Islamic Shari'ah- Compliant Project Finance: Collateral Security and Financing Structure Case Studies
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Fordham International Law Journal
Case Studies
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2000
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Islamic Shari’ah- Compliant Project Finance:
Collateral Security and Financing Structure
Case Studies
Michael J.T. McMillen
This Essay addresses collateral security structures and project financing structures used in
project financings where the structure of, and documentation for, the financing is compliant with
the precepts of Islamic Shari’ah. The Essay first provides a brief summary of the sources and
exposition of Shari’ah principles in financing transactions. It then surveys economic and financial
trends in Saudi Arabia promoting and supporting the project financings discussed in the Essay.
General legal considerations influencing development of the structure are then identified, including
the absence of a statutory structure, the inapplicability of stare decisis, and the fact that many laws
are not published. A critical factor in any project financing, particularly in a jurisdiction in which
Islamic law is predominant, relates to the available enforcement entities and paradigms and the
degree to which Islamic Shari’ah is the basis for interpretation and enforcement of agreements.
This Essay examines the enforcement regimen of Saudi Arabia and then examines three project
financing case studies.
Michaelj T. McMillen*
This Essay addresses collateral security structures and
project financing structures used in project financings where the
structure of, and documentation for, the financing is compliant
with the precepts of Islamic Shari'ah.' The Essay first provides a
brief summary of the sources and exposition of Shari'ah
principles in financing transactions. It then surveys economic and
financial trends in Saudi Arabia promoting and supporting the
project financings discussed in the Essay. General legal
considerations influencing development of the structure are the
identified, including the absence of a statutory structure, the
inapplicability of stare decisis, and the fact that many laws are not
published. A critical factor in any project financing, particularly in a
jurisdiction in which Islamic law is predominant, relates to the
available enforcement entities and paradigms and the degree to
* Mr. McMillen is a Partner in the New York office of the law firm of King &
Spalding and a member of the Firm's Islamic Finance and Investment Practice Group
as well as the Project and Equipment Finance Group. Mr. McMillen was previously a
partner in another large international law firm, where he was located in Saudi Arabia
and had responsibility for Middle Eastern financings. Mr. McMillen represented the
lenders in the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project financing and led the team that
developed the rahn-adl collateral security structure discussed in this Essay. Mr.
McMillen also represented the financiers in, and was Islamic counsel for, the sharikat
mahassa-murabahafinancing discussed in this Essay and project and Islamic counsel for
the istisna'a-ijaratransactions described in this Essay. Views expressed in this Essay are
those of Mr. McMillen and not those of King & Spalding or his previous law firm. All
copyright and other intellectual property rights in respect of this Essay are held by
Michael J.T. McMillen.
1. Portions of this Essay addressing the rahn-adlcollateral security structure
previously appeared in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON
IsLAMIC FINANCE: LOCAL CHALLENGES, GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES 111-31 (2000) [hereinafter
THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM]. A general description of the financing of the rahn-adl
structure in the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project financing appeared in Michael
J.T. McMillen, Special Report, Saudi Arabia, Briefing: ProjectFinance, Reconciling New
Funding with the Sharia,38 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 18, 1999, at 36-39. A general
description of the financing of the Maconda Park Project istisna'a-ojaratransaction appeared in
Michael J.T. McMillen, Special Report U.S., Briefing: Islamic Finance: Breaking the Mould,
38 MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., Sept. 22, 2000, at 28-29.
which Islamic Shari'ahis the basis for interpretation and
enforcement of agreements. This Essay examines the enforcement
regimen of Saudi Arabia and then examines three project financing
case studies. The first case study focuses on a Shari'ah-compliant
collateral security that was developed for, and implemented in,
the first limited recourse project financing in The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Chevron Petrochemical Project. The
structure is a rahn-adl (mortgage/pledge-"trustee-arbitrator")
structure that is now used in the Middle East. The second case
study focuses on a sharikat mahassa-murabaha (joint
venturebank purchase and sale) structure that was used in the financing
of an expansion to a power project and related transmission
equipment, in Saudi Arabia: the Utility Power Project. The final
two case studies examine a Shari'ah-compliant istisna'a-ijarai
(construction contract-lease) structure that was recently
effected in the United States in the Maconda Park Apartments and
the Truman Park Apartments Projects and which will be effected
in various Islamic and non-Islamic jurisdictions. In each case,
the transactional participants and documentary structure are
considered in detail. In the case of the rahn-adl collateral
security structure, the methodology of the development of the
structure is also examined in order to provide an indication of the
nature of structuring a transaction that bridges Western and
Islamic financial systems and their divergent credit, economic,
legal, and cultural parameters. The methodology is the opposite of
that used in structuring project financings in other jurisdictions,
commencing from the Islamic system and working to
incorporate Western elements and, because it had not previously been
undertaken, began with first principles under the Shari'ah and
consideration of the nature of security interests in camels.
Although the two Saudi Arabian transactions involved structures
developed with primary sensitivity to the Hanbali School of
Islamic jurisprudence, the Essay discusses variations for
implementation of the structures in other jurisdictions where other schools
of Islamic jurisprudence predominate.
INTRODUCTION
Commonly used definitions of "project financing" are
focused on the productive capabilities of an economic unit (i.e.,
the project) and the needs and preferences of the debt
partici
FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
pants in financing the construction and operation of such units,
with the impact on the equity participants being implied by the
debt structure. In general terms, a "project financing" is the
financing of an economic unit in which the lenders look initially
to the cash flows from operation of that economic unit for
repayment of the project loan and to those cash flows and the other
assets comprising the economic unit as collateral for the loan. It
is an "off-balance sheet" method of financing from the vantage
of the operator of the project.
Project financing techniques have become a primary means
for financing a broad range of economic units throughout the
world. The application of these techniques has been refined in
most industrial categories and with respect to most types of
assets. For example, they are used for the financing of power
generation, transmission, and distribution assets; for upstream,
midstream, and downstream assets in the oil and gas industries; for
petrochemical, paper, and mining projects; and for the entire
panoply of infrastructure projects, including roads, airports, and
desalination plants. These techniques have been used for the
financing of tankers and other vessels, aircraft, and virtually
every type of manufacturing, transportation, computer, and
telecommunications equipment.
And, with one major exception, project financing
techniques have been used in most countries and economic systems
in the world. The one major exception is that relatively little
implementation has been made of those techniques in
transactions that are compliant with the precepts of Islamic Shari'ah,be
it in Islamic jurisdictions such as the Middle East, North Africa,
Malaysia, Indonesia, or in other jurisdictions. A significant
limiting factor relates to the conflict of certain Islamic principles with
the fundamental debt-leverage principle of Western project
financing, namely Islamic Shari'ahprohibitions on the payment or
receipt of interest and other aspects of the doctrine of iba.2
2. Riba is traditionally translated as usury. However, jurists have a more expansive
concept in Islamic jurisprudence, addressing not only prevention of the exploitation of
those in a weak bargaining position, but also "the illegality of all forms of gain or profit
which were unearned in the sense that they resulted from speculative or risky
transactions and could not be precisely calculated in advance by the contracting parties."
NOELJ. COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL TRADITION
11 (1984) [hereinafter COULSON, GULF STATES COMMERCIAL LAW]. See FRANK E. VOGEL
& SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 71-95
(1998) [hereinafter VOGEL & HAYES]; NABIL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE
The essential participants in any financing of a large scale
industrial, infrastructure, real estate, or similar project are (a)
one or more equity investors (often the sponsors of the project)
and (b) the availability of debt financing or an Islamically
acceptable alternative to the debt portion of the financing.3 The
determination by a bank or other financier as to whether to
participate in a given project financing of this type centers on the
project economics and, particularly, in a limited recourse project
financings, the collateral package that is made available to
secure the financing. Project sponsors and their affiliates have a
strong aversion to guaranteeing a project loan or other
financing and to otherwise incurring a balance sheet liability in respect
of a project. This is particularly true of companies that may have
to reflect the guarantee liability on, or consolidate project debt
onto, a parent company balance sheet under generally accepted
accounting principles. Thus, in addition to careful tax and
ownership structuring, project sponsors and their parent companies
also have a strong interest in providing the financiers with an
acceptable collateral security package. And, to effectuate
liability limitations and non-consolidation, sponsors and their parent
companies want the collateral for the project to be, and to be
limited to, the assets comprising the project and the cash flows
from operation of the project.
This highlights a second group of limitations on the
implementation of project financing techniques in transactions that
are Shari'ah-compliant: the difficulty of obtaining a collateral
security interest under the Shari'ahand the constraints inherent in
the nature of a rahn (mortgage/pledge) under the Shari'ah.
There is a pressing need for industrial, infrastructure, and
real estate development in the entire range of Islamic
jurisdictions. And, as noted below, there is a significant trend in Islamic
jurisdictions to broaden the capital base within each country,
draw upon funds from a world-wide financing base, and reduce
reliance on local capital for all financing needs. However, there
is a dearth of available financing structures that bridge Western
financial systems4 and Islamic systems. And there is a perception
that the legal systems and principles of the Western systems and
the Islamic systems are so diverse as to be unbridgeable.
This Essay focuses on two aspects of project financings in an
Islamic jurisdiction: (i) the design and implementation of a
collateral security structure under Islamic Shari'ahprecepts and (ii)
the design and implementation of Shari'ah-compliant financing
structures so as to avoid, among other things, prohibitions on
the payment and receipt of interest, and so as to comply with
Shari'ah precepts applicable to the specific contractual
arrangements used in those financings.5
To give structure to the discussion, four case studies are
presented. Two of the case studies are of projects in Saudi
Arabia, and the other two are of a Shari'ah-compliant structure
recently implemented in the United States. The Saudi Arabian
transactions were chosen (i) because of they were the first of
their kind, (ii) because they involved both Western and Middle
Eastern sources of financing (and thus had to comply with credit
.policies and legal requirements applicable in multiple divergent
jurisdictions), and (iii) because of the lack of an applicable
statutory framework in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which forced
direct consideration of Shari'ah principles and precepts. The
United States transactions were chosen because they also were
4. References to "Western" systems are primarily to financing techniques and
expectations that predominate in the United States of America, Europe, and Japan.
