Haredi Fundamentalism in the State of Israel

Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik, Dec 2022

Since its establishment in 1948, the State of Israel, which defines itself as Jewish-nation state, has been providing Haredi Jewry, also known as ultra-Orthodoxy, with a vast autonomy in education, enabling the development of a Jewish “Society of Learning Men.” This goes back to the Status quo regulations, which blocks the separation of state and religion in the country. In this framework, Haredi Jewry, which was nearly extinct after the Shoah, has developed into a striving and confident fundamentalist religious Jewish movement. At the same time, it has become the demographically most dynamic Jewish current. The influence of Haredi Jewry in Israel is crucial, for its leadership and its members do consider their isolationist, counter-acculturative, anti-modern moulding as the only authentic and “pure” form of Judaism, and they actively combat liberal Jewish interpretations or denominations. In this paper, a discussion about the definition of Haredism as fundamentalism will be provided. Furthermore, it will be argued that through the basic requirement of the Status quo between State and Jewish (orthodox) religion, the Haredi society’s attempt to organize itself as a cultural and communal autonomy has been highly successful also against the background of the societal restrictions of this effort given the dependant relationship that has developed between the Haredi community and general Israeli society. As illustrations for this case study, the educational autonomy, the Haredi judicial power over Jewish and non-Jewish citizens and the struggle over the Shabbat regulations will be examined.

Article PDF cannot be displayed. You can download it here:

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41682-022-00139-8.pdf

Haredi Fundamentalism in the State of Israel

Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik https://doi.org/10.1007/s41682-022-00139-8 ARTIKEL Haredi Fundamentalism in the State of Israel How the status quo between state and religion provides ground for a modern religious counter-collective Eik Dödtmann Received: 26 April 2022 / Revised: 29 October 2022 / Accepted: 3 November 2022 © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Since its establishment in 1948, the State of Israel, which defines itself as Jewish-nation state, has been providing Haredi Jewry, also known as ultra-Orthodoxy, with a vast autonomy in education, enabling the development of a Jewish “Society of Learning Men.” This goes back to the Status quo regulations, which blocks the separation of state and religion in the country. In this framework, Haredi Jewry, which was nearly extinct after the Shoah, has developed into a striving and confident fundamentalist religious Jewish movement. At the same time, it has become the demographically most dynamic Jewish current. The influence of Haredi Jewry in Israel is crucial, for its leadership and its members do consider their isolationist, counter-acculturative, anti-modern moulding as the only authentic and “pure” form of Judaism, and they actively combat liberal Jewish interpretations or denominations. In this paper, a discussion about the definition of Haredism as fundamentalism will be provided. Furthermore, it will be argued that through the basic requirement of the Status quo between State and Jewish (orthodox) religion, the Haredi society’s attempt to organize itself as a cultural and communal autonomy has been highly successful also against the background of the societal restrictions of this effort given the dependant relationship that has developed between the Haredi community and general Israeli society. As illustrations for this case study, the educational autonomy, the Haredi judicial power over Jewish and non-Jewish citizens and the struggle over the Shabbat regulations will be examined. Keywords Israel · Jewish · Status quo · Haredi · Haredism · Fundamentalism  Eik Dödtmann Filmuniversity Babelsberg KONRAD WOLF, Potsdam, Germany E-Mail: K E. Dödtmann 1 Introduction Haredi Jewry, known under the popular term “Jewish ultra-Orthodoxy,” is the isolationist, counter-acculturative, anti-modern expression of Judaism. Before the start of the discussion, just a short explanation of the two terms, which will be used equally in this article: The word “ultraorthodox” has been known since the middle of the 20th century—initially from usage in the USA (Blutinger 2007). By then, the selfdesignation of strictly religious Jews has simply been “religious Jews,” “God-fearing Jews” or “Haredim,” i.e., as “those trembling before the words of God” (Book of Isaiah 66:5). Increasingly since the mid-20th century—in distinction to the religious Zionist and to Modern Orthodox groups—the ultraorthodox Jewish communities in Israel and worldwide refer to themselves mainly as “Haredim.” In addition, strictly religious use as self-reference and as distinction from other Jewish identities the terms “righteous Jews” or “pious Jews,” or the Hebrew expression “Bney Torah” (Sons of the Torah) (Heilman and Friedman 1994, p. 198–199). Today, Haredi Judaism is the fastest-growing Jewish religious streaming in the 21st century. In Israel, it enjoys a special status as a culturally protected minority (Stopler 2016). Due to the central role of the Jewish religion as a toolbox for Zionism and for the nation-building process and due to the deep interconnection of state and religion, Haredi Judaism was able to quickly recover from the Shoah and to flourish in an unprecedented manner. This can be seen demographically, politically, and culturally. Demographically, the development of Haredi Jewry is well-documented. In Israel of the year 2020, 1,175,088 Jews in Israel were officially listed as “ultraorthodox” (Cahaner and Malach 2020, p. 11), i.e., 14% of the Jewish population. The Haredim are the fastest-growing Jewish community (Cahaner et al. 2017, p. 14), as is the case in other industrialized countries with a noteworthy Jewish population. Demographic projections predict that by 2050, Haredi communities will be the majority of Jews in the USA and in the UK (The University of Manchester 2007). The reasons for this development are multifold. In Israel, since the year 2000, Haredi population has been growing by approximately 4% per year—in comparison, the overall Jewish population has grown by only 1.4% annually. Haredi Israeli women have 6.6 children on average (Cahaner and Malach 2020), Haredi youngsters marry at a low age, and they are ideologically and religiously driven by efforts to rebuild traditional Jewish life after the Shoah and to follow the divine biblical command in Genesis 1:28, to “be fruitful and multiply.” The Haredim are also the youngest population in Israel: by the late 2010s, nearly 60% of its members were under the age of 16. Among the general population, this age-group just counted 30%. At constant birth rates the number of ultraorthodox Jews will be between 1.5 to 1.8 million by 2030 and around 4 million by the year 2050 (Bystrov and Soffer 2012, p. 60). Cooperation between the state and ultraorthodox Jews has clear limits. In education: Haredim do not attend secular schools within the plethora of different school systems (the others being state-secular, state-religious, and state Arab schools), but they send their children to the institutions of their own educational sector. In the army: While military service is in fact obligatory for all male and female Jewish Israelis, the vast majority of Haredi men and no Haredi women at all do not perform K Haredi Fundamentalism in the State of Israel military service at arms. This is because the environment in the Israeli army is considered incompatible for the strict rules of Haredi society—observance of Shabbat, separation of sexes, the dietry laws of kashrut, etc. In the judicial system: The Haredi community has established a private court system that adjudicates matters according to Jewish religious law, the Halakhah, rather than state civil law. The rapidly growing Haredi population poses major political, economic and social challenges for the Israeli society. Politically, because of the growing influence in politics and law-making. Culturally, in maintaining an interpretation of Jewish religion that discriminates women, homosexuals, non-orthodox Jews and non-Jews. Materially, because the large number of Haredi families need housing, schools and jobs. Within Jewish-Israeli society, the risk of poverty is highest among the ultraorthodox population. This is due to the fact, that Haredi men and women are less integrated into the labour market and earn much less than their secular or religious Zionist Jewish fellows. A very small group of Haredi Jews has maintained the traditional anti-Zionism of the ultraorthodox communities of Eastern Europe into the 21st century. The (...truncated)


This is a preview of a remote PDF: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s41682-022-00139-8.pdf
Article home page: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41682-022-00139-8

Dödtmann, Eik. Haredi Fundamentalism in the State of Israel, Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik, 2022, pp. 1-32, DOI: 10.1007/s41682-022-00139-8