The Current Scope of the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Under New York v. Quarles

City University of New York Law Review, Dec 1998

Alan Raphael

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The Current Scope of the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Under New York v. Quarles

Recommended Citation Alan Raphael, Th e Current Scope of the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Under New York v. Quarles The C urrent Scope of the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Under New York v. Quarles Alan Raphael 0 1 0 The C UNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more information please contact , USA 1 Loyola University Alan Raphaelt In New York v. Quarles' the United States Supreme Court announced an exception to the rule established in Miranda v. Arizona.2 Miranda bars the use of any statement in the prosecution's case in chief obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect has first been advised of his or her constitutional right against self-incrimination 3 and has voluntarily waived that right.4 t Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. J.D., 1979, Indiana University School of Law; Ph.D., 1972, University of Chicago; M.A.; 1968, University of Chicago; B.A., 1966, Haverford College. 1 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 4 Miranda,384 U.S. at 444-45. Prior to interrogation, a person in custody must be clearly informed that: (1) he has the right to remain silent; (2) anything he says can be used against him in court; (3) he has the right to the presence of an attorney at the questioning; and (4) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him by the court. Id. at 444. There must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of these rights for the interrogation to continue. Id. at 479. If these criteria are not met, any statements made by the defendant are inadmissible at trial in the prosecution's case in chief. Id. When a person is not in custody, the police may question him/her as part of their investigation and may introduce elicited answers into evidence if that person is subsequently charged with a crime. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433 (1984). Questioning of a suspect in custody, however, must conform to the guidelines set forth in Miranda outlined above. A suspect is considered to be in custody when "a 'formal arrest or restraint or freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest" has taken place. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (citation omitted). Express questioning or its functional equivalent constitutes an interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). A "custodial interrogation [therefore is] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (citations omitted). The test is whether the police should have known that their statements to the suspect or from the suspect "were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (citation omitted). The Innis court determined that an arrestee's response to a conversation he overheard between two police officers regarding the dangers of a gun previously held by the suspect toward handicapped children did not constitute an interrogation. Id. at 302. Miranda requirements therefore did not apply, and the arrestee's statement about the gun's location was admissible as evidence. Id. at 302-03. By contrast, in Quarles, the police directly questioned the defendant regarding the location of a gun. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. Under Innis, this would constitute express questioning. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. Quarles established a public safety exception to Miranda (the "exception") which allows the admission of otherwise barred statements where police questioning is "necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public .... ." This article will discuss the application of the exception in the thirteen years since the Supreme Court decided Quarles. It will point out the limited degree to which courts have extended the exception beyond the bounds set forth by the Supreme Court. This article will also discuss a related exception for questioning in emergency situations involving hostages and other persons at risk. I. BACKGROUND Familiarity with the facts of Quarlesare essential to understanding the scope of the exception. Shortly after midnight, a young woman approached a police patrol car and informed the officers that a man armed with a gun had just raped her.6 She further informed the police that the suspect had entered a nearby supermarket.7 The police entered the supermarket, spotted a man who matched the woman's description, and apprehended him after a brief pursuit.' The police handcuffed and frisked the suspect, Benjamin Quarles, who wore an empty holster but did not possess a gun.9 One of the officers inquired as to the location of the gun, and Quarles told him where to find it, saying "the gun is over there.""° The police recovered the loaded gun where Quarles indicated it would be. 1 Quarles was subsequently charged with criminal possession of a weapon. 2 The defendant sought to ha (...truncated)


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Alan Raphael. The Current Scope of the Public Safety Exception to Miranda Under New York v. Quarles, City University of New York Law Review, 1998, Volume 2, Issue 1,