Lawful Permanent Residency: What the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services Giveth, It Can Also Take Away
Lawful Permanent Residency: W hat the United States Citizenship & Immigration Ser vices Giveth, It Can Also Take Away
Rebecca Hayes 0 1 2
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1 Rebecca Hayes, Lawful Permanent Residency: What the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services Giveth, It Can Also Take Away , 59 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 329, 2018
2 Boston College Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr Part of the Immigration Law Commons Recommended Citation
1 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. (“USCIS”)N,aturalization Fact Sheet (May 19,
[http//sp:erma.cc/9H2QRQ4Y] (recording that over half a million citizens are naturalized in the United States every year,
with over seven million people naturalized in the last ten years); U.S Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(“DHS”), Table 20. Petitions for Naturalization Filed, Persons Naturalized, and Petitions
forNaturalization Denied: Fiscal Years 1907 to 2015 (Dec. 15, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2015/table20 [https://perma.cc/E5CP-DVQH] (recording that levels of pi-et
tions for U.S. naturalization have increased dramatically since the 1990s and continue to be high).
2 USCIS, Immigration and Citizenship Data F(eb. 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/tools/
who presumably will eventually pursue naturalizatio3n.In 2016, 752,800
people became naturalized citizens4. These numbers demonstrate that U.S.
immigration policy affects millions of people, and any case law that further
defines or restricts the path to naturalization in the United States has
News coverage regarding immigrants and their endeavors to become
residents in the United States is pervasive.6 Frequently, this coverage
focuses on instances of immigrant fraud or misrepresentation.7 A rarely depicted
situation, however, is one where an immigrant with a valid legal claim to
LPR status is denied the chance to naturalize as a result of procedural errors
committed by U.S. immigration authorities.8 In 1995, Kamal Turfah
immigrated to the United States from Lebanon and received LPR status through a
3 RYAN BAUGH & KATHERINE WITSMAN, DHS OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S.
LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2015 1 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
4 USCIS, Naturalization, supra note 1.
5 See Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Adding Extra Hurdle for Green Cards, CNN (Aug.
29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/28/politics/trump-administration-green-cards-interviews/
index.html [https://perma.cc/5A6Y-PCJ8] (noting that an interview may be enforced for green card
applicants that will lengthen the process in an effort to protect against fraud impacting around
180,000 people); David Nakamura, Trump Administration Announces End of Immigration Protection
Program for ‘Dreamers,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/09/05/trump-administration-announces-end-of-immigration-protection-programfor-dreamers/?utm_term=.094f9d67dd55 [https://perma.cc/Q93M-2GD7] (noting that hundreds of
thousands of immigrants will be impacted and potentially forced to begin deportation proceedings
when U.S. government rescinds the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals(“DACA”)
6 See Kopan, supra note 5 (reporting that green card applications may become a lengthier
process due to the Trump Administration’s decision to enforce an interview requirement for
applicants in an effort to combat fraud); Nakamura, supra note 5 (reporting on the Trump
Administration’s plan to end the DACA progra mthat allowed hundreds of thousands of immigrants who
arrived in the United States as children to remain in the country); Chris StirewaltC,an GOP Find
Consensus on Immigration?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/
09/05/can-gop-find-consensus-on-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/9YLA-NHG4] (reporting on
the divide in Congress about immigration issues and the uncertain future for DACA recipients).
7 See Gardiner Harris, State Department Tightens Rules for Visas to U.S,. N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
18, 2017,) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/us/politics/us-visa-rules-tillerson.html [https://
perma.cc/Y66A-AUAR] (discussing the Trump Administration’s changes to immigration policy in
the hopes of preventing abuse of the legal immigration process); Newsweek ArchivFeos,r Many
Immigrants, Marriage Is the Fastest and Easiest Way to Legal Righ,tsNEWSWEEK (Aug. 8, 2017),
(discussing the frequency of marriage fraud in order to obtain visas); Ron Nixon, Visa Program up
for Renewal Amid Allegations of Fraud,N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
cc/J5D7-KW9L] (discussing the fraud plaguing the EB-5 visa).
8 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 845 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2017) “Turfah
derivative visa.9 Though Turfah had no trouble with his LPR status forl-a
most twenty years, when he attempted to naturalize in 2012,he found out
that because of the negligence of immigration authorities, he wasont
lawfully admitted for permanent residency.10 He was subsequently barred from
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of LPR status in the United
States and a key requirement in achieving naturalized citizen—shilpawful
admission for permanent residency.12 This requirement, although initially
ambiguously defined, has undergone extensive interpretation by numerous
circuit courts.13 Part I explains these decisions and details the expansionof
“lawful admission” provided by the United StatesCourt of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit inTurfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigration r-Se
vices.14 Part II dives deeper into the Turfah decision and addresses how the
majority reached its conclusion that the plaintiff was not lawfully
admitted.15 Additionally, it discusses the novelty of the court’s decision that
procedural errors committed byU.S. immigration authorities are sufficient to
render an otherwise eligible immigrant unlawfully admitted1.6 Finally, Part
III argues that the holding in Turfah has unforeseen consequences in that it
places a burden on immigrants to police the negligence of immigration
uathorities and fails to establish a practical way for immigrants to rectify
deficiencies with their LPR statuses.17
9 Id. at 670, 673; see Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2012) (stating that
the child of a recipient of Lawful Permanent Residence (“LPR”) status who is not separately
eligible for LPR status can receive immigrant status if they are“accompanying or following to join”
their parent); see also USCIS, FILING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE BASED ON A FAMILY
PETITION 4, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/About%20Us/Electronic%20Reading%20
cc/NQ8V-SZTH] (defining a derivative visa holder as an immigrant who does not have their own
claim to reside in the United States, but who can “follow to join” or “accompany” a spouse or
parent with a valid claim to U.S. residency).
