Brandeis's IP Federalism: Thoughts on Erie at Eighty
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Brandeis's IP Federalism: Thoughts on Erie at
Eighty
Joseph Scott Miller
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Miller, Joseph Scott (2019) "Brandeis's IP Federalism: Thoughts on Erie at Eighty," Akron Law Review: Vol. 52 : Iss.
2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/7
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Miller: IP Federalism
BRANDEIS’S IP FEDERALISM:
THOUGHTS ON ERIE AT EIGHTY
Joseph Scott Miller*
I.
II.
III.
Introduction ............................................................... 367
Erie’s IP Context ....................................................... 371
A. The 1830s and ‘40s ............................................. 374
B. The 1920s and ‘30s ............................................. 380
Conclusion ................................................................. 389
“I have always regarded the [Erie] decision as one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch
the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems.”
— Harlan the Younger 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Like each of us, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 2 contains
multitudes. 3 Most pragmatically, “[u]nder the Erie doctrine, federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural
* Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. © 2019 Joseph Scott Miller. With great thanks to
those who organized and attended the Akron Law Review’s September 2018 “Erie at Eighty” event.
1. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Guar. Tr. Co.
of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–10 (1945):
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution
of judicial power between State and federal courts . . . [and] has been applied with an eye
alert to essentials in avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts.
A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements with
analytical or terminological niceties.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. See Walt Whitman, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 29, (David McKay ed., 1891)
(“Do I contradict myself? | Very well then I contradict myself, | (I am large, I contain multitudes.)”).
SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
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Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 7
368
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law.” 4 Parsing the substantive from the procedural “is sometimes a
challenging endeavor,” 5 to be sure, but the goal—identifying the rule of
decision in state law—is clear. The Erie case holds, as a formal matter,
that the state-law referent comprises not only a state’s statutory law, but
also its decisional law (be the question local or general): So far as the
Rules of Decision Act 6 is concerned, “whether the law of the State shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern.” 7 The Erie provocation,
finally, “is about effectuating a policy of federalism”—about “allocat[ing
power] between federal courts and state courts, and federal law and state
law.” 8 It is that provocation that prompts me to explore, in the Erie
context, our intellectual-property-law federalism.
The choice to propertize information, in the Anglo-American
utilitarian tradition, is easy to explain: give a time-limited right to exclude
others from competitive imitation to cut off at the pass an
underproduction-of-ideas risk. 9 Atop this foundation is a body of law that
makes an especially fruitful ground for considering juridical federalism.
First, the five modes of IP protection sit on a continuum from largely
4. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Also, where a federal
court has supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012), state law supplies
the rule of decision. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988). Courts should, however,
approach state law mindful of the presence of that primary federal claim. See Alexander Reinert, Erie
Step Zero, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2341, 2367–76 (2017).
5. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427. An inquiry of this sort thoroughly fractured the Court, most
recently, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (2012)).
7. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. For a detailed analysis of the Erie case on its own stated grounds, by
one of the decision’s most able defenders, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013). For a bracing analysis from one of Erie’s most
trenchant critics, see Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie As the Worst Decision
of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129 (2011). For an excellent contemporary middle path, see Caleb
Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013). All
three pieces have helped me enormously in thinking about Erie more clearly.
8. Donald Earl Childress III, Redeeming Erie: A Response to Suzanna Sherry, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 155, 161 (2011); see also Young, supra note 7, at 20 (concluding that Erie embodies “the vision
of limited federal lawmaking . . . in which the federal separation of powers reinforces federalism by
limiting when federal lawmaking may displace state law.”).
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The propertization strategy for intangibles is discussed in
hundreds of articles. To choose but one, see Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to
Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 974–75 (2012) (describing the
strategy’s internal logic). For a general description of tangibles and intangibles, see Thomas W.
Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2062–63 (2012) (describing “property [a]s
a distinctive strategy for determining how resources will be used and by whom,” in which “[s]pecific
resources are assigned to designated persons who have unique prerogatives in dealing with the
resource relative to all other persons in the relevant normative community.”).
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Miller: IP Federalism
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IP FEDERA (...truncated)