From Counterbalancing to Engaging China: Shift in Japan’s Approach towards the New International Order in the Asia-Pacific under the Second Abe Administration

Torun Interna onal Studies No. 1 (7) 2014 2019, No. 1 (12), pp. 143–155 Published online December, 2019 DOI: h p://dx.doi.org/10.12775/TIS.2019.009 Karol Żakowski*1 ORCID: 0000-0003-2715-570X FROM COUNTERBALANCING TO ENGAGING CHINA: SHIFT IN JAPAN’S APPROACH TOWARDS THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN THE ASIA PACIFIC UNDER THE SECOND ABE ADMINISTRATION ABSTRACT Since returning to the post of prime minister in 2012, Abe Shinzō has been promoting Japan’s active posture in maintaining international stability in the Asia-Pacific. Abe’s vision of the new international order in the region has been based on Tokyo’s alliance with Washington, both in the security and economic spheres. Through legalizing Japan’s participation in collective self-defense pacts and through revising the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation in 2015, Abe strengthened the Japan–US alliance. In parallel, he promoted Japan’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which; however, was realized as Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership without Trump administration’s participation. In addition, Tokyo has been negotiating Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Japan–China–Republic of Korea Trilateral Free Trade Agreement, and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. The article argues that while initially the Japanese prime minister’s regional initiatives were aimed at counterbalancing China’s rise, they gradually started putting more emphasis on engaging China in international cooperation. Applying a neoclassical-realist methodology, this study examines both the international and the domestic determinants of Japan’s shift in approach towards the new international order. Keywords: Japan, China, Asia-Pacific, Abe Shinzō, Japan–US alliance, Belt and Road Initiative * University of Lodz (Poland), e-mail: 144 K Ż 1. INTRODUCTION Since the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, the alliance with the US has been a cornerstone of Japan’s vision of the regional order. However, in the period of globalization, economic regionalization started playing an equally important role as security policy in shaping international systems. Due to opposition of the agricultural lobby, Japan made some efforts towards regional economic integration relatively late. Tokyo’s first free trade agreement was signed in 2002 with Singapore, as thanks to the virtual lack of the agricultural sector in that country the initiative was easily accepted by the domestic pressure groups. At the same time, regional integration platforms exhibited geopolitical significance as methods for creating a new international order in the Asia-Pacific. This article argues that Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has perceived different regional initiatives as a way of both counterbalancing and engaging the rising China. Strengthening of the Japan–US alliance and negotiations over accession to TPP were supposed to protect the US-oriented regional order while counterbalancing Beijing’s attempts at creating international institutions alternative to the system dominated by Washington. On the other hand, Japan’s foreign policy remained flexible enough to seek cooperation with Chinese initiatives once Trump’s administration withdrew from the “Pivot to Asia” and TPP. It is argued that the shift in approach towards China from the policy of counterbalancing to the one of engagement was triggered by the change in international determinants, but it was also facilitated by the fact that part of Abe’s closest entourage supported a more flexible approach towards Beijing. The first section examines the policy agenda of the Abe’s administration from the perspective of containment and engagement policy towards China. A particular emphasis is put on policy proposals of the prime minister’s diplomatic advisors. The second and third sections, in turn, analyze the counterbalancing and engaging strategies undertaken towards Beijing since Abe’s return to power in December 2012. 2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH The neorealists tend to perceive sovereign countries as “black boxes” pursuing objectively definable national interests that stem from the position of states in the international system (Waltz, 1990, p. 29). The neoliberals focus on analyzing the mitigating influence of economic interdependence on international disputes (Nye, 1976, pp. 130–161). The representatives of the third mainstream theory of international relations, constructivists, in turn, place their interest in inter-subjective identities and their influence on defining the roles played by nations in mutual interaction (Wendt, 1999). All three theories point to the significance of China in interpreting Japan’s approach towards the formation of the new order in Asia-Pacific. In line with neorealism, Japan has instituted counterbalancing measures against the rising power of the PRC. As predicted by neoliberalism, due to increased economic interdependence with China, Tokyo has tried to engage Beijing in regional initiatives. Just as claimed by constructivism, in turn, history issues and growing nationalism have been major obstacles in Sino-Japanese cooperation. Nevertheless, each of the three theories offers only partial explanation of the determinants of Japan’s foreign policy. FROM COUNTERBALANCING TO ENGAGING CHINA: SHIFT IN JAPAN’S... 145 This study relies on neoclassical realism in explaining the factors behind Tokyo’s regional strategy. As stressed by Gideon Rose, “the translation of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium term” (Rose, 1998, p. 158). While international determinants impose the general direction for foreign policy, domestic-level factors can hinder or accelerate the realization of national interests. As the external environment evolves over time, statespersons should adapt foreign policy decisions to a new situation, but the pace of this process depends on intra-state conditions. In line with neoclassical realism, this study analyzes both external factors that are treated as independent variables, as well as domestic determinants of Japan’s regional strategy which constitute intervening variables. While the former refer mainly to the US grand strategy, the latter focus on examining, through primary and secondary sources, the policy agenda of the prime minister and his closest entourage. It is argued that while the shift from the policy of counterbalancing to engaging China in regional initiatives was conditioned by the evolution of the external environment, it was also facilitated by the promotion of Sino-Japanese rapprochement by Abe’s diplomatic advisors. 3. THE ABE ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGIES OF COUNTERBALANCING AND ENGAGING CHINA China has gone a long way since launching economic reforms in 1978. At the end of the 1970s China’s GDP amounted only to little more than one seventh of Japan’s, whereas in 2010 it surpassed Japan’s, and by 2019 it was almost three times as (...truncated)