Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland

Grand Valley Journal of History, Mar 2018

While the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Tennessee have each rightly earned their spots in the annals of Civil War history, the Army of the Cumberland has fallen through the cracks into unfortunate neglect and undue malice, despite the large number of successes and triumphs achieved by its men. This paper advances four theories explaining why this has happened, including the timing of battles, conflict between Union generals, the failures of the army's commanders, and the unfortunate influence of Southern romanticism.

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Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland

Grand Valley Journal of History Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 1 3-27-2018 Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland Andrew R. Perkins Cedarville University, This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 4.0 License Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh Part of the Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Perkins, Andrew R. (2018) "Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland," Grand Valley Journal of History: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. Available at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Grand Valley Journal of History by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact . Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland Cover Page Footnote CEDARVILLE UNIVERSITY “NOT WRITTEN IN LETTERS OF BLOOD”: THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE GRAND VALLEY JOURNAL OF HISTORY BY ANDREW R.E. PERKINS 19 JANUARY 2017 This article is available in Grand Valley Journal of History: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1 Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood There is a chapter missing in the annals of Civil War history. The story of an entire army, and the thousands of men that comprised it, is being widely overlooked by the majority of Civil War historians. That army, the Union Army of the Cumberland, has begun to fade into public obscurity due to four main factors: poorly timed defeats and victories in battle, personal feuds and politicking between Union officers, the mistakes of the army’s commanders, and the undue emphasis of Civil War historians on Southern romanticism. The Two Armies: Potomac and Cumberland While the largest Union army of the war, the Army of the Potomac, has numerous publications lining the shelves of libraries around the country, the second largest army, the Army of the Cumberland, has garnered no such attention. For proof, look no further than texts written about the Battle of Gettysburg (in which the Army of the Potomac took part), which make up approximately half of the 65,000 books about the Civil War.1 This is relatively unsurprising, as Gettysburg does represent perhaps the Union’s finest victory of the war, on its bloodiest battlefield. However, by comparison, the Battle of Stones River, one of the more notable battles in which the Army of the Cumberland took part, has received just four full volumes written about it,2 despite being a significant Union Alexander Atkins, “Gettysburg by the Numbers” Atkinsbookshelf.com. Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), ix. Larry J. Daniel. wrote a book on the battle later, and his book is added to Cozzens’ figure. 1 2 Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 1 Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1 victory with the highest casualty percentage of the entire war.3 To uncover why the Army of the Potomac has been studied so thoroughly while the Army of the Cumberland has not, both armies need to be examined through their leadership, battles fought, and the soldiers themselves. The Army of the Potomac lacked respectable leadership for the first half of the war. While its founder, George B. McClellan, was organizationally brilliant, he failed miserably during his Peninsular Campaign and barely gained success at Antietam. Following his failure to pursue Lee after the Maryland Campaign, Lincoln began a practice he would be forced to implement far too many times for this army; he removed McClellan from command. His successor, Ambrose Burnside, fared no better, displaying his incompetence through a horrible mauling at the Battle of Fredericksburg. In his footsteps came Joseph Hooker, who was trounced almost as badly at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Finally George Meade, the fourth and final commander of the Army of the Potomac, won at Gettysburg and proved himself worthy of command even after Ulysses S. Grant came east to supervise the army in 1864.4 The performance of the soldiers was generally better than their commanders. Though some of the men did wilt away in lopsided battles like 3 4 James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 582. William Swinton, Army of the Potomac, 227, 253-54, 303-07, 410-11. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/gvjh/vol5/iss1/1 2 Perkins: Not Written in Letters of Blood Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville, most of the time they performed admirably, such as when they made assault after assault on Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg or the Sunken Road at Antietam. Units earned nicknames like “The Fighting 69th”5 and the “Iron Brigade.”6 The grit and determination of these kinds of men showed that their own commanders did not deserve them, nor did those soldiers deserve the defeats their officers so graciously handed to them time after time. The Army of the Cumberland did not struggle quite as badly when it came to commanders. While the army was still referred to as the Army of the Ohio, it was commanded by Don Carlos Buell. While Buell was not a particularly brilliant man, he did come to Grant’s aid and help save the Battle of Shiloh for the Union,7 and he managed to turn Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee out of Kentucky, despite his poor handling of the Battle of Perryville.8 After Buell was replaced because of that tactical loss, the army found its second commander, who would bring the soldiers together into a fully functioning and successful military unit. That commander was William Starke Rosecrans. He led the Army of the Cumberland to victory at Stones River and Tullahoma, before being soundly defeated at the Battle of Chickamauga. After Chickamauga, Grant 5 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004) xii. McPherson, Battle Cry, 528. 7 Daniel, Days, 84. 8 McPherson, Battle Cry, 520-22. 6 Published by ScholarWorks@GVSU, 3 Grand Valley Journal of History, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1 replaced Rosecrans with George Thomas, a tough, stoic Virginian who led the army to even greater victories at Missionary Ridge, Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville. All totaled, the Army of the Cumberland earned more victories and less defeats than the Army of the Potomac by a wide margin.9 This was due at least in part to the gallantry and valor of the Cumberlanders themselves, whose fighting performance on an individual basis was similar to their Eastern counterparts. Still, the two armies were more different than alike. One of the differences between the two was that the Army of the Cumberland had a distinctly Western flavor. While the Army of the Potomac was made up of genteel Pennsylvanians, New Yorkers, and (...truncated)


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Andrew R Perkins. Not Written In Letters of Blood: The Forgotten Legacy of the Army of the Cumberland, Grand Valley Journal of History, 2018, Volume 5, Issue 1,