern District noted in Gill, the issue in Central Bank was whether federal courts generally had the power to infer secondary liability when a statute was silent on the topic.339 The Supreme Court in Central Bank offered no indication that its ruling was only limited to securities fraud private suits.340 332. See supra Part I.B.1. 333. See supra notes 74–78. 334. See supra note 35. 335. See supra Part II.A. 336. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 337. Note, however, that while the Supreme Court has endorsed the Halberstam model, there is not unanimity on the precise elements of tort law aiding and abetting liability. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 338. See supra notes 233–34. 339. See supra notes 316–18 and accompanying text. 340. See supra Part I.B.2.a. In fact, the Court held that there was generally no presumption in favor of reading aiding and abetting into a statute that was silent on the issue of secondary liability.341 Congress could have easily indicated in § 2333(a) that secondary liability was available. Many courts, including the Second Circuit in Rothstein, have reached this conclusion in recent years.342 The Boim III court rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Central Bank applied not only to the implied private right of action under section 10(b) but also to the expressly granted government right of action.343 This fact significantly diminishes Boim I‘s argument that courts should treat civil secondary liability in ATA and securities fraud cases differently. In addition, the language of the ATA is very much in line with the statutory language of the RICO civil provision, which states: ―Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.‖344 If courts have generally applied Central Bank to civil RICO, it makes sense to apply its reasoning to ATA aiding and abetting as well.345 Furthermore, while there is evidence in the ATA‘s legislative history to suggest that Congress intended plaintiffs to use the civil provision against terrorism financers,346 legislative history can be unreliable and should not override hard textual evidence.347 While the ATA‘s more general goals might be clear from the legislative history,348 it is far more difficult to identify a unified congressional purpose on the more specific issue of secondary liability.349 The Gill court illuminated the kinds of inconsistencies that can arise from an overzealous reliance on legislative history.350 For instance, Joseph Morris‘s testimony in favor of holding negligent defendants liable for aiding and abetting acts of terrorism is starkly at odds with other evidence, including § 2333(a)‘s explicit treble damages provision.351 341. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 342. See supra Part II.B.2.a. 343. See supra notes 274–79 and accompanying text. 344. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012) (providing plaintiffs with a private cause of action when injured ―by reason of‖ international terrorism, with treble damages as a potential remedy), with 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (providing plaintiffs with a private cause of action when injured ―by reason of‖ a § 1962 RICO violation, with treble damages as a potential remedy) . 345. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 346. See supra Part I.A.2. 347. See supra note 128 (explaining that the Court in Central Bank found that the lack of textual evidence of secondary liability was enough to resolve the case in defendants‘ favor); supra note 320 (discussing that the Gill court found that Wultz‘s strong reliance on legislative history was ―contrary to the realities of the legislative process‖). 348. These goals include offering private plaintiffs a chance for justice and deterring terrorism. See infra Part III.B. 349. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 350. See supra Part II.B.2.b. 351. See supra notes 66, 71–72. As treble damages are punitive in nature, they do not apply to negligence cases. 2015] Even evidence suggesting that banks were intended as an ATA target can cut the other way—such discussions demonstrate that Congress was aware that the ATA did not clearly permit a secondary liability cause of action.352 Thus, one can presume that confusion surrounding the secondary liability issue was apparent to Senator Grassley.353 Congress had the chance to explicitly provide for secondary liability in the ATA but chose not to do so. Finally, Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer, two of the cases that spawned the ATA, were not banking cases.354 In these instances, Congress wanted to give plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain civil damages from the actual terrorist organizations that funded and supported the attacks.355 The Wultz court asserted that Bank of China‘s alleged knowledge that it was providing financial services to terrorists overcame the benefit of the doubt often applied to routine services.356 However, this point alone is not enough to rebut the ATA‘s language and permit secondary liability. The routine or nonroutine nature of a bank‘s services to a terrorist group should be considered only if the civil provision granted secondary liability in the first place. For the reasons above, the ATA does not appear to provide for a secondary liability cause of action. 2. Applying the Material Support Law to § 2333(a) Creates Inconsistencies As discussed in Part II.B, Judge Posner in Boim III proposed using a ―chain of incorporations‖ theory to hold liable organizations that provide financial services to terrorist organizations.357 Plaintiffs have frequently invoked this theory to attempt to hold banks primarily liable under the ATA when a secondary liability theory has failed.358 If the court considers § 2339B to qualify as an act of international terrorism, it would then apply the mental state standard established in Humanitarian Law Project; as a result, a defendant would only be required to know that he or she was dealing with a terrorist organization and would not be required to specifically intend to aid terrorism.359 At first glance, this solution to the secondary liability issue appears quite feasible, but upon further inspection, it raises certain problems. The trouble concerns the clash between the Supreme Court‘s holding in Humanitarian Law Project and the text of the current definition of international terrorism. This Note argues that courts are often incorrect in applying the material support law as a basis for primary liability under the ATA civil provision. For the reasons below, the ―chain of incorporations‖ method is not a viable alternative to ATA secondary liability for banks. 352. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 353. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 354. See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text. 355. See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text. 356. See supra Part II.A. 357. See supra Part II.B.1. 358. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. 359. See supra Part II.B.1. The material support crime does not completely fit the definition of international terrorism at § 2333(1).360 The crime could feasibly fulfill § 2331(1)(A); while funding terrorists is not a violent act in itself, courts have found that financing terrorism is dangerous.361 The inconsistency between the definition and Humanitarian Law Project arises at § 2331(1)(B). This subsection states that an act of international terrorism must also ―appear to be intended‖ to intimidate or coerce civilians, influence a government‘s policy by coercion or intimidation, or impact a government‘s conduct through assassination, mass destruction, or kidnapping.362 The implications of this failure of the ―chain of incorporations‖ approach are significant. In cases such as Linde v. Arab Bank, where there is persuasive evidence that the bank had extensive knowledge of its dealings with a terrorist group, this knowledge would not be a sufficient basis for primary liability—a plaintiff would need to demonstrate the defendant‘s specific intent pursuant to § 2331(1)(B).363 While it is possible that a plaintiff could meet this threshold of proof, this standard would frequently prove insurmountable.364 B. Congress Should Pass Legislation Amending the ATA Due to public policy interests in providing an effective civil remedy for terrorism victims against banks that knowingly aid terrorists, Congress should amend the ATA to provide for aiding and abetting liability for acts of international terrorism. This bill could provide a workable solution to the conflict arising from the ATA‘s vague current language. Particularly in cases where the actual terrorists are beyond the reach of the American judicial system, or where state sponsors of terrorism have defaulted, victims of terrorism may have no source of relief without the ability to pursue those who conducted business with these parties.365 Following the Tel-Oren and Klinghoffer cases, the American public became keenly aware of terrorism victims‘ limited options for redress.366 The ATA was enacted to fix this problem—it is therefore unlikely that Congress would be satisfied with the law existing as an empty shell, without any real power to bring plaintiffs relief. Although Congress‘s intent cannot alter the text of the ATA in hindsight, it can inform actions moving forward. The ATA‘s goals were to provide 360. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 361. See supra note 203. Judge Posner compares ―[g]iving money to Hamas‖ to ―giving a loaded gun to a child.‖ Boim III, 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) . 362. 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(b) (2012). See supra note 35 and accompanying text for the full statutory definition of international terrorism. 363. See supra Part I.C.1 for discussion of the Linde case. 364. Consider the cases discussed in Part II, where knowledge was often alleged but demonstrating actual intent was difficult or impossible. See also supra Part I.C.1 and its discussion of routine and nonroutine banking services and what such services indicate about a bank‘s mental state. 365. See supra Part I.C. 366. See supra Part I.A.2. relief to plaintiffs and to deter terrorism.367 In cases where the bank was merely negligent, it is unlikely that the threat of a lawsuit under an ATA aiding and abetting liability theory will deter terrorism financing—in fact, such a threat could potentially wreak havoc on financial systems as well as diplomatic relations.368 On the other hand, in cases where a bank persistently conducted business with nations included on the SST list, the bank arguably had constructive notice and a stronger nexus exists between the bank and the terrorist attack.369 Such a link should not automatically result in bank liability; in applying secondary liability under the ATA, courts should incorporate the Halberstam standard, based on the Restatement, which requires knowledge and substantial assistance.370 In banking cases, a plaintiff therefore should be required to demonstrate that the bank was extremely reckless in its handling of terrorist-linked accounts. For example, continued engagement with businesses within a state sponsor of terrorism, such as Iran, could establish such a mental state. This careful application of aiding and abetting charges only will be possible once Congress takes action to permit secondary liability under the ATA. Congress could arrive at a similar result by altering the ATA‘s definition of terrorism so that it better matches the material support law‘s knowledge standard, which would render Boim III‘s ―chain of incorporations‖ approach more feasible.371 However, as this definition serves as the basis for other provisions aside from § 2333(a),372 its text is probably best left unaltered. An amendment to the ATA to permit secondary liability, applied as described above, would solve the complicated issue of how and when to hold banks liable for acts of international terrorism. CONCLUSION When the assets of a terrorist organization or its state sponsor are unreachable, where should plaintiffs turn? Banks have emerged as an attractive target. For many plaintiffs, suing a bank and pleading under a civil aiding and abetting theory may represent the best chance for relief. Nevertheless, this Note agrees with the Second and Seventh Circuits that the ATA‘s text does not provide for secondary liability in civil suits. To end the analysis here, however, would render an incomplete picture of the current scope of liability under the ATA. Courts that do not permit secondary liability have often misapplied the material support to terrorism law as an alternative to aiding and abetting liability. Congress should 367. See supra Part I.A.2, I.C. 368. See generally Sant, supra note 14. 369. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing OFAC and the State Department‘s process of listmaking). 370. See supra Part I.B.1. 371. See supra Part III.A.2 (identifying the problems with the ―chain of incorporations‖ approach). 372. This definition also mirrors the definition of international terrorism in other federal statutes. See Harper, supra note 35, at 1138. amend the ATA to include secondary liability because the ATA, interpreted correctly, does not provide a viable avenue for relief for private plaintiffs in cases where banks demonstrate extreme recklessness without clear evidence of intent. However, courts should only permit aiding and abetting claims against banks where there is overwhelming evidence that the bank‘s involvement went beyond providing routine financial services, either due to its extensive interaction with a state sponsor of terrorism or some other red flag. Through applying this strict standard, courts can maintain the delicate balance between serving national security interests and protecting legitimate financial institutions from unjust persecution. EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM SUITS AGAINST BANKS .................. 3394 A. The Antiterrorism Act ............................................................ 3394 1. The ATA's Statutory Language...................................... 3395 2. The ATA's Legislative History ...................................... 3396 * J.D. Candidate , 2016 , Fordham University School of Law; B.A. , 2011 , Georgetown would also like to thank my amazing family for always being there to support me. 3. The Crime of Material Support to Terrorism.................. 3400 Difference Matters ................................................................ 3401 1. The Nature of Secondary Liability.................................. 3402 2 . Statutory Secondary Liability Analogies: Securities Fraud and RICO .............................................................. 3403 Fraud Cases.............................................................. 3404 b. RICO and Secondary Liability .................................. 3406 C. Some Background on Banks .................................................. 3408 1 . Routine Versus Nonroutine Banking Services................ 3408 2. Reliance on List-Making Post-September 11 ................. 3410 3. Are Banks the Best Chance of Redress for Victims of Terrorism?....................................................................... 3411 II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW ON ATA SECONDARY LIABILITY ..... 3413 Secondary Liability Theory................................................... 3413 B. Courts Against Secondary Liability Under the ATA.............. 3418 1. The Seventh Circuit in Boim III. ..................................... 3419 2. The Second Circuit's Take on Secondary Liability ........ 3421 a. Rothstein Raises the Bar ........................................... 3422 b. Gill v. Arab Bank ...................................................... 3423 III. RESOLVING THE SECONDARY LIABILITY CONUNDRUM.................. 3424 Banks Liable for Acts of International Terrorism................. 3425 1. The ATA's Legislative History Does Not Overcome the Central Bank Presumption Against Secondary Liability 3425 2. Applying the Material Support Law to § 2333(a ) Creates Inconsistencies ................................................... 3427 B. Congress Should Pass Legislation Amending the ATA.......... 3428 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 3429 9 . See infra Part I.B. 10 . Primary liability was the basis of a recent successful lawsuit and trial centered upon Arab Bank , PLC. See Linde v. Arab Bank , PLC , No. 04 -cv-2799, 2014 WL 4913320 (E.D.N.Y. Sept . 22 , 2014 ) (verdict form); Linde v . Arab Bank , PLC , No. 04 -cv-2799 (BMC) (VVP) , 2015 WL 1565479, at *27 ( E.D.N.Y. Apr . 8 , 2015 ) (upholding the jury's verdict and discussing the nature of ATA liability) . In September 2014 , a jury in Linde v . Arab Bank found Arab Bank liable for violating § 2333(a ). Linde , 2014 WL 4913320. The plaintiffs Arab Bank , PLC, 384 F. Supp . 2d 571 , 578 - 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2005 ). See infra Parts II and III abetting liability. 11. See generally 2 NANDA & PANSIUS, supra note 3. 12. See infra Part II. 13. See infra Part III. 14. See Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit Provision of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ . ST. L.J. 533 , 534 ( 2013 ). 15 . See infra Part I.C. 2 . 16. See Terrorist Financing, U.S. ATTORNEY'S BULL ., July 2013 , at 7. 17. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. , THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 169 (1st ed. 2004 ). 18 . See id. at 171. 19. See id. 20. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16, at 7 . 21. Id . 22 . See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S ., supra note 17 , at 169- 70; see also JOHN ROTH ET AL., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING 18 ( 2004 ). 23 . See ROTH ET AL., supra note 22, at 25-26. 24. See id. at 26 . 25. Id. (―[T]he September 11 hijackers and their co-conspirators had bank accounts and bank-to-bank transfers . ‖) . 26 . See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S ., supra note 17 , at 185 . 27. Pub . L. No. 95 - 223 , 91 Stat. 1626 ( 1977 ) (codified at 50 U .S.C. §§ 1701 - 1705 ( 1977 )). 31 . See 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (a) ( 2012 ). 32 . Id . See infra note 66 for a discussion of the phrase ―threefold the damages,‖ or treble damages. 33 . Id . Non-U.S. nationals have sought to use the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a means against extraterritorial application‖ in order to sue under the ATS . Kiobel, 133 S. Ct . 1659 , 1669 ( 2013 ). 34 . 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (a). 35 . See Rothstein v . UBS AG , 708 F.3d 82 , 95 ( 2d Cir . 