10 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.s, No. 2:15-CV-10371, 2016 WL 362456,
at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2016), aff’d, 845 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2017) “Turfah I”..
11 Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1, *4.
12 See infra notes 18–54 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 33–54 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 33–70 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 71–89 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 103–135 and accompanying text.
I. THE ELUSIVE AND EVOLVING DEFINITION OF “LAWFUL
ADMISSION” IN THE UNITED STATES
Section A of this Part provides an introduction to the history of
immigration laws in the United State1s8. It explains the requirementsto become a
LPR, including that an immigrantmust be lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.19 Further, Section A details how federal courts have interpreted the
phrase “lawful admission.”20 Section B discusses how Turfah’s case arrived
in front of the Sixth Circuit and provides an overview of the court’s holding.21
A. A Brief History of U.S. Federal Immigration Laws and the
Judiciary’s Interpretation of “Lawful Admission”
In 1875, in Henderson v. Mayor of New York, the Supreme Court
declared that the obligation of creating and managingU.S. immigration law
fell to the federal government.22 This decision led to a series of legislative
reforms regulating who could enter the country.23 These reforms sought to
limit immigration through legislation prohibiting aliens with certain
quailties, changes in tax policies, and the establishment of new enforcement
agencies.24 Beginning in 1940, the United States started to requireforeign
nationals to register and to document their right to reside in the country.25 A
person with a documented claim to permanently remain in the United States
is considered a LPR.26 LPRs have the opportunity to legally work in the
18 See infra notes 22–32 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 29–54 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 33–54 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 55–70 and accompanying text.
22 Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (ruling that the federal government,
and Congress specifically, is more qualified to regulate immigration in a consistent and appropi-r
ate way than the states);USCIS, Early American Immigration Policies(Sept. 4, 2015), https://
23 USCIS, Early American, supra note 22.
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1301 (stating that an immigrant must be registered with the government in
order to receive a visa); CitizenPathH,istory of the Green Card F(eb. 21, 2017), https://citizen
path.com/history-green-card/ [https://perma.cc/G6SC-GQ2H] (detailing the history of LPR status).
In 1940, documenting an immigran’ts legal right to reside in the United States included getting
fingerprinted and registering at the local post office. CitizenPath,supra. As immigration numbers
increased, registration expanded to official immigration officeIsd. . Those determined to have
legitimate claims to reside in the United States were issued cards that detailed their status.Id.
26 BAUGH & WITSMAN, supra note 3; see also Juliana Jiménez Jaramillo, Why Isn’t My Green
Card Green?, SLATE (July 4, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/design/2012/07/green_
[https://perma.cc/XUD5TSVB] (noting that the name“green card” comes from the green paper upon whichimmigrant’s
documented claims to reside in the United States were historically printed).
United States, receive financial aid, serve in the military, attend schoo,l and
own land.27 In addition, LPRs have the chance to naturalize and become
U.S. citizens after living inthe country for five years and fulfilling
additional eligibility requirements.28
Since 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) has been the
law governing U.S. immigration and citizenship policy.29 Section 316 of the
INA discusses the requirements to become a naturalized citizen.30 Pursuant
to Section 316, an alien must have been “lawfully admitted for permanent
residence” in the United States to be eligible for naturalization31. The INA
defines “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” as the stastuan
individual has when he or she was legally permitted to immigrate to and
permanently live in the United States.32
This definition has been refined by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”).33 In 2003, in In re Koloamatangi, the BIA held that an alien ahs
not been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” if he or she acquired
27 BAUGH & WITSMAN, supra note 3.
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (listing the requirements for naturalization, including residing in the
United States for five consecutive years as a lawful permanent resident and havin“ggood moral
character”); USCIS, Naturalization, supra note 1 (describing additional eligibility requirements
including “good moral character,” English literacy, a historical understanding of the United States,
status as a legal adult, swearing an oath, and receipt of LPR status through lawful admission).
29 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (incorporating the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as
Title Eight of the U.S. Code); USCIS, Immigration and Nationality Act (Sept. 10, 2013), https://
www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/GXG9-BK5P] (indicating
that the INA has been amended since its inception in 1952, but still remains the governing statute
over U.S. immigration and citizenship); see also Jerry Kammer, The Hart-Celler Immigration Act
of 1965, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 30, 2015),
https/:/cis.org/HartCeller-Immigration-Act1965 [https://perma.cc/E754-6STU] (indicating that the 1965 amendment of the INA, which
adopted a major policy change that eradicated the previous immigration quota systwemas, in
response to widespread criticism of the prior federal immigration legislation’s (the 1924
JohnsonReed Act) racial discrimination).
30 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (listing the requirements for naturalization, including residing in the
United States for five consecutive years as a LPR and having good moral character).
32 See id. § 1101(a)(20) (defining “lawfully admitted for permanent residence”).
33 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2018). The Board of Immigration Appeals(“BIA”) was created within
the Department of Justice to provide appellate review and rule clarifications, as well as to
administer U.S. immigration laws.Id. The BIA is comprised oftwenty-one attorneys, one of whom is
Chairman of the Board. Id. The BIA is authorized to hear immigration cases from across the
country, and it conducts paper reviews, rather than trials in court, but the opportunity for oral argument
can be requested. Id. The BIA’s judgments are binding law, unless overturned by a federal court’s
ruling or by the Attorney General.Id.; see also Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548, 549–51 (B.I.A.
