‘Arrestez et pillez contre toute sorte de droit’: Trade and the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–1720)

The Journal for Renaissance and Early Modern Diplomatic Studies 1 / 2017 Frederik Dhondt* Free University of Brussels (VUB)/University of Antwerp/Ghent University ‘ARRESTEZ ET PILLEZ CONTRE TOUTE SORTE DE DROIT’**: TRADE AND THE WAR OF THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE (1718–1720) Abstract The War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718–1720) was a conflict between Spain and the other major European powers over the balance of power in Italy. France and Britain jointly intervened on the side of the attacked party, Emperor Charles VI. In February 1720, the conflict was resolved when Philip V of Spain finally adhered to the Treaty of London (2 August 1718). The decision to go to war was contentious at the French court. For the benefit of public opinion, Philip, duke of Orléans and Regent of France, had to wage war against the Spanish Prime Minister, Cardinal Giulio Alberoni, rather than against the Sun King’s grandson, Philip V. Moreover, whereas French and British diplomats found consensus as regards maintaining the principles of the Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713), they remained commercial rivals. This article lifts a tip of the veil covering the complex trade relations during the conflict. Spain tried to placate and reassure French merchants, and conversely to punish their British counterparts. The British fleet patrolled the Mediterranean, searching French vessels as well as those of neutral states. The Emperor, though allied to France and Britain, could not prevent Neapolitan corsairs from preying on their trade. Moreover, French ships illegally furnished the Spanish army. Finally, France and Britain hoped to quell the abuse of neutral powers in the conflict (Tuscany, Genoa, Venice) by imposing upon them a duty to chase Spanish privateers from their harbours. The complaints of * My thanks to the anonymous reviewers of this paper for their insightful comments, as well as to Dirk Heirbaut, Dave De Ruysscher, Jelten Baguet, Marco in ‘t Veld and the attendees of the St Andrews conference ‘Balance of Power, Balance of Trade’ on 21–22 January 2015 for their remarks and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. ** Marginal note, Archives Nationales (AN), Marine, B1, fol. 299v. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LEGATIO.2017.04 98 Frederik Dhondt French traders, as indicated by the consuls to the Conseil de la Marine and the Regent himself at the apex of the French government, reveal pleas borne out of frustration, as well as appeals to either the law of nations or consular protection to shield merchants from assaults and abuses. When war was declared, inimical, friendly or allied relations in high politics seemed almost irrelevant. The military conflict generated uncertainty and damaged the reputation of the French flag. Diplomatic pressure on the neutral powers was seen as being more effective than reliance on seemingly corrupt or biased local jurisdictions. The Regent’s management of the conflict - in close collaboration with Britain, despite all the difficulties on the ground – is all the more remarkable. Keywords: Law of nations, legal history, commerce, War of the Quadruple Alliance, Regency, Italy The Peace Treaties of Utrecht (11 April 1713), Rastatt (6 March 1714) and Baden (7 September 1714) were collectively a milestone in European diplomatic history.1 Conflicts which engulfed the whole of Europe were conspicuous by their absence until the Wars of the Polish Succession (1733–1735)2 and the Austrian Succession (1740–1748).3 The Peace of Utrecht ended almost a century of gruelling conflict in Europe, from the Thirty Years’ War to the War of the Spanish Succession.4 The partition of the composite Spanish monarchy between Habsburg and Bourbon 1 Utrecht – Rastatt – Baden 1712–1714: Ein europäisches Friedenswerk am Ende des Zeitalters Ludwigs XIV., ed. by Heinz Duchhardt and Martin Espenhorst (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013); Lucien Bély, Espions et Ambassadeurs au Temps de Louis XIV (Paris: Fayard, 1990); The Treaties of the War of the Spanish Succession: An Historical and Critical Dictionary, ed. by Marsha Frey and Linda Frey (Westport: Greenwood, 1995); Rolf Stücheli, Der Friede von Baden (Schweiz) 1714 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag, 1997); Heinhard Steiger, ‘Rechtliche Strukturen der europäischen Staatenordnung 1648–1792’, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 59 (1999), 609–49. 2 John L. Sutton, The King’s Honor and the King’s Cardinal: The War of the Polish Succession (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980); Pierre Massuet, Histoire de la guerre présente contenant tout ce qui s’est passé de plus important en Italie, sur le Rhin, en Pologne & dans la plupart des Cours de l’Europe (Amsterdam: François l’Honoré, 1735). 3 Reed Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1995). 4 André Corvisier, ‘Présence de la Guerre au XVIIe Siècle’, in Guerre et Paix dans l’Europe du XVIIe Siècle, ed. by Lucien Bély, Jean Bérenger and André Corvisier, 2 vols (Paris: S.E.D.E.S., 1991), I, pp. 13–27. ‘Arrestez et pillez contre toute sorte de droit’ 99 was at the heart of these agreements of 1713–1714. Yet, inevitably, economic and trade disputes followed as a corollary.5 The territorial balance of power in Europe, established in 1713, was predicated on a commercial balance of trade on a global scale.6 Subsequently, trade issues occupied a secondary place in the diplomatic management of the system. Incidents between British and French subjects overseas were not allowed to escalate into a rupture of political relations and were generally settled through normal diplomatic channels. Numerous reported incidents could have given rise to a conflict between Britain and France, but these were not allowed to poison the Franco-British rapport.7 In the years between 1716 and 1718, peace negotiations amending the treaties of Utrecht had priority over commercial quarrels.8 5 Antonella Alimento, ‘Commercial Treaties and the Harmonisation of National Interests: The Anglo-French Case (1667–1713)’, in War, Trade and Neutrality: Europe and the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. by Antonella Alimento (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2011), pp. 107–28; Armin Reese, Europäische Hegemonie und France d’outre-mer: Koloniale Fragen in der französischen Aussenpolitik 1700–1763 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988). The Politics of Commercial Treaties in the Eighteenth Century. Balance of Power, Balance of trade, ed. by Antonella Alimento and Koen Stapelbroek (London: Palgrave, 2017). 6 See: Josiah Child, Discourse of Trade, Wherein is Recommended Several weighty Points relating to Companies of Merchants, the Act of Navigation, Naturalization of Strangers, and our Woollen Manufactures, the Ballance of Trade And the Nature of Plantations, and their Consequences, in Relation to the Kingdom, are Seriously Discusses, 3th edn (London: Sowle, 1718). 7 On harsh treatment suffered by French merchants in the Mediterranean at the hands of Vice (...truncated)