Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will

A O W W * Lubomira Radoilska University of Cambridge Abstract This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle’s work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is after, referred to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’, is best understood as an unsuccessful a empt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency. Key words: akrasia, Aristotle, blameworthiness, intentional agency, inverse akrasia, motivation, practical syllogism, reasons for action, planning, value, weakness of will. Recibido: 15-08-2011. Aceptado: 05-09-2012. *I would like to thank the participants of the international symposium “The Relevance of Aristotle’s practical philosophy” held at the Centre for Aristotelian Studies in Practical Philosophy” at the University of Barcelona in April 2011 for a very stimulating discussion on the topic of this paper. I am particularly grateful to: Margarita Mauri, Claudia Baracchi, Héctor Zagal, and Alejandro Vigo for their helpful comments and suggestions. Tópicos 43 (2012), 25-50 26 L R Resumen Este artículo ofrece una explicación de la noción de akrasia como una falla primaria de la acción intencional, por oposición con una reciente propuesta sobre la debilidad de la voluntad desarrollada por Richard Holton, que también apunta a un tipo de falla en la acción intencional, pero la presenta tanto separada de la akrasia como más fundamental que ella. Con base en la obra de Aristóteles, se arguye aquí que la falla en la agencia articulada por el concepto de akrasia es el problema central, mientras que el fenómeno tras el cual va la descripción de Holton,denominado ‘debilidad ordinaria de la voluntad’, se entiende mejor como un intento frustrado de explicar la akrasia y, más específicamente, como una falla secundaria de la agencia intencional. Palabras clave: akrasia, Aristóteles, acción intencional, akrasia inversa, motivación, silogismo práctico, razones para actuar, planear, valor, debilidad de la voluntad. The aim of this paper is to put forth an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency and to clarify how it relates to the account of weakness of will developed by Richard Holton that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it (1999; 2009, 70–96). In particular, I shall argue, drawing on Aristotle’s work, that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is after, let us call it ‘ordinary weakness of will’,¹ is dependent upon akrasia as a condition for its possibility. By this I mean that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as an unsuccessful a empt to tackle akrasia, that is, a secondary failure of intentional agency which follows and is partly explained by the primary failure it tries to redress. The paper consists of three parts. In the first, I provide an initial sketch and then flesh out the proposed account of akrasia. Since the purpose of this analysis is not exegetical, relevant texts by Aristotle ¹This is to reflect Holton’s central claim that his account, unlike alternatives, does justice to ordinary, untutored intuitions about weakness of will (1999, 241). Tópicos 43 (2012) A O W W 27 will be given close consideration; however I shall not engage directly with the rich interpretative literature on the subject of akrasia but selectively refer to it. In the second part, I set out some challenges for ordinary weakness of will that come to the fore if we compare this phenomenon with the so-called inverse akrasia. In the final part, I propose a way to address these challenges by grounding ordinary weakness of will in the account of akrasia developed here and then briefly contrast both conceptions with a more familiar one, according to which akrasia amounts to acting against one’s be er judgment. 1 The concept of akrasia In this section, I shall begin to articulate the structure of the concept of akrasia as it emerges from Aristotle’s discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics 7 and further relevant texts.² In doing so, my first objective will be to clarify the sense, in which akrasia can be said to involve a failure of intentional agency. For the sake of clarity, the logical form of akrasia will be outlined at the start of the discussion, which will then expand on individual features and their possible implications. This form is as follows. Akrasia is a failure of intentional agency that involves a particular kind of inner conflict, which is unnecessary in the sense that it should not have arisen in the first instance and which also gets poorly resolved; as a result, it keeps on coming back. This schema grounds a number of central features. Firstly, akrasia covers both a specific behaviour and a related character disposition. Secondly, it is fully intelligible only from a temporarily extended perspective. Thirdly, a hierarchy of different kinds of values as possible ends of action is a further prerequisite for understanding akrasia. Fourthly, akrasia does not stem from an actual conflict between different kinds of values. Fifthly, the motivational conflict experienced by the akratic agent is due to his immaturity as a valuer (henceforth: evaluative immaturity). Sixthly, this evaluative immaturity makes akrasia an appropriate target for blame. And seventhly, akratic actions are best understood as pre-intentional. ²In the following, I shall refer to the treatise by the standard abbreviation, EN. Tópicos 43 (2012) 28 L R Let us start to unpack this sketch of a concept by looking in some detail into the first feature, the fact that akrasia covers both a specific behaviour and a related disposition (Grgic 2002). An immediate implication is that the assessment of an action as akratic cannot be done in isolation, but requires some kind of intrapersonal comparison: an akratic action is always one in a series of similar actions performed by a particular agent at different moments in time (link forth to the second feature). This becomes clear if we think about the kind of inner conflict that characterizes akrasia (link back to the underlying schema). In On the Soul 3.10, it is described as a motivational conflict between two kinds of objects of a raction, the one immediately present, the other being at some distance.³ This conflict is finally resolved in favour of the first, immediately present object. This winner is an apparent good in both senses of the word ‘apparent’: it is conspicuous and it is not exactly what it seems. Drawing on EN 7.4–6, things that could pla (...truncated)