2013 ) (relying on the reasoning of RICO cases to hold that the ―by reason of‖ language in § 2333(a) indicates a proximate 503 U.S. 258 , 265 - 68 ( 1992 ) (finding that the ―by reason of‖ language in RICO's civil elements); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp . 2d 560 , 569 (E.D.N .Y. 1999 ) ( ―‗By reason of' has been interpreted by courts to require something more than ‗but for' causation.‖); infra Part I.B.2.a-b (discussing RICO and the Rothstein ruling, respectively). 36 . 18 U.S.C. § 2331 ( 1 ). This definition is the same as the definition for international terrorism provided in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub . L. No. 95 - 511 , 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 ) ; see also Nick Harper, FISA‟s Fuzzy Line Between Domestic and International Terrorism, 81 U. CHI. L. REV . 1123 , 1138 ( 2014 ) (―The 30 J. LEGIS . 249 , 256 ( 2004 ) (―The definition of ‗international terrorism' . . . is a verbatim copy of the FISA definition . . . .‖). 37 . 18 U.S.C. § 2331 ( 1 ) ( A ). 38 . Id . § 2331 ( 1 )(B). 39 . Id . § 2331 ( 1 )(C). For instance, the Southern District of New York has held that the September 11 attacks, while occurring on U.S. soil, nonetheless qualify as acts of Organizations , and Global Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV . 1341 , 1435 - 36 ( 2004 ) (citing Smith v . Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan , 262 F. Supp . 2d 217 , 221 -22 (S.D.N .Y. 2003 )). 40 . 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (a). 41 . See id. § 2331 ( 1 ). 42. See infra Part II. 43. See Wultz v . Islamic Republic of Iran , 864 F. Supp . 2d 24 , 32 -37 (D.D .C. 2012 ) (holding Syria and Iran liable under the ATA) . 44 . See infra Part II .B. 45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 , cl. 10 . 46. See Patrick L. Donnelly , Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 , 72 CORNELL L. REV . 599 , 608 - 09 ( 1987 ) (describing the congressional powers authorized under the Define and Punish Clause) . 47 . Antiterrorism Act of 1987 , Pub. L. No. 100 - 204 , §§ 1001 - 1005 , 101 Stat. 1406 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201 - 5203 ( 1987 )) ; see also Almog v . Arab Bank, PLC , 471 F. Supp. 2d 257 , 266 (E.D.N .Y. 2007 ) (discussing the evolution of the ATA's civil provision ). 48 . 22 U.S.C. § 5202 . 49. For instance, it is unlawful to receive ―anything of value‖ (excluding informational PLO. Id. 50. See supra note 35. In 1991 , Congress repealed the ATA due to a technical issue . See Goldberg v . UBS AG , 660 F. Supp . 2d 410 , 414 n.5 (E.D.N .Y. 2009 ). However, in 1992 , Congress reenacted all of the 1990 Act's substantive provisions in the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 . See id .; Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC , 471 F. Supp . 2d 257 , 266 (E.D.N .Y. 2007 ). 51 . See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) , Pub. L. No. 107 - 56 , 115 Stat. 272 ( 2001 ) ; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub . L. No. 104- 132 , 110 Stat. 1214 ( 1996 ). See infra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the material support law, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339 - 2339 (d). 52 . 517 F. Supp . 542 , 549 -51 (D.D .C. 1981 ), aff‟d, 726 F. 2d 774 (D.C. Cir . 1984 ) (per curiam). The case arose from a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) attack in 1978 in Haifa , Israel. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776 . The PLO took 121 civilian hostages, and before the killed, with eighty-seven injured . Id . 53 . See Beth Van Schaack , Finding the Tort of Terrorism in International Law , 28 REV. LITIG. 381 , 285 , 388 ( 2008 ). 54 . Id. at 385- 86 . 55 . Id. at 385. The ATS provides that ―district courts shall have original jurisdiction of treaty of the United States .‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ( 2012 ). 56 . See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute : The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in U .S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1645 , 1647 ( 2014 ); Van Schaack, supra note 53, at 386. 57 . 739 F. Supp . 854 (S.D.N .Y. 1990 ), vacated by 937 F.2d 44 ( 2d Cir . 1991 ). 58 . Id. at 856 . 59. Id . 60 . Id. at 858- 59 . 61 . See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. (Boim I) , 291 F.3d 1000 , 1010 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ) (citing Klinghoffer , 739 F. Supp . at 858-59) ( ―The district court found that [Klinghoffer's] Strauss v . Credit Lyonnais , 242 F.R.D. 199 , 214 (E.D.N .Y. 2007 ). For purposes of clarity, this Note will refer to the Seventh Circuit's decision in 2002, which held that there is a secondary liability cause of action under § 2333(a), as Boim I, and the Seventh Circuit's en banc decision in 2008 (overturning Boim I and holding against permitting secondary liability) as Boim III. Boim v . Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. (Boim III) , 549 F.3d 685 , 705 ( 7th Cir . 2008 ) (en banc) . 62 . See H.R. REP . NO. 102 - 1040 , at 5 ( 1992 ) (―The recent case of the Klinghoffer family international terrorism.‖) . 63 . See Goldberg v . UBS AG , 660 F. Supp . 2d 410 , 421 (E.D.N .Y. 2009 ) ; see also H .R. REP. NO. 102 - 1040 , at 5 ( ―Only by virtue of the fact that the [Klinghoffer] attack violated actions against such terrorists the Committee [on the Judiciary] recommend[ed] [this bill].‖) . 64 . See , e.g., Boim I , 291 F.3d at 1010; Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 755 F. Supp . 2d 1 , 55 -57 (D.D .C. 2010 ). 65 . See 137 CONG . REC. 4511 ( 1991 ). Senator Grassley cited banking information and subpoenas for financial records as examples of such tools . Id . 66 . See id.; see also Goodrow v. Lane Bryant , Inc., 732 N.E.2d 289 , 299 (Mass. 2000 ) required for treble damages . See, e.g., Bangert v . Harris , 553 F. Supp . 235 , 239 (M.D. Pa . 1982 ) (holding that specific statutory authorization was needed for a court to award treble damages) . 67 . 136 CONG. REC. 14279 - 84 ( 1990 ). 68 . See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 14, Boim I , 291 F.3d 1000 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ) (Nos . 