2003) (interpreting “lawfully admitted for permanent residence”to mean that the visa must have
been acquired without fraud, misrepresentation or mistake); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of
Immigration Appeals (Mar. 16, 2017), htt/p/ws:ww.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals,
[https://perma.cc/V9NR-6WHD] (noting that the BIA conducts paper reviews of cases, has
nationwide jurisdiction, and its decisions are binding).
LPR status through “fraud or misrepresentation” or “had otherwise not been
entitled to it.”34 The respondent in Koloamatangi obtained LPR status by
marrying a U.S. citizen; however, the marriage was later determinedto be
knowingly fraudulent because the respondent was still legally married to a
woman in Tonga.35 The BIA stated that an alien’s lawful admission not only
requires following the procedural rules of immigration policies, but also
conforming to the essential substance of the law3.6 The BIA found that the
respondent’s fraudulent marriage violated substantive immigration law and
as a result, the respondent was never lawfully admitted.37 In its analysis, the
BIA relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision inIn re Longstaff, holding that,
even when an immigrant is forthright, if the immigrant unintentionally
voilates substantive law regarding LPR eligibility, he is still not lawfully
Several circuit courts addressing the “lawful admission” issue adopted
the holding in Koloamatangi and determined that aliens were not lawfully
admitted if granted LPR status as a result of error or “had otherwise not
been entitled to it.”39 Every circuit court addressing the “lawful admission”
issue upheld the BIA’s reasoning in Koloamatangi that fraud, deception, and
lack of entitlement are bars to “lawful admission.”40
For instance, in Injeti v. United States Citizenship & Immigration
Services, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that an immigrant who had submitted a
fraudulent death certificate for her spouse and lied about prior marriages
had intentionally misrepresented herself and deceived the U.S. gno- ver
ment.41 The court ruled that the plaintiff was not “lawfully admitted” sa a
permanent resident because she was only awarded LPR status as a result of
this misrepresentation.42 Further, the Fourth Circuit stated that even if the
plaintiff’s misrepresentation was notwillful or intentionally fraudulent, an
immigrant can fail to cahieve “lawful admission” if that immigrant was
simply not entitled to LPR status.43
The Seventh Circuit observed that in addition to deception and
falsifcation, failure to disclose disqualifying information also provides a basis for
violating “lawful admission.”44 In Estrada-Ramos v. Holder, the court
reasoned that the plaintiff’s failure to disclose an expunged cocaine possession
conviction, while not necessarily intentional misrepresentation, was still an
offense that would have rendered him otherwise ineligible for LPR status.45
In Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit ruled that an
immigrant was not “lawfully admitted” after it was later determined that he had
been convicted of drug trafficking and illegal reentry following his
deportation.46 The prosecutor in Gonzales could not prove that the plaintiff had
ni(4th Cir. 2013) (adopting Koloamatangi’s holding and finding an immigrant is not lawfully
admitted if the LPR status is received “by fraud—or who was not otherwise entitled to ”it); WRONG
Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 321(adopting the BIA’s definition of “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence”); Savoury 449 F.3d at 1317 (adopting the BIA’s definition of lawfully admitted
and finding it “reasonable”); Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 2005)
(adopting the BIA’s definition of lawfully admitted and finding i“treasonable”); Koloamatangi,
23 I&N Dec. at 550.
41 Injeti, 737 F.3d at 314.
42 Id. at 314–15.
43 Id. at 317. The Fourth Circuit explainedthat although deliberate fraud will violate lawful
admission, lawful admission can also be hindered regardless of an immigrant’s intention. Id. Here,
because the plaintiff was not“otherwise entitled” to LPR status, she was not lawfully admitted,
even if her fraud was accidental. Id.
44 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S.
controlled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or
entry into the country); Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 320–21 (noting that although Estrada-Ramos
did not commit fraud to get his LPR status, he was not eligible for it, and only obtained it because
of his undisclosed conviction).
45 Estrada-Ramos, 611 F.3d at 320–21.
46 Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1184, 1186–87 (noting that the plaintiff served nine months in prison
for the possession and sale of cocaine, an aggravated felony that bars him from LPRstatus under
the INA, as did his illegal return to the United States after his deportation following his sentence).
Although the government mistakenly grantedthe plaintiff LPR status, he was not entitled to it
absent the mistake and thus was not lawfully admitted. Id.
tentionally deceived the government in obtaining his LPR statu4s7. But, in
consensus with other circuit court holdings, the court held that willful fraud
was not required to violate “lawflu admission.”48 This decision expanded
Koloamatangi by stating that admissionwas unlawful if an alien only
erceived LPR status due to a “negligent mistake” committed by immigration
authorities.49 In Gonzales, regardless of the plaintiff’s intent, there were
sufficient factors to prevent the plaintiff from being eligible for LPR status,
and the government’s failure to note his prohibitive felony conviction did
not change the fact that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR and thus not
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held in Savoury v. United States Attorney
General that an alien is not “lawfully admitted” when immigration services
negligently grants LPR statu5s1. In this case, the plaintiff proactively
informed Immigration and Naturalization Services (“INS”) of his drug
possession conviction and the conviction was recorded by INS52. Despite this
notice, INS subsequently provided the plaintiff with LPR stat5u3sW.hen the
error was realized, INS rescinded the plaintiff’s LPR status on the grounds
that he was never entitled to status adjustment because of his felony concv-i
B. The Sixth Circuit Takes on “Lawful Admission”
The Sixth Circuit did not rule on the definition of “lawfully admitted
for permanent residence” until 2017 in its decision in Turfah.55 Turfah is a
Lebanese citizen who has been living in the United States aas LPR since
47 Id. at 1186.
48 Id. at 1187; see Injeti, 737 F.3d at 315 (stating that, even absent fraud, admission is
unlawful if it fails to comply with immigration law or was received by mistake); Holder, 611 F.3d at 321
(stating that fraud is not the only means of finding admission unlawful).
