Alignment of the Safety Assessment Method with New Zealand Legislative Responsibilities

safety Article Alignment of the Safety Assessment Method with New Zealand Legislative Responsibilities Dirk J. Pons Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch 8140, Canterbury, New Zealand; Received: 30 June 2019; Accepted: 21 August 2019; Published: 23 August 2019



 Abstract: Need—National legislative health and safety (H&S) frameworks impose requirements but grant self-management to organisations. Consequently variability arises in management systems, and some organisations struggle to achieve successful implementation. The risk assessment process is key to the H&S management system, and could benefit from greater consistency and better external alignment with the legislative framework of the jurisdiction. Approach—The harm categories in the New Zealand (NZ) Act were adapted into a consequence scale. A non-linear scale was developed for the consequence axis to represent the disproportional nature of catastrophic harm outcomes compared to minor injuries. A hazard assessment process was devised based on systems engineering methods. Organisational decision-criteria were derived from the communications requirement in the Act, and these thresholds linked to expected treatments. Originality—A method is providing for aligning risk assessments with a national legislative framework, and integrating the technical aspects of risk assessment with the management processes. The approach also more explicitly includes recovery actions in contrast to existing methods where prevention dominates. Regarding the management aspects, it shows how thresholds may be defined relative to the legislation, to give clear expectations regarding treatment and internal communication, thereby assisting executives (‘officers’ in terms of the NZ Act) meet their duties. Keywords: legal duty; organisational behavior; external alignment 1. Introduction The assessment of occupational health and safety (OSH) hazards, as commonly applied in the workplace, typically comprises the tabular evaluation of consequences and their likelihoods, for various risks. The resulting table of hazards and the solutions (which are variously called treatments, remedies, or mitigation) is called a risk register. Optionally, it may also include residual risks, i.e., a reassessment of the risk assuming the proposed treatments are effective. Risks are possible future events that might happen, and in the safety context they are invariably negative. The term ‘risk’ has variable usage, and can either mean the possibility of an event, or the combination of consequences and the likelihood of those consequences. More generally, risks have the potential to give rise to future consequences, which may be negative (threats or hazards) or (positive) opportunities, and this is the perspective taken by the risk management standard ISO 31000 [1]. The risk assessment used in health and safety (H&S) is a simplified version of risk assessment that only looks at the threat component. In the H&S application the assessment is consistent with the ISO 31000 approach of partitioning the risk into consequence and likelihood, i.e., those are considered orthogonal. The processes are: identify risks, analyse risks; evaluate risks (quantitative and qualitative methods are available); and treat risks. Those who are interested in a fuller discussion of the treatment of risk, including other options that may be useful at design-time, are referred to the risk management literature. Suitable Safety 2019, 5, 59; doi:10.3390/safety5030059 www.mdpi.com/journal/safety Safety 2019, 5, 59 2 of 24 starting points for risk management generally are ISO 31000 [1], HB436 [2], and for technology risks in particular AS3931 [3] or the equivalent international standards. However there are a number of problems with the risk assessment approach as applied to H&S. The methods tend not to be aligned to the legislative framework of the jurisdiction, at least in New Zealand (NZ) which is the region under examination. Furthermore, there is no consistency in practice regarding the scales used in the risk assessments. What follows relates specifically to the NZ situation, though some of the principles are believed to have wider applicability. 2. Background to Health and Safety Legislation in NZ 2.1. Health and Safety Legislation in NZ In the NZ case, the relevant legislation is the Health and Safety at Work Act (2015) [4]. As the date shows, the Act is relatively recent. Moreover, it introduced a radically different legislative intent towards safety. The initiating event for the change in legislation was the Pike River mine catastrophe [5]. The resulting investigation into the mining catastrophe [6] identified multiple weaknesses in the legislative landscape prevailing at the time of the accident. For one, the legislation obligated organisations to eliminate/minimise/isolate hazards for their staff. The NZ approach to H&S was, and still is, consistent with the principle that legislation should ‘stipulate the duties of those with primary responsibility for OSH measures in general terms, rather than to attempt to regulate a multitude of hazards in minute detail [7]. A legislative system comprises regulations in addition to laws, and the mining industry operated under considerable self-regulation. The mine company had the freedom to make decisions with significant adverse safety implications. For example: they proceeded to put the main ventilation fan inside the mine itself, despite the misgivings of the mine inspector [6]; they defined for themselves a ‘non-restricted’ zone within the gassy coal seam, where they placed electrical apparatus, and made this decision based on engineering convenience [5]. The investigation found no evidence of any risk assessment prior to placing the electrical services in the coal [6]. The safety systems were ad hoc, staff from subcontractor firms were in the mine, sometimes with inadequate or no safety induction: “Its health and safety systems were inadequate” [6]. Hence the self-management of H&S was ineffective and safety was compromised. It was possible for executives to avoid the legislative duties if they could show, as in this case, that they were uninformed about risks: “the board of directors did not ensure that health and safety was being properly managed and the executive managers did not properly assess [this]” [6], despite the numerous prior warning signs that methane was regularly at explosive levels. Fundamentally, the managers did not manage the risks competently. Consequently, the law was changed, resulting in the current act [4], which placed a much greater duty of care on executive officers (‘officers’) to inform themselves of H&S risks and resource the treatments. It also changed the definition of workers to include anyone at the workplace, irrespective of their employment contract or remuneration. It also created a joint responsibility for H&S for all organisations that had wor (...truncated)