Multiple Indexing Relativism about Predicates of Taste

CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 51, No. 151 (abril 2019): 5–34 DOI: 10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.01 MULTIPLE INDEXING RELATIVISM ABOUT PREDICATES OF TASTE D AN Z EMAN University of Vienna SUMMARY : Focusing on predicates of taste, this paper puts forward a novel version of relativism, motivated by a recently discussed phenomenon: perspectival plurality. After showing that the phenomenon is problematic for at least some versions of relativism and discussing several possible answers on behalf of the relativist, I put forward my own version. The main feature of the proposal is the introduction in the index not of a single parameter for perspectives, but of a (possibly infinite) sequence of such parameters. In the last part of the paper, I defend the view against three objections. KEY WORDS : semantics, perspectives, perspectival plurality, Lasersohn, “the paraphrasing strategy” RESUMEN : Centrando la atención en los predicados de gusto, este artículo propone una nueva versión de relativismo, cuya motivación es un fenómeno que se ha discutido recientemente: la pluralidad de perspectivas. Tras mostrar que este fenómeno es problemático para algunas versiones de relativismo y discutir posibles respuestas que el relativista podría ofrecer, presento mi propia versión. La principal característica de la propuesta es la introducción en el índice, no de un único parámetro para perspectivas, sino de una secuencia (posiblemente infinita) de tales parámetros. En la última sección del artículo defiendo esta propuesta de tres objeciones. PALABRAS CLAVE : semántica, perspectivas, pluralidad de perspectivas, Lasersohn, “la estrategia de paráfrasis” Relativism about a variety of expressions has been very present in semantics lately —so much so that the view has become one of the main contenders in the debate over the right semantic account of those expressions. One type of expression that this debate has focused on is predicates of taste —expressions such as “fun”, “tasty”, “delicious”, etc. Most authors dealing with such expressions agree that they are perspectival —in the sense that appeal to perspectives (or points of view, or standards, etc.) is needed for their semantic interpretation. Also, most authors agree that they give rise to a certain sort of context-sensitivity best exemplified by the fact that the same sentence containing such a predicate can have different truth values when uttered in different contexts. These two characteristics have been linked: the context-sensitivity of the sort described arises due to the perspectival character of predicates of taste. critica / C151Zeman / 1 6 DAN ZEMAN Canonically, relativism about predicates of taste has been cashed out as the view (or, more accurately, a cluster of views) that a parameter for perspectives should be introduced in the circumstances of evaluation/index1 with respect to which utterances of sentences containing predicates of taste are evaluated. The version of relativism I want to put forward in this paper goes further: according to what I call Multiple Indexing Relativism about predicates of taste, not only a parameter for perspectives should be introduced in the index, but a sequence of such parameters. I will offer a sketch of the view. One motivation for proposing such a view is intrinsic: given that multiple indexing has been proposed in the past in connection with, for example, time and possible worlds, it would be interesting to see how such a view might look like as applied to predicates of taste. Another (perhaps better) motivation is that it provides a neat solution to a problem for (at least some versions of) relativism that has only recently been fully engaged with in the literature: that raised by the phenomenon known as “perspectival plurality”. I will thus present this phenomenon and the problem it raises, and show how Multiple Indexing Relativism attempts to solve it. Finally, I address three possible objections to the view. Before going further, two remarks. First, the main aim of this paper is to sketch and motivate a certain version of relativism about predicates of taste that is different from the canonical one; it is not to provide or even discuss arguments in favor of relativism per se. Given that discussion of such arguments has taken central stage in current literature, they are well-known2 and thus no rehearsing is needed. My contention in this paper is that if there are good arguments for relativism about predicates of taste, then the phenomenon of perspectival plurality gives you a reason to go further and be a Multiple Indexing Relativist. Second, although this paper deals 1 “Circumstances of evaluation” is the term used by Kaplan (1989); “index” is the term used by Lewis (1980). In what follows I will use “index” for convenience and for the sake of convergence with the phrase “multiple indexing”, but the two terms should be taken (at least for current purposes) to be interchangeable. 2 The argument from faultless disagreement has been put forward by, among others, Kölbel (2004a) and Lasersohn (2005, 2016). Retraction has been mainly the focus of MacFarlane’s work, a comprehensive picture of which is given in his (2014) book. Eavesdropping scenarios have also been used to argue in favor of relativism —see, for example, Egan, Hawthorne and Weatherson (2005). Lasersohn (2009) uses arguments from de se readings of predicates of taste, their embedding under factive propositional attitude verbs like “recognize” and from truth evaluative adverbs like “correctly”, while Kölbel (2009) tries out a version of the “operator argument” known from Kaplan (1989). Crítica, vol. 51, no. 151 (abril 2019) DOI:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.01 critica / C151Zeman / 2 MULTIPLE INDEXING RELATIVISM 7 with predicates of taste, I take the view proposed to apply to other perspectival expressions as well. But while I will refer to such expressions in relation to various issues in several footnotes, applying the view to those expressions might not be entirely straightforward. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1, I say a few words about predicates of taste and show how canonical relativism treats them. In section 2, I present the phenomenon of perspectival plurality and the problem it raises for (certain versions of) relativism. After presenting and criticizing some possible relativist solutions to the problem in a short section 3, in the following section I offer a sketch of Multiple Indexing Relativism. In section 5, I deal with the three objections. 1 . Predicates of Taste and Relativism Predicates of taste are expressions like “tasty”, “delicious”, “disgusting”, “fun”, “boring”, “cool”, etc. Together with many others,3 they belong to a class that could be called “perspectival expressions”, whose main purpose is to describe how people experience bits of reality from a certain perspective (a certain point of view, given a certain standard, etc.) or another. The use of perspec (...truncated)