'A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet': How Aggregate Sentencing Violates Miller v. Alabama

Criminal Law Practitioner Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 3 2015 'A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet': How Aggregate Sentencing Violates Miller v. Alabama Elizabeth C. Kingston Michigan State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Kingston, Elizabeth C. (2015) "'A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet': How Aggregate Sentencing Violates Miller v. Alabama," Criminal Law Practitioner: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminal Law Practitioner by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact . Kingston: 'A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell As Sweet': How Aggregate Se Criminal Law Practitioner "A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME WOULD SMELL AS SWEET": HOW AGGREGATE SENTENCING VIOLATES MILLER V. ALABAMA by Elizabeth C. Kingston as was held unconstitutional in Miller: life imprisonment INTRODUCTION In 2007, sixteen-year-old Rodrigo Caballero, a member of the Lancas gang, opened fire on three teenage boys of the Val Verde Park Gang.' One boy was hit in the upper back and the other two were untouched; none of the victims died.2 As a result of this event, Caballero was sentenced to consecutive term-of-years sentences totaling 110 years to life.' Under this sentence, Caballero's first opportunity for parole will occur in 2117, long after Caballero has died.4 The United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that imposing life without parole upon a juvenile without individualized consideration of his youth as a mitigating factor violates the Eighth Amendment.' Sentences like Caballero's raise the question of whether the imposition of aggregate term-of-years sentencing-wherein the defendant will likely die in prison before the possibility of parole-similarly violate the Eighth Amendment. The California Supreme Court, ruling on Caballero's case, held that it does.6 While the terminology employed is different, this type of term-ofyears sentence holds the same outcome for the juvenile People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 293 1 (Cal. 2012). 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 See id at 295 (stating that defendant's first opportunity for parole will occur in 110 years). ,132 S. Ct. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 5 2455, 2460 (2012). Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295. 6 without parole following no opportunity for the juvenile to offer his youth as a mitigating circumstance.' Essentially, these lengthy aggregate sentences are a type of defacto sentence of life imprisonment without parole.' Following the Caballero ruling, California passed § 3051, which mandates that juveniles who were sentenced to a term-of-years sentence over twenty-five years shall become eligible for parole during his twenty-fifth year of the sentence. 9 While disagreement exists among the states as to whether extensive aggregate term-of-years sentences violate the Eighth Amendment per the decision in Miller,"o states should recognize the high value the Supreme Court has placed on youth in as a sentencing factor and proactively move to resolve any potential constitutional issues with legislation." Whether states disagree with California's Caballero analysis of constitutionality, the California code implements a system that reflects a proper balance of the Supreme Court's emphasis of youth as a mitigating factor with the need for retribution and proper punishment. 7 See id. at 294-95. As in Romeo & Juliet, "that which we call 8 a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet." William Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet 22 (1839). Though states may give a different terminology to these aggregate term-of-years sentences, the name matters not, as the character of the punishment remains the same. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3051 (West 2015). See 9 infra Part III for a more detailed analysis of this statute. 10 See infra Part II. See infra Part I. 11 Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015 14 Washington College of Law Fall 205 1 Criminal Law Practitioner, Vol. 3 [2015], Iss. 1, Art.Criminal 3 Part I of this Note discusses the development of juvenile sentencing jurisprudence from the ineligibility of juveniles for the death penalty in Roper v. Simmons 2 to the recent decision in Miller v. Alabama. Part II analyzes how different states have handled the constitutionality question. Part Ill examines California's § 3051 in greater depth. Finally, Part IV advocates for the adoption of similar legislation across the United States. 1. ROPER THROUGH MILLER: "CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT" Law Practitioner by enacting categorical activity restrictions on those under eighteen, including military service, voting, and jury service.19 Second, juveniles are "more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure." 20 Finally, juveniles have not yet had the opportunity to develop their character, meaning that "personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed." 2 1 These differences cause juveniles to have diminished culpability; this diminished culpability in turn means that capital punishment, when applied to juveniles, does not serve its traditional purposes of retribution and deterrence. 22 Therefore, capital punishment is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.2 3 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."" Since the 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons,14 the United States Supreme Court has applied the Eighth Amendment to juvenile sentencing in the criminal justice system to afford juveniles a special status. The Court has consistently identified the unique characteristics of youth and their relationship to culpability to justify conclusions affording juveniles greater constitutional protections than adults. Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court assessed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment and the special circumstances of minors to sentences of life imprisonment without parole. 24 Recognizing that "developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds," the Court accepted the continuing relevance of the factors discussed in Roper.25 The Court acknowledged that life imprisonment without parole is the "second most severe penalty permitted by law" 26 and affects juveniles more disproportionately than In Roper v. Simmons, the Court declared that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty upon offenders who committed murder as a juvenile." According to the Court's interpretation of the Ei (...truncated)