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The Subject of Harm in Non-Identity Cases

In a typical non-identity case, the agent performs an action that causes someone to exist at a low but positive level of well-being, although an alternative was to create another, much happier person instead. There seem to be strong moral reasons against what the agent does, but it is difficult to explain how this can be so. In particular, it seems that on a simple counterfactual...

The Problem of Justified Harm: a Reply to Gardner

In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.

Preoperative Coronary Anatomy Assessment with Echocardiography and Morbidity After Arterial Switch Operation of Transposition of the Great Arteries

In transposition of the great arteries (TGA), certain coronary patterns have been associated with major adverse events early after the arterial switch operation (ASO). We sought to determine the impact of preoperative echocardiographic (ECHO) diagnosis on the intra­ and postoperative morbidity. All patients with TGA born between June 2001 and June 2017 and who underwent ASO were...

The preemption problem

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions...

The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time

If a person’s death is bad for him for the reason that he would have otherwise been intrinsically better off, as the Deprivation Approach says, does it not follow that his prenatal nonexistence is bad for him as well? Recently, it has been suggested that the “A-theory” of time can be used to support a negative answer to this question. In this paper, I raise some problems for this...

Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr

In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct...

The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-existence: Guest Editor’s Introduction

Jens Johansson 0 0 J. Johansson (&) Uppsala, Sweden Can a person be benefited or harmed by coming into, and by going out of, existenceand if so, what moral weight do these benefits and harms have