People Prefer System 2 Nudges (Kind Of)
PEOPLE PREFER SYSTEM 2 NUDGES (KIND OF)
CASS R. SUNSTEIN 0 1
0 Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to Mary Schnoor for indispensable research assistance, especially with the statistical analyses here, and to Arevik Avedian, who helped organize and oversee the surveys here. Thanks also to Oren Bar- Gill, Ralph Hertwig, Daniel Kahneman, Eric Posner, Lucia Reisch, and Glen Weyl for valuable Richard Thaler for helpful discussions; none of them should be held responsible for any errors. An early version of some of these results was presented at Yale Law School and at Yale's Institute presented at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Max
1 Copyright © 2016 Cass R. Sunstein
In the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and many other nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or “nudges,” informed by behavioral science and promoting important public policy goals, such as improved health and safety. But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference between System 1 nudges, which target or benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic warnings and default rules are System 1 nudges; statistical information and factual disclosures are System 2 nudges. On philosophical grounds, it might seem tempting to prefer System 2 nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual dignity and promote individual agency. A nationally representative survey in the United States finds evidence that, in important contexts, most people do prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is significantly more effective, then many of them will shift to preferring the System 1 nudge. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats, and independents show surprisingly similar responses. The survey findings and an accompanying normative analysis offer lessons for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System 1 nudges and System 2 nudges.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 66:121
INTRODUCTION In numerous nations, those involved in law and policy have been exploring policy initiatives that preserve freedom of choice, or “nudges,” informed by behavioral economics and psychology and
meant to promote important goals, such as improved health and
safety.1 But there is a large and insufficiently explored difference
between System 1 nudges, which are not educative and which target or
benefit from automatic processing, and System 2 nudges, which are
educative and target or benefit from deliberative processing. Graphic
warnings and default rules count as System 1 nudges; statistical
information and factual disclosures count as System 2 nudges.
On philosophical grounds, it is tempting to prefer System 2
nudges, on the assumption that they show greater respect for individual
autonomy and dignity and promote individual agency. But it is also
possible to prefer System 1 nudges, on the ground that they are likely
to be cheaper and more effective, and also because they promote
autonomy in their own way, by allowing people to conserve scarce
cognitive resources and to devote attention to their largest concerns.
For example, automatic enrollment in sensible savings plans might be
preferable to financial education—or vice versa. Any judgment
between System 1 and System 2 nudges would seem to require
judgments about social welfare and individual autonomy, and the
extent to which one or another nudge will promote them.
A nationally representative survey in the United States finds
evidence that, in important contexts in law and policy, a majority does
prefer System 2 nudges. At the same time, that preference is not fixed
and firm. If people are asked to assume that the System 1 nudge is
significantly more effective, then many of them will shift to preferring
the System 1 nudge. In a range of contexts, Republicans, Democrats,
and independents show surprisingly similar responses.
The survey findings fit with an analysis of a basic principle, which
suggests that on grounds of welfare and autonomy, the choice between
the two kinds of nudges is not self-evident. A great deal depends on
context. In some settings, a System 1 nudge will promote social welfare
and will not compromise autonomy in any way, and in some settings, a
System 2 nudge is better on welfare grounds and will best promote
autonomy. The survey findings, and the analysis, offer concrete lessons
for those involved in law and policy who are choosing between System
1 nudges and System 2 nudges.
1. See generally DAVID HALPERN, INSIDE THE NUDGE UNIT (
2015
) (recounting the efforts
of the United Kingdom’s Behavioural Insights Team, nicknamed the “Nudge Unit”); RHYS
JONES, JESSICA PYKETT & MARK WHITEHEAD, CHANGING BEHAVIOURS: ON THE RISE OF THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE (2013) (...truncated)