Life as Relation: Classical Metaphysics and Trinitarian Ontology

Theological Research ■ volume 2 (2014) number 1 ■ p. 31–52 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15633/thr.677 Giulio Maspero Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome Life as Relation: Classical Metaphysics and Trinitarian Ontology Abstract Life is a theological and metaphysical problem, because it constitutes the apex of the realm of being. The Aristotelian Unmoved Mover was identified with Life as the act of thinking. Christian doctrine affirms that God is triune just as Life, but here identified both with Logos and Love. The ontology of the First Principle is different in Classical metaphysics and in Trinitarian theology. The question discussed in the paper is how this difference affects the understanding of the relationship between God and the world. Having recourse to the theological framework developed by the Cappadocian Fathers in the discussions that lead to the formulation of the Trinitarian dogma in the 4th century, free and mutual relation is presented as the key concept that was used in theology to overcome the limitations of the metaphysics of the time and to extend it in order to develop a new ontology that is an ontology of life. Trinitarian ontology may also aid our understanding of created life, because it is not simply meta-physics, i.e. a description of man and God according to the category of necessity, but is ana-physics: life is understood from above with suitable categories for free beings. Keywords Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, metaphysics and trinitarian theology 32 Giulio Maspero And all other realities will appear immaterial and unnecessary, save this one: father, son and love. In that instant, gazing at the simplest of realities, we shall all say: was it not perhaps possible to decipher this long ago? Has it not been ever-present at the foundation of all that is? (Karol Wojtyla, Rays of Fatherhood) Introduction J. Daniélou wrote, “The real metaphysical questions are those which reveal the limits of metaphysics.”1 Life does, in fact, seem to be one of these very questions that poses a challenge for human thought. Certainly religion has always been connected to life and its limits, which refer to the sacred dimension: one thinks, for example, of the religious value of the beginning, the end, and the transmission of life found in every ancient culture. The phenomenological perception of the finiteness of one’s own life and the necessity for a source that is identified with the fullness of life itself begs for God. In this paper we analyze the relationship between life and the first principle, dealing with some fundamental factors in the development of philosophical and theological thought, in an attempt to gather how a Trinitarian revelation permits us to reach a new ontological conception capable of overcoming some difficulties that have emerged throughout the course of history. The key to this transition has been the discovery of the ontological value of the will and of relation. The analysis begins with the Greek philosophical thought of Plato and Aristotle, in order to then show how the Church Fathers in the fourth century extended the concept of classical metaphysics, according to a model that was later fixed in the synthesis of Aquinas in the Medieval Period. The conclusion of this narrative is a proposal for an ontological re-examination of the notion of life based on those categories developed within human thought by its reflection on Trinitarian revelation.2 1 2 J. Daniélou, Dieu et nous, Paris 1956, p. 65. For this particular work there have been many important discussions with professor Ariberto Acerbi of the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross (Rome) and with professor Riccardo Chiaradonna of RomaTre University (Rome). Life as Relation… Classical Metaphysics In Plato’s ontological hierarchy Eros serves as an intermediary uniting the universe.3 This mythical figure is clearly a reference to life, in all its immediate anthropological and religious resonances. Within the context of the Symposium Eros is again tied to authentic life: it is, in fact, defined as the tendency to engender and give birth to what is in the beautiful in order to reach eternity.4 The relation between ontology and life is therefore intrinsic to the metaphysical understanding of reality. Generation and the tendency towards fullness of life are included in the structure of being in all its gradations. One may wonder if the connection between being and life also applies to the zenith of the ontological spectrum. Clearly, the generative dimension cannot be extended to the perfect World of Forms, but it is extremely interesting to find Plato address life within this realm. In Laws he presents a magnificent line of reasoning that ends with the pre-existence of the soul and its primacy over the body. Classifying the different movements, he demonstrates how the chain of those things that move and are moved must be preceded by something that moves by itself, without receiving motion from others.5 And this is precisely what is identified with life and the soul.6 This doctrine unfolds a genuine evolution in the theological thought of Plato: while in Phaedo he represents the World of Forms in a static way, in Sophist, one of his last works immediately preceding Laws, this vision of the World of Forms is modified, attributing movement, life, soul, and intelligence to it (κίνησιν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν). Certainly this dynamic is related to thinking, inasmuch as the Forms are subject to knowing and being known.7 In this way, the maturity of Platonic thought reveals a close connection between life and the ontological foundation. This construction is perfected by Aristotle who, by means of the metaphysical instrument of the act, comes to identify God with the 3 4 5 6 7 Cf. Plato, Symposium, 202e, 1–7. Plato, Symposium, 206.e; see also 208.ab. Cf. Plato, Laws, 894.e. Cf. Plato, Laws, 895.ce. Cf. Plato, Sofist, 248.e – 249.a. 33 34 Giulio Maspero act of living and thinking. Similarly to Plato’s analysis,8 Aristotle, beginning from the constant circular movement of primordial heaven, returns to the necessity of some reality that may be the cause of this motion. But the reality that moves because it is moved is recognized as an intermediary (μέσον), which necessarily appeals to an ultimate reality that moves without being moved (ἔστι τι ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ), insofar as it is eternal, and simultaneously, substance and act (ἀΐδιον καὶ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια οὖσα).9 The Prime Mover must be the final cause of each and every thing. It is highly desirable because it is pure act and pure thought. Hence, it does not communicate movement in that it is moved, as is true of the rest of reality, but because it is attractive as far as it is loved and desired (κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον͵ κινούμενα δὲ τἆλλα κινεῖ).10 The use of the verb ἐράω is extremely significant, because it calls to mind the Platonic reflection on Eros. Aristotle arrives at the apex of his (...truncated)