Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoption
American Indian Law Review
Volume 28 | Number 1
1-1-2003
Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of
Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoption
Kevin Noble Maillard
Syracuse University College of Law
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Recommended Citation
Kevin N. Maillard, Parental Ratification: Legal Manifestations of Cultural Authenticity in Cross-Racial Adoption, 28 Am. Indian L. Rev.
107 (2003),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/3
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PARENTAL RATIFICATION: LEGAL MANIFESTATIONS OF
CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY IN CROSS-RACIAL ADOPTION
Kevin Noble Maillard
L Introduction
The question "Who is Indian?" marks a standard subject of academic
inquiry, but to ask "who decides and how" is much more interesting. In Indian
country, state and tribal standards for determining "Indian" may belie personal
and private definitions of identity. While I believe that identity should be selfdefined, the unavoidable truth persists that juridical claims cut across
subjective beliefs to establish a legal standard for determining identity. As is
historically true of legal determinations of race, no single standard of
membership exists that provides a clear boundary of belonging that uniformly
adjudicates who belongs and who does not. Presently, the closest answer lies
within the courts. Judges may exert a great deal of discretion in determining
the racial affiliation of the parties, especially in situations where that
affiliation stands as the determinative factor in litigation. The substantive
reasoning of each case differs in its rationale and logicality, yet this remains
an acceptable obligation of the judge, as a supposedly neutral third-party
observer, to decide.
The specter of authenticity exists as a perennial foe in the daily battles of
life experienced by American racial minorities. In the face of a general
consciousness, which usually means White, minorities run against a dominant
image of what their group is perceived to embody. This creates a
standardizing point against which people of color are measured. These
perceptions may be spoken or silent, believable or absurd, but their existence
in our collective social consciousness testifies to their powerful influence on
perceptions of racial minorities. Whether these are stereotypes, fictions, or
truths, the isolated subject relates to an aggregate theme. The proximity of
part to whole engenders a hierarchy of authenticity that bolsters or palliates
the subject's connection to the group.
The methods of legitimization for legal consideration as a Native American
are neither based solely on considerations of race or culture, but both,
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. Candidate, University of Michigan; B.A., Duke
University. Member, Seminole Nation of Oklahoma. I would like to thank Professor Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse and Licha Nyiendo for their criticisms and comments.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 28
depending on the jurisdiction. Following the standards established by the
federal government in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),' state courts
have held that being Native entails the minimal requirements of proof of
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.2 In other states, mere
political membership is not enough.' In order to prove oneself as Indian, a
litigant-parent must present evidence of active engagement in seemingly
Indian activities, which are designated in the mind of the presiding judge.'
The primary problem with the present scheme is that the subjective and
personal tribal considerations of membership fail to achieve the level of
recognition they deserve outside of Indian country.
This Article aims to critique the practice of judicially created definitions of
"Indian" in a hotly contested and controversial area of law: transracial
adoption (TRA).' It is my belief that the evaluation of potential parents as
appropriate, qualified, and situated persons to adopt and care for children of
color stands as a juridical ratification of ethnic authenticity that privileges
those who accede to the judicially created norm while punishing those who
depart form it. At the heart of the controversy of transracial adoption is the
question of what type of ethnic values can the differently situated parent
1. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2000).
2. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court will assume that tribal enrollment is
sufficient to trigger the Act, regardless of the person's racial, social, cultural, and spiritual
affiliations. See In re Alicia S., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 121, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
tribal membership alone is satisfactory to trigger ICWA). But in other cases, the lack of formal
tribal enrollment is not a bar to legal relief. See Michael G. v. Superior Court of San Diego
County, 2002 Ca. App. LEXIS 3473, 7-8 (holding that a parent's failure to report Indian
heritage in a child custody proceeding does not forfeit tribal jurisdiction).
3. These states require proof that, in addition to having Indian blood, the person also
thinks of herself as an Indian. This is evinced in various practices such as her political
affiliations, style of dress, knowledge of tribal language, etc. See generally In re Adoption of
Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (upholding a requirement of substantial tribal affiliation
to enact ICWA).
4. One judge wrote a detailed description of appropriate Indian activities that would
demonstrate substantial connections to tribal activities. See In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d
507, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (establishing a rubric for participation in tribal activities that
testify to a tribal member's involvement with the tribe). See id. at 528.
5. In conducting research for this paper, I noticed differing applications of terminology
for adoptions involving parents of one race and a child of another. The term "transracial
adoption" is generally applied to cases involving Black children, while "international adoption"
generally applies to cases involving Latino/a and Asian children from countries other than the
United States. Regarding Indian children, "transracial adoption" is generally downplayed,
perhaps because of the greater concern with culture rather than race alone. I will go into further
detail about the these issues below.
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No. 1)
PARENTAL RATIFICATION
impart upon the child, and whether that parent possesses the cultural
consciousness needed by the child to grow up with a healthy racial identity.
As Profe (...truncated)