5. In addition to sources cited in this Essay (and other sources), many Islamic
scholars, Islamic financiers, and Saudi Arabian legal practitioners have graciously
provided invaluable assistance to the author in orally exploring Shari'ah principles and
precepts, including those applicable to the structures discussed in this Essay. The
author expresses particular gratitude to Dr. Mohamed Mi Elgari of the National
Management Consultancy Center and of King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
Mr. Hafedh Maamouri, currently Senior Consultant with Islamic Finance Consultants in
Manama, Bahrain, and previously Head of Islamic Banking for Saudi American Bank,
and Hassan M.S. Mahassni, Esq. of the Law Office of Hassan Mahassni in association
with White & Case LLP. Any errors in the statements of Shari'ah principles and
precepts are the sole responsibility of the author.
the first of their kind and because they illustrates application of
Islamic financings in a more complex regulatory environment
without diminution in Islamic compliance or the ability to apply
the structure in other jurisdictions.
An Islamically acceptable collateral security structure is
discussed in the context of a case study for the first limited recourse
project financing in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Chevron
petrochemical project in late 1998. In particular, it focuses on the
development of the rahn-adl structure for that financing. This
collateral security structure has been used as a model for, and
has found a much broader implementation in, other secured
financings throughout the Middle East. The first
Shai'ah-compliant financing structure discussed in this Essay is a sharikat
mahassa-murabaha(joint venture-share sale) structure that was
used in the project financing of the expansion of a power plant
and related transmission facilities in Saudi Arabia for an electric
utility ("Utility") in 1998. The second Shari'ah-compliant
financing structure was implemented (a) first in Austin, Texas, in June
2000, for the Maconda Park Apartments project and (b) second
in Largo, Maryland, in April 2001, for the Truman Park
Apartments project. Both the Maconda Park Project and the Truman
Park Project (collectively, the "Projects") entail construction
financing for residential housing developments. The Truman
Park Project involved the take-out of a conventional construction
loan using an Islamic structure. The Islamic structure in both
transactions is an istisna'a-ijara (construction contract-lease)
structure that involves bank construction and ownership of the
project with a subsequent financing lease to the involved project
company.
I. SOURCES OFISLAMIC SHARIAH
Islamic religious law as applied to commercial activities is
comprised, for purposes of this Essay, of two parts: Shari'ah
(literally, "the Way"), or perfect, immutable, divine law, as revealed
in the Qur'an and the sunna; and fiqh (literally,
"understanding"), or the sum of human comprehension of that divine law.
While there is dispute among Islamic scholars as to the precise
manner in which Islamic law is to be determined, those who
determine Islamic law are religious scholars (ulama) that are
skilled in interpreting the revealed sources of the Shari'ahand
the fiqh and in financial and economic disciplines. The primary
methodology used in this determinative and interpretive effort is
ijtihad (literally, "effort"), or legal reasoning. Ijtihad observes a
particular methodology, called the "roots of the law" (usual
alfiqh).6 The roots (usul) upon which Islamic jurisprudence is
based are (a) the Qur'an, being the holy book of Islam, (b) the
sunna of the Prophet Mohammed, which are the binding
authority of his dicta and decisions, (c) the ijma or "consensus" of
the community of scholars, and (d) the qiyas, or analogical
deductions and reasoning.
In practice, Islamic Shari'ahis determined by ulama, acting
individually or in groups. For purposes of this Essay, it is
important to note that most significant Islamic financial institutions
have Shari'ah supervisory boards, committees, and advisors
("Shari'ah Boards"), comprised of one or more Islamic scholars
that have particular expertise in economic and financial
transactions. These Shari'ah Boards will often examine in detail both
the structure of a proposed transaction or financial product and
the documentation giving effect to that transaction or product.
In the course of structuring the transaction and documentation,
there may well be multiple review sessions by the Shari'ahBoard
with modifications to the structure and the documentation after
each review session, a process of continual refinement to give
effect to the determinations of the Shari'ahBoard with respect to
the individual transaction or product. Given that Shari'ahBoard
determinations are fiqh (human comprehension of Shari'ah,the
divine law), there can be variations in interpretation and
implementation from one Shari'ahBoard to another, with a
multiplicity of views on a specific issue. These variations occur even
though Shari'ahscholars in this period strive to achieve a
consensus on difficult and novel issues, such as those involved in the
development of new financial instruments and products.7
Is6. See generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); JOSEPH
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCrION TO ISLAMIC LAW (1964). See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 2;
NICHOLAS DYLAN RAY, ARAB ISLAMIC BANKING AND THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW (1995)
[hereinafter RAY]; SALEH, supranote 2; COULSON, GULF STATES COMMERCIAL LAW, supra
note 2; see also SECOND HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supranote 2; THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC
FORUM, supra note 1 (containing articles covering current issues in Islamic finance).
While, as a precise matter, all discussion of Islamic jurisprudence is one offiqh, this
Essay, in keeping with convention, will refer to precepts and principles of
Shari'ahwithout further reference to fiqh.
7. See Nizam Yaquby, Islamic Finance in View of the Shari'ah, in SECOND HARVARD
lamic investors, be they financial institutions or individual
investors, rely heavily on the involvement of Shari'ah Boards in the
structuring and documentation of a transaction or financial
product and may request that the Shari'ah Board's fatwa of
approval be provided before an investment is made.
II. THE ECONOMIC AMD FINANCING ENVIRONMENT IN
SAUDI ARABIA
The economic and financing environment in Saudi Arabia
prior to, and at the time of consummation of, the financings of
the Saudi Chevron petrochemical project and the Utility power
project (the first two case studies) involved a focus on
diversification of the industrial base in the Kingdom. There was a trend
toward accessing a broader financing base, with greater
involvement of Saudi Arabian investors as well as foreign investors,
internationalization of the financing process, and the use of
project financing techniques rather than personal and corporate
guarantees. Concurrently, the government and local businesses
were considering and attempting to implement methods of
reducing the role of government in the provision of financing.
In the initial stages, industrial diversification proceeded
most rapidly in the petrochemicals industry, particularly where
affiliates of Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation
("SABIC") were involved. Among the early petrochemical
projects that obtained financing were expansions by Saudi
Yanbu Petrochemical Company ("Yanpet"), a joint venture
between SABIC and Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Company, Saudi
Petrochemical Company ("Sadaf"), UnitedJubail Fertilizer
Company, a joint venture among SABIC and five SABIC companies,
A1-Jubail Petrochemical Company ("Kemya"), and Eastern
Petrochemical Company ("Sharq"). Notably, 1998 also saw the first
international lending transaction in the electricity sector when
Saudi Consolidated Electric Company in the Eastern Province
executed a "dedicated receivables" financing for its Ghazlan II
power project near Yanbu.
Financings by these, and other, companies involved some
degree of recourse to the project sponsors or their affiliates.
They also involved some element of collateral security for the
IsLAMIc FORUM, supranote 2, at 159-61 (summarizing these and other responsibilities of
modern Shari'ah Boards).
financiers of such projects. However, these projects did not fall
within the "limited recourse project financing" concept that is
being considered in this Essay and none of those projects
involved the use of the rahn-adlcollateral security,
sharikatmahassamurabaha, or istisna'a-ijarastructures discussed in this Essay.
These early projects illustrate a broader involvement of
Saudi Arabian investors. Each project involved significant or
exclusively Saudi Arabian equity, and some involved joint stock
companies that may eventually seek stock exchange listings.
Foreign investors, such as Chevron, were allowed to participate in
company ownership in Saudi Arabia, and there has been a
significant advance in the encouragement of foreign investment in
Saudi Arabia since the Saudi Chevron financing. In addition,
Saudi Chevron and many SABIC projects, such as Yanpet,
involve a combination of local, regional, and international lenders.
The health and liquidity of local and regional banks were
significant factors in industrial and infrastructure finance in
Saudi Arabia in that period. Local banks reported profits in
each of the years preceding the financings of the Saudi Chevron
petrochemical and Utility power projects. Those banks
experienced substantial liquidity and low loan-to-asset ratios. Profits
were based more on investment income than interest, and loan
growth had been low. This encouraged banks to increase
lending to all economic sectors. To spread risks and increase the
borrowing base, banks sought to join regional and international
lending groups, particularly for large projects such as Saudi
Chevron, Ghazlan II, and Yanpet.
Governmental evaluations were ongoing regarding
restructuring of the electricity sector, with initial consideration given to
financing the Shoaiba project as an independent power project
using a build-own-operate ("BOO") structure.' Privatization of
the telecommunications sector, Saudi Arabian Airlines, and port
operations, maintenance, and management were all being
actively considered, and the privatization of the
telecommunications sector did proceed. A public offering of SABIC shares was
also being considered at the time. Regarding capital markets
development, in April 1998, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
("SAMA") issued a new binding draft of the Investment Business
8. The transaction Was not completed as a build-own-operate structure at that
time. Restructuring of the electricity system was undertaken and is in process.
Regulations, which regulate, among other things, the
distribution of securities and the management of mutual funds.
Accession to the World Trade Organization was also a frequently
considered topic, together with its effects on brokerage, insurance,
and commercial banking activities, as well as export/import
markets.
Each of these developments, and others, worked to expand
the capital markets, permitting greater access to foreign funds
and a strengthening of the economy over the longer term. One
goal was to free up Saudi Arabian capital, allowing it be spread
over a broader risk base within the economy. It was believed that
this, in turn, would have the effect of a reduced burden on
government and an allocation of risks to those willing and most able
to bear them. It was anticipated that increased foreign equity
investment would result in further technology transfer into the
industrial and infrastructure sectors. As completed financings
illustrate, the time frame for implementation of individual
projects was reduced as businessmen sought to avoid additional
costs of delays and other inefficiencies in implementing their
projects. Privatization, where determined appropriate, would
allow governmental risk sharing with the private sector, cost
reduction, and governmental management of the pace and depth of
movement of functions to the private sector.
