A Generation of Patent Litigation

San Diego Law Review, Dec 2015

This Article builds on the very best parts of current cross-sectional work by adding a longitudinal component that finds every case that asserted a set of patents and then separately tracing the outcome of every patent asserted in each of those cases. Part II discusses the debate about patent troll litigation. It focuses on how other studies have measured patent quality through patent litigation data. Part III discusses this study’s methodology: the collection of data about highly litigious NPEs and a control group of randomly selected nonNPEs. It describes how the cases were selected and the data collected in different phases of the study. This includes collection of previously untapped data: reexamination outcomes. Part IV presents the data in a variety of formats, and follows each subpart with a discussion of potential policy implications associated with the data. Subpart IV.A shows the growth in case complexity, including defendant counts, transfers and consolidations, and selection of district court venue. This subpart includes a linear regression showing the effect of NPEs on case duration. Subpart IV.B shows how much more often the NPEs settled and all of the different ways that cases ended. For example, NonNPEs ended a large portion of their cases with consent judgments, though the NPEs used consent judgments as well. Subpart IV.C presents data about invalidity in a number of ways: in terms of adjudicated patents, all patents, and cases. This subpart presents a novel regression estimating the likelihood that an asserted patent will be invalidated and finds that NPE status is not among the factors. Subpart IV.D examines infringement findings and shows that the primary concern with NPEs may be noninfringement rather than invalidity. Both subparts C and D show that decisions on the merits of cases are so rare that it is difficult to base policies on them. This Article concludes with some thoughts about how the results might guide policy.

Article PDF cannot be displayed. You can download it here:

https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=sdlr

A Generation of Patent Litigation

San Diego Law Review Volume 52 | Issue 1 Article 3 3-1-2015 A Generation of Patent Litigation Michael Risch Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael Risch, A Generation of Patent Litigation, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 67 (2015). Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol52/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact . RISCH FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 2:20 PM A Generation of Patent Litigation MICHAEL RISCH* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. III. IV. INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................68 BACKGROUND............................................................................................74 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION ...................................................77 A. Selecting the NPEs...........................................................................77 B. Selecting a Loosely Matched Random Control Set ..........................80 1. Choosing “Normal” Cases .......................................................80 2. Selecting the Cases ...................................................................81 3. Using a Hybrid Solution ...........................................................85 4. NPEs in the Matching Set .........................................................86 C. Litigation Identification and Data ...................................................88 D. Patent Identification and Data.........................................................89 ANALYSIS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS .......................................................92 A. Case Complexity ..............................................................................92 1. The Data ...................................................................................92 * © 2015 Michael Risch, Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. The Author thanks David Abrams, Chris Buccafusco, Michael Burstein, Colleen Chien, Eric Claeys, John Duffy, Mark Lemley, Thomas Sager, David Schwartz, Josh Wright, Felix Wu, and participants of the 2013–14 Edison Fellowship Program, 2013–14 Cardozo IP & Information Law Colloquium, and 2014 IP Scholars Conference for their helpful comments and feedback. The Author further thanks Patent Freedom, Lex Machina, John Allison, and Brian Corcoran for providing, or assisting in providing, some of the data used in this study. This seemingly endless project could not have been completed without the seemingly endless support provided by the Villanova University School of Law. Valuable research assistance for this study was provided by Dustin Bednarz, Doug Behrens, Jamey Collidge, Brian Corcoran, Jarina D’Auria, Richard Eiszner, Adam Fenstermaker, Amanda Garger, Nate Griffith, Simran Kaur, Christie Larochelle, Meredith Lussier, Josh Nightingale, Samantha Peruto, Jessica Watkins, Molly Yingling, and Brett Zakeosian. Data collection efforts were supported by an Edison Fellowship and a da Vinci Fellowship from the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property and a summer research assistant grant from Intellectual Ventures. None of the patents studied were asserted by Intellectual Ventures. 67 RISCH FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/30/2018 2:20 PM 2. V. Policy Implications ................................................................... 98 a. Venue and Filing Rules ..................................................... 98 b. The Rise of the Eastern District of Texas .......................... 98 c. Case Management........................................................... 100 d. Reporting ........................................................................ 101 B. Non-Merits Outcomes .................................................................... 102 C. Invalidity Outcomes ....................................................................... 106 1. The Data ................................................................................. 106 2. Bases for Invalidity ................................................................. 113 3. Reexamination ........................................................................ 114 4. Testing Measures of Patent Quality ........................................ 116 5. Policy Implications ................................................................. 122 D. Infringement Outcomes .................................................................. 124 1. The Data ................................................................................. 124 2. Policy Implications ................................................................. 130 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 131 I. INTRODUCTION Despite a virtual avalanche of patent studies issued during the past few years, simple but fundamental questions necessary to address patent reform remain unanswered. Most importantly, the studies do not tell us whether the currency of the patent system—the patent itself—is the core part of the problem. Is patent quality the cause of patent woes? Are litigants the problem? Current studies do not disaggregate these questions. This study adds to the literature by considering every outcome of every patent in every case, and finding that litigation choices drive outcomes more than anything observable on the face of the patent. That is, whom the parties sue and other choices are more likely to predict patent invalidity than any measurable aspect of the patent. Patent quality is a slippery concept; there are many ways to consider quality, such as disclosure and technology breadth.1 Perhaps the simplest measure of quality is whether a patent is valid, that is, whether it is novel, nonobvious, and otherwise compliant with the Patent Act.2 Validity quality can only be observed when a court finally adjudicates a patent, but patents are never adjudicated valid. Instead, courts merely rule that they will survive this challenge, and the next time could be different. 1. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2009) (describing the difference between quality and value); see also Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 137–51 (2013) (surveying various methods for valuing patents). 2. See Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2008) (“Thus, this Article assumes that maximum social value is obtained by the issuance of only those patents that are justified under the statute.”); Wagner, supra note 1, at 2138. 68 RISCH FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) [VOL. 52: 67, 2015] 10/30/2018 2:20 PM A Generation of Patent Litigation SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW Moreover, most cases sett (...truncated)


This is a preview of a remote PDF: https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=sdlr
Article home page: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol52/iss1/3

Michael Risch. A Generation of Patent Litigation, San Diego Law Review, 2015, Volume 52, Issue 1,