49 See Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1186–87 (emphasizing that, despite being unable to prove that
the plaintiff committed intentional fraud, the fact that the plaintiff’sLPR status was granted due to
government negligence in failing to recognize the plaint’ifsf prohibitive felony convictiondoes
not render his LPR status lawful).
50 Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1186–87.
51 Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317.
52 Id. at 1310–11; see also USCIS, Did You Know?: The INS No Longer Exist(sApr. 13,
2011), https//:www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists [https://
perma.cc/EEN8-253Z] (stating that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was a
separate agency that was a predecessor to USCIS, butclosed in 2003, and its functions were adopted
53 Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1310.
54 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S.
controlled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or
entry into the country); Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317.
55 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672.
his entry into the country on September 23, 199556.Turfah arrived in the
United States at nineteen years old on a derivative visa permitting him to
enter the country “accompanying or following to join” his father, the
principal LPR.57 But, Turfah arrived in the United States alone, twenty-four days
before his father entered the country.58 U.S. immigration authorities
erroneously admitted Turfah early, instead of informing him that he needed to wait
to enter the country with, or after, his father.59
After his admission, Turfah remained in the United States as a LPR for
seventeen years and filed an application for naturalized citizenship with
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on
November 30, 20126.0 On April 29, 2014, USCIS denied Turfah’s naturalization
application on the basis that he was not a lawfully admitted LPR because he
arrived in the United States before his father in 1995, violating the terms of
his derivative visa.61 On May 16, 2014, Turfah requested an administrative
review of the denial of his application; his application was again denied by
USCIS on December 29, 2014.62
Turfah then filed suit against USCIS on January 28, 2015i,n the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking judicial review
of the denial of his naturalization application6.3 Both parties filed motions
for summary judgment, and the district court granted USCIS’ motion,
concluding that Turfah was not lawfully admitted as a LPR, and, therefore, was
ineligible for naturalization.64 Turfah appealed to the Sixth Circuit.65 This
appeal forced theSixth Circuit toaddress whether a procedural mistake
made by U.S. immigration authorities is sufficient to invalidate an apip-l
cant’s otherwise lawful admission for permanent residence.66
The Sixth Circuit concluded that although the violation in Turfah’s acse
was technical and the court was sympathetic to Turfah’s unique
situation,Koloamatangi’s holding that lawful admission mandates an alien comply with all
substantive immigration requirements is reasonabl6e7. Moreover, the court
concluded that although the error in Turfah’s LPR status was not based in any
material issues with his application or his father’s, his early entry was still a
violation of derivative visa law barring him from achieving “lawful
admission.”68 The court interpreted Koloamatangi’s ruling consistently with most
other circuit courts, concluding that an alien is not lawfully admitted if he or
she commits fraud or lacks entitlement to LPR status.69 The court elaborated,
however, that even absentfraud or misrepresentation, admission is also
nulawful if LPR status is awarded toa meritorious applicant, but the
government’s error leads to a procedural violation of immigration law.70
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FINDS TURFAH UNLAWFULLY ADMITTED
FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCY AND ESTABLISHES
CONCERNING NEW PRECEDENT
The Sixth Circuit found that Turfah was not lawfully admitted
foprermanent residence because he violated 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) by entering the
United States before his father.71 Part A of this Section details the Sixth
Circuit’s explanation of its decision to find Turfah unlawfully admitftoerd
permanent residency.72 Part B of this Section highlights the novelty of the
Turfah decision’s interpretation of lawful admissionand its distinctions
from other circuit courts’ interpretations.73
66 Id.; Notice of Appeal at 1, Turfah I, 2016 WL 362456, at *1(No. 15-10371) (noting that
Turfah appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of USCIS).
67 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 673, 675; Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. at 550.
68 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d. at 674–75 (expressing sympathy at the denial of Turfah’s
naturalization “based on a technicality”).
69 Id. at 672; see supra note 40 and accompanying text a(dopting the BIA’s definition of
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and finding it reasonable).
70 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672.
71 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 845 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2017)
“Turfah II”; see 20 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) (2017) (stating that an accompanying relative cannot
percede the principal applicant).
72 See infra notes 74–89 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 90–102 and accompanying text.
A. An In-Depth Look at the Sixth Circuit’s Reasoning in Turfah
The court’s reasoning commenced with an analysis of theINA
definition of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”74 The court stated that
the INA’s definition was unclear and warranted further interpretation by the
BIA and other circuit courts.75 The Sixth Circuit concludedthat the BIA’s
clarification of the definition of lawful admissionin In re Koloamatangi,
and its approval by every circuit court to confront the issue thereafter, was
properly decided.76 In response, the Sixth Circuit determined it would also
follow Koloamatangi’s holding that an immigrant is not lawfully admitted if
their LPR status is erroneously granted as a result of the government’s
The court highlighted the ambiguity of the INA’s requirementunder 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) that LPR status must be given “in accordance with the
immigration laws,” and postulated that two different interpretations of this
phrase exist.78 On the one hand,the court could construe this statute to
mean that an immigrant is lawfully admitted so long as the immigrant is
given entry by the government, even if the immigrant fails to meet all of the
material requirements of LPR status.79 Alternatively, the court could decide
that an immigrant is only lawfully admitted ifhe or she successfully
completes all of the material LPRstatus requirements (essentially the BIA’s
holding in Koloamtangi).80 The court reasoned that given the
statute’sambiguity, it had to show deference to theBIA’s understanding of the statute,
particularly because the executive branchholds a significant position in
U.S. immigration policy.81 Further, the court noted that Turfah had not
claimed or produced any evidence to support the conclusion that the BIA’s
holding was unreasonable, and so it was forced to defer toKoloamatangi’s
The court next addressed Turfah’s argument that USCIS’ interpretation
of 22 C.F.R. § 40.1(a)(2) defining “accompanying” led to “absurd results.”83
The court stated that USCIS’ interpretation of “accompanying” was nc-o
sistent with the word’s recognized ordinary meaning, and that in contrast,
74 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 671.
