An Intersubjective Treaty Power

Notre Dame Law Review Volume 90 | Issue 4 Article 1 5-2015 An Intersubjective Treaty Power Duncan B. Hollis Temple University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Duncan B. Hollis, An Intersubjective Treaty Power, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1415 (2014). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol90/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact . \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-4\NDL401.txt unknown Seq: 1 11-MAY-15 14:02 SYMPOSIUM AN INTERSUBJECTIVE TREATY POWER Duncan B. Hollis* INTRODUCTION How does the Constitution limit the subject matter of the U.S.’s treaties? For decades, conventional wisdom adopted a textual emphasis—prohibitions and other limits on federal authority listed in the Constitution itself (e.g., the Bill of Rights) apply to U.S. treaties.1 In contrast, proposals for subject matter limitations implied by federalism fared less well. The case of Missouri v. Holland is famous precisely because it dismissed the idea of any structural “invisible radiation” from the Tenth Amendment prohibiting treaties on subjects falling within the states’ reserved powers.2 The Supreme Court emphasized that U.S. treatymakers could not only conclude treaties independent of states’ rights concerns, but that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorized © 2015 Duncan B. Hollis. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. * James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. The author would like to thank Samantha Rocchino and Cheri Snook for their research assistance in the preparation of this Article. 1 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW] (“No provision of an agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exercise of authority by the United States.”); see also id. cmt. b. The textual limitation view usually includes some implied limitations as well. See, e.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (denying that the treaty power “extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the [s]tates, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent”). In this Article, I use “States” to refer to foreign nation States and “states” to refer to the states of the United States. 2 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (upholding the constitutionality of Migratory Bird Treaty Implementation Act); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 302 cmt. d (1987) (“[T]he Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or other agreements.”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 189–94 (2d ed. 1996). 1415 \\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-4\NDL401.txt 1416 unknown Seq: 2 notre dame law review 11-MAY-15 14:02 [vol. 90:4 Congress to implement them independent of its enumerated powers.3 A more affirmative requirement that U.S. treaties regulate only subjects of “international concern” suffered a similar fate.4 As the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States notes, “Contrary to what was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that an international agreement deal only with ‘matters of international concern.’”5 Taken together, such pronouncements suggest federalism imposes neither affirmative nor negative limits on which treaties the United States concludes or how it implements them. In recent years, Missouri v. Holland and its two holdings have come under increasing scrutiny.6 Academics like Curtis Bradley called for limits on the treaty power itself, subjecting treaties to “the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s legislative powers.”7 Others like Nicholas Rosenkranz looked to undermine Missouri v. Holland’s suggestion that Congress could implement treaties beyond its enumerated powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause.8 Both positions generated robust rebuttals from those committed to preserving Missouri v. Holland’s canonical status in U.S. foreign relations law.9 These debates did little, however, to resuscitate the idea of affirmative federalism limits on the treaty power to matters of international concern. Critics dismissed such a test as incapable of protecting federalism in the mod3 4 Holland, 252 U.S. at 425. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 117(1) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW] (“[T]he Constitution [conveys the power] to make an international agreement if (a) the matter is of international concern . . . .”). 5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 302 cmt. c (1987). 6 See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1330–31 (2006) (surveying the renewed discourse). 7 Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 450 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley I]; Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley II]. Others adopting a similar stance include Gary Lawson, Guy Seidman, and Edward Swaine. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 44–45; Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 406–08 (2003). 8 See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005). For a more nuanced take, see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Missouri v. Holland’s Second Holding, 73 MO. L. REV. 939, 941 (2008) (suggesting that Congress’s treaty implementing authority extends beyond its enumerated powers for obligatory, but not for aspirational, treaties). 9 The most extensive defense was undoubtedly offered by David Golove. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). For other supporters of Missouri v. Holland or the lack of subject matter limitations on U.S. treatymaking, see Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (...truncated)