III. THE SAUDI ARABIAN LEGAL ENVIRONMENT:
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The fundamental and paramount body of law in The
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Shari'ah,as construed by the Hanbali
School of Islamic jurisprudence.9 The sources of the Shari'ah
9. The four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence are: (1) the Hanafi School,
which is predominant in the countries of the former Ottoman Empire and emanated
from the disciples of Abu Hanafi (d. 767 H.) in the Iraqi center of Kufa; (2) the Hanbali
School, which is predominant in The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and few other
jurisdictions and was formed aby Ahmad bin Hangal (d. 855 H.); (3) the Maliki School, which
emanated from the Arabian center in Medina through the followers of Malik bin Anas
(d. 796 H.); and (4) the Shafi'i School formed by the followers of Shafi'i (d. 820 H.).
The four major schools differ in many respects in their interpretation of certain
Shari'ahprecepts. Most scholars from medieval times until modern times aligned
themselves with one of the four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence. However, in modern
times many scholars do not believe it necessary to belong to any single school of Islamic
jurisprudence. See VOGEL & HAYEs, supranote 2, at 34-41 (describing methods of
elaboration of law).
are the Qur'an, the sunna, ijma, and the qiyas. Certain matters
are dealt with "statutorily," by Royal Decrees with respect to that
matter. Where such a statutory body of law has been
promulgated, such law is ultimately subject to, and may not conflict
with, the provisions of the Shari'ah. Unlike other Middle Eastern
countries, there is no statutory body of law in Saudi Arabia with
respect to collateral security, mortgages and pledges,
recordation of security interests, or related matters.1 ° Nor is there a
comprehensive statutory regime pertaining to sale (istisna'a) or
lease (ijara) transactions. There are statutes pertaining to joint
ventures and other types of business organizations and foreign
investments in Saudi Arabia. However, considerations,
hereinafter set forth below in this Section III, limit the predictability of
those statutes in certain circumstances. Thus, financiers and
legal practitioners must look directly to the Shari'ahin structuring
and applying legal principles relating to collateral security
matters, sales transactions, and leases. Financiers and legal
practitioners must also look to the Shari'ahin implementing existing
statutory provisions. These factors, in addition to those
discussed immediately below, render it difficult to provide
definitive advice as to how collateral security and financing
arrangements similar to those implemented in the Saudi Chevron,
Utility Power, Maconda Park, and Truman Park transactions can be
effected or would be interpreted by adjudicative bodies in Saudi
Arabia.1 It is noteworthy, however, that under the Shari'ah,
absent a prohibition in the Shari'ah, the agreement of the parties
will control.
In addition, under the principles of law applicable in Saudi
Arabia, previous decisions of Saudi Arabian courts and other
adjudicative authorities are not considered to establish binding
precedents for the decision of later cases, and the principle of
stare decisis is not accepted in Saudi Arabia. Also, Royal Decrees,
10. A unique exception in Saudi Arabia is in the area of ship mortgages, which is
governed by the Commercial Court Regulations (Royal Decree No. M27 of 1931), the
Ship Mortgage Regulations (which came into force on June 17, 1955), and the
Regulations for Ports and Harbors (Royal Decree No. M27 ofJuly 14, 1974), the Regulations
for Ports, Harbors and Lighthouses dated 19/6/1394 (Resolution No. 934 of the
Council of Ministers).
11. This realization had a profound impact on the "scientific method" and
approach chosen for development of the rahn-adlcollateral security structure.
Predictability of outcome was a primary concern of the financing banks in the Saudi Chevron
transaction.
ministerial decisions and resolutions, departmental circulars and
other governmental pronouncements having the force of law,
and the decisions of the various courts and adjudicatory
authorities of Saudi Arabia are not generally or consistently collected in
a central place and are not necessarily available to the public.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OFAGREEMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
A. Jurisdiction of Enforcement Entities
Considerations of choice of forum are critical in every
financing and in every jurisdiction in the world. Different
enforcement entities have different areas of expertise and different
sensitivities to issues. Each enforcement entity has a different
array of remedies that it can apply, particularly in a jurisdiction
such as Saudi Arabia. Rights to appeal from each enforcement
entity are different as are the procedural rules applicable to each
enforcement entity. And, given varying dockets and procedures,
the dispute resolution period can and does vary dramatically
from one enforcement entity to another.
There are a number of different courts, committees, offices,
and boards (collectively, "Enforcement Entities") that might
have jurisdiction over a matter in Saudi Arabia in which a bank
could be involved. Three of these Enforcement Entities were of
particular relevance in the context of the financings of the Saudi
Chevron Project and the Utility Power Project: the Banking
Disputes Settlement Committee ("SAMA Committee") of the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency ("SAMA"); the Office of the
Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes, also known as the
Negotiable Instruments Offices ("NIO"), which are under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce; 12 and the Board of
Grievances (Qiwan Al-Mazal'im) under The Board of Grievances Law
("Board of Grievances"). In summary:
(i) The SAMA Committee has jurisdiction over matters and
disputes involving banks and their customers-that is,
"settling" (mediating) disputes between banks and their
customers "in accordance with the agreements
concluded between them." Under the regulations
constituting the SAMA Committee, all disputes between banks,
12. The NIO operates in practice like a court with hearings being held in a
number of different circuit locations in Saudi Arabia. For ease of reference, references to
the NIO will be in the singular.
including foreign banks, and their customers (other
than those involving negotiable instruments) are to be
referred in the first instance to the SAMA Committee. 3
(ii) The NIO has jurisdiction over actions, matters, and
disputes involving negotiable instruments (such as the
promissory notes used in the financings discussed in this
Essay), and in the context of such disputes, the NIO has
jurisdiction superior to that of the SAMA Committee.' 4
(iii) The Board of Grievances has jurisdiction over
commercial disputes (by implication, other than banking
disputes and negotiable instruments disputes), including
the enforcement of foreign judgments and bankruptcy
matters.15
The jurisdiction of the various Enforcement Entities is, in
certain respects, unclear and arguably overlapping. Numerous
questions arise as to which Enforcement Entity would have
jurisdiction in various matters involving one of the financing banks
in the transactions discussed in this Essay. For example,
although the Board of Grievances has jurisdiction with respect to
enforcement of foreign judgments and awards generally, the
SAMA Committee has jurisdiction with respect to all matters
involving banks (other than in respect of negotiable instruments).
Does this mean that the SAMA Committee should
assertjurisdiction with respect to a foreign award obtained by a bank? Would
this be true despite the express provisions of the various official
pronouncements regarding enforcement of foreign awards,
particularly those rendered in foreign arbitrations? In the
bankruptcy context, although the Board of Grievances generally has
jurisdiction, if a bank creditor has a claim, should the SAMA
Committee take jurisdiction? Which Enforcement Entity has
jurisdiction where the foreign judgment or award obtained by a
bank is on a negotiable instrument? These are questions of first
instance in Saudi Arabia that will be determined by each
Enforcement Entity, and it is not possible to determine in advance
the decision that will be made.
Given the foregoing situation and issues, among others, it
13. SAMA Committee decisions are final and not appealable.
14. NIO judgments may be appealed to the Legal Committee of the Ministry of
Commerce.
15. Determinations of the Board of Grievances may be appealed to the Board of
Grievances Scrutinization Committee.
was important to structure the Saudi Arabian transactions in a
manner that would afford the banks initial access to, and an
ultimate determination by, the Enforcement Entity of their choice
in any given situation and the opportunity to raise these
jurisdictional issues with the chosen Enforcement Entity.
B. Examination of UnderlyingDocumentation Under the Shari'ah
Creditors involved in disputes to be resolved through the
SAMA Committee or the NIO are afforded certain advantages
over creditors who pursue their claims before the Board of
Grievances. Although the SAMA Committee is in theory obliged
to apply the Shari'ahand its precepts, including the prohibition
on interest, to banking disputes, in practice the SAMA
Committee has generally shown a willingness to force a recalcitrant
debtor to honor the terms of the agreement creating the
indebtedness, regardless of whether the agreement requires the
payment of monies in the nature of interest or is otherwise variant
from principles of Saudi Arabian law. The SAMA Committee
does examine the various underlying documents and will make
inquiry as to whether these arrangements are in accordance with
Saudi Arabian law, but it makes all reasonable efforts to respect
the agreement of the parties even in the face of conflicts with
the Shari'ah.
It is noteworthy that review by the SAMA Committee is
comprised of a legal review and an accounting review. The
accountants of the SAMA Committee perform independent
determinations based on their calculations of the amount of interest
payable in respect of a given dispute. Interest is payable only to the
date of commencement of the action with the SAMA
Committee. Thus, no interest is payable in respect of periods after such
date and no interest is payable in respect of overdue amounts. It
is the author's understanding based upon discussions with Saudi
Arabian lawyers and judges that in practice most actions before
the SAMA Committee take from six months to one year.
Remedies available to the SAMA Committee include (i)
prohibition of the debtor from leaving Saudi Arabia and (ii) putting
the debtor on a "notice list" that is circulated to banks in Saudi
Arabia. The second alternative can be a very effective remedy, as
banks in Saudi Arabia will decline to conduct banking business
with the debtor so listed.
Where the SAMA Committee, acting as a mediation body, is
unable to bring about a settlement of a dispute, its
implementing regulations require that the matter be submitted to the court
of competent jurisdiction (i.e., the Board of Grievances) for a de
novo hearing. Notwithstanding the express requirements of such
implementing regulations, however, under present practice the
Board of Grievances will generally decline to hear cases that fall
under the jurisdiction of the SAMA Committee. 16
In resolving actions, matters, and disputes within its
jurisdiction, the NIO will generally enforce a debt obligation as
evidenced by a negotiable instrument without looking to the
substance of the transaction giving rise to such instrument,
including whether such indebtedness includes amounts in the nature
of interest.17 The NIO will, however, consider general defenses
such as whether or not a debt was actually incurred or a
negotiable instrument properly formed. Thus, the NIO generally does
not undertake an inquiry into whether the documents
underlying a negotiable instrument comply with the Shari'ahand certain
other principles of Saudi Arabian law.is Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners have informed the author that actions before the
NIO are resolved in less time that those before the SAMA
Committee.
