The interplay of economic vote dimensions: inequality, redistribution preferences and support for incumbents

Comparative European Politics https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-021-00249-2 ORIGINAL ARTICLE The interplay of economic vote dimensions: inequality, redistribution preferences and support for incumbents Slaven Živković1,2 Accepted: 16 July 2021 © Springer Nature Limited 2021 Abstract Economic voting is multidimensional (covering valence, patrimony and positional dimensions), and a growing number of research contributions have explored the existence and strength of the effect of these dimensions on voting. However, we know comparatively little about the interplay between these dimensions. This article fills that void by focusing on how the interplay between the rise of income inequality (the valence dimension) and redistribution preferences (the positional dimension) influences support for incumbents. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Modules 4 and 5, I find that preferences for income redistribution reduce the likelihood of voters supporting incumbent parties. Modest evidence demonstrates that this relationship is stronger in countries where inequality increased to a greater degree between elections. Voters who want more redistribution tend to reelect left-wing governments and want to throw out right-wing incumbents. However, rise of inequality hurts both left-wing and right-wing incumbents. Keywords Positional economic voting · Valence · Redistribution · Inequality · CSES Introduction The state of the economy can help us understand voting behavior and explain the election performance of incumbent parties. Scholars have found a strong, positive, consistent effect is produced by the economy on incumbent support (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck 1988; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007; Okolikj and Quinlan 2016). Testing the relationship between general economic performance, and voting for incumbents dominates economic voting research. * Slaven Živković 1 GESIS Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne, Germany 2 Cologne, Germany Vol.:(0123456789) S. Živković Nevertheless, the premise that citizens, seeing the economy performing poorly, will tend to throw the rascals out, has been contested, as a normatively appealing but theoretically limiting finding (Hellwig 2012). Another important point of valence economic model criticism is partisan contamination bias, meaning that “inferences about the direction of causality between perceptions of the economy and party support remain questionable” (Anderson 2007; Bailey 2019; Evans and Andersen 2006, p. 194). Others have criticized the unidimensionality of economic voting, saying that researchers only focus on valence issues (Lewis-Beck et al. 2013). In recent years two alternative strands of economic voting research have developed: patrimony and positional economic voting (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011). Patrimony is the dimension that goes beyond perceptions of the economy, and takes into consideration the assets voters hold and how they predict voting behavior (Nadeau et al. 2009). Positional economics assume that voters’ positions on economic policy issues shape their vote (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Lewis-Beck et al. 2013). A review of the evolving literature1 reveals that researchers have mainly focused on showing that the effect of patrimony and positional economic voting exists and that it is unrelated to valence. Additionally, the positional economics research strand has focused on demonstrating that people who have preferences for leftist (or rightist) policies are more likely to vote for left (or right) parties as a consequence. However, we know little about the interplay between these dimensions and whether positional economics can influence support for incumbents. Lewis-Beck et al. (2013) showed that patrimony through the positional dimension affects the vote. But what is the role of the interplay between positional economics and valence on vote choice? Are we in danger of overlooking certain connections and findings by treating these dimensions independently, without examining their relationship? Stokes noted that “it is, of course, true that position-issues lurk behind many valence-issues” (1963, p. 373). This article fills that void by looking at the interplay between valence and positional dynamics and its impact on the vote. For this, I take income inequality (as the valence dimension) and preferences for redistribution (as a positional issue). Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2020) show that inequality functions as a valence condition at both the aggregate and the individual level. Preferences for redistribution are an issue that polarizes voters and one where we observe a significant degree of macroheterogeneity (Quinlan and Okolikj 2018). Thus, I take preferences for redistribution as a positional economic issue that is activated, i.e., made more salient by rising inequality. Apart from disentangling the relationship between the dimensions of the economic vote, studying income inequality is particularly timely, given its rise worldwide (Milanovic 2012). Previous research has shown the adverse consequences 1 Some of the notable research contributions are: De Sio and Weber (2014), Hellwig and McAllister (2019), Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2009), Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2011), Lewis-Beck et al. (2013), Nadeau et al. (2009), Nezi and Katsanidou (2014), Paparo and Lewis-Beck (2017), Quinlan and Okolikj (2018, 2019), Stubager et al. (2013), Talving (2017). The interplay of economic vote dimensions: inequality,… inequality can have. It can negatively influence the state of democracy (Scheve and Stasavage 2017), economic mobility (Piketty and Saez 2014), political and civic participation (Uslaner and Brown 2005), and even the stability of the economy (Stiglitz 2012). Connecting inequality and redistribution preferences to vote decisions is the growing trend (Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Rueda and Stegmueller 2015). This paper contributes to the ongoing debates on this question by providing a comparative analysis. To address the research question, I use the Comparative Study of Electoral Surveys (CSES) Module 4 (2018) and Module 5 Advance Release 2 (2020). Analysis reveals that the effect of preferences for redistribution on incumbents’ support is stronger in countries with greater (and thus more obvious) increases in income inequality. Furthermore, voters who want more redistribution tend to reelect left-wing incumbents and to replace right-wing ones. Rise of inequality hurts both left-wing and right-wing incumbents. In the next section, I consider the definition of valence and position issues and then focus on the economy. After that, I proceed to discuss the interplay between valence and positional dynamics and defend my choice of valence issue. Subsequently, I discuss the mechanism through which these are connected with voting for incumbents and devise several hypotheses. Then, I present the relevant data and methods to test these hypotheses, followed by the empirical findings. Finally, I (...truncated)