76 Id. at 671–72.
77 Id. at 672.
78 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C§. 1101(a)(20) (2012); Turfah II, 845 F.3d at
79 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 672–73.
80 Id. at 673.
Turfah’s broad reading of the term would go against Congress’ intention in
writing 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).84 The court reasoned that Congress intended to
ensure that immigrant children would arrive in the United States with or
after their parents, and that since 22 C.F.R§. 40.1(a)(2) follows this
interpretation, its plain meaning must be upheld.85
The court concluded that because Turfah preceded his father he failed
to comply with 22 C.F.R.§ 40.1(a)(2) and this violation means he was not
lawfully admitted for permanent residency and was, therefore, ineligible to
naturalize.86 The court conceded that Turfah’s case was “factually distinct”
because Turfah did not commit fraud, misrepresentation, or criminal
activity, but it determined that those variances were ultimately irrelevant because
Turfah had statutorily violated 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).87
Overall, the court’s opinion focused on the statutory language of 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a) and 1153(d) and the meaning of “accompanying” when
determining that Turfah was not lawfully admitted for permanent resind-e
cy.88 The court’s decision paid little attention to the facthat Turfah only
violated these statutes due to the error of U.S. immigration officers.89
B. Turfah Renders Procedural Mistakes by Governmental Agents
Sufficient to Bar Otherwise Lawful Admissions
The court’s decision in Turfah v. United States Citizenship &
Immigration Services marks the first time the Sixth Circuit adoptedKoloamatangi’s
definition of lawful admission9.0 This ruling expands Koloamatangi in an
unprecedented way by holding that an immigrant can be deniedLPR status
as a result of a procedural errormade by the U.S. government, without any
other fundamental bars in the immigrant’s applicati9o1nA.lthough other
84 Id. at 673–74; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (noting that a child can obtain a derivative visa
when accompanying or following to join a parent to the United States).
85 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674.
88 Id. at 671–74.
89 See id. at 675 (noting that immigration officers “were presumably negligent in admitting
Turfah” when he arrived early).
90 Id. at 672–73.
91 Id. at 674–75. The court states the facts in this case are far less extreme than those involved
in decisions by other circuit courts; this case distinctly involves technical violations pertaining to
procedure. Compare id. at 674 (stating that Turfah was unlawfully admitted because he entered
the United Statestwenty-four days too early,) with Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., 737 F.3d 311,316 (4th Cir. 2013)(stating that Injeti was not lawfully admitted due to
marriage fraud and submitting fraudulent documents when applying for LPRstatus), and
Arellano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that Gonzales was not
lawfulcircuit courts expanded Koloamatangi’s definition of unlawful admission to
include cases without fraud,Turfah implicitly reasons that an alien can be
unlawfully admitted even if the alien would have otherwise been eligible
for LPR status absent the government’s mistake.92 Turfah and his father
applied for LPR status through valid legal procedures without any afurd.93
Moreover, Turfah’s father, the principal applicant, was considered lawfully
admitted as a LPR and successfully became a naturalized citizen9.4 Despite
these facts, the Sixth Circuit maintained that Turfah statutorily violated the
law governing derivative visas because he preceded his father twent-yfour
The rulings inArellano-Garcia v. Gonzalesand Savoury v. United
States Attorney General are similar to Turfah because they both conclude
that their respective plaintiffs were unlawfullyadmitted as LPRs due to the
negligence of immigration authorities9.6 In Turfah, however, there was no
underlying substantive issue, such as a criminal historyor other barring
offense, to prevent Turfah from entitlement to LPRstatus prior to his
procedural error of entering the country before his father.97 Gonzales and Savoury
ly admitted because he was convicted of an aggravated felony involving controlled substances,
was deported, and illegally reentered the country).
92 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (noting that Turfahs’ LPR status issue was technical and
non-fraudulent, acknowledging that Turfahs’ father met the lawful admission requirement and
successfully retained his LPR status);see also Injeti, 737 F.3d at 315–16 (noting that the plaintiff
was never eligible for LPR status because of marriage fraud); Estrada-Ramos v. Holder, 611 F.3d
318, 321 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPsRtatus because of a
felony drug conviction); Savoury v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2006)
(noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPR because of a felony drug possession conc-vi
tion); Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1187 (noting that the plaintiff was never eligible for LPRstatus
because of a felony drug possession conviction).
93 See Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgmen,t supra note 64, at 7 (describing Turfah’s
and his father’s applications as legitimate and in compliance with visa application
policy).Compare Injeti, 737 F.3d at 312 (describing the plaintif’fs fraud through misrepresentation of a
bigamous marriage and a fraudulent death certificate to acquire LPR,)with Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674
(describing a plaintiff whose application was honest and lacked any fraud or misrepresentation).
94 See generally Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64.
95 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674.
96 Id. at 675; see Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1317 (noting that the government erroneously granted
the plaintiff LPR status despite being informed of his prior drug felony conviction); Gonzales, 429
F.3d at 1186 (noting that the government mistakenly granted the plaintiff LPR status despite a
drug felony conviction).
