Curbing Reversals of Non-Textual Constitutional Rights

University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class Volume 22 Issue 2 Article 2 Curbing Reversals of Non-Textual Constitutional Rights James G. Hodge, Jr. Jennifer L. Piatt Erica N. White Madisyn Puchebner Summer Ghaith Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation James G. Hodge,Jr., Jennifer L. Piatt, Erica N. White, Madisyn Puchebner & Summer Ghaith, Curbing Reversals of Non-Textual Constitutional Rights, 22 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender & Class 167 (2022). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol22/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact . HODGE, PIATT, WHITE, PUCHEBNER & GHAITH CURBING REVERSALS OF NON-TEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS* JAMES G. HODGE, JR., J.D., LL.M.** JENNIFER L. PIATT, J.D.*** ERICA N. WHITE, J.D.**** MADISYN PUCHEBNER***** SUMMER GHAITH****** Abstract With the June 2022 issuance of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, one of the most impactful cases in U.S. history, the Supreme Court renounced nearly a half-century of constitutional guarantees to abortion access. The Court’s stunning “rights reversal,” justified by the majority’s originalist assessment that prior jurisprudence was imprudently decided, places at immediate risk other non-textual rights—including access to contraceptives, privacy in sexual intimacy, and marriage equality. These privacy interests are already under political and legal attacks in several jurisdictions. As illustrated in response to Dobbs, neither the President, Congress, nor progressive states are willing, well-positioned, or poised to ameliorate existing or future judicial reversals of rights. Who then can allay the threat of diminishing privacy interests or other non-textual rights? Why, the Supreme Court itself. Under principles of “constitutional cohesion,” which recognize the close interplay of rights and structural components (e.g., separation of powers, federalism, and preemption) within the U.S. Constitution, the Dobbs Court’s “rights-centric” approach to withdrawing non-textual rights faces © 2022 James G. Hodge, Jr., Jennifer L. Piatt, Erica N. White, Madisyn Puchebner & Summer Ghaith. * This article is based in part on (i) James G. Hodge, Jr., Stemming Supreme Court Rights Reversals, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.: BILL OF HEALTH (June 21, 2022), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2022/06/21/stemming-supreme-court-rights-reversals/; (ii) James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Regressive Federalism, Rights Reversals, and the Public’s Health, 50(2) J.L. MED. & ETHICS 384 (2022); and (iii) James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Constitutional Cohesion and the Right to Public Health, 53 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 173 (2019). ** Peter Kiewit Foundation Professor of Law; Director, Center for Public Health Law and Policy, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University (ASU). *** Research Scholar; Co-Director, Center for Public Health Law and Policy, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, ASU. **** Research Scholar, Center for Public Health Law and Policy, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, ASU. ***** Senior Legal Researcher, Center for Public Health Law and Policy, and J.D. Candidate (May 2023), Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, ASU. ****** Senior Legal Researcher, Center for Public Health Law and Policy, and J.D., M.D. Candidate (May 2023), Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, ASU, and Mayo Medical School (Scottsdale). HODGE, PIATT, WHITE, PUCHEBNER & GHAITH 168 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 22:2 significant challenges. Ultimately, structural norms set definitive limits on additional judicial reversals of non-textual rights as well as opportunities for their partial reinstatement through the Court. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................168 I. REVERSING RIGHTS TO ABORTION: DOBBS .....................................176 A. Scope and Justifications Underlying Dobbs .......................178 B. Post-Dobbs Legal Repercussions ........................................181 II. NON-TEXTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AT RISK ........................183 A. Distinguishing Textual and Non-Textual Rights ..............186 B. Non-textual Rights On the “Cutting Board” ......................191 III. COHESIVE APPROACH TO RIGHTS REVERSALS ..............................199 A. Principles of Constitutional Cohesion ................................202 B. Structural Limits on Judicial Interpretations .......................206 IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ENDGAME REGARDING “RIGHTS REVERSALS” .............................................................................212 A. Existing Structural Legal Challenges..................................214 B. Impending Cohesive Legal Strategies .................................223 V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................226 INTRODUCTION The abolition of the constitutional right to abortion by the United States Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization on June 24, 2022,1 seriously threatens access to reproductive health services in over half the states.2 As the Court explicated in its majority opinion, state-based abortion restrictions are now lawful so long as they meet a “rational basis” test under substantive due process.3 Almost any determination by state, tribal, or local law and policy-makers limiting abortion access may pass this minimal standard in the wake of the Court’s overruling of Roe v. Wade4 nearly fifty years after its issuance. 1 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). See infra Part I.B. 3 Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2283 (displacing former strict levels of scrutiny to assess abortion-related restrictions under prior Court decisions); see infra note 83 and accompanying text. 4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 2 HODGE, PIATT, WHITE, PUCHEBNER & GHAITH 2022] CURBING REVERSALS 169 As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court’s “rights reversal”— i.e., stripping a previously-bestowed individual right by overruling precedent—in Dobbs is astonishing and impactful,5 even if it was expected.6 Among immediate concerns are what other existing freedoms the Court may seriously reconsider under similar logic espoused in Dobbs.7 Other extant liberties previously affirmed by the Court may be on the “cutting board,” specifically rights to contraception, intimacy, and marriage equality.8 Like abortion, these “non-textual” rights are not based on explicit constitutional language or deeply-held historical concepts.9 Rather, they are constructs from relatively modern Court decisions centered on liberty;10 in other words, they exist largely because J (...truncated)