Operating with Names: Operational Definitions in the Analects and Beyond

Dao https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-021-09813-9 Operating with Names: Operational Definitions in the Analects and Beyond Dawid Rogacz 1 Accepted: 2 December 2021/ # The Author(s) 2022 Abstract The philosophy of Confucius has often been accused of lacking classical definitions of its core concepts. However, as I shall argue, Confucius systematically used nonclassical definitions—to be precise, operational ones. The notion of operational definition comes from Percy Bridgman’s The Logic of Modern Physics (Bridgman 1927) and means that the definiendum is defined by a set of operations that results in determining the meaning of the term in question. In the case of Confucian argumentation, operational definitions are mostly nominal and, in contrast to unambiguous methods of measurement, also context-dependent. This results in there being various yet not mutually inconsistent definitions of one term, and in “paradigmatic examples” playing a crucial role. As I show, this mode of defining things had major implications for the content of Confucius’ thought. In fact, many of its forms could be traced back to other Chinese philosophers, including those of non-Confucian provenance. Keywords Confucius . the Analects . Operationalism . Definitions . Contextualism . Chinese logic 1 Introduction Chinese philosophy, and the philosophy of Confucius in particular, has quite often been criticized for lacking definitions of its core concepts. According to Max Weber, the thought of Confucius was more like the “expression of Indian chieftains rather than of rational argumentation.” In Weber’s eyes, because of the absence of logic and systematic speculation in China, combined with the nature of the Chinese language, “the power of logos, of defining and reasoning, was not accessible to the Chinese” (Weber 1951: 125–127). A similar opinion is also expressed by Hajime NAKAMURA: “Xunzi [荀 * Dawid Rogacz 1 Faculty of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Szamarzewskiego 89C, 60-568 Poznań, Poland Dawid Rogacz 子] … distinguished between common or general names and particular names. But he did not attain a full consciousness of ‘definition’ as did Aristotle…. Lack of this consciousness in a Chinese philosopher so far advanced in logical thinking is symptomatic of the general lack of consciousness of genus and differentia in the abstract among the Chinese” (Nakamura 1964: 186). While Weber’s general opinion that there is a lack of any abstract definitions in Chinese philosophy is completely misguided and racially prejudiced, Nakamura’s claim may be proven true, but only insofar as classical definitions are concerned. Classical definitions are not, however, the only type of definitions. In fact, in both colloquial language and scientific practice people often use nonclassical definitions, such as, for instance, contextual, ostensive, paradigmatic, recursive, alternative, and operational ones, to name just a few. My thesis here is that Confucius frequently used nonclassical definitions—to be precise, operational ones. The choice to focus on Confucius is motivated by the fact that he was historically the most popular target of the critics of Chinese philosophy, and as a founding figure of China’s greatest philosophical tradition, criticism of Confucius’ way of reasoning was almost automatically extended to the entirety of Chinese thought. In fact, the distinctiveness of Confucius’ philosophy cannot be fully recognized without an insight into his method of defining things. As I shall show, the employment of operational definitions had a significant influence upon not only the form, but also the content of Confucius’ thought and, to some extent, of some other Chinese thinkers, including those of non-Confucian provenance. 2 Operational Definition The notion of operational definition comes from The Logic of Modern Physics (1927), written by Percy W. Bridgman (1882–1961). Bridgman was a physicist at Harvard University, whose pioneering work in the physics of high pressures was rewarded with a Nobel Prize in 1946. In his book on the philosophy of science, Bridgman attempted to define unobservable entities in terms of the physical and mental operations used to measure them. Temperature for instance, in addition to its classical definition, may be defined in terms of the characteristics ascertained by means of using a thermometer. In a similar way, Bridgman tried to redefine such fundamental physical notions as force, mass, energy, light, and field. Importantly, the vaguest and most context-dependent notions of physics, such as hardness, do not have other definitions than operational ones.1 Their definiendum is identical with a set of operations. As Bridgman puts it, “In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations” (Bridgman 1927: 5). However, as Bridgman notes in one of his later papers, since the purposes of science are restricted, the operations that can be used in assigning meanings must also be restricted. This implies the postulate that “a specification of meanings, both of isolated terms and of 1 Different characteristics that are identified as hardness will be obtained if one uses different measuring instruments (hardness tester, sclerometer, rebound hammer, etc.), different measurement methods, and different tests of hardness; all of which also vary in terms of the type of materials (Mohs scale of mineral hardness, Leeb rebound hardness test, Rockwell scale, Janka hardness scale for wood, etc.). Operating with Names communication in toto, involves a specification of action of some sort” (Bridgman 1949: 253). The easiest way to specify such an operation in relation to physics and other experimental sciences is to give the precise circumstances which are required to lead to the desired meaning. Generally speaking, “circumstances” have to be understood as a certain type of “condition,” for “to know the meaning of a term used by me it is evident, I think, that I must know the conditions under which I would use the term” (Bridgman 1938: 116). Such an understanding of the concept of definition has some profound implications. When defining length, Bridgman observes that “to say that a certain star is 105 light years distant is actually and conceptually an entirely different kind of thing from saying that a certain goal post is 100 meters distant” (Bridgman 1927: 17–18). Therefore, although both meters, which are measured with meter sticks, and light-years, which are measured by means of a reflected signal (a light wave) from a star, are all units of length, “length” turns out to be only a name representing a series of concepts. In fact, Bridgman admits that In principle, the operations by which length is measured should be uniquely specified. If we have more than one set of operations, we have more than one concept, and strictly there should be a separate name to correspond to each differen (...truncated)