97 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (noting that Turfah was not lawfully admitted because he
entered the country before his father);Savoury, 449 F.3d at 1310, 1317 (noting that the plaintiff
was inadmissible and not eligible for LPRstatus due to his prior drug conviction, asubstantive
issue barring an applicant from receiving LPR status); Gonzales, 429 F.3d at 1187 (noting that the
plaintiff was mistakenly approved for LPRstatus but would not have otherwise been entitled to
that status because of his cocaine possession conviction, a substantive issue barring an applicant
from receiving LPR status).
exhibit notable differences because their plaintiffs were both convicted of
controlled substance felonies that went undiscovered by immigration
uathorities during the granitng of their LPR statuses.98 Had the U.S.
government known of these criminal historiesbeforehand, it would have
immediately denied both plaintiffs’ applications for LPR status.99
In contrast, htere was no criminal activity to otherwise bar Turfah’s
LPR application.100 Had Turfah waited twenty-four days and arrived with
his father, or had U.S. immigration authorities properly informed a teenage
Turfah at the border that he was not allowed to enter without his father,
there would be no reason to deny Turfah’s LPRapplication.101 In addition,
Turfah’s father’s successful naturalization indicates there was no
fundamental issue with their visas except for this procedural snafu at the hands of the
III. SIXTH CIRCUIT OVERLOOKS THE IMPLICATIONS TURFAH WILL HAVE ON
AN IMMIGRANT’S BURDEN AND ABILITY TO NATURALIZE
Turfah v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services establishes
that an immigrant who validly applies for and has been approved foLrPR
status may lose the status as a result of procedural violationscommitted by
government agents.103 In doing so, it establishes a precedent that could
create unfair and unpreventable consequences for immigrants seeking LPR
While it is reasonable to require compliance with immigration laws,
Turfah was wrongly decided on two counts.105 First, Part A of this Section
discusses how the ruling in Turfah creates a new burden for immigrants to
monitor immigration procedure.106 Second, Part B of this Section discusses
how the ruling leaves LPRs in Turfah’s situation without a clear method to
remedy the deficiencies in their LPR status so that they may eventually
A. Turfah Unfairly Burdens Immigrants with Ensuring That United States
Immigration Authorities Comply with the Law
Because of the court’s decision inTurfah, an LPR-eligible immigrant
may be denied lawful admission through pure procedural error and no fault
of the alien.108 This reasoning places a burden on applicants to ensure that
the U.S. government does not commit any errors when admitting them into
the country.109 This burden falls on immigrant applicants already
shouldering the substantial burden opfroviding all required information in good
faith to immigration services.110 After Turfah, the onus is now on the alien
to ensure that governmental agents are not making mistakes that will impact
106 Id. at 675; see infra notes 108–122 and accompanying text.
107 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at675 (observing that Turfah’s case is sympathetic but placing the
onus on USCIS to utilize discretion and come up with a solution to allow Turfah to eventually
naturalize); id. at 676–77 (Boggs, J., concurring) (observing there is not an established procedure
for someone who already has LPR status to reapply for lawful admissions)e;e also infra notes
123–135 and accompanying text.
108 Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674–75.
109 See Injeti v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2013).
The court in Injeti briefly addressed this issue when ruling that an alien who had misrepresented
herself was not lawfully admitted as aLPR. Id. The court stated that it is not the job of an alien to
provide affirmative evidence that would refute any and all admission iss u;ehsowever, an alien
does have to provide proof when there is“reason to suspect” unlawful admission. Id. This
observation implies that an alien does still have to show proof whenever a reason of doubt arisIeds.
This case is distinct fromTurfah, however, because inInjeti there was clear misrepresentation, and
the applicant was not eligible for LPR status without thamistake. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at674; see
generally HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT
ASYLUM SEEKERS (2017),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrf-crossing-the-linereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2CA-DSJE] (documenting instances where U.S. immigrationu-a
thorities illegally deny immigrants interviews or entry and only follow procedures when prompted
by professional immigration advocates, illustrating an unfair burden on immigrants to know their
rights and U.S. immigration policies).
110 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C§. 1361 (2012); Petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8–9. Section 1361 establishes an alien’s burden of proof
when applying for a visa. 8 U.S.C. §1361. It is the alien’s responsibility to show that he or she is
eligible for the visa and that he or she has the proper documents. Id. This statute is silent, however,
on what to do when an alien has already been determined eligible for a visa but is then found to be
unlawfully admitted because the government failed to inform the alien he is toeoarly. Id. Turfah
and his father arguably already carried out their burden when they were validly approved for an
LPR visa; the only unlawful component arose when Turfah was mistakenly admitted early by
immigration authorities. Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674. The court acknowledged that the only basis
for Turfah’s denial was governmental oversight. Id. at 674–75.
their lawful admission.111 This additional burden should not fall on foreign
immigrants, and particularly not on minor immigrants arriving on derivative
visas.112 It is not reasonable to expect these applicantsto know and
understand U.S. immigration law well enough to ensure governmental agents
follow appropriate procedure and to correct them when they do not.113
The court reasons thatpermitting derivative applicant minors who
arrive before their respective principal applicants would create pandemonium
for U.S. immigration officials.114 The court postulates afuture “slippery
slope,” wherein very young children are sent to the United States without
115 It is reasonable to
guardians, for potentially much greater time intervals.
uphold the principles of a derivative visa requiring a child to enter the
United States with or after a parent’s arrival.116 Nevertheless, whether derivative
applicants should be able to legally arrive without their guardians is not the
issue.117 Rather, the problem this decision creates is that a U.S. government
official should bear the responsibility of informing an otherwise qualified
derivative LPR applicant that he or she must wait until their guardian is
with them to enter.118
It seems unlikely that the intent of the INA is to denya minor child,
like Turfah, lawful admission as a result of governmental failings when he
would have otherwise rightfully earned his LPR status alongside hai-s f
ther.119 The Supreme Court has determined that Congress’ intent increating
111 See Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 7–8.
112 See id.
113 See 8 U.S.C. § 1361; Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8–9.
114 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674–75 (observing that the“accompanying” component of a
derivative visa is reasonable and its absencceould create achaotic situation where minors are
allowed to immigrate long before their guardians; Defenda’nst Motion for Summary Judgmen,t
supra note 64, at 9 (observing that a derivative visa holder cannot arrive before the principal
115 See Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 674 (imagining the results of immigrant children arriving days
or months before their parents).
