Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism

Demotivating Semi-compatibilism Desmotivando el semicompatibilismo Kevin Timpe* Department of Philosophy Northwest Nazarene University - E.E. U.U. Abstract In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer’s semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are in tension with each other: the more one is moved by the first motivation, the less one can appeal to the second, and vice versa. I then argue that Fischer’s third motivation ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer’s semi-compatibilist picture to any of the leading contemporary libertarian theories. Finally, I make some methodological comments about the role intuitions play in Fischer’s project. Keywords: John Martin Fischer, semi-compatibilism, motivation, free will, resilience, luck. Resumen En este artículo exploro algunas de las motivaciones detrás del semicompatibilismo de John Martin Fischer. En particular, examino tres razones que Fischer ofrece para preferir el semicompatibilismo sobre el libertarismo. Defiendo que las dos primeras motivaciones se encuentran en tensión la una con la otra: cuanto más motivado se encuentre uno por la primera, menos lo estará por la segunda y viceversa. Después defiendo que la tercera motivación de Fischer no ha de inclinar a nadie a preferir su visión semicompatibilista sobre ninguna de las teorías libertaristas contemporáneas. Finalizo con unos comentarios metodológicos acerca del papel que las intuiciones juegan en el proyecto de Fischer. Palabras clave: John Martin Fischer, semicompatibilismo, motivación, libre albedrío, resistencia, suerte. 1. Introduction John Martin Fischer’s particular version of compatibilism is exceedingly influential in the contemporary literature on free will and moral responsibility.1 According to Fischer’s brand of compatibilism, which he calls ‘semi-compatibilism’, the truth of causal determinism * 1 A number of the works in which Fischer develops and defends semi-compatibilism are co-authored with Mark Ravizza. In what follows, I will focus primarily on some of Fischer’s more recent single-authored work. Ideas y Valores • número 141 • diciembre de 2009• ISSN 0120-0062• Bogotá, Colombia • Páginas 109-124 [1 10] k evin timpe is compatible with moral responsibility even if causal determinism ends up being incompatible with a certain kind of freedom. Fischer differentiates between two kinds of control: guidance control and regulative control. Regulative control involves having control over which of a number of genuinely open possibilities becomes actual. And while semi-compatibilism is officially agnostic about whether regulative control is compatible with the truth of causal determinism, Fischer himself finds it “highly plausible” (Fischer 2007 56) that regulative control is incompatible with causal determinism. (In particular, Fischer is inclined to accept the soundness of the Consequence Argument, which argues that if determinism is true, no one ever has the freedom to choose otherwise (ibid.).) But, for reasons related to Frankfurt scenarios, Fischer thinks that regulative control is not required for moral responsibility. The freedom relevant condition necessary for moral responsibility is guidance control, and such control is compatible with determinism. Fischer’s discussion of guidance control is extensive and wellknown. Here, let me simply give a brief but hopefully sufficient overview for the task at hand. According to Fischer, “guidance control of one’s behaviors has two components: the behavior must issue from one’s own mechanism, and this mechanism must be appropriately responsive to reasons” (Fischer 2002 307). The responsiveness that Fischer takes to be required here requires that the agent “act on a mechanism that is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral reasons” (Fischer & Ravizza 82). This means that the volitional structure that results in the agent’s choices manifests an understandable pattern of recognizing moral reasons for choosing in various ways. Such an agent “recognizes how reasons fit together, sees why one reason is stronger than another, and understands how the acceptance of one reason as sufficient implies that a stronger reason must also be sufficient” (id. 71). Furthermore, the agent’s volitional structure must also be reactive to those reasons in the right kind of way: In the case of reactivity to reasons, the agent (when acting from the relevant mechanism) must simply display some reactivity, in order to render it plausible that his mechanism has the ‘executive power’ to react to the actual incentive to do otherwise. (Fisher & Ravizza 75) The second requirement for guidance control is that the agent takes responsibility for the reasons-responsive mechanism that results in her choices; that is, that the mechanism is her own, or one for which she has taken responsibility. This feature of Fischer’s view marks an important difference from purely structural or hierarchical compatibilist accounts (such as Harry Frankfurt’s). For Fischer, “the mere existence of [the right kind of volitional] mesh is not sufficient for moral responsibility; the history behind the mesh Departamento de Filosofía • Facultad de Ciencias Humanas • Universidad Nacional de Colombia Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism is also relevant” (Fisher & Ravizza 196). So, in order for an agent to be morally responsible, he needs to have taken responsibility for his volitional structure. Taking responsibility involves three elements. First, the agent must see that his choices have certain effects in the world —that is, he must see himself as the source of consequences in the world (in certain circumstances). Second, the individual must see that he is a fair target for the reactive attitudes as a result of how he affects the world. Third, the views specified in the first two conditions —that the individual can affect the external world in certain characteristic ways through his choices, and the he can be fairly praised and/or blamed for so exercising his agency— must be based on his evidence in an appropriate way. (Fischer 2006b 224) There is much in Fischer’s semi-compatibilism to admire, and it is not surprising that it has been called both “the most plausible compatibilist account of freedom” (Rowe 298) and “the best case for compatibilism to date” (McKenna 132). In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind semicompatibilism. In particular, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are in tension with one another: the more one is moved by the first motivation, the less one can appeal to the second, and vice versa. I then argue that Fischer’s third motivation ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer’s semi-compatibilist picture to any of the leading contemporary libertar (...truncated)