Nuclear weapons in an international security environment

Scientific and Technical Journal Safety & Defense 5(2) (2019) 8–16 Nuclear weapons in an international security environment Krzysztof ZAŁĘSKI WSB University, Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland; , ORCID: 0000-0002-0245-5987 Abstract Nuclear weapons are a historically acknowledged factor of security development and maintenance of the strategical balance. Therefore, in spite of programs preventing its proliferation, most states having such weapons modernize and develop their nuclear arsenals, perceiving it as a sign of power and a guarantee of security. The methodology employed in this article critical analysis and synthesis of reliable sources from the scope of the area of research. The nature of the article is explanatory with elements of inference. This paper presents an evaluation of circumstances inducing a state to possess nuclear weapons, in consideration of both the positive and negative consequences of their possession. In the author’s view, studying this article should at least evoke a reflection on the development of nuclear weapons as a means of forming modern relations of security. Keywords: nuclear weapons, legal restrictions of nuclear weapon use, modernization of the nuclear arsenal 1. Introduction It is a kind of ‘’trump card’’ about which partners may not know everything, but with which they have to reckon. Is it not an enticing prospect for other quarrelsome states? Iran perceives nuclear technology issues in a similar way, presenting a new attitude in this matter [1,2]. Today nobody doubts the fact that the possession of a nuclear weapon is a guarantee of security. It does not matter whether these guarantees may sometimes be “fragile”. Here I will refer to the denuclearization of Ukraine. For the return of nuclear arsenals developed in the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, the Budapest Memorandum having the force of a treaty was signed. It was supposed to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is worth noticing that in 2014, after its annexation of the Crimea, Russia refused consultation in this matter, and the signatories to the treaty did not show the determination expected by the Ukrainian party in spite of appeals by the Ukrainian Parliament. Thus, we can ask a question: what has been left of international guarantees? Although 70 years have passed since the first use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the tragic consequences of this occurrence, they continue to play an important role in global politics. Moreover, there is a large group of states aspiring to possess them. North Korea – an insignificant totalitarian regime until quite recently – has become a political entity remaining in the center of attention of world powers: the United States, the Russian Federation, China, Japan and South Korea, because of its possession of a nuclear weapon. Although this state does not have much to offer, it drives a hard bargain. Its only expectations concern the price that the world is ready to pay for its denuclearization. The expectations are high. North Korea expects the lifting of political and economic sanctions and, consequently, the coverage of all costs of social and political-economic transformation of the state. In the hands of North Korea’s leader, the nuclear weapon is the only bargaining tool, but a very strong one. 8 Safety & Defense 5(2) (2019) 8–16 years have passed, and little has changed in the nuclear policy of NATO, the United States and the Russian Federation. As during the Cold War period, it is again used as a political deterrent and for the reinforcement of diplomatic efforts in international relations. Is a new arms race beginning to form? Probably yes – at least many military analysts think so. This is confirmed by the unilateral suspension of the INF treaty by the United States since February 2nd, 2019; as a consequence, Russia did the same. This means the beginning of the end of the treaty establishing the international control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons deployed on intermediate-range ballistic missiles (500–5,500 km) in Europe [4]. In his address to both houses of the Russian parliament in January 2018, Vladimir Putin used the words that leave no doubt any more: “Russia has started an active phase of testing a new intercontinental Sarmat ballistic rocket [5]. The new missile is to replace Voivode – currently the most powerful Russian intercontinental ballistic missile.” Putin stated that Russia would take further steps in response to the growth of the American anti-rocket defense system. This did not escape the attention of NATO’s leaders. At his meeting with the President of Poland Andrzej Duda, Jens Stoltenberg stated that Russia is ready and wants to use force to change borders within Europe. In the arms race that has already started, Russia seems to be winning. In response to any kind of presence – even a symbolic one – of NATO forces in Baltic states and Central & Eastern Europe, Russia builds strike forces close to the external borders of the Alliance. In spite of the apparent political dialogue (John Kerry’s talks with Sergei Lavrov and Vladimir Putin), security relations have not been so tense since the mid-1980s. In the military rhetoric of the Russian Federation, the NATO states and the United States have become a “very probable opponent”. It seemed that after the Cuban crisis in 1962, when the real threat of a nuclear conflict existed, the world came to its senses and that ‘nuclear states are not at war with one another’. Did that really happen? No. The nuclear threat is still very real. Having joined a group of states with a nuclear potential, North Korea does not intend to resign from exposing its power due to the possession of nuclear weapons. As the leader of North Korea, Kim Dzong Un, has recently remarked that his state will use nuclear weapons against the United States (or any other enemy) only for the defense of its own territory [6]. Thus, contrary to what President Obama envisaged a few years ago, the world without nuclear weapons does not exist. An assumption was made that the security environment in Europe and around the world underwent serious modification after the end of World War II, becoming divided into two opposite political-military blocs that used their nuclear potential for deterrence and for exerting a political impact on each other. As a consequence of this, nuclear weapons began to be perceived as an effective guarantee of security. The weapons that additionally increase the importance of a state on the international arena constitute a sort of insurance policy in case of an higher threat, particularly for states with an average or small military potential. This is how North Korea treats nuclear weapons (‘others have to reckon with me while Sadly, not much; the only available option is to make diplomatic attempts, but do they matter at all in the face of a real threat of using nuclear weapons being at the disposal of the endangered state? I (...truncated)