The Board of Grievances will undertake a fulsome
examination of any matter presented to it, and this examination will
include a rigorous inquiry into matters of public policy (including
the compliance of all documentation with the Shari'ahand other
principles of Saudi Arabian law). Thus, if a foreign judgment or
award is obtained and enforcement is sought in Saudi Arabia,
the Board of Grievances may examine the underlying
documentation and make what is essentially a de novo determination as to
whether the documentation underlying the judgment complies
16. The author has been informed that the Minister of the Interior has instructed
the Civil Rights Department, the department of the Ministry of the Interior that is
responsible for enforcing judgments of the SAMA Committee, that decisions of the SAMA
Committee are to be enforced in the same manner as a decision of a court.
17. Many transactions are thus structured to provide separate notes for principal,
interest, and other costs and expenses. These transactions frequently have a
requirement for on-going provision of such notes.
18. Ajudgment issued by the NIO may be enforced through a presentation of the
judgment to the Civil Rights Department of the Ministry of the Interior. Saudi Arabian
legal practitioners have indicated that, unfortunately, the Civil Rights Department is
often somewhat less than diligent in enforcing judgments.
with the Shari'ahand other Saudi Arabian law. In the context of
considering the position of the Board of Grievances, it should be
noted that the Board of Grievances generally does not recognize
provisions of agreements with respect to choice of foreign law or
submission to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Actions before
the Board of Grievances often take from two to ten years,
although the author has been informed by Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners that actions for enforcement of foreign judgments
are likely to take approximately one year if the order or award,
on its face, does not contravene the Shari'ah or Saudi Arabian
law.
C. Enforcement of ForeignJudgments and Awards; Arbitration
As noted above, large industrial, infrastructure, real estate,
and other projects are increasingly international in scope. Thus,
they frequently involve the law of two or more countries. A
critical set of legal and financial issues involve the enforcement of a
foreign (e.g., American, English, or French) arbitral award or
court judgment against the project company or its assets in the
country in which the project is located (in this case, Saudi
Arabia). The court with jurisdiction over applications seeking
enforcement of foreign judgments is the Board of Grievances.
There is an unresolved jurisdictional issue where the foreign
judgment or arbitral award is obtained by a bank because of the
jurisdiction of the SAMA Committee over disputes involving
banks. The author is aware of only one case where a foreign
bank has sought to enforce in Saudi Arabia a decision of a
foreign court or arbitral body.19
There is little precedent for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments by the Saudi Arabian courts.2 1
In19. It is likely that, on the basis of Council of Ministers Resolution No. 729/8
(which establishes the jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances to enforce foreign
awards) and the animosity with which many Board of Grievances judges view
non-Islamic banks, the Board of Grievances will refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the
enforcement application submitted by a non-Islamic commercial bank. On the other
hand, the Board of Grievances might decide that it is inappropriate for a decision of a
foreign arbitral body or court to be referred to a non-judicial body (such as the SAMA
Committee) for enforcement, particularly where jurisdiction over enforcement actions
is specifically given to the Board of Grievances.
20. See A. Kritzalis, Saudi Arabia, in INTERNATIONAL EXECUTION AGAINST JUDGMENT
DEBTORS (D. Campbell ed., 1993) (providing a comprehensive analysis of issues arising
in respect of enforcement actions).
stance.
deed, other than a small number of 1989 cases involving
judgments of courts in member states of the Arab League, the author
is aware of no instance where the Board of Grievances has
afforded final recognition to, and enforced, a judgment of a
foreign court or a foreign arbitral award. The author has been
informed of a single recent case in which a bank sought
enforcement of a foreign judgment or award.2 ' In that case, the Board
of Grievances reportedly declined to exercise jurisdiction
because of the involvement of a bank. Presumably, enforcement
would be sought from the SAMA Committee in such an
in22
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabian law does give the Board of
Grievances the power to issue a judgment recognizing a foreign
judgment for enforcement in Saudi Arabia if the state of origin
would afford reciprocal recognition to the judgments of the
Saudi Arabian courts and provided that nothing in the foreign
judgment contravenes the Shari'ah2.3 In the only recent cases of
which the author is aware that sought enforcement of decisions
of the courts of England, the Board of Grievances declined to
enforce the judgments because no showing had been made that
the English courts would afford reciprocal treatment to a Saudi
Arabian court decision. 24 As noted above, the Board of
Grievances is said to have recently declined to exercise jurisdiction in
21. The author is unaware of whether this is a foreign courtjudgment or a foreign
arbitral award.
22. The author has been unable to determine at this time whether the party
seeking enforcement of the foreign award has sought enforcement by the SAMA Committee
in the referenced case.
23. Rules of Civil Procedure Before the Board of Grievances, Council of Ministers
Resolution No. 190 dated 16/11/1409 A.H. (June 20, 1989), Article 6. Additional
requirements for the enforcement of foreign judicial awards are set forth in Circular
Number 7 of the President of the Board of Grievances, 15/8/1409 A.H. (May 5, 1985).
24. In these companion cases, the Board of Grievances initially issued a decision
recognizing the three English High Court decisions. On appeal, however, the Board of
Grievances found that there was no treaty between Saudi Arabia and the United
Kingdom allowing for the reciprocal enforcement ofjudgments and that, on the evidence
submitted, no law of the United Kingdom would provide for automatic recognition of a
Saudi Arabian judgment. Rather, the Board of Grievances concluded that a judgment
creditor seeking to enforce a Saudi Arabian court judgment in England would have to
commence a common law action against the English judgment debtor in the English
High Court to recover the debt evidenced by the Saudi Arabian judgment. In such new
action, the English High Court could accept the Saudi Arabian judgment as proof of
the debt. The Board of Grievances, therefore, held that the enforcement of the three
High Court judgments should be denied.
the case of a foreign court judgment or arbitral award obtained
by a bank.
In 1994, Saudi Arabia filed an instrument of accession to
the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Arbitral Awards of 1958 ("New York Convention"). The
authorizing decree incorporates the requisite reciprocity
requirement and specifies that jurisdiction over actions seeking
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards shall lie with the Board of
Grievances. 2 5
To date, the Board of Grievances has not issued procedural
rules for actions seeking enforcement of international
arbitration awards. The author understands from Saudi Arabian legal
practitioners who have consulted Board of Grievances officials
that no such rules will be issued in the near future. This being
the case, it appears that an application for the recognition of a
foreign arbitral award would be submitted and would proceed in
accordance with the procedures specified for applications in
respect of the recognition of foreign judicial awards.
The author also understands that only one application
seeking recognition of a foreign arbitral award under the New York
Convention has been filed to date. In that case, the Board of
Grievances declined to exercise jurisdiction because a bank
obtained the foreign court judgment or award. Presumably, the
bank must then make application to the SAMA Committee for
enforcement of the judgment or award. Since any such
application to the Board of Grievances would be quite rare at this point
in time, it would be reasonable to anticipate that the Board of
Grievances would consider such an application, as well as any
objections filed with respect to the application, carefully and
deliberately. De novo Board of Grievances proceedings normally
last from two to ten years, with the long duration being in large
25. The structure for the Saudi Chevron transaction was designed to allow the
banks, through the Onshore Security Agent, to attempt to enforce the foreign award
through the SAMA Committee, rather than through the Board of Grievances. The
structure of the Utility power project transaction was similarly structured. In each case,
this should result in (i) substantially quicker resolution and enforcement and (ii)
avoidance of a de novo review of the underlying documentation by the Board of Grievances in
the enforcement action.
The respective jurisdictional ambits of the SAMA Committee and the Board of
Grievances in this situation are unclear and, to the author's knowledge, except as noted
in the text, no actions have been brought by a bank in either forum for enforcement of
a foreign arbitral or judicial award to date.
lamic Investors"). To implement the Maconda Park financing
arrangements, the Islamic Investors formed a special purpose
project company as an investment entity, the Maconda Park
Limited Partnership ("Maconda Project Company"). In the Truman
Park transaction, an existing limited liability company, Truman
Park LLC ("Truman Project Company"), was reorganized in
connection with the Islamic financing and the infusion of the
Islamic investment. A Fairfiled Residential affiliate serves as the
"General Partner" of the Maconda Project Company, and a
Dolben affiliate serves as the "Managing Member" in the
Truman Park transaction. GIH and the Key Global Capital affiliates
invested as the limited partners and members in these
transactions. KeyBank, National Association ("KeyBank") provided
financing for each of the transactions8" through an affiliated
entity (each, an "Owner"). FF Development L.P., an affiliate of
Fairfield Residential, as the general contractor ("Maconda
General Contractor"), is constructing the apartment buildings and
other improvements for the Maconda Park Project ("Maconda
Improvements") and Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. is acting as the
general contractor ("Truman General Contractor") for construction
of the apartments and other improvements ("Truman
Improvements") for the Truman Park Project. The Maconda
Improvements and the Truman Improvements are referred to as the
"Improvements" and the Maconda General Contractor and the
Truman General Contractor are referred to as the "General
Contractors." The Truman Park transaction involved an entity
not present in the Maconda Park transaction, the "Construction
Arranger." The Construction Arranger is an "orphan" special
purpose vehicle that was created to enter into the Construction
Contract with the General Contractor and to enter into the
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner. The relevant
Owner is leasing and will lease the Maconda Park Project to the
Maconda Project Company, and is leasing and will lease the
Truman Park Project to the Truman Project Company, in each case
as described in this Essay. Each of the Project Companies also
acts as a managing contractor ("Managing Contractor") for the
construction and operation of the respective Projects. The
Maconda Project Company owns the site on which the Maconda
Park Project is being constructed ("Maconda Site") together
88. The "debt equivalent."
with various easements, licenses, and other real estate interests
(collectively with the Maconda Site, "Maconda Premises").
