Crisis between Russia and Ukraine: The China Factor

ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022, Vol. 92, Suppl. 7, pp. S595–S600. © The Author(s), 2022. This article is an open access publication. Russian Text © The Author(s), 2022, published in SShA & Kanada: Ekonomika, Politika, Kul’tura, 2022, No. 8. Transregional Processes Crisis between Russia and Ukraine: The China Factor S. M. Trush# (ORCID: 0000-0001-7275-001X) Institute for the US and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 121069 Russia e-mail: Received May 12, 2022; revised May 23, 2022; accepted May 25, 2022 Abstract—China is not formally taking sides in the Russian–Ukranian conflict; it keeps neutrality, but PRC is closely siding with the Russian explanation of its conflict with the West and NATO. China stresses its traditional adherence to sovereignty and territorial integrity of the national states meaning Ukraine indirectly. Moscow is seeking China’s support and backing diplomatically, economically and most important in militarily strategic sphere, aiming at securing of its Eastern flank in case of escalation between Russia and NATO on the West. Кеуwords: Russia–Ukraine conflict, secondary economic sanctions, Taiwan problem, NATO enlargement DOI: 10.1134/S1019331622130093 СHINA’S APPROACH TO CRISIS: BASIC POINTS The basic points of the Chinese official reaction on the Ukrainian crisis, that were made public at the initial phase of the Russia’s special operation (February– April 2022) can outlined in the following way. 1. China is formally not taking sides in this conflict, it keeps neutrality between Moscow and Kiev. Beijing calls for negotiations and diplomatic instruments to settle the conflict. 2. China stresses its traditional adherence to sovereignty and territorial integrity of the national states. Such Chinese stance could be viewed as a certain indirect criticism of Russia and its special military operation. 3. China is very closely or completely siding with Russia’s explanation of its motives for conflict with the West. Beijing shares Moscow’s view that Russian security interests were neglected by NATO. Several “phases” of the NATO enlargement took place in the past and there is a real possibility of Ukraine’s inclusion to NATO alliance in the future. 4. China opposes comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia, aimed to its isolation and blockade. Сhina is not joining them, considering such economic blockade as the instrument of the cold war and unipolar domination. 5. China is ready to deliver humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Beijing initiated the special plan for such aid and this plan has 6 points in it. China also signaled that # Sergei Mikhailovich Trush, Cand. Sci. (Hist.) is a Leading Researcher at the Institute for the US and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN). it is ready to render economic support for Ukraine in postwar restoration. 6. China is actively playing the “Europe card” in this crisis, trying to weaken the alliance unity between the European members on the one hand, and the United States on the other. Beijing calls for Europeans to build separate and independent strategic relationship with Moscow with lesser coordination with the US interests. Such policy is not new to Chinese foreign strategy in the recent years. However, this Chinese approach was invigorated and received new stimuli during the period of Trump administration, when systemic confrontation between China and the United States has grown to its heights. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has the visible and multifaceted impact on China’s foreign policy. On the one hand, speaking pragmatically, from the “Realpolitik” perspective, as the result of the outburst of animosity between Russia and the West, due to the economic sanctions against Moscow, China’s influence and the capitalization of the “China card” has increased. On the other hand, Moscow is seeking for China’s support and solidarity in diplomatic, economical and, most importantly, in militarily – strategic sphere, since Russia is trying to secure its Eastern flank amidst escalation between Russia and NATO. Washington, for its part, thinking pragmatically—whatever belligerent Baiden’s rhetoric against China sounds—is not excluding additional sensitivity and flexibility to China’s demands, trying to prevent China’s deeper cohesion with Moscow. Both capitals—Moscow and Washington are ready “to pay their price” to China. S595 S596 TRUSH Moscow’s “price” could possibly be the meaningful concessions and further steps, moving Russia to subordinate role in “strategic partnership” with China. Moscow could possibly be ready to strengthen its cooperation and support to Beijing in its competition with the United States at the Indo–Pacific theater, at the South China sea and even over Taiwan dispute. Russia’s concessions could possibly pertain to Moscow’s further acceptance of the growing China role in Central Asia, in Arctic zone, China’s further penetration to the Russian internal market, attaining monopolistic position at pricing of Russian energy. It also seems that Biden will be ready to walk his part of the road to prevent growing Chinese tilt to Moscow in Ukrainian crisis. Washington’s possible concessions to China could be the softening of the US tariff pressure on Chinese export, partial easing of restrictions on certain high-tech items for China, the US less harsh approach in South China Sea dispute,freezing or downgrading activity in the newly born anti-China military formation with Australia and UK (AUKUS). Certain guarantees of the United States to Beijing in Taiwan independence issue, in easing tension at Taiwan strait—either openly or tacitly— could also be the possible options for compromise. The deep split and contradictions in the US political elite notwithstanding, its anti-Moscow sentiments are very strong due to the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, Washington and Beijing seem to be ready to compromise and bargaining on the Ukrainian issue. At the same time, China itself is facing the serious negative implications of the Ukrainian crises. Those negative implications are visible for Beijing in his bilateral ties with Moscow, but mostly due to the rising risks for global security and challenges in global economy. Three most negative factors for China are as follows. 1. The risk of global escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, involvement of new participants it it. Direct involvement of NATO countries in hot conflict, use of the nuclear weapons and triggering the Third world war are a real possibility. The old Chinese maxim about “the wise monkey sitting on the top of the hill and watching the tigers’ fighting down below” stopped to be relevant for the nuclear age. 2. Western sanctions against Russia are seriously shattering global economy, affecting logistic and production chains, slowing down world consumption, triggering sharp rise of prices, first of all for energy and for food. China’s main realms of competition for multipolarity with the United States (...truncated)