A New Universal Bundle Theory

Philosophia, Dec 2017

Universal Bundle Theory (UBT) holds that objects are fundamentally identical with bundles of universals. Universals are multiply instantiable properties. One popular objection to UBT concerns the possibility of distinct indiscernibles. There are mainly two replies in the literature, corresponding to two representative UBTs, which I shall call the Identity-View and the Instance-View. Each view faces serious problems. This paper proposes a new version of UBT and argues that it is better than these other two versions.

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A New Universal Bundle Theory

Philosophia A New Universal Bundle Theory Ruoyu Zhang 0 0 Department of Philosophy, Durham University , Durham , UK Universal Bundle Theory (UBT) holds that objects are fundamentally identical with bundles of universals. Universals are multiply instantiable properties. One popular objection to UBT concerns the possibility of distinct indiscernibles. There are mainly two replies in the literature, corresponding to two representative UBTs, which I shall call the Identity-View and the Instance-View. Each view faces serious problems. This paper proposes a new version of UBT and argues that it is better than these other two versions. Universal Bundle Theory provides a one-category ontology. According to this theory, objects are fundamentally identical with bundles of universals. Universals are repeatable qualities and wholly present 'in' the objects that instantiate them. For instance, two exactly similar white tables are similar in colour because they literarily share one universal, whiteness.1 But consider a universe where there are only two symmetrically arrange spheres with the same properties as described by Black (1952). 1UBT does not require that any character stands for a universal; all it requires is that all characters are fundamentally grounded by universals. Bundle theory; Universals; Indiscernibles; Instantiation - BIsn’t it logically possible that the universe should have contained nothing but two exactly similar spheres? We might suppose that each was made of chemically pure iron, had a diameter of one mile, that they had the same temperature, colour, and so on, and that nothing else existed. Then every quality and relational characteristic of the one would also be a property of the other. Now if what I am describing is logically possible, it is not impossible for two things to have all their properties in common^. (p. 156) Most people take this thought experiment as a refutation of the commonly known, and attractive Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII), which holds that, roughly, necessarily for any object x and object y, if x and y share all their properties, x and y are identical.2 This in turn suggests that UBT is false, because UBT seems to imply that the spheres are identical. According to UBT, an object is nothing but its ontological constituents and universals are the only ontological constituents it has. Then suppose the two spheres are named A and B3: if sphere A is identical with a bundle of universals U1, U2 and U3 and sphere B is also identical with a bundle of universals U1, U2 and U3, then it seems sphere A must be identical with sphere B. They cannot be distinct because they are constituted by the very same entities. But as demonstrated in the Blackian universe vividly, it seems metaphysically possible for there to be two distinct but indiscernible spheres. This suggests that UBT is false, since it is unclear how it can accommodate that possibility. 2 The Instance-View, the Identity-View and their Problems Despite there being various bundle theories of universals, only two representative versions of UBT tackle the Blackian objection head-on4,5: The Instance-View and the Identity-View. This section evaluates them in the light of recent literature. 2 We need not discuss the issue of how precisely to formulate PII because it does not matter for current purposes. Also, there are many other similar cases that have been discussed before and after Black in history of philosophy, but it seems his case is the most representative. Different interpretations of Black’s paper can be given. Some argue that it expresses a thesis about reference or perception, while some others take a more realist reading. No matter which interpretation we take, it is enough for us to say that this case can be a good starting point to discuss the issues on identity and properties with which we are concerned. 3 For current purposes, we can assume that this can be achieved and naming does not break the symmetry of the two spheres. 4 There is another mixed view that we shall not discuss in detail here. For instance, Shiver (2014), following Paul (2002), argues for a mereological bundle theory of universals. He uses a liberal notion of mereology, and argues that there are not only two, but three spheres in Black’s world. One is the unlocated sphere, which is a qualitative overlapping part of the other two located spheres. The two spheres are distinct because of the distinction of their location properties. We do not think this is an attractive view for various reasons. For instance, there are many problems in using location to differentiate the two spheres. One problem is that it cannot be used for many non-located things and co-located things; another problem is it seems that location is dependent upon matter, rather than the reverse. Finally, the distinction of locations itself needs to be explained. 5 The only work I know of which hints towards something like the New-View developed belo (...truncated)


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Ruoyu Zhang. A New Universal Bundle Theory, Philosophia, 2017, pp. 473-486, Volume 46, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1007/s11406-017-9937-6