Comments on the Sources of Greek Philosophical Criticism

Folia Philosophica 34 ISSN 2353-9445 (online) ISSN 1231-0913 (print) Dariusz Kubok Comments on the Sources of Greek Philosophical Criticism Abstract: The present article attempts to shed light on the sources of philosophical criticism of early Greece and on the origins of the critical attitude adopted by the thinkers of the period. Above all, however, reflections presented hereby are meant to serve as a backdrop for analyses of a much broader scope. The study seeks to identify the defining characteristics of early Greek criticism, upon which basis the author puts forth a proposition for a general typology of its forms. Complementing the present comments is a brief discussion of the suggested types of philosophical criticism in light of the views of some of the leading philosophers of the time. Keywords: early Greek philosophy, critical thinking, criticism, skepticism, typology There is universal agreement that a critical approach is the main force pushing human thought forward, and that criticism, as an attribute of thought, must be an essential element of rational reflection on reality. A deficit of criticism leads not only to stagnation in scholarship and science, but also to the appearance of various forms of dogmatism, which do not permit the emergence of alternative views, nor the revision of positions acknowledged as final. Dogmatism in science often goes hand in hand with dogmatism in worldviews, which manifests itself in the social sphere in the form of a conviction that final solutions have been found. The ability to think critically is a refreshing quality in both academic and social debates, and may even be—in the Pyrrhonian spirit— an antidote to the deceitful consequences of unreflective dogmatism. From a historical perspective, researchers seeking the source of the critical approach most frequently point to the views of Pyrrho (earlier, possi- 10 Dariusz Kubok bly, to the Sophists) and to those of the Academics, who present a mature, though not entirely unambiguous form of criticism and as such have been the subject of a slew of studies. However, it is worth taking a look at historically earlier sources of critical reflection in pre-Pyrrhonian thought. There exist, of course, studies dedicated to specific problems encompassed by criticism during this period of the history of philosophy, such as Plato’s elenctics or hypothetics, or the aporetics of Aristotle. Reflection on pre-Platonic critical thought, analyzed, for example, in light of the skeptical themes present within it, seems especially interesting. For skepticism—in its Greek sense—is an expression of criticism1 and, as such, stands in opposition to dogmatism in both its positive and negative forms. It is worth noting here that many scholars understand criticism solely in light of the thought of Immanuel Kant, who refers to the concept of the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience. In light of such an understanding, criticism appears as a cognitive approach in opposition to both dogmatism and skepticism. Such a conviction is based on Kant’s typology, which presents the necessary stages of philosophy as he sees them: dogmatism, skepticism, and criticism.2 The thinker from Königsberg describes dogmatism as a way of thinking that blindly trusts the authority of reason, which expands a priori by way of conceptions, that is, which declares trust of knowledge without first investigating the ability to make judgments on objects beyond the sphere of possible experience. Skepticism, on the other hand, assumes the impossibility of achieving certainty. Kantian criticism was to go beyond dogmatism and skepticism. In my opinion however, such a stance may be qualified as dogmatic because it considers the acquisition of knowledge impossible and therefore may be described in terms Criticism refers back to the verb kr nw (to separate, distinguish, judge, evaluate, explain, investigate, among others) and to the adjective kritikÒj (critical, able to distinguish, deciding, among others). 1 See Immanuel Kant, “Logik,” in: Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe. 6. Bd. Ed. by W. Weischedel. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1993); see also: Immanuel Kant, “Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?” in: Immanuel Kant, Werkausgabe. 6. Bd. W. Weischedel, ed. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1993). 2 Comments on the Sources of Greek Philosophical Criticism 11 of negative dogmatism. In my reflections, I will employ the root understanding of skepticism (Gr. skšptomai—to investigate, examine, consider, judge) as a philosophical stance that consists in perpetual searching and examination (zeteticism). Adopting such a position, I refer back to the typology of Sextus Empiricus, who, in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, distinguishes three philosophies:3 dogmatic (dogmatik»), characteristic of those who assert that they have found the truth; academic (¢kadhmaik»), described as negative dogmatism, which rejects the possibility of finding truth; and skeptical (skeptik»), which postulates a lasting search for truth. Of course, we have to be aware of the fact that this division occurs for the first time only in the writings of Sextus— and that it does not appear explicite in pre-Platonic texts. Nevertheless, it is worth using this typology as a frame of reference for the purpose of analysing the views of the thinkers of this period, because it will allow us to grasp the difference between negative dogmatism (academic philosophy) and true skepticism more precisely. In light of such a distinction, criticism as skepticism appears as an anti-dogmatic stance, and, as such, stands in opposition to both positive and negative dogmatism. Skepticism, in its root understanding,4 that is, above all, as zeteticism (conversely to what it is in Kant’s typology, in which it is essentially Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by R.G. Bury (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1990), I, 1–2. 3 Sextus specifies that skeptical philosophy (skeptik») is zetetic (zhthtik»), because it commands one to search and examine (tÕ zhte‹n kaˆ skšptesqai), effectic (™fektik»), due to the holding back that follows after investigation, aporetic (¢porhtik»), because it presupposes helplessness and searching (¢pore‹n kaˆ zhte‹n) and Pyrrhonian (Purrèneioj), as Pyrrho came closest to true skepticism (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines…, I, 7). Diogenes Laertios, on the other hand, writes, that this doctine got its name from the fact that its adepts were called “aporetics (¢porhtiko…), skeptics (skeptiko…), effectics (™fektiko…) or zetetics (zhthtiko…). Zetetics due to the fact that they searched for truth everywhere (¢pÕ toà p£ntote zhte‹n t¾n ¢l»qeian), skeptics because they always searched for, but never found, solutions (¢pÕ toà skšptesqai ¢eˆ kaˆ mhdšpote eØr…skein), effectics due to their approach to research, that is, from holding back (¢pÕ toà met¦ t¾n z»thsin p£qouj· lšgw dš t¾n ™poc»n); aporetics bec (...truncated)