Points of convergence between logical empiricism and inductive metaphysics: Hans Reichenbach and Erich Becher in comparison

Synthese https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03280-8 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Points of convergence between logical empiricism and inductive metaphysics: Hans Reichenbach and Erich Becher in comparison Ansgar Seide1 Received: 30 November 2020 / Accepted: 21 June 2021 © The Author(s) 2021 Abstract In this paper, I take a closer look at Hans Reichenbach’s relation to metaphysics and work out some interesting parallels between his account and that of the proponents of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late 19th century and the early 20th century in Germany. It is in particular Hans Reichenbach’s conception of the relation between the natural sciences and metaphysics, as displayed in his treatment of the question of the existence of the external world, that shows some very interesting similarities with inductive metaphysics. By a comparison with the position of the inductive metaphysician Erich Becher and his handling of the problem of realism, I work out the parallels between Reichenbach’s program and inductive metaphysics. I come to the conclusion that while there are certainly some respects in which Reichenbach’s logical empiricism is closer to the positions of the representatives of the Vienna Circle, it turns out that with regard to his views on metaphysics there is a greater affinity with the program of inductive metaphysics. Keywords Logical empiricism · Inductive metaphysics · Realism · Inference to the best explanation · Hans Reichenbach · Erich Becher 1 Introduction In this paper, I investigate points of convergence between two different philosophical programs at the beginning of the 20th century which, at first glance, may not look as if they have much in common: inductive metaphysics and logical empiricism. In This article belongs to the topical collection “All Things Reichenbach”, edited by Erik Curiel and Flavia Padovani. * Ansgar Seide 1 Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Philosophisches Seminar, Domplatz 23, 48143 Münster, Germany 13 Vol.:(0123456789) Synthese particular, I will take a closer look at Hans Reichenbach’s relation to metaphysics and work out some interesting parallels between his account and that of inductive metaphysics. At first sight, it may look as if inductive metaphysics and logical empiricism are completely contrary positions. While the proponents of inductive metaphysics took metaphysical questions very seriously and tried to reform and resurrect metaphysics after the decline of German Idealism, the logical positivists, on the other hand, are famous for being harsh critics of metaphysics and for denying the meaningfulness of metaphysical questions and metaphysical theses. But a closer look reveals that there are many interesting connecting points between inductive metaphysics and logical empiricism. Especially with regard to the initial motivations for the respective positions, there are many overlaps: Both groups took their point of departure in distancing themselves from German Idealism and in particular from its a priori methods in metaphysics. Both groups, on the other hand, rated the successful empirical and inductive methods of the natural sciences very highly. In a way, both inductive metaphysics and logical empiricism can be described as attempts to renew and revive philosophy after the decline of German Idealism by finding a new role that philosophy could play in relation to the natural sciences. The points of convergence become even more apparent when one does not restrict logical empiricism to the narrow phase of the Vienna Circle and its protagonists. Indeed, as has been pointed out in the literature, Hans Reichenbach, the leading member of the Berlin Group and one of the most important proponents of logical empiricism, brought forward a variant of logical empiricism that distinguishes him from the Vienna Circle, especially by his attitude to certain metaphysical questions: Reichenbach is now often lumped together with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle, but his ideas, especially those in Experience and Prediction, were often developed in opposition to positivism. Reichenbach frequently sought to save concepts and problems from the many positivists who sought to discredit them. For example, he thought that causality has a place in science and that the problem of the external world is not a pseudo-problem. Indeed, Reichenbach always defended realism against positivism, and his defense was truly ingenious. (Irzık & Sober, 2011, p. 2). As I will argue in this article, Reichenbach presents an idea of the relation between metaphysics and science which is strongly reminiscent of certain core features of inductive metaphysics. In particular, it is his treatment of the metaphysical question of the existence of the external world which bears many resemblances to the way the inductive metaphysicians deal with the same problem. While there are certainly some respects in which Reichenbach’s logical empiricism is closer to the positions of the representatives of the Vienna Circle,1 it turns out that with regard to 1 In particular, of course, Reichenbach shares with the representatives of the Vienna Circle an affinity for modern logic and a close examination of the language of science. 13 Synthese his views on metaphysics there is a greater affinity with the program of inductive metaphysics.2 To bring out the convergences between Reichenbach’s position and inductive metaphysics, I will compare Reichenbach’s approach, as presented in his early paper “Metaphysik und Naturwissenschaft” (1925)3 and in his book Experience and Prediction (1938),4 with the position of Erich Becher. Becher, a later representative of inductive metaphysics, was Reichenbach’s contemporary and developed his version of inductive metaphysics at about the same time. I will use some space in Sect. 2 to first describe Becher’s position in detail, because Becher (as well as the tradition of inductive metaphysics in general) is widely unknown today.5 Against the background of the careful reconstruction of Becher’s position, Sect. 3 will then show how much Reichenbach formulates thoughts that come very close to the ideas of inductive metaphysics or even correspond to them one-to-one. 2 Becher’s inductive metaphysics 2.1 Historical background: inductive metaphysics in 19th century and early 20th century philosophy Erich Becher (1882–1929) can be placed in the tradition of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century in Germany.6 Besides Becher himself, representatives of inductive 2 In a sense, this is reflected by a conflict that arose between Reichenbach and members of the Vienna Circle in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As Carus (2007, p. 107, n. 18) points out, Carnap, in 1929, compiled a list of “metaphysicians ‘according to their degree of badness’”, on which Reichenbach, together with Russell, was listed in the category of “more modest o (...truncated)