116 See id. at 674–75 (noting that the accompanying requirement for a derivative visa is not
118 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 8; see Turfah II, 845 F.3d at
677 (Boggs, J., concurring) (noting that the government admitted its own responsibility and fault
for the procedural mistake of allowing Turfah in prematurely when they should have turned him
119 Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment,supra note 64, at 8; see Cynthia S.
Anderfuhren-Wayne, Family Unity in Immigration and Refugee Matters: UnitedStates and European
Approaches, 8 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 347, 352–53 (1956) (stating that the“legislative concern” of
Congress when creating the INA was to emphasize family unity);see also Lau v. Kiley, 563 F.2d
543, 547 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that the underlying principle of visas in U.S. immigration law is
the INA was a concern for family preservation and unity.120 The goal of
derivative visas is to unite family members, noto penalize those who suffer
procedural negligence but were otherwise entitled to legal entry.121 There is
room to distinguish cases where an immigrant’s criminal history is negi-l
gently overlooked by immigration authoritiesfrom someone who meets all
of the qualifications for LPR status but is forced into noncompliance with
the law because of governmental agency incompetency.122
B. Turfah Leaves Immigrants in Limbo with No Vehicle for Naturalization
The court’s decision inTurfah raises the question of what thismeans
for Turfah’s current LPR status and any future attempts he makes to
naturalize.123 Although Turfah’s LPR status can no longer be rescinded by USCIS
because he has had it for longer than five years, the court found him
unlawfully admitted and, therefore, ineligible to meet the requirements of
naturalization.124 The Sixth Circuit operated under the assumption that Turfah
currently has LPR status, even though he was not lawfully admitted12.5
However, Judge Boggs notes inhis concurrence that the government provided
“inconsistent statements” about whether or not Turfaish still aLPR.126
USCIS had previously stated that Turfah was a “nonimmigrant,” but then on
other occasions stated that he still had LPRstatus.127 Assuming as the
majority did that Turfah is still aLPR, this case’s holding does not establish a
procedure for how a LPR can change his status from unlawful to “lawful
admission.”128 Moreover, there is no known processin existence for an
immigrant that is already considered a LPR to petition to adjust that status to
be “lawfully admitted.”129 The court expressed a hope that USCISwould
exercise discretion in assisting Turfah to reapply for LPR, but this outcome
is unlikely considering USCIS is responsible for thceontinued denial of
Turfah’s naturalization application in the first place13.0 Judge Boggs
suggests that Turfah could become lawfully admitted if he can convince USCIS
to permit him to file an adjustment of status form (FormI-485) and USCIS
grants that change.131 It seems apparent thatTurfah would need to reapply
for LPR altogether to render his admission lawful, but it is unclear whether
USCIS will allow Turfah to reapply and, if so, whether hceould lose the
status he has now in the reapplication process.132 Given that Turfah’s
statutory violation is the result of theU.S. government’s mistake, it seems that
the responsibility should fall on the government tosuggest a solution to
remedy their error.133 Moreover, given that Turfah has opened up the door to
future governmental negligence rendering immigrants unlawfully admitted,
it is prudent that the government come up with a documented procedure for
how to handle these cases so that immigrants are not left in limbo with no
recourse or clear status in the future.134 Turfah has been in the United States
for over two decades, and his immigration status should not be left in flux
because of the government’s oversight.135
Permanent residency and naturalization in the United States are highly
regulated and sought-after statuses with numerous eligibility requirements.
“Lawful admission” as a LPR is necessary to naturalizeb,ut its definition
was ambiguous and required further interpretation by theBIA and several
circuit courts. Every circuit court that has deciphered the issue has upheld
the BIA’s ruling in Koloamatangi, holding admission unlawful if it involved
fraud, misrepresentation, or if the alien was not eligible for LPR status
absent a mistake. In Turfah, the Sixth Circuit expanded on Koloamatangi by
determining that admission may be unlawful as a result of procedural
negligence committed by theU.S. government, even if an alien was otherwise
properly entitled to LPR status. This holding affects not only the definition
of “lawful admission” but also has potential implications on the burden an
immigrant bears when entering the country,as well as what becomes of an
immigrant’s LPR status if he pursues reapplying for LPRstatus to right the
34 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec . at 549-50 (holding that a respondent who committed marriage fraud by marrying a U.S. citizen while already married had procured his LPR status through fraud and thus was never eligible for LPR status) . According tBolack's Law Dictionary, fraud is defined as “a knowing misrepresentation or knowing concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Fraud, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014 ).
35 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec . at 549.
36 Id. at 550 (noting that to obtain something lawfully means to complywith the legal obligations associated with it); see also In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 , 1441 ( 5th Cir . 1983 ) (arguing that obtaining a visa through appropriate procedure alone is insufficient and that an alien must also comply with the substantive obligations of the law to achieve lawful admission into the United States) .