Similarly, the Truman Project Company owns the site on which the
Truman Park Project is being constructed ("Truman Site")
together with various easements, licenses, and other real estate
interests (collectively with the Truman Site, "Truman Premises").
The Maconda Site and the Truman Site are collectively referred
to as the "Sites" and the Maconda Premises and the Truman
Premises are collectively referred to as the "Premises."
The primary documents for the construction and
miniperm financing of each of the Maconda Park Project and the
Truman Park Project are, in each case:
(a). "SITE LEASE": The lease of each of the relevant Site (and
assignment of related easements) and the remainder of
each of the relevant Premises from the Project Company
for that Project, as the site lessors, to the relevant Owner,
as the site lessee, to allow such Owner to occupy such
Site and cause construction and leasing of the
Improvements thereon;
(b). "CONSTRUCTION (Istisna'a) Agreement": The
Shari'ahcompliant construction contract between the relevant
Owner and the Maconda General Contractor (in
Maconda Park) and between the relevant Owner and
the Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), in each
case for the construction of the Improvements for the
relevant Project, having attached thereto the
Construction Terms (in Maconda Park) and the Construction
Contract (in Truman Park), including the specifications
and details of the cost of construction;
(c). "CoNSTRUCTION TERMS" and "CoNSTRUTION CONTRACT":
A standard construction contract 9 between the
Maconda General Contractor and the related Owner (in
Maconda Park) and between the Construction Arranger
and the Truman General Contractor (in Truman Park)
with respect to construction of the Improvements for the
relevant Project, including all specifications for such
Improvements;
89. Such a standard construction contract might be the American Institute of
Architects Form A 11I, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, and
Standard General Conditions and Special Conditions Relating Thereto, as was used in
the Truman Park transaction. In the Maconda Park transaction, the Construction
Terms were the General Contractor's own customary form of construction contract and
conditions.
(d). "LEASE (Ijara)": A lease of the Improvements
constituting part of each Project, and a sublease of each Premises
for such Project, from the Owner thereof to the each of
the relevant Project Company;90
(e). "PUT OPTION AGREEMENT": An agreement allowing each
Owner to cause the related Project Company to
purchase its related Project at various times and under
various circumstances at the election of such Owner;
(f). "CALL OPTION AGREEMENT": An agreement allowing each
Project Company to purchase its related Project from the
relevant Owner at various times and under various
circumstances at the election of the such Project Company;
(g). "MANAGING CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT": An agreement
between each Owner and the relevant Project Company
pursuant to which the such Project Company performs
various construction and operation activities as the
representative of the related Owner; and
(h). "TAx MATTERS AGREEMENT": An agreement to clarify the
characterization of the transaction for United States tax
and other laws.
The mortgage (rahn), security agreement, and other
collateral security documentation, including guarantees of payment,
completion of construction, and environmental matters
(collectively "Security Documents"), are not discussed in this Essay. In
addition, there are various consents and similar documents
between and among the parties to the transaction that allow for
assignment of documents in connection with the Security
Documents and also make provision for the exercise of remedies in
various default scenarios and provide for damages in such
scenarios.
In summary, in the Maconda Park transaction, the
Developer and the Islamic Investors formed the Maconda Project
Company, with each such entity making equity contributions.
The Maconda Project Company, using such equity contributions
and the other financing amounts provided by KeyBank through
the related Owner as described herein, purchased, and holds
title to, the Maconda Site and the other portions of the Maconda
Premises. The Maconda Project Company leased the Maconda
90. The obligations of the Lessee under the Lease (Ijara) are evidenced by a Basic
Rent Note.
2001]
SHARJ'AH-COMPLIANT PROJECTFINANCE
Site and granted other rights to the remainder of the Maconda
Premises to the Owner pursuant to a Site Lease.
In the Truman Park transaction, the Developer had
previously formed the Truman Project Company and had purchased
the Truman Site prior to the conversion of the conventional
construction loan to an istisna'a-ijarafinancing structure. The
Islamic Investors made equity contributions to the Truman
Project Company after restructuring of that company. The Truman
Project Company, using such equity contributions and the other
financing amounts provided by KeyBank through the Owner as
described herein, converted the conventional loan financing to
an Islamic financing and undertook construction of the Truman
Park Project. The Truman Project Company leased the Truman
Site and granted other rights to the remainder of the Truman
Premises to the related Owner pursuant to a Site Lease.
KeyBank provided and provides financing for both Projects
by making amounts available to separate affiliates of KeyBank,
the respective Owners. The Owner of the Maconda Park Project
disbursed the financing amounts into the Maconda Park Project
by making payments with respect to acquisition of the Maconda
Premises. On a periodic basis, the Owners of each of the
Projects will disburse further amounts with respect to
construction of the Improvements pursuant to the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreements. Each Owner holds legal title to the
Improvements constituting a part of its related Project. In the
Maconda Park transaction, the Owner is causing the General
Contractor to construct the Improvements pursuant to the
Construction (Istisna'a)Agreement between such entities. The
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement incorporates the General
Contractor's conventional construction contract, the Construction
Terms, including specifications and milestone payment
provisions, and also modifies the Construction Terms to comply with
applicable Shari'ah precepts. In the Truman Park transaction,
an "orphan" special purpose entity was established to enter into
the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner and to
enter into the Construction Contract with the General
Contractor. The Construction Contract is incorporated in, and
modified in accordance with Shari'ah precepts by, the Construction
(Istisna'a)Agreement. The use of this entity resulted in the
General Contractor being able to use its customary Construction
Contract without adaptation to the Islamic structure, isolated the
General Contractor from the Islamic transaction, and resulted in
substantial savings in transactional costs and implementation
time. Each Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement contains the
"lending and disbursement half' of a conventional loan
agreement, including conditions precedent to funding.
Each of the Owners is leasing and will lease its constructed
Improvements, is subleasing and will sublease its related Site,
and has grant rights to the remainder of the relevant Premises to
the related Project Company in its capacity as lessee under each
Lease (Ijara) (in their respective capacities thereunder, each
Owner is referred to as the "Lessor" and each Project Company
is referred to as the "Lessee"). The Lease (Ijara) is the primary
financing document for the transaction, particularly as regards
repayment of financing amounts through rent mechanisms,
events of default, remedies, and covenants.
Each Project Company will be permitted to purchase the
Project that it is leasing on a date elected by such Project
Company pursuant to the Call Option Agreement. The provisions of
the Call Option Agreement include the voluntary prepayment
concepts of a conventional loan agreement. Similarly, each
Owner will be permitted to sell its Project to the related Project
Company in certain circumstances, such as defaults under the
Lease (Ijara), pursuant to the Put Option Agreement. The
provisions of the Put Option Agreement are akin to the mandatory
prepayment provisions of a conventional loan agreement. As a
general rule, put option agreements are disfavored under the
Shari'ah. As a result and despite the name of the agreements,
the Put Option Agreement and the Call Option Agreement were
structured to comply with the many Shari'ahprecepts applicable
to agreements of sale and purchase.
Each Owner, as the holder of title to its related
Improvements and lessee and grantee of the related Premises, and each
Project Company, as the Managing Contractor for the related
Project, entered into a Managing Contractor Agreement.
Pursuant thereto, the Managing Contractor supervises construction
activities under the related Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement,
inspects the related Project as it is being constructed, and upon
completion of milestones accepts that Project on behalf of the
related Owner. The Managing Contractor also maintains the
related Project to the extent that its Owner does not do so under
the Lease (Ijara). Applicable Islamic Shari'ahprecepts permit a
managing contractor or agent to act in this capacity.
Each Owner, each Project Company, and other entities also
entered into the Tax Matters Agreement, which acknowledges
the transaction as a financing for purposes of U.S. tax law. This
acknowledgment allows each Project Company to take economic
advantage of various expense and depreciation provisions of the
U.S. tax law (such as allowing the payment of certain amounts to
offshore investors without withholding tax) and other U.S.
federal and state laws pertaining to the liability exposure of
financiers (such as environmental liability laws).
B. Structural and Documentary Shari'ahIssues
1. Site Lease
Each Site has been made available to the related Owner, as
the site lessee, pursuant to a Site Lease from the relevant Project
Company, as the site lessor (in such capacity, "Site Lessor"), in
consideration for the payment of site lease rent ("Site Rent").
The Site Lease is unusual, considered from the vantage of a
customary project financing or real estate financing in the United
States. The differences from a conventional ground lease relate
to applicable Islamic Shari'ah precepts and to risk allocations
that must be made to accommodate use of the istisna'a-ijara
structure in the United States with parties that are accustomed
to a specified pattern of risk allocations. As examples of the
structural differences from customary ground leases, in the
istisna'a-ijarastructure, the Site Lessor, as owner of the Site,
retained responsibility for environmental liabilities, the state and
condition of the Site, unforeseen circumstances pertaining to
the relevant Site, compliance with legal requirements by the
Lessee, and payment of taxes and other amounts, among other
things. In addition, the Site Lessor has the obligation to prevent
unlawful use of the Site, unlawful conditions on the relevant
Site, and other uses of that Site that may give rise to damages or
liabilities pertaining to use or occupation of that Site, including
compliance with environmental laws. The Site Lessor also
provided indemnities to the related Owner/Site Lessee and other
indemnitees in respect of such matters.
2. Construction (Istisna'a)Contract; Construction Terms;
Construction Contract; Total Construction Cost
The Maconda Park Project is being and will be constructed
by the Maconda General Contractor pursuant to the
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the relevant Owner. The
Construction Terms were negotiated by the Maconda Project
Company with the Maconda General Contractor. The Construction
Arranger will cause the construction of the Truman Park Project
(by the Truman General Contractor) pursuant to its
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement with the Owner, which incorporates
the Construction Contract between the Construction Arranger
and the Truman General Contractor. The Construction
Contract for the Truman Park Project was negotiated by the Truman
Project Company with the Truman General Contractor." The
Maconda General Contractor (in Maconda Park) and the
Construction Arranger (in Truman Park) agreed in the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreement to construct and deliver the relevant
Project to its Owner, who has legal title to the related
Improvements. The total cost for construction of each Project pursuant
to the Construction (Istisna'a)Agreement is referred to as the
"Total Construction Cost" of that Project.
