The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 38
Issue 1 Fall
Fall 2017
The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral Investment
Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction
Prabhash Ranjan
Pushkar Anand
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Prabhash Ranjan and Pushkar Anand, The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Critical Deconstruction, 38 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. (2017).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol38/iss1/1
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RANJAN_JCI
VOL. 38, NO. 1
The 2016 Model Indian Bilateral
Investment Treaty: A Critical
Deconstruction
Prabhash Ranjan* and Pushkar Anand**
Abstract: In the global backdrop of backlash against bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), this paper
critically studies India’s new Model BIT, adopted in 2016 as a response to
increasing number of ISDS claims brought against India. This paper studies the
Indian Model BIT, which heralds a new era of India’s BIT practice, from the
standpoint of two key objectives that the Indian government claims the Model
BIT achieves. First, the claim that the purpose of the Model BIT is to balance
investment protection with host state’s right to regulate. Second, the claim that
the Model BIT aims to make the treaty provisions more precise so as to minimize
arbitral discretion. This paper shows that for most of the key provisions given in
the Model BIT, contrary to the Indian government’s claim, India has not been
able to strike a balance between investment protection and host State’s right to
regulate. For most of the provisions, the scale tilts in favor of the host state. This
paper also shows that many provisions in the Indian Model BIT, contrary to the
government’s claim, are vague and imprecise and thus, continue to grant
significant discretion to ISDS arbitral tribunals to determine the actual import
of these provisions.
* Chevening Scholar & Assistant Professor, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian
University, New Delhi, India. PhD. 2013, King’s College London; LL.M. 2007 with
Distinction, University of London. Dr. Ranjan was part of the team of Law Commission of
India (LCI) that prepared the 260th report on India’s 2015 Draft Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty in August 2015. Some minor parts of this paper draw from author’s previous work–
Prabhash Ranjan, Investment Protection and Host State’s Right to Regulate in Indian Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty 2016: Lessons for Asian countries in Julien Chaisse et al (eds)
International Law of Foreign Investment in Asia: Sustainability, Regionalization and
Arbitration
(Springer
Nature:
Singapore:
2017)
(Forthcoming).
[E-mail:
].
** Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies,
Dehradun, India. LL.M. 2015, Faculty of Legal Studies, South Asian University, New Delhi.
[E-mail: ].
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International Law & Business
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I. Introduction ............................................................................................... 2
II. Background to India’s 2016 Model BIT ................................................ 11
Mapping India’s Backlash Against ISDS ................................. 13
III. Definition of Investment ....................................................................... 19
IV. Most Favored Nation Treatment ........................................................... 22
V. Fair and Equitable Treatment ................................................................. 25
VI. Expropriation ........................................................................................ 31
VII. Full Protection and Security ............................................................. 36
VIII.
Monetary Transfer Provisions ....................................................... 38
IX. Non-Precluded-Measures (NPM) Clauses or General Exceptions ....... 40
X. Other Exceptions .................................................................................... 44
Taxation .................................................................................... 44
Compulsory License ................................................................. 45
XI. Investor-State Dispute Settlement......................................................... 45
Jurisdictional Qualification ....................................................... 46
Exhaustion of Local Remedies ................................................. 48
Additional Qualifications .......................................................... 50
XII. Conclusion ........................................................................................... 51
I. INTRODUCTION
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are treaties between two countries
aimed at protecting investments made by investors of both countries.1 BITs
protect investments by imposing conditions on the regulatory behavior of
the host state and thus, prevent undue interference with the rights of the
foreign investor.2 These conditions include restricting the host state from
expropriating investments, barring for public interest with adequate
compensation; imposing obligations on host states to accord fair and
equitable treatment (FET) to foreign investment and not to discriminate
against foreign investment; allowing for repatriation of profits subject to
conditions agreed to between the two countries; and most importantly,
allowing individual investors to bring cases against host states if the latter’s
sovereign regulatory measures are not consistent with the BIT, for monetary
compensation. This is known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).3
1 For a general discussion on BITs see R. DOLZER & C. SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2012); A. NEWCOMBE & L. PARADELL, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-73 (2009); JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2015).
2 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 13.
3 In this paper, ISDS and ISDS system are used interchangeably. While ISDS refers to
just the dispute settlement system between the investor and the State, ‘ISDS system’ means
not just the dispute settlement system but the entire universe of BITs and investment treaty
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Model Indian BIT
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There has been a steady increase in the number of BITs across the
world—from 500 in 1990s to more than 3,324 by the end of 2016.4 This
increasing mass of BITs has led to a significant increase in investor-state
disputes in international investment law5 where a wide array of sovereign
regulatory measures, such as environmental policy, 6 regulatory i (...truncated)