01 - 1969 , 01 - 1970 ) [hereinafter Boim I Brief] (citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm . on Courts and Admin. Practice , 101st Cong. 136 ( 1990 ) (statement of Professor Wendy Perdue )). 69 . 136 CONG. REC. 14279 - 84 . 70 . Boim I Brief , supra note 68, at 13- 14 . 71 . See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 755 F. Supp . 2d 1 , 56 (D.D .C. 2010 ) (citing Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice , 101st Cong. 136 ( 1990 ) (statement of Joseph A . Morris , General Counsel, U.S. Information Agency)); see also Boim I Brief, supra note 68, at 14. 72. See Boim I Brief, supra note 68 , at 14 (quoting Morris as stating that ―[t]he tort law these civil suits‖). 73. S. REP. NO. 102-342 , at 22 ( 1992 ). In January 2013 , Congress amended the ATA's 18 U.S.C. § 2335 ( 1992 ) ; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 , Pub . L. No. 112 - 239 , 126 Stat. 1632; see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC , 950 F. Supp . 2d 459 , 460 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ) (holding that courts must apply the amended ten-year statute of limitations retroactively to cases that were pending during or commenced following the amendment 82 . Id. at 15- 18 . However, Chesney notes that the law is narrower in the sense that § 2339A can apply to aid given to anyone, while § 2339B is specific to aid given to terrorist groups. Id. at 18 . Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339B ( 1996 ) (criminalizing knowingly providing requirement) , with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A ( 1994 ) (permitting charges where the group is not a U.S .-designated terrorist organization) . 83 . See Chesney, supra note 79, at 18. 84 . 561 U.S. 1 , 8 ( 2010 ) ; see also infra Part II .B. 1 . 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b). 86 . CHARLES DOYLE , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334 , TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B , CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5 ( 2010 ). 87 . See id. 88 . See Halberstam v. Welch , 705 F.2d 472 , 489 (D.C.C . 1983 ). 89 . See Boim III , 549 F.3d 685 ( 7th Cir . 2008 ). See infra Part II.B.1 for further organizations secondarily liable under the ATA . 90 . Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project , 561 U.S. 1 , 17 - 18 ( 2010 ). Defendants have generally id.; United States v . Al Kassar, 582 F. Supp . 2d 488 , 498 (S.D.N .Y. 2008 ) (―Defendants contend that because Section 2339B does not require a showing of specific process clause of the Fifth Amendment.‖) . 91 . See infra Part III.A.2. 92. In particular, the ruling in Central Bank of Denver v . First Interstate Bank of Denver , 511 U.S. 164 ( 1994 ), which concerned secondary liability in private securities fraud suits, has strongly influenced ATA banking cases . See infra Part I.B.2.a. 93 . See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b ) ( 1979 ) ; see also Will Rice, American & British Insurers and Courts As Aiders and Abettors of Commercial Terrorism, 6 ST. MARY'S L. REV . ON MINORITY ISSUES 1 , 44 - 47 ( 2003 ). In specific relation to aiding and assistance,' not all have formally adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b ). ‖ Id. at 44 n. 190 . 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 . 95. See Nathan Isaac Combs, Note, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability , 58 VAND. L. REV. 241 , 254 - 55 ( 2005 ). 96 . See Kevin Bennardo, The Tort of Aiding and Advising?: The Attorney Exception to Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty , 84 N.D. L. REV. 85 , 85 ( 2008 ) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b )) ; see also In re Chiquita Brand Int'l, Inc . Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative Litig. , Inc., 690 F. Supp . 2d 1296 , 1310 (S.D. Fla . 2010 ) (citing Halberstam v . Welch , 705 F.2d 472 , 477 (D.C. Cir . 1983 ), and applying the test to the ATA civil provision) . 97 . See Combs, supra note 95, at 289-90 . 98 . See id. at 278 ( ―With the dearth of coherent precedent and the increasing importance of civil aiding and abetting, courts need a clearer test for liability . ‖) . 99 . 705 F. 2d 472 (D.C. Cir . 1983 ). 100 . Cent . Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , 511 U.S. 164 , 181 ( 1994 ). See infra Part I.B.2.a for an in-depth discussion of this case's handling of secondary liability under federal securities law. 101. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487-89. 102. Id. 103. Id. at 488 . 104. 18 U.S.C. § 2 ( 2012 ). 105 . Id . § 2 ( a ). Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) also provides that ―whoever willfully causes an act United States , is punishable as a principal . ‖ 106 . See Nye & Nissen v . United States , 336 U.S. 613 , 619 ( 1949 ) ; United States v . Turner , 583 F.3d 1062 , 1067 ( 8th Cir . 2009 ). Conspiracy to provide material support to for liability . See DOYLE, supra note 86 , at 2. Furthermore, conspirators may be held liable as opposed to conspiracy . 107. See Combs, supra note 95, at 280. 108 . 511 U.S. 164 ( 1994 ). 109 . See , e.g., Rolo v . City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust , 155 F.3d 644 , 656 (3d Cir. 1998 ) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v . First Interstate Bank of Denver , 511 U.S. 164 , 181 - 82 ( 1994 )). 110 . Pub . L. No. 73 - 291 , 48 Stat. 881 . 111. See generally Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164 . 112. Id. at 191. 113. Id. at 167-68. 114. Id. 115. Id. at 167. 116. Id. at 167-68. 117. Id. at 166-168. Section 10 ( b) is the general antifraud provision of the 1934 Act . Id. at 171. The Tenth Circuit rule permitted a section 10(b) aiding and abetting cause of action consisting of the following elements: ―(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor . ‖ Id. at 168 . The 1934 Act 1933, regulates the initial distribution of securities. Id. at 171 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v . Manor Drug Stores , 421 U.S. 723 , 752 ( 1975 )) ; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 , Pub . L. No. 73 - 291 , 48 Stat. 881; Securities Exchange Act of 1933 , Title I , Pub . L. No. 73 - 22 , 48 Stat. 74 . 118. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act states: 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b ) ( 2012 ). Rule 10b-5 contains similar language and also lacks an explicit private right of action . See 17 C.F.R. § 240 .10b- 5 ( 2014 ). 