Payments under each Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement
are made in the same manner, on the same schedule and subject
to the same conditions that advances would be made in
connection with a conventional construction financing arrangement.
Those conditions precedent that would be conditions precedent
to the initial advance and all subsequent advances in a
conventional construction financing are conditions precedent to the
making of payments under each Construction
(Istisna'a)Agreement. Conditions precedent for subsequent advances are
addressed through the construction payment request mechanism,
which, in turn, incorporates a milestone completion payment
mechanism. Thus, for example, each General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger, and the Managing Contractor will
pre91. The customary practice is that each construction contractor (i.e., each General
Contractor in the istisna'a-ijaratransaction) dictates the form of construction contract
that it uses. Many construction contractors use a widely recognized standard form
(such as those of the American Institute of Architects, which was used, in modified
form, by Bovis Lend Lease, Inc. as the General Contractor in the Truman Park
transaction). Others use their own forms, which are precisely tailored to that individual
construction contractor, such as in the Maconda Park transaction.
2001]
pare payment requests and milestone completion certificates
that will resemble advance requests in a conventional
construction financing. The obligation of each Owner to make such
payments will be conditioned upon compliance with performance
of matters relevant to the payment request.
In the event that a payment request cannot be given due
failure of a Project Company to satisfy one or more of the
relevant conditions precedent, the General Contractor (in Maconda
Park and Truman Park) and the Construction Arranger (in
Truman Park) will continue to be entitled to pursue their respective
rights to payment, but only against the relevant Project
Company. However, it will have to do so under the Managing
Contractor Agreement and certain other documents. The amount
of damages that a General Contractor and the Construction
Arranger will be entitled to collect will be limited to amounts
obtainable from the relevant Project Company and other amounts
payable through performance bonds, warranties, completion
bonds, insurance proceeds, and similar arrangements. Neither
of the General Contractors nor the Construction Arranger is
entitled to pursue remedies against an Owner for failure to
perform a funding condition.
3. Lease (Ijara)
The Lease (Ijara) is the primary financing document on the
repayment side of the transaction. Each Project Company, as
the Lessee, repays the financing amounts made available by its
related Owner through the payment of periodic basic rent
("Basic Rent"). Commencing upon an agreed date, the Lessee will
be required to begin paying Basic Rent in installments over the
agreed rental period ("Rental Term").92 The Lease (Ijara) was
executed at the same time as the other financing documents, but
cannot become fully effective at such time due to a
Shari'ahprinciple that prohibits the payment of rent for an asset until that
asset has sufficient economic value and sufficiency for Shari'ah
purposes-i.e., until the asset can be, and is, put to the intended
use. Different Shari'ah Boards take different positions as to
92. The documentation for each of the Projects is for a construction financing. As
such, the Rental Term is likely to be in the range of one to four years, with a permanent
long-term financing take-out contemplated during, or at the end of, such period. The
structure could be extended to cover a long-term financing of either Project. In other
transactions, a long-term lease (ijara) has been used.
when an asset has sufficient economic value and sufficiency.
This determination is dependent upon the specific facts of the
project being considered. For example, each of the Projects is
comprised of numerous buildings with many units in each
building. Construction commences with the first building and moves
in sequential fashion through each of the buildings. As a result,
the first building will be completed and occupied prior to
completion of construction on the last building. Rental activities
with respect to the buildings will thus commence substantially
before the entire project is constructed.9"
Under one of the strict interpretations of relevant Islamic
principles, Shari'ah Boards may allow an ijara to become
effective only on a building-by-building basis as construction nears
completion. Such an interpretation might require the use of
nine lease (ijara) agreements (assuming eight buildings and
common property), and nine construction (istisna'a)
agree93. Significant construction or expenditure may be completed or made at the time
of entering into, or very shortly after execution of, the Lease (jara) because
approximately 20-25% of the construction costs may already have been incurred and related
activities completed. The 20-25% represents the equivalent of the equity investment in
the project that must have been spent on approved expenditures before the Owner
thereof will make payment advances under the Construction (Istisna'a)Agreement. As
a result, the related Site will have been acquired, much of the site preparation work may
be completed, and the related Premises may already contain sewers, roads, water, and
other infrastructural improvements. Some Shari'ahBoards have indicated that this
degree of expenditure upon a project is sufficient to cause the Basic Rent provisions to
become effective because the value of the related Premises will be substantially, and
sufficiently, increased by this time. Further, and as noted in the Lease (Ijara),
construction of certain blocks and segments of the Improvements for each Project will be
completed before completion of other blocks or segments. Certain blocks and segments
will have considerable lease value, and units will actually be rentable, prior to
completion of other blocks and segments. Thus, significant rental income will already be
generated prior to completion of the entire Project in either financing transaction. This,
in turn, allows full effectuation of all provisions of the Lease (jara) at a relatively early
time.
Although the determination of sufficient economic value and sufficiency of status
to permit the intended use are significant and vexing Shari'ahissues, they are not
difficult issues in a practical sense in projects such as the Maconda Park Project and the
Truman Park Project. This is because the transaction is a construction financing in
which no Basic Rent is payable during the construction period, i.e., for approximately
two or two and one-half years from commencement of the financing. Construction is
complete for the entire Project by the end of that period. Although no Basic Rent is
payable during that period, most construction financings include a feature that
capitalizes interest (in a conventional financing) or profit (in an Islamic financing) during the
construction period. The capitalization method used in each Project, and in similar
projects, is particularly complex and has received the approval of various Shari'ah
Boards. That capitalization method is not discussed in this Essay.
ments, to provide financiers with required certainties of
repayment and perfected security interests over all funds advanced in
respect of construction.9 4 This, in turn, might require nine
filings under local law of memoranda of leases, mortgages, and
other security agreements. Filing and recordation fees and title
insurance costs alone might make such an approach
prohibitively expensive. Such a transaction would be complicated and
difficult to implement. Other Shari'ahBoards acknowledge the
practical difficulties of multiple filings of mortgages and have
taken a pragmatic view of the financing process in Europe, the
Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the United States. Those
Shari'ahBoards have allowed a single lease (ijara) to become
effective as to all provisions other than the Basic Rent provisions at
the inception of the transaction. The Boards have allowed the
Basic Rent provisions to become effective at the time that
marketing and rental activities commence with respect to any part of
the project or some other similar date that relates to
commencement of binding activities in respect of rent generation. The
date of effectiveness of the Basic Rent provisions ("Full
Effectuation Date") for the projects is then determined in accordance
with relevant Shari'ah principles as specified by the Shari'ah
Board.
The GIH Shari'ah Board that considered the structure of,
94. The author has worked on transactions in which multiple leases were used, one
for each phase of the project. This approach permits different leases, and financing
arrangements, for different aspects of construction, and allows each lease to be tailored
to a different intended use. Given that the Shari'ahprecept focuses on the intended
use, effectuation of the leases under Shari'ah precepts can be obtained at an earlier
point in the overall financing transaction, and the various leases can be closely tailored
to construction milestone completion and funding.
The author is presently working on an istisna'a-ijaratransaction that poignantly
raises the effect of factual variation on the Shari'ahdetermination of full effectuation of
the lease. The transaction involves the acquisition of a large farm. An Islamically
acceptable joint venture has been formed to subdivide the farmland, obtain certain
permits for construction and related activities, and construct infrastructure (roads, sewers,
lighting, and the like). Each parcel will be sold off to another residential or
commercial developer, or a commercial enterprise, which will construct the housing or
commercial facilities for that specific parcel. The entire purpose of the joint venture is so
limited. Clearly, the intended construction activities are limited, and substantial
economic value and sufficiency, especially when considered from an "intention"
perspective, is obtained at a very early stage in the business cycle. Another factor affecting
substantial economic value and sufficiency issues, particularly in the United States, is
the fact that obtaining a permit or zoning approval, without more, will frequently
substantially enhance the value and sufficiency of the land (without regard to any physical
construction).
and documentation for, the Maconda Park Project and the
Truman Park Project was intimately involved in defining and
implementing the mechanism for determining and implementing the
Full Effectuation Date. The Board took a rigorous position with
respect to the determination of sufficient economic value and
sufficiency. However, based upon the factual configuration of
each Project and its development, the Board also allowed each
of the transactions to be structured using a single Lease (Ijara), a
single Construction (Istisna'a)Agreement, and a single set of
Security Documents. In each Project, if the Full Effectuation Date
has not occurred by a stated date, then the Owner may cause the
relevant Project Company to purchase that Project in
accordance with the Put Option Agreement.
Pursuant to the Lease (Ijara), each Owner, as the Lessor,
leases its Improvements, and subleases the related Site, to the
relevant Project Company, as the Lessee. The Improvements
and the Site will be leased and subleased, respectively, as-is,
where-is, as the same is constructed or otherwise provided to the
Owner.95 Property becomes subject to the Lease (Ijara) on a
continuous on-going basis as construction is completed and each
Project is inspected and accepted by the relevant Managing
Contractor. Except as prohibited by applicable Shari'ah precepts,
the Lease (Ijara) is a triple net lease, with all costs associated
with the use and operation of the relevant Project being payable
by the related Lessee,96 and with broad indemnity provisions
similar to those found in triple-net financing leases, although
such indemnity provisions must themselves be modified to
comply with Shari'ahprecepts.97 Each Lessee has and will have the
right to operate and use its Project and the obligation to
maintain that Project (except, for example, that structural
maintenance will remain the responsibility of the Owner as the Lessor).
The Basic Rent payable under the Lease (Ijara) has been
structured to include a profit to the Lessor. The profit amount
is determined on the basis of a weighted group of LIBOR
refer95. As noted in Section VII(B) (6), a Managing Contractor, among other things,
supervises construction activities, inspects construction of each Project on an on-going
basis, accepts that Project, and provides for maintenance (including major and
structural maintenance) pursuant to the Managing Contractor Agreement.
