Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential Supremacy

University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy, Dec 2010

By Heidi Kitrosser, Published on 05/30/16

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Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential Supremacy

omas Journal of Law and Public Policy Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential Supremacy Heidi Kitrosser 0 0 Follow this and additional works at: SUPREMACY HEIDI KITROSSER* INTRODUCTION From the beginning, it sounded too good to be true. Like a modem-day inventor announcing that she has constructed the world's safest, most environmentally sound, yet fastest and most powerful mode of transportation, the Constitution's Framers boasted that they had crafted a presidency both deeply efficacious and unthreatening to liberty. What is more, the Framers explained that a single ingredient, when added to the Constitution's other structural elements, would facilitate both qualities. That ingredient was unity, whereby one person, not a multi-member body, would serve as President, and the presidency would have no constitutionally annexed council. Unity, promised the Framers and other founding era constitutional proponents, would create "energy" and accountability. With respect to the former, Alexander Hamilton stated in the Federalist that "[u]nity is conducive to energy" because "[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number . . ," With respect to the latter, Hamilton assured fellow Founders in the very same essay that unity would also conduce to accountability. He explained that "multiplication of the executive adds to the difficulty of detection," including the "opportunity of discovering [misconduct] with facility and clearness." One person "will be more narrowly watched and most readily Associate Professor and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota Law School. For their thoughtful comments, I am very grateful to David Dana, Kurt Lash, Larry Solum, the students and faculty who attended my presentation at the Constitutional Law Colloquium at the University of Illinois Law School, the organizers and attendees of the St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy symposium, "Presidential Powers: Prudence or Perversion?", and participants in a faculty workshop at the University of California, Irvine. I am also very grateful for the valuable comments of my research assistants Meghan Heesch and Justin Rhodes and for Justin Rhodes' fine bluebooking work. 1. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 422-23 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003). suspected."2 This assurance-that the new presidency's structure would support both energy and accountability-was echoed throughout the framing and ratification debates.3 Of course, unity by itself could not achieve all of these benefits. To differentiate the new President from a monarch, the Founders explained that unity would combine with other structural innovations-including presidential election, impeachment, Congress' power to declare war, and the Senate's shared role in the appointment and treaty processes-to balance energy and accountability.4 Perhaps the most delicate mechanisms in this promised structure were those to control information. A key component of the energy trumpeted by the Founders was secrecy. Yet founding assurances of presidential accountability assumed transparency. It is no accident, after all, that Hamilton spoke of accountability as a product of the executive's being "watched." Other constitutional supporters similarly assumed transparency when they spoke of unity and accountability. For example, William Davie, championing ratification in North Carolina, explained that the Framers' predominant reason for creating a unitary presidency was: the more obvious responsibility of one person. It was observed that, if there were a plurality of persons, and a crime should be committed, when their conduct was to be examined, it would be impossible to fix the fact on any one of them, but that the public were never at a loss when there was but one man.' Similarly, a constitutional proponent wrote in the Virginia Independent Chronicle that "secrecy and dispatch" will attach to the unitary presidential office. Yet the author placed greater emphasis on the fact that "[t]he United States are the scrutinizing spectators of [the President's] conduct, and he will, always, be the distinguished object of politicaljealousy."6 How might one reconcile these twin founding promises that Presidents would act both secretly and transparently? Were the Founders "lying liars?"7 Were they delusional? Elsewhere, I have argued that the seeming 2. Id at 426-27, 429. 3. See infra note 4. 4. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 1, at 414-21; 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, VIRGINIA 1097-98 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990); 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RATIFICATION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 141 (essay of Tench Coxe) (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976); id. at 495 (statement f (...truncated)


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Heidi Kitrosser. Supremely Opaque?: Accountability, Transparency, and Presidential Supremacy, University of St. Thomas Journal of Law and Public Policy, 2010, Volume 5, Issue 1,