119 . See , e.g., Cleary v . Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 , 777 ( 1st Cir . 1983 ); Kerbs v . Fall River Indus ., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 , 740 ( 10th Cir . 1974 ); Brennan v . Midwestern United Life Ins . Co, 259 F. Supp . 673 (N.D. Ind . 1966 ), aff‟d, 417 F.2d 147 ( 7th Cir . 1969 ). 120 . See , e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301 , 1311 n. 12 ( 9th Cir . 1982 ). 121 . See , e.g., Akin v . Q-L Invs ., Inc. 959 F.2d 521 , 525 ( 5th Cir . 1992 ) (noting the 797 F.2d 490 , 495 ( 7th Cir . 1986 ) (effectively eliminating secondary liability in securities cases through its holding that a deceptive or manipulative act was required for section 10(b ) liability) . 122 . Cent . Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver , 511 U.S. 164 , 170 ( 1994 ). 123 . See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 , 13 n.9 ( 1971 ) (finding an implied private right of action under section 10(b )). 124 . Cent . Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 ( ―Congress did not create a private § 10(b) cause of scheme.‖). 125 . Id . 126 . See id. at 177. 127. Id. at 175-76 . 128 . Id. at 176. The court noted that there was ―a basic flaw with this interpretation .‖ Id. 10b- 5 . Id. at 180 ( ―Our reasoning is confirmed by the fact that respondents' argument would impose 10b-5 aiding and abetting liability when at least one element critical for recovery under 10b-5 is absent: reliance.‖ (citing Basic Inc . v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 , 243 ( 1988 ))). The Court concluded that ―the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a § 10(b) violation. Unlike those courts [recognizing an aiding and abetting action], however, we think that conclusion resolves the case . ‖ Id. at 177. 129. Id. at 178. 130. Id. at 179. 131. Id. at 183-84 . 132 . Id. at 180-81 (citing Brief for SEC As Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner- Appellants at 10 , Cent . Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (No. 92 - 854 )). 133 . Id . 181 - 83 . 134 . Id. at 182. 135. See infra Part II.B. 136. See infra Part II. 137. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 , Pub. L. No. 91 - 452 , 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961- 1968 ( 1970 )). 138 . Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961 , ―racketeering activity‖ includes crimes such as ―any act or as an extensive list of other crimes under Title 18 of the U .S. Code. 139 . See 2 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO , WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 11 .03, at 11- 6 ( 2006 ). 140 . 18 U.S.C. § 1962 . 141. Id . § 1964 . The provision adds that such recovery shall include reasonable violation of section 1962 . ‖ Id. This securities fraud exception does not stand , however, with regard to any person criminally convicted for such fraud . Id. 142. See 2 OBERMAIER & MORVILLO, supra note 139 . 143. See H.J. Inc . v Nw. Bell Tel . Co., 492 U.S. 229 , 248 ( 1989 ) (recognizing that Sedima , S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co ., 473 U.S. 479 , 495 ( 1985 ) (holding that RICO applies to all criminals, not only those involved in organized crime ). 144. See Sedima , 473 U.S. at 499 ( noting that RICO civil suits ―are being brought almost mobster‖) . 145 . This includes the Supreme Court. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp ., 547 U.S. 451 , 453 ( 2006 ) (relying on Holmes v . Sec. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 ( 1992 ), resulting from a RICO violation) . 146 . See generally 8 JEROLD S . SOLOVY & R. DOUGLAS REES , BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 96 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d. ed. 2005 ). 147 . Dep 't of Econ . Dev. v. Andersen, 924 F. Supp . 449 , 475 -77 (S.D.N .Y. 1996 ) aiders and abettors was inadvertent‖). But see In re Melridge, Inc . Sec. Litig., No. 93 - 36184 , 1996 WL 138468 , at * 1 ( 9th Cir. Mar . 27 , 1996 ) (finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank was only relevant to Rule 10b-5 and not RICO ). 148 . 155 F.3d 644 ( 3d Cir . 1998 ). 149 . Id. at 657 ( ―We conclude that the same analysis [as the Court used in Central Bank] v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839 , 844 ( 3d Cir . 2000 ) (affirming Rolo and clarifying that Rolo also applied in common law-based RICO cases) . 157. Id. at 123- 25 . The court relied on Rothstein's holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate proximate cause to advance a primary liability cause of action under § 2333(a ). requirements also relate to ATA secondary liability. 158. See Sabine Michalowski, No Complicity Liability for Funding Gross Human Rights Violations ?, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L . 451 , 507 ( 2012 ) (citing In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11 , 2001 , 349 F. Supp . 2d 765 , 832 -34 (S.D.N .Y. 2005 )); see also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11 , 2001 , 718 F. Supp . 2d 456 , 489 (S.D.N .Y. 2010 ); Almog v . Arab Bank , PLC , 471 F. Supp . 2d 257 , 291 (E.D.N .Y. 2007 ); Weiss v . Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC , 453 F. Supp . 2d 609 , 625 (E.D.N .Y. 2006 ); Strauss v . Credit Lyonnais, S.A. , No. CV- 06- 0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704, at *12 ( E.D.N .Y. Oct. 5 , 2006 ); Linde v . Arab Bank, PLC , 384 F. Supp . 2d 571 , 588 (E.D.N .Y. 2005 ). 159 . See Michalowski, supra note 158 , at 487; see also Goldberg v . UBS AG , 660 F. Supp. 2d 410 , 425 (E.D.N .Y. 2009 ) (holding that the defendant's performance of three wire assistance‖ element of tort aiding and abetting liability) . 160 . See Michalowski, supra note 158 , at 487 . 161. See id. 162 . 384 F. Supp . 2d 571 (E.D.N .Y. 2005 ). 163 . See id. at 588 ( ―Given plaintiffs' allegations regarding the knowing and intentional alleged to provide.‖). 164 . See Anti-Terrorism Act Liability for Financial Institutions , SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP , Sept. 24 , 2014 , at 2, available at http://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ SC_ Publication_Anti_Terrorism_Act_Liability_for_ Financial_Institutions.pdf. 165. See Linde , 384 F. Supp . 