96. Certain modifications to the triple net lease concept that are necessary for
compliance with Shariahprecepts are discussed below.
97. See M.A. Elgari, supra note 86, at 151-54.
ence rates for different time periods and advance allocations
("Lessor Profit")."8 The Basic Rent is due and payable on the
leased assets (i.e., the relevant Improvements) commencing
upon the Full Effectuation Date or a later scheduled repayment
commencement date thereafter. The Basic Rent payable at any
given time is a pro rata portion of the Total Construction Cost
paid to the Maconda General Contractor or the Construction
Arranger, as appropriate, at such time, plus the Lessor Profit on
such amount. Thus, the Basic Rent will be redetermined on a
time schedule (for example, a monthly basis) in lock step with
the payments by the Owner to the General Contractor (in
Maconda Park) and the Construction Arranger (in Truman
Park). This arrangement keeps the Basic Rent Payments in
harmony with the on-going partial payments in respect of the Total
Construction Cost and the increase in the portion of each
Project that has been completed, inspected, and accepted. The
mechanism for achieving this recalculation of Basic Rent, which
involves change orders accepting completed work, has been
structured so as to comply with relevant Islamic Shari'ahprecepts
and does not involve an uncertain rent amount under such
precepts.99 Change orders for each transaction will become
effective only when agreed upon by the General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), the Managing
Contractor, the Owner, and the Lessee for that transaction. Part of
such approval process will include an addition of such items to
the leased asset base under the Lease (Ijara) in the relevant
period (i.e., for future periods).
The standard supplemental rent provision is used to
provide for payment of costs of use and operation of each Project
above and beyond the Basic Rent ("Supplemental Rent").
Supplemental Rent includes taxes, impositions, third-party
payments, and indemnity payments. Pursuant to the sublease
arrangement for each Site under the relevant Lease (Ijara), the
Lessee is responsible to pay the Site Rent directly to the relevant
Site Lessor. Basic Rent, Supplemental Rent, and Site Rent for
each Project are collectively referred to as "Rent" for that
Project.
In the event that the Lease (Ijara) is terminated during the
Rental Term of a Project, and in a case where no long-term
financing takes out the construction financing pursuant to the
Lease (Ijara) for that Project, all Rent due to such date of
termination or otherwise permissible under relevant Shari'ah precepts
will be immediately due and payable. In addition, the relevant
Owner will be entitled under the Put Option Agreement to
cause the relevant Project Company to purchase its Project at
such time. 0 0
Various Shari'ahprecepts pertaining to leases resulted in the
Lease (Ijara) being structured differently from customary
United States leases. For example, under the Shari'ah, a lessor
must retain responsibility for structural maintenance of leased
property. The obligation for structural maintenance cannot be
passed to the lessee under an ijara. Similarly, some Shari'ah
Boards require the lessor to retain the obligation to provide
100. The form of lease (ijara) that served as the structural basis for the Lease
(Ijara) has been used in numerous Islamic financings and the adjustment mechanism
has been approved by several Shari'ah Boards. Analytically, the Lease (Ijara) can be
thought of as a lease for a specified period (for example, one month). The Basic Rent
payable under the Lease (Ijara) is determined by dividing the absolute amount of the
Total Construction Cost paid to the first day of such month by the overall payment
period, and then adding the applicable Lessor's Profit. Analytically, the Lease (Ijara)
will then terminate on the last day of such month unless the parties agree to extend for
another period (say, another month). If the Lease (Ijara) is so extended by virtue of a
new and otherwise identical lease, the Basic Rent is recalculated to increase by the
amount of Total Construction Cost advanced to the first day of such second month,
and, again the weighted reference rate analysis is applied to determine the applicable
Lessor's Profit for the new lease. This process is repeated with respect to each
subsequent rental period. Payment of some or all of the Rent is deferred during the
construction period so long as there is a continuous and contiguous series of leases.
If the Lease (jara) is not renewed at the end of any month or other rental period,
the Lease (jara) terminates and the total amount of Rent accrued to such date
becomes immediately due and payable and can no longer be deferred. Pursuant to the
Put Option Letter, the relevant Owner is entitled to cause the relevant Project
Company to immediately purchase its Project in its then-existing state and condition for a
specified amount.
In practice, the Lease (Ijara) is written such that it automatically renews each
period (for example, each month) unless there is a cancellation. These, and other
structural elements, are designed to minimize the administrative and financial burden on
the parties (especially the Lessee) and streamline the renewal and recalculation process
and to avoid various complications of various United States laws, including bankruptcy
laws, mortgage recordation laws, and recordation and taxation requirements in
different jurisdictions.
property casualty insurance. The Lease (Ijara) for each of the
Projects was structured in compliance with these, and other
similar, Shari'ah precepts.
The events of default in the Lease (Ijara) are those that are
customary for a lease of such type, and include most of the
events of default usually found in a conventional construction
financing. Certain other events constitute events that permit the
purchase and sale of each Project under the related Put Option
Agreement. As with a conventional construction financing, an
event of default will allow the Lessor a broad choice of remedies,
including the ability to terminate the Lease (Ijara) and related
arrangements, to sell the related Project, and to collect the
purchase price in respect of such sale. The remedies provisions
have been structured to reflect those available to a lender in a
conventional loan financing. The overall structure also allows
each Owner to exercise its right under certain of the financing
documents to suspend or cease making payments to the General
Contractor (in Maconda Park) and the Construction Arranger
(in Truman Park) upon the occurrence of events of default
under those documents, assign rights under the Lease (Ijara)
(and/or related documents) to the related General Contractor
in certain circumstances, and be relieved of further liability to
the General Contractor, the Construction Arranger, and the
Lessee.
4. Put Option Agreement and Call Option Agreement
In order to allow each Project Company to prepay the
financing and obtain ownership of its Project, each Owner and its
related Project Company entered into a Call Option Agreement.
The applicable provisions of each Call Option Agreement
basically reflect the optional prepayment provisions of a
conventional loan agreement, with certain limitations to preclude
adverse bankruptcy and other undesirable results.
In addition, to allow the Owner to exit the transaction in
certain cases (such as defaults by the Lessee and certain
instances of illegality), each Owner and its related Project
Company entered into a Put Option Agreement. The Put Option
Agreement allows the Owner to sell its Project to the related
Project Company. Cases in which such sale will be permitted
include defaults under the Lease (Ijara) or the other financing
documents, including the failure of the Project Company to
make payments or to accept any property that is required to be
subject to the Lease (Ijara) or the other Project Documents,
termination of the Lease (Ijara), the Site Lease, the Managing
Contractor Agreement, and certain other agreements prior to the
last day of the stated Rental Term, certain agreed termination
events, illegality, and certain termination events relating to
excess payments in respect of the Project. There are significant
Shari'ah issues with respect to any put option as put options are
generally considered to be executory agreements that are
cancelable by either party to the options. With the assistance of the
GIH Shari'ah Board, the Put Option Agreement (and the Call
Option Agreement) for the Maconda Park and the Truman Park
transactions were structured to comply with Shari'ahprecepts
applicable to valid sale and purchase agreements.
Numerous Shari'ah precepts are applicable to irreparable
damage or destruction of assets and to the application of
insurance, condemnation, or similar payments that are received in
respect of destroyed assets. These precepts require termination
provisions to be structured quite differently than conventional
construction and project financings. However, within the ambit
permitted by applicable Shari'ah precepts, the transaction must
be structured to insure full repayment of all financing amounts
and put the financiers in the same position they would occupy in
a conventional financing. In the Maconda Park and Truman
Park transactions, upon destruction or total condemnation of
the relevant Project, the Lease (Ijara) will terminate immediately
as required by Shari'ahprecepts, the Rent then due and payable
(but not future rents) will be paid to the Lessor, the related
Project Company will be required to purchase its Project and pay
the purchase price therefore, and the proceeds of such
insurance, condemnation, and other payments will be applied to the
payment of the purchase price for that Project (and related
transfer costs) and any excess thereafter remaining will be paid
over to the relevant Project Company. Difficult issues arise in
connection with the determination of the relevant purchase
price as Shari'ahprinciples generally restrict payments to the fair
market value of the Projects after the event of destruction or
condemnation.
Upon any purchase by a Project Company of its Project, the
Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement (and related rights and
agreements) will be assigned to that Project Company and that
Project Company will assume all of the obligations of the related
Owner thereunder. Similarly, all insurance policies and
warranties will be assigned and assumed such that the Project Company
is afforded complete ownership rights.
5. Security Documents
The obligations of the Maconda Project Company and the
General Contractor, in the Maconda Park transaction, and the
Truman Project Company and the Construction Arranger, in the
Truman Park transaction, are secured by the related Security
Documents, which include a mortgage (rahn) on, and other
security interests in, the relevant Site, the cash flows of such
entities, including in respect of operation of the relevant Project,
and any other assets of such entities. Those Security Documents
also include various guarantees of the Developer or others that
would be required by a bank in a conventional construction
financing (such as general guarantees, completion guarantees,
and environmental guarantees). These documents are provided
to, or assigned for the benefit of, the relevant Owner and
KeyBank in the Maconda Park and Truman Park transactions.
6. Managing Contractor Agreement
As previously noted, Islamic Shari'ah precepts require an
Owner to retain obligations in respect of structural maintenance
of its Improvements. Other Shari'ahprecepts pertain to
inspection of property being constructed, responsibility for latent
defects, acceptance of leased (or purchased) assets, and operation
and maintenance of leased assets. In order to achieve, as closely
as possible, the risk allocations found in a conventional
financing, it was necessary to structure the transaction in reliance upon
a body of Shari'ahprinciples that allows an owner of property to
contract with other entities to perform activities on behalf of
such owner. Generally, these principles pertain to concepts of
agency and contracting for services under the Shari'ah. Those
principles also incorporate certain of the doctrines of Western
jurisprudence applicable to the retention of independent
contractors to perform activities on behalf of a property owner.