37 Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec . at 551.
38 Id. at 550; see Longstaff, 716 F. 2d at 1441 (concluding thatthe plaintiff, who was homosexual, was unlawfully admitted to the United States when he responde“dno” to an application question asking if he suffered from“psychopathic personality”). At the time, Congress included homosexuality in the definition of“psychopathic personality,” but the plaintiff was unaware of this definition . Longstaff , 716 F.2d at 1441. Although the plaintiff followed correct procedure, and did not intend to lie in his application, the court found that his sexual orientation was a barrier to lawful admission because it rendered him excludable under immigration law at the time; therefore, he was not lawfully admitted . Id.
39 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 672; Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec . at 550; see also Estrada-Ramos v . Holder , 611 F.3d 318 , 321 ( 7th Cir . 2010 ) (holdintghat an alien had not met lawful admission because he had once pled guilty to a cocaine offense whichwas a bar to visa eligibility); Savoury v . U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307 , 1313 ( 11th Cir . 2006 ) (holding that an alien was not lawfully admitted as a LPR because he failed to disclose a cocaine possession conviction).
40 Turfah II , 845 F. 3d at 672 (adopting the B'IAs interpretation of lawful admission from Koloamatangi); see also Injeti v . U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 737 F.3d 311 , 315 - 16
56 Id. at 670.
57 Id.; 22 C.F.R . § 40 . 1(a)(1)-(a)(2) ( 2018 ) (defining an accompanying applicant to a principle visa holder as someone who cannot arrive before the principal applicant). The court inTurfah II spends a good deal of time analyzing the language of the derivative visa provision, concluding that “accompanying to join” means that Turfah needed to arrive in the United States with or after his father to comply with the requirements of the derivative visa . Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 673-74.
58 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 670.
60 Turfah I , 2016 WL 362456, at *1.
63 Id.; Petition for De Novo Review of Denial of Application for Naturalizationat 1 , Turfah I , 2016 WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15 - 10371 ) (alleging that Turfah is a valid LPR who was incorrectly denied the opportunity to naturalize).
64 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 670; Turfah I , 2016 WL 362456, at *1; Petitioner 's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6 , Turfah I , 2016 U.S.WL 362456, at *1(No. 15 - 10371 ) (arguing that Turfah was lawfully admitted and that the timing error should not affect his status); Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10 , Turfah I , 2016 WL 362456, at *1 (No. 15 - 10371 ) (arguing that Turfah is not eligible for naturalization because he was not lawfully admitted by virtue of his failure to comply with the substantive requirements of a derivative visa).
65 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 670.
98 See Gonzales , 429 F. 3d at 1184 (notingthat Gonzales had a criminal history where he was convicted for possession to sell cocaine). Technically, in Savoury, the INS was in fact informed of this criminal history, but it was not properly considered and noted when the LPR status was granted . Savoury v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 449 F.3d 1307 , 1310 ( 11th Cir . 2006 ). If it had been realized, the LPR status would have been denied out of hand because a felony conviction is a bar to LPR status . Id.
99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (rendering all aliens who have violated a U.S. controlled substance law or conspired or attempted to violate a law inadmissible for any U.S. visa or for entry into the country ).
100 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 674.
101 Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment , supra note 64 , at 7-8.
102 See id . (stating that “the principal alien secured a valid immigrant visa through the apporpriate diplomatic channels” and Turfah's father became a naturalized citizen).
103 Turfah v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs,. 845 F. 3d668 , 675 ( 6th Cir . 2017 ) “Turfah II” .
104 See id . at 676- 77 (Boggs, J., concurring) ( noting that USCIS has not made it clear what Turfah's status is now, or how he can adjust his status).
105 Turfah II , 845 F.3d at 674 -75.
120 Anderfuhren-Wayne, supra note 119 , at 353; Monique Lee Hawthorne,Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope of “Family”, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV . 809 , 814 - 15 ( 2007 ).
121 Lau, 563 F.2d at 547; Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment , supra note 64 , at 7-8; Anderfuhren-Wayne, supra note 119119.
122 Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment , supra note 64 , at 6-7; see also Turfah II , 845 F. 3d at 674 (conceding that the cases USCIS provided for their supporting arguments were all “factually more extrem”e than Turfah's situation and involved undisclosed or misrepresented criminality) . Compare Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 670 , 675 (stating that Turfah was not lawfully admitted for permanent residency because he entered before his fath,erw)ith Injeti, 737 F.3d at 316 (stating that Injeti wasnot lawfully admitted due tocommitting marriage fraud and submitting fraudulent documents when applying for LPRstatus), and Arellano-Garcia v . Gonzales , 429 F.3d 1183 , 1184 ( 8th Cir . 2005 ) (stating that Gonzales was not lawfully admitted because he wasconvicted of an aggravated felony involving controlled substances, was deported, and illegally reentered the country ).
123 Turfah II , 845 F. 3d at 676 (Boggs , J., concurring).
124 Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §1256 (noting that USCIS can rescind LPR status during the first five years after the status is adjusted). In Turfah II, the five-year time period in which USCIS can rescind LPR status had passed, so regardless of the cou'rst ruling that Turfah was not lawfully admitted, the government cannot rescind his LPR status or remove him . Turfah II, 845 F.3d at 676 (Boggs, J., concurring).
125 Turfah II , 845 F. 3d at 676 (Boggs , J., concurring).
127 Id. Preferred Cite: Rebecca Hayes, Comment, Lawful Permanent Residency: What the United States Citizenship & Immigration Services Giveth , It Can Also Take Away, 59 B.C. L. REV . E. SUPP. 329 ( 2018 ), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss6/329.