2d at 575 . 166. See id. at 576- 77 . The court noted that although the plaintiffs occasionally referred to the payments to the bombers' families as insurance, the ―scheme is not alleged to be a 179. See id . at 9-11; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1702 ( 2012 ) (permitting the prosecution the President considers to be a national security threat ). 180. See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16 , at 11; see also Exec. Order No. 13 , 224 , 15 C.F.R. pt . 744 .12 ( 2001 ). 181 . See id.; see also Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank , PLC, 936 F. Supp . 2d 100 , 118 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 ( 2d Cir . 2014 ). 182 . See Terrorist Financing, supra note 16 , at 11 . 183. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY , OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS LIST (Jan . 2, 2015 ), available at https://www.treasury.gov/ofac/downloads/t11sdn.pdf ; see also AUDREY KURTH CRONIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV ., RL32120, THE ―FTO LIST‖ AND CONGRESS: SANCTIONING DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS , CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 4-5, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32120.pdf. 184 . 50 U.S.C. § 2405 (j); see also Export Administration Act of 1979 , Pub. L. No. 96 - 72 , 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401 - 2420 ). 185. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6) ( 2012 ). 186 . See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE , http://www.state.gov/ j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Apr . 23 , 2015 ). 187 . See Levin v. Bank of N.Y., No. 09 CV 5900 RPP , 2011 WL 812032, at * 13 (S.D.N .Y. Mar. 4 , 2011 ). 188. See supra Part I.A.2. 189. See supra note 73 . 190 . 291 F.3d 1000 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ). 191 . Boim I Brief , supra note 68, at 18- 19 . 192. Van Schaack, supra note 53 , at 392-93 ( ―The hope was that allowing civil liability support acts of terrorism while not engaging in violent acts directly . ‖) . 193 . See Jack D. Smith & Gregory J. Cooper , Disrupting Terrorist Financing with Civil Litigation , 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L . 65 , 80 ( 2009 ). 194 . See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 755 F. Supp . 2d 1 , 61 (D.D .C. 2010 ). 195 . See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 79 . 196. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA , CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31258 , SUITS AGAINST TERRORIST STATES BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM , CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ( 2008 ), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31258. pdf (―The limited availability of defendant 549 F.3d 685 ( 7th Cir . 2008 ). 197 . 755 F. Supp . 2d 1 , 61 (D.D .C. 2010 ). 198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 199 . Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 864 F. Supp . 2d 24 , 42 (D.D .C. 2012 ). The court in civilized society and represent a moral depravity that knows no bounds . ‖ Id. at 43 . 200. See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 80 . 201. See Boim III , 549 F.3d at 690 ( ―Damages are a less effective remedy against Liberation Organization , 402 F.3d 274 , 276 ( 1st Cir . 2005 ); Biton v . Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority , 252 F.R.D. 1 , 1 (D.D .C. 2008 ); Knox v . Palestine Liberation Organization , 248 F .R.D. 420 , 423 (S.D.N .Y 2008 ). 202 . Boim III , 549 F.3d at 691. 203. Id. at 690 . 204. Boim I , 291 F.3d 1000 , 1021 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ). 205 . See Smith & Cooper, supra note 193, at 74. The standard for civil suits is ―clear and reasonable doubt.‖ Id . 206. See Adam B. Weiss , From the Bonannos to the bin Ladens: The Reves Operation or Terrorism , 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1123 , 1165 ( 2010 ). 207 . See generally Sant, supra note 14 (presenting several reasons why banks should not be targeted under the ATA) . 208 . See , e.g., Linde v . Arab Bank, PLC , 950 F. Supp . 2d 459 , 460 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ). 209 . Id. at 535 , 544 - 45 ( arguing that the ATA civil provision was enacted as a largely symbolic law, intended to target terrorist actors and not banks ). 210 . See , e.g., Gill v . Arab Bank, PLC , 893 F. Supp . 2d 523 , 538 (E.D.N .Y. 2012 ) Weiss v . Nat'l Westminster Bank , 936 F. Supp . 2d 100 , 111 , 116 - 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2013 ) conducted business with any U. K.-designated terrorist groups) . 211 . See Sant, supra note 14 , at 599 . 212. Boim I , 291 F.3d 1000 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ). 213 . 708 F.3d 82 ( 2d Cir . 2013 ). 214 . See infra Part II.A-B . 215 . Boim I , 291 F.3d at 1002. 216. Id. at 1003. The family also sued the Quranic Literacy Institute, the American See Mike Robinson , Court Upholds $156M Palestinian Terror Verdict, USA TODAY (Dec . 3, 2008 ), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-03-3866513362_x.htm. 217. Boim I , 291 F.3d at 1002 - 03 . 218 . See id. at 1021 . 219. See generally Wultz v . Islamic Republic of Iran , 755 F. Supp . 2d 1 (D.D .C. 2010 ). 220 . See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 864 F. Supp . 2d 24 , 27 (D.D .C. 2012 ). Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip formed PIJ in the 1970s with the purpose of establishing COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER , http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/pij. html (last visited Apr . 23 , 2015 ). 221 . Raphael Ahern , US Court Orders Syria to Pay $330 Million to Bereaved Family of 2006 TA Bombing Victim , TIMES OF ISRAEL (May 15 , 2012 ), http://www.timesofisrael. com/us-court-orders-syria-to-pay-330-million-to-bereaved-family-of-2006-ta-suicide- WORLDNETDAILY (Apr. 27 , 2006 ), http://www.wnd.com/ 2006 /04/35925/. 222. See Wultz, 755 F. Supp . 2d at 18. The plaintiffs pleaded in the alternative that Bank of China was directly liable under the ATA as well as liable under Israeli law . Id. 223. Id. at 19 . 