From Conflict to Collaboration: An Innovative Approach to Reducing Coca Cultivation in Bolivia

Practice Notes From Conflict to Collaboration: An Innovative Approach to Reducing Coca Cultivation in Bolivia Authors: Kathryn Ledebur , BO About Kathryn Director, Andean Information Network X close Coletta A. Youngers a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA, US X close Abstract Upon his presidential election, Bolivian coca grower leader Evo Morales adopted a policy of promoting consensual coca reduction through social control, a sophisticated coca monitoring system, and economic development. That strategy is paying off. In 2011, coca cultivation decreased by 13 per cent according to the U.S. government. The Morales administration has also made significant progress facing the ongoing challenges of drug production and trafficking. Seizures of coca paste and cocaine and destruction of drug laboratories have steadily increased since President Morales took office. Despite continued tensions in bilateral relations, U.S.-Bolivian counter-drug cooperation continues and the signing of a new framework agreement in 2011 should lead to an exchange of ambassadors. Internationally, Bolivia has successfully gained acceptance of the right to the traditional use of coca within its own territory. But Bolivia’s efforts must be carried out in tandem with effective demand reduction strategies to shrink the global cocaine market. How to Cite: Ledebur, K. & Youngers, C.A., (2013). From Conflict to Collaboration: An Innovative Approach to Reducing Coca Cultivation in Bolivia. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development. 2(1), p.Art. 9. DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.aw 1110 Views 284 Downloads 3 Citations 2 Wikipedia   Published on 25 Mar 2013 Peer Reviewed  CC BY 4.0 Untitled Document Introduction For decades, Bolivia faithfully carried out forced eradication of the coca leaf2 - the raw material used for processing cocaine - as required by the U.S. government to receive economic assistance and trade benefits. However, Bolivians paid a high price for waging Washington’s ‘war on drugs’. Forced coca eradication efforts generated social unrest, violence, and political instability. Human rights violations proliferated, including arbitrary detentions, mistreatment of the local population and, in some cases, torture and killings. Targeting poor farmers, the eradication strategy plunged families deeper into poverty. However, the election of coca grower leader Evo Morales in January 2006 radically transformed that scenario.3 The Morales government adopted a strategy best summarized as ‘coca yes, cocaine no’, which is aimed at decreasing the cultivation of coca while increasing law enforcement efforts targeting cocaine production and drug trafficking organizations. The government’s policy of promoting gradual and consensual coca reduction through economic development and improved livelihoods is paying off. In 2011, the land area devoted to coca cultivation in Bolivia dropped by 13 per cent, according to U.S. government figures, in contrast to net increases in Peru and Colombia. And the violence and conflict that characterized past policy is largely a thing of the past. Seizures of coca paste and cocaine as well as the destruction of drug laboratories have steadily increased since President Morales took office. Yet despite the positive results achieved to date, the government faces increasing challenges as the amount of coca paste (pasta base) and cocaine flowing across its borders from Peru has increased, the production of cocaine in Bolivia itself has risen, and drug traffickers have diversified and expanded areas of production and transportation within the country. As a long-standing foe of U.S. drug policy, many expected Morales to break ties with Washington and put a stop to drug policy cooperation. Instead, both Morales and the George W. Bush administration initially kept the rhetoric at bay and developed a workable bilateral relationship - though one that at times has been fraught with tension. Following Bolivia’s expulsion in 2008 of the U.S. Ambassador, Philip Goldberg, for allegedly meddling in the country’s internal affairs and encouraging civil unrest, and the subsequent expulsion of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the White House upped its criticism of the Bolivian government and for the past five years has issued a ‘determination’ that Bolivia has ‘failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to adhere to [its] obligations under international narcotics agreements’ (The White House 2012). U.S. economic assistance for Bolivian drug control programs has slowed to a trickle. Nonetheless, in 2011 the two countries signed a new framework agreement to guide bilateral relations and are planning an exchange of ambassadors. At the international level, Bolivia is seeking to reconcile its new constitution, which recognizes the right to use the coca leaf for traditional and legal purposes and that coca is part of the country’s national heritage, with its commitments to international conventions. In June 2011, the country denounced the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol and announced its intention to re-accede with a reservation allowing for the traditional use of the coca leaf (List 1 of the 1961 Convention mistakenly classifies coca as a dangerous narcotic). A minimum of one-third of the 184 members of the treaty would have had to object to prevent Bolivia from rejoining the convention, yet only 15 countries did so. Bolivia has scored a historic victory for its people. However, coca remains illegal outside of the country and the historic error in the classification of the coca leaf has yet to be corrected.4 Cooperative Coca Reduction Strategy Produces Results In September 2012, both the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the U.S. government released their 2011 statistics on coca cultivation in Bolivia (Figure 1). The convergence of the coca cultivation estimates, which differed by only one per cent, highlight the effectiveness of the government’s coca crop monitoring strategy. The statistics also point to the effectiveness of the cooperative coca reduction strategy. In contrast, according to the UNODC, in 2011 Colombia cultivated 64,000 hectares of coca and Peru 62,500 hectares, representing three and five per cent increases, respectively. Figure 1: Estimated Hectares of Coca Cultivation, UN vs U.S. Figures. Source: UN Crop Monitoring Reports and U.S. International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports According to the UNODC’s 2011 Coca Cultivation Survey, coca cultivation in Bolivia fell to 27,200 hectares5 in 2011 from 31,000 hectares in 2010 - a 12 per cent decrease (UNOCD 2012). The report notes that coca cultivation declined in every important coca-growing region in the country, bringing the overall area under cultivation to near the 2005 level. The UN attribut (...truncated)