It is permissible under applicable Shari'ah precepts for an
Owner to retain a Managing Contractor to perform certain of
1258 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
the activities retained by that Owner under the Lease (Ijara) and
accept responsibility for them in connection with the
performance of its duties. The Maconda Park and Truman Park
transactions were each structured to allow the Owner to hire and
appoint the related Project Company as the Managing Contractor
for the primary purposes of (a) supervising and managing the
design, engineering, and construction of the relevant Project by
the General Contractor (and the Construction Arranger, in
Truman Park), (b) inspecting that Project, (c) accepting delivery of
that Project, (d) enforcing the rights of the Owner as against the
related General Contractor and the Construction Arranger, and
(e) operating and maintaining that Project, all pursuant to the
Managing Contractor Agreement.
This Managing Contractor Agreement has been structured
such that the Managing Contractor bears the risks (i) of
construction of the relevant Improvements in compliance with
specifications and other terms and conditions of the Construction
(Istisna'a) Agreement (including the Construction Terms or
Construction Contract, as applicable) to the extent permissible
applying Shari'ah precepts pertaining to the options of
inspection and defect, and to precepts applicable to supervision and
acceptance, and (ii) for maintaining the structure of the relevant
Project and certain related matters throughout the Rental Term.
The arrangement facilitates immediate and continuous
inspection and acceptance by each Project Company of the work and
assets comprising its Project and insures on-going maintenance
of that Project, including in respect of its structural integrity. In
accordance with Shari'ah precepts, each Owner, as the
titleholder of its Improvements, retains some of the exposure on
these items. The liability exposure of each Owner for such
defects and conditions will be limited by express substantive
provisions and by provisions that limit the payment obligation of that
Owner to amounts actually collected under applicable
warranties, performance bonds, completion bonds, guarantees,
insurance policies, and similar documents and instruments.
Similarly, claims of the Project Companies under each respective
Lease (Ijara), and other documents, against each of the
respective Owners, including as the Lessor and the owner of the
related Project, are limited to amounts collectible from the
relevant Managing Contractor, the relevant General Contractor, the
Construction Arranger (in Truman Park), and relevant
insur
SHARI'AH-COMPLANT PROJECTFINANCE
ance policies, performance bonds, completion bonds,
warranties, guarantees, and similar documents and instruments.
The Managing Contractor also has responsibility for
enforcing the insurance agreements, condemnation award
proceedings, performance bonds, completion bonds, warranties, and
similar documents and instruments in respect of the related
Project, although these obligations and related rights are restricted
in various situations (such as default scenarios) and are subject
to defined parameters. This arrangement removes the Owner
from involvement in the enforcement process to the greatest
possible extent. The Managing Contractor Agreement extends
to enforcement, on behalf of the relevant Owner, of any claim
under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement that such Owner
may have against the Maconda General Contractor, in the
Maconda Park transaction, or the Truman General Contractor
and the Construction Arranger, in the Truman Park transaction.
As a corollary, in any circumstance where the claim of a Project
Company relates to any matter covered by insurance, bonds,
warranties, or similar arrangements, that Project Company's
damage recovery will be limited to amounts recovered thereunder or
otherwise from the relevant General Contractor (and the
Construction Arranger, in Truman Park).
7. Tax Matters Agreement; Other Documents
The Tax Matters Agreement has been designed to afford
legal recognition to the fact that the istisna'a-ijarastructure is a
financing arrangement under applicable United States law.
Various characterizations are also made under relevant state law
(for example, New York law for the financing, and the relevant
state law for mortgage and other real property purposes). These
characterizations may be somewhat different than those
appearing in the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement or the Lease
(Ijara). For example, the Tax Matters Agreement clarifies that
the entire transaction is, for purposes of United States tax law
and applicable state law, a loan financing, and that all amounts
(other than costs and expenses) payable to an Owner in excess
of the Total Construction Cost are to treated as interest for
United States tax and bank regulatory purposes. This is
important in order to allocate tax benefits (such as depreciation,
interest deductions, and various project expenses) to each Project
Company (and thus to the General Partner or Managing
Member and the Islamic Investors). It additionally allows payments to
Islamic Investors that are not U.S. persons to be made without
tax withholding in accordance with the relevant portfolio
interest provisions of U.S. tax laws. Environmental matters are also
addressed in this agreement, with the relevant Project Company
having all risks in respect thereof as regards any exposure of the
relevant Owner.
Various consents and other documents have been
structured to specifically address structural matters, including Shari'ah
principles. For example, payment obligations of the relevant
Owner under the Construction (Istisna'a)Agreement cannot be
conditioned on the status, actions, or omissions of its Lessee
under the Lease (Ijara). Thus, a default by, or bankruptcy of, a
Lessee will not relieve an Owner of its obligation to make
payment to the Maconda General Contractor or the Construction
Arranger under the Construction (Istisna'a) Agreement, except
in certain circumstances. Documents have been structured to
address this difference from a conventional construction
financing in a manner that puts the various parties, as nearly as
possible, in the same position they would occupy in such a
conventional financing. This is effected in part by documents that
provide for agreed methods of enforcement of claims and agreed
limitations on damage amounts and sources of damage awards
or compensation in delineated circumstances. For example, in
certain situations awards and damages are limited to amounts
collected in respect of insurance policies, warranties,
performance bonds, completion bonds, guarantees, other similar
documents and instruments, and other security and amounts
available from the estate of the bankrupt entity. In other situations,
mandatory and voluntary assignments of rights and assumptions
of liabilities, temporary and permanent, are operative to
reallocate risk and responsibility to effect the allocations that would
exist in a conventional financing.
CONCLUSION
The application of Islamic structures to project financings is
in the early stages, just as the development of a true Islamic
economy is in its infancy. The transactions described in this
Essay, and others, are efforts to lay the critical base and explore the
use of a variety of Islamic techniques within a framework that
must acknowledge the critical security, credit, economic,
cultural, religious, and legal concerns of both Western and Islamic
participants. The techniques and structures thus far
implemented will be further refined to achieve simplicity, greater
economics of implementation, and a smooth interface between a
Western interest-based system and an Islamic interest-averse
system. New structures are being developed as more and more
Western financial institutions move into Islamic banking, which
is an accelerating trend.
The Saudi Chevron structure is now the basis for a wide
variety of project financings and other secured lending transactions
in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Islamic jurisdictions. Lending
transactions of all types are incorporating the possessory
concepts relating to a rahn of a marhoun, even where additional
collateral is available to secure the loan. Various business groups, as
well as banks, are considering ways in which to use the rahn-adl
structure to promote residential housing finance in Saudi Arabia
where the absence of a dependable collateral security system
(and, particularly, the unavailability of recordation of security
interests) has resulted in an unavailability of financing for home
purchases by anyone that is not wealthy. The rahn-adl structure
has been implemented in the collateralization of large
equipment leases and fleet leases. Proposals are being discussed for
the establishment of a private security interest recordation
system in Saudi Arabia to achieve the broadest possible
achievement of notice of a rahn. As lender comfort increases, there
should be decreased reliance on personal and corporate
guarantees and greater use of secured financing techniques. This
would allow individuals and companies to deploy assets over a
wider investment base and banks to make loans of longer tenor,
increasing capital investment throughout the economy.
The adl structure is also being implemented in diverse
transactions. These range from employee stock participation
programs to securitizations to debt instrument issuances to
project financings. The increased certainty and stability of adl
arrangements will insure that its use becomes commonplace in
capital market transactions as well.
The author is unaware of any use of the sharikat
mahassamurabaha structure in project financings other than in the
financing of the Utility Power Project. The structure does hold
promise for use in similar financings although the Shari'ahissues
involved in this structure are somewhat more problematic than
those in other structures.
The Maconda Park/Truman Park istisna'a-ijarastructure is
being widely used, particularly in residential, commercial, and
industrial real estate projects throughout the world. The
availability of a practical Islamic structure of this type has also given
rise to the development of a range of related Islamic financial
products. For example, the author is currently working on a
number of real estate funds that will invest in properties and
projects in Europe, Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and the United States. The majority of those funds will
investment in residential real estate projects in the United States,
all financed using the istisna'a-ijarastructure. Those projects will
be diversified as to geography, tenant base, and other
characteristics. The funds will be sold to Islamic investors, primarily in the
Middle East and Europe. A similar fund will use Islamic
acquisition (primarily ijara) and istisna'a-ijaratechniques to invest,
initially, in commercial (primarily) and residential and industrial
properties in Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United
States. This fund has obvious geographical risk diversification.
It is also being structured to provide industrial and credit
diversification through its focus on leases to select tenants in different
Shai'ah-compliant industries. A Shari'ahscreen, similar to those
used for Shari'ah-compliant equity funds, will be applied to
tenants under the various iara agreements implementing the
financings." 1 That fund will be sold to Islamic investors in the
Middle East and Europe. The istisna'a-ijarastructure is also
being applied to equipment and vessel financings, including
Shari'ah-compliant ijara charter parties for liquified natural gas
tankers. This will enable Islamic construction financing for
those vessels and the development of related financial
instruments to allow Islamic investment in those financings.
We are on the threshold of a bright future for
Shari'ah-compliant project financing. The structures discussed in this Essay,
and many others, are being developed to facilitate
Shari'ah-compliant financings with joint participation, as to both equity and
101. See, e.g., DowJones Islamic Market Indexes, at http://indexes.dowjones.com/
djimi/imiinvest.html; IBFNET, at
http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-equity/equityl.html; Abdul Hamid, supra note 99, at 91-101.
98. See id. at 151-54.
99. See , e.g., DowJones Islamic Market Indexes , at http://indexes.dowjones.com/ djimi/imiinvest.html; Islamic Business & Finance Network ("IBFNET" ), at http://islamic-finance.net/islamic-equity/equityl.html; Abdul Hamid, Investing in Equities: Some Issuefrom the Islamic Perspective, in THIRD HARVARD ISLAMIC FORUM, supranote 1 , at 91- 101.