Philosophy's Practical Turn

Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 3 September 2018 Philosophy's Practical Turn Kevin P. Tobia Yale Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kevin P. Tobia, Philosophy's Practical Turn, 29 Yale J.L. & Human. (2018). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact . Tobia: Philosophy's Practical Turn Philosophy's Practical Turn Kevin P. Tobia* Has modem philosophy taken a "practical turn?" If such a turn requires the first emphasis on practicality, then probably not. Prior philosophy has not discarded or neglected practicality. But a "turn" might instead be understood as a profound transformation.' Even if philosophy's practical concern is not new, perhaps its targets, methods, or character have changed significantly. Only time will tell whether this modem moment signifies a transformation in practical philosophy. The purpose of this introduction is simply to suggest that, insofar as practical philosophy continues or transforms, a particular subset of work deserves attention: practical legal philosophy. The purpose of this journal symposium is to feature that work. The atmosphere in some corners of contemporary philosophy suggests something like a practical turn, or at least practical transformation. Philosophy seems to be broadening, and this expansion provides room for practical concerns once prohibited.2 Moreover, longstanding philosophical areas-for example, ethics and epistemology-witness a shift in practical emphasis. There is also a growing appreciation of the value of public philosophy, argument made less esoteric and more impactful. These developments and impressions do not mark a "turn" in the sense of turning from former non-practicality, since philosophy has long addressed practical issues. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw * Yale Law School. 1. So-called "turns" occur within philosophy, law, and other disciplines. See, e.g., THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD, (Richard Rorty ed., 1992); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE PRAGMATIC TURN (2010); Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, STAN. L. REv. 1323 (2017); Pascal Borry, Paul Schotsmans & Kris Dierickx, The Birth of the Empirical Turn in Bioethics, 19 BIOETHICS 49 (2005); Michael Freeden, Editorial: The 'Political Turn' in Political Theory, 19 J. POL. THEORY 1 (2014). 2. Notably, the modem expansion includes increasingly broader recognition of often-neglected philosophical areas. Among others, these include African/a, African-American, and Caribbean philosophy; Arabic and Islamic philosophy; Asian and Asian-American philosophy; Feminist philosophy; Indigenous philosophy; Latin American philosophy; LGBTQ philosophy; philosophy of disability; philosophy of gender and sexuality; and philosophy of race. It is not the case that every project in each of these areas is "practical" philosophy. However, the expansion of these areas and broader awareness of them only increases the amount of philosophy and thus the amount of practical philosophy. 239 Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3 240 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 29:2 Wollstonecraft and Mills' defenses of women's rights.3 The 1970s marked a transformative growth of philosophical bioethics.4 Significant examples abound before and after these dates. Others will be recognized retrospectively as we continue to expand the "philosophical cannon."' Nevertheless, there is a recent sense of growing focus on practicality. Our time also marks a moment of tremendous practical philosophical outlets such as Giving What We Can, and Effective Altruism more broadly. 6 Despite important debates about the theory, ambitions, and methods of those organizations,7 their status as novel and notable practical-philosophical vehicles is undeniable. Whether history will reveal philosophy's current practicality as a speedbump or U-turn, philosophy's practical projects are intriguing from our modern vantage point. One subset of these projects is especially remarkable and worth continued attention. We can call these projects "philosophy in service of practicality," or "philosophyfor practicality." These are projects that attempt to make progress on practical problems by using the tools of philosophy. To clarify the significance of this type of project, consider its foil: practicality in service of philosophy, or practicality for philosophy. Included in that set of projects are those that employ practical issues to illuminate philosophical debates. For example, one might argue that some philosophical view has practical consequences that provide reasons against the philosophical view. Where philosophy for practicality generally starts with the practical issue, practicality for philosophy typically begins with a more traditional philosophical debate. To be sure, many projects fall between the poles of these categories. However, philosophy for practicality is an especially valuable enterpriseand one that should not be neglected. For one, scores of extant real issues could benefit from rich philosophical analysis. Moreover, neglect or disrespect of "philosophy for practicality" can be self-reinforcing. When these projects are dismissed for their non-philosophical subject matter, this further rigidifies the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate domains of philosophical inquiry. This is not to say that we should abolish or even deemphasize practicality for philosophy. These projects have value and are worth 3. MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN: WITH STRICTURES AND MORAL SUBJECTS (1792); see also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869). 4. See, e.g., The Belmont Report, NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Apr. 18, 1979); see also PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1975). 5. See, e.g., THE NEGLECTED CANON: NINE WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS: FIRST TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (T. Dykeman ed., 1999); see also AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: RACISM IN THE FORMATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CANON, 1780-1830 (P.K. Park ed., 2013). 6. See generally PETER SINGER, THE MOST GOOD YOU CAN Do: How EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM IS CHANGING IDEAS ABOUT LIVING ETHICALLY (2015); WILLIAM MACASKILL, DOING GOOD BETTER: EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM AND A RADICAL NEW WAY TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE (2015). 7. See, e.g., lason Gabriel, Effective Altruism and its Critics, 34 J. APPLIED PHIL. 457 (2017). https://digit (...truncated)