224. Id. at 54. This theory contrasts with the plaintiffs' simultaneously pleaded theory that the bank's provision of funds was in itself an act of terrorism under the ATA . Id. at 19 . 225. Id. at 44-45; Jesse D. H. Snyder , Reading Between the Lines: Statutory Silence and Congressional Intent Under the Antiterrorism Act, 1 BRIT . J. AM. LEGAL STUDIES 265 , 286 ( 2012 ). 226 . Wultz , 755 F. Supp . 2d at 46 ( ―Israeli officials allegedly informed China, which PIJ.‖). 227 . Id. at 54. Bank of China only argued that the secondary liability claim did not exist elements of the claim, should it exist . Id. at 57. 228. Id. at 82 . 229. Id. at 54- 56 . See supra Part II.B.2.a for an overview of Central Bank's holding on secondary liability for private securities fraud claims . 230. Wultz , 755 F. Supp . 2d at 54. See supra Part I.B.2.a for a discussion of Central Bank. 231. Wultz , 755 F. Supp . 2d at 54 . 232. Id . 233 . Id. at 55 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate of Denver , 511 U.S. 164 , 182 ( 1994 )). 234 . Id. at 57. Similarly, other courts have applied secondary liability in the face of statutory silence despite Central Bank . See, e.g., Khulumani v . Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd ., 504 F. 3d 254 , 282 ( 2d Cir . 2007 ) (holding that Central Bank's presumption was rebutted by an international norm recognizing claims of aiding and abetting violations of international law ). 235. Wultz , 755 F. Supp . 2d at 55; see also Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC , 893 F. Supp . 2d 474 , 500 (E.D.N .Y. 2012 ) (observing that Wultz relied on Boim I's reasoning and finding that § 2333(a) provided for secondary liability ). 270 . Boim III , 549 F.3d 685 , 688 ( 7th Cir . 2008 ). 271. See id. 272. See id. at 685 . 273. See id. at 690 . 274. See Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC , 893 F. Supp . 2d 474 , 499 (E.D.N .Y 2012 ) (citing Freeman v . DirectTV , Inc., 457 F.3d 1001 , 1006 n. 1 ( 9th Cir . 2006 )). 275 . See Boim III , 549 F.3d at 689. 276. See id. ; see also Boim I, 291 F.3d 1000 , 1019 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ). 277 . See Boim III , 549 F. 3d at 689 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v . First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 , 200 ( 1994 ) (Stevens , J., dissenting)) . 278 . Id . 279 . Id . 280 . Id . 281 . Id . The provision states that 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) ( 2012 ). 282 . Boim III , 549 F.3d 685 , 689 ( 7th Cir . 2008 ). 283 . See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc ., 552 U.S. 148 , 156 - 59 ( 2008 ). Judge Posner also suggested that to permit a secondary liability private action under the ATA would overextend federal courts' extraterritorial jurisdiction . Boim III , 549 F.3d at 689- 90 . 284 . Boim III , 549 F.3d at 690. 285. See Boim I , 291 F.3d 1000 , 1015 ( 7th Cir . 2002 ); Abecassis v . Wyatt , 704 F. Supp . 2d 623 (S.D. Tex . 2010 ); Goldberg v . UBS AG , 690 F. Supp . 2d 92 , 114 (E.D.N .Y. 2010 ); In re Chiquita Brand Int'l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute & S'holder Derivative Litig ., 690 F. Supp . 2d 1296 , 1309 (S.D. Fla . 2010 ); Almog v . Arab Bank, PLC , 471 F. Supp . 2d 257 , 268 (E.D.N .Y. 2007 ); Weiss v . Nat'l Westminster Bank , PLC, 453 F. Supp . 2d 609 , 613 (E.D.N .Y. 2006 ); In re Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 , 392 F. Supp . 2d 539 , 564 - 65 (S.D.N .Y. 2005 ). 286 . Boim III , 549 F.3d at 690. Judge Posner's majority opinion asserted that ― [§§ 2333 and 2331(1)] are part of the same statutory scheme . ‖ Id. (citing Perry, supra note 35 , at 257)). 287 . Id . 288 . Id. at 691 . 289. Id. at 692 . 290. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (a) ( 2012 ). 291 . Id . § 2339B . 292 . Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project , 561 U.S. 1 , 16 - 18 ( 2012 ). 293 . See , e.g., Weiss v . Nat'l Westminster Bank , PLC, 936 F. Supp . 2d 100 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ); Linde v . Arab Bank, PLC , 950 F. Supp . 2d 459 , 460 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ); Abecassis v. Wyatt , 704 F. Supp . 2d 623 , 645 -47 (S.D. Tex . 2010 ). 294 . 936 F. Supp . 2d 100 , 118 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ), vacated and remanded, 768 F.3d 202 ( 2d Cir . 2014 ). 295 . Weiss , 768 F.3d 202 . 296 . Id. at 204 . 297. Id. at 207- 08 . 298 . See Weiss, 936 F. Supp . 2d at 111 . 299. See Exec . Order No. 13 , 224 , 15 C.F.R. pt . 744 .12 ( 2001 ). 300 . Id . 301 . Weiss , 936 F. Supp . 2d at 118; see supra Part III (considering the merits of this hold banks liable for the actions of their clients) . 302 . See , e.g., Linde v . Arab Bank, PLC , 950 F. Supp . 2d 459 , 460 (E.D.N .Y. 2013 ); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais , S.A. , 242 F.R.D. 199 ( E.D.N .Y. 2007 ). 303 . 893 F. Supp . 2d 474 (E.D.N .Y. 2012 ). 304 . Rothstein v. UBS AG , 708 F.3d 82 , 85 ( 2d Cir . 2013 ). 305 . Id. at 87 . 306. The plaintiffs alleged that Iran pursued an official policy targeting Israelis and the State of Israel. Id. at 85. 307. Id. at 86 . 308. Id. at 88. The plaintiffs also initially alleged that UBS had aided and abetted entirety, holding that it was preempted by the ATA . See Rothstein v . UBS AG , 647 F. Supp . 2d 292 , 296 (S.D.N .Y. 2009 ). 309 . Rothstein , 708 F.3d at 97 -98 (discussing the application of Central Bank to ATA abetting cause of action) . 310 . Id . The court did note, however, that the chain of causation alleged by the plaintiffs requirement for ATA primary liability . See id. at 88 ; see also Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 3 n.1 , In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11 , 2001 , 714 F.3d 118 ( 2d Cir . 2013 ) (No. 13 - 318 ). incorporations‖ approach . Linde v. Arab Bank , PLC , No. 04 -cv-2799 (BMC) (VVP) , 2015 WL 1565479, at *27 ( E.D.N.Y. Apr . 8 , 2015 ). 311 . Rothstein , 708 F.3d at 98. 312. Id. ( ―It of course remains within the prerogative of Congress to create civil liability


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Alison Bitterly. Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the Antiterrorism Act, Fordham Law Review, 2015,