Three Metacontingencies in the Pre-Perestroika Soviet Union

Behavior and Social Issues, SpringfSummer 1991, Vol. 1, Number 1 THREE METACONTINGENCIES IN THE PRE-PERESTROIKA SOVIET UNION P.A LamaI Department of Psychology University of North Carolina at Charlotte ABSTRACT: Three metacontingencies in the Soviet Union and some of their attendant problems are described. The metacontengencies are: (1) centralized control of the economy, (2) increased production as the primary goal, (3) maintenance of power and privilege by the nomenklature. Let me make clear at the outset that it is not my intent to present a detailed behavioral analysis of most practices in the Soviet UDian. Lack of sufficiently detailed information concerning many practices precludes that. Also, because of the recent pace of change in the Soviet Union, much that is described here may be historical in nature by the time this appears in print. A caveat drawn from an earlier paper is also relevant: ...it should be borne in mind that the described practices are embedded in complex ecological matrices. As a result of these considerations the drawing of facile generalizations about what is happening in China [here the Soviet Union] is, at best, risky (Lamal, 1984. p.121). It is unlikely that the Soviet leadership is familiar with the tenets and findings of behavior analysis. The term "contingency management" probably would have no meaning for the leadership, at least not the meaning it has for behaviorists. Nevertheless, perestroika - that is, "restructuring", is all about contingency management. This is not the first time in the history of the Soviet Union that significant, widespread reforms - changed contingencies - have been adopted. In the 1920;8 Lenin's New Economic Policy was an attempt to reinforce the peasants for producing more. Kruschev also attempted to change contingencies to increase agricultural production. In the 1960 and 1970's new types of private production and distribution appeared. Various kinds of private economic activity have been legal, at least in principle, since the 1970's (Boucek, 1988). Attempts were also made to AUTHOR'S NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Southeastern Association for Behavior ~, Gatlinburg, Tennessee. October 1988. I thank Richard Bakos for commenting on an earlier version and George Windholz for translation of Russian materials. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to the author at the Department of Psychology, UNC .. Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, 28223. 75 LAMAL improve Soviet economic performance through changes adopted pursuant to a resolution of July 1979. The title of the resolution is instructive. It is: "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism's Influence on Raising the Effectiveness of Production and the Quality of Work" (Bornstein, 1985, p.I). So there is a history of reforms. Indeed, one author has referred to "the almost continuous stream of attempts since 1965 to thinker with the organizational and incentive structures of Soviet industry..." (Gorlm, 1985, .p.353) These various reforms share two features. They were adopted in response to the dismal performance of the industry and agricultural economies of the Soviet Union, they antedate Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985. Consideration of how bad the Soviet economy has been will serve as background for points to be developed. and INDICATORS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE There is a strong consensus that the Soviet economy has been declining for a number of years (e.g., Goldman, 1983; Hanson, 1987; Scrivener, 1986). Foremost among those holding this 'view are Gorbachev and a number of other Soviet leaders and advisers. According to one of Gorbachev's economic advisers (Aganbegyan, 1988) during the years 1981-85 there was practically no economic growth in the Soviet Union. Aganbegyan (1988) says that "Unprecedented stagnation and crisis occurred, during the period 1979-82, when production of 40% of all industrial goods actually fell" (p.l8). Agricultural output also declined. Since 1971 the capital output ratio has sharply fallen, and average of 14% during each 5-year period "In other words for every rouble introduced into the capital stock there has been less and less production, and less and less good use has been made of it" (Aganbegyan, 1988, p.9). In agriculture, Soviet labor productivity "is five times inferior to the USA" (Aganbegyan, 1988. p.39). Additional data documenting the dismal performance of the Soviet economy are provided by Sorokin (1987), who shows us a significant decrease in growth rates from 1950 through the early '80's, with a few exceptions. Data documenting the decline of labor productivity have also been assembled (Kostakov, 1987). It is noteworthy that the decline in labor productivity has been accompanied by wage increases, and "the trend is toward even faster wage increase.In 1982, wages ros~ almost one-third faster than labor productivity" (Goldman, 1987, p.29). Additional problems and shortcomings have characterized the Soviet economy. The quality of most consumer goods is shoddy, housing is inadequate, and the level of technology is deficient. This list of problems is not exhaustive. According to one expert on the Soviet Union, "20 percent of the Soviet urban population continues to live in communal apartments, with only one room for each family and a toilet and kitchen that must be shared with the other families in the same apartment" (Goldman, 1987, p.4). Major and recurring shortages of basic and 76 SOVIET UNION consumer goods and various types of food are common. Agriculture has perennially been a serious problem for the Soviet Union. The climatic and geographical variable of the Soviet Union are far from optimal. But inadequate harvests cannot be attributed solely to these factors. Over 20% of the Soviet labor force works in agriculture, whereas 3% of the American work force does. In addition, while American farmers have to be restrained from producing more, the Soviets have sometimes found it necessary to import as much as 25% of their grain (Goldman 1983, p. 64). There has traditionally been a great deal of waste as well as bad planning and management and insufficient mechanization. Failure to achieve growth in grain production has been described by one expert as "probably the most important domestic problem facing the Soviet Government" (Scrivener, 1986, p. 111). A common practice has been to underreport the amount of land planted, thereby "raising" the yield at harvest time (Manevich, 1987). These agricultural shortages occur in a society marked by a great deal of waste and unnecessary loss of natural resources and foodstuffs (Aganbegyan, 1988). Estimates of the spoilage and wastage of crops have varied between 20% and 50% (Ellman, 1986, p. 538). In an attempt to increase agricultural production, the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted a plan to lease land to peasants for fifty-year terms. Since the days of (...truncated)