Divined Comity: Assessing the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation and Updating the Second Circuit’s Prescriptive Comity Framework

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law Volume 29 Issue 1 Article 5 2023 Divined Comity: Assessing the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation and Updating the Second Circuit’s Prescriptive Comity Framework William Weingarten Fordham University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, International Business Commons, International Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons Recommended Citation William Weingarten, Note, Divined Comity: Assessing the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation and Updating the Second Circuit’s Prescriptive Comity Framework, 29 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 281 (2023). This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact . DIVINED COMITY: ASSESSING THE VITAMIN C ANTITRUST LITIGATION AND UPDATING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY FRAMEWORK William Weingarten* ABSTRACT In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, recently decided by the Second Circuit, sets a grave precedent for American plaintiffs seeking redress for antitrust injuries wrought by foreign defendants. The case involved a group of Chinese manufacturers and exporters of vitamin C, who conspired to fix prices and restrict output in the export market, injuring American consumers in import commerce. The foreign manufacturers conceded that they had colluded in fixing prices and restricting output, in flagrant violation of U.S. antitrust law. And yet, with the assistance of the Chinese government—intervening as amicus curiae—the defendants were successfully able to argue, on appeal from a jury finding against them, that “prescriptive comity”— a species of international comity doctrine—justified the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the claim. The district court below had erred, on international comity grounds, in declining to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the claim. This Note assesses the outcome of In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, concluding that it was incorrectly decided in several respects. This Note then proposes two means by which prevailing “prescriptive” comity frameworks like the Second Circuit’s might be reconfigured to minimize the separation of powers tensions inherent in prescriptive comity doctrine, and provide courts with a clear, * J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2024; B.A., New York University College of Arts & Science, 2020. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Lee for his expertise and invaluable feedback throughout the research and writing process for this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Laurence Sorkin for the exceptional guidance and support he has provided me since this Note’s inception. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their assistance during the editing process. Finally, I want to thank my family and friends for their “virtually unflagging” care and support. 281 282 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW [Vol. XXIX common-sense approach to evaluating future abstention defenses rooted in prescriptive comity. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 283 I. THE VITAMIN C ANTITRUST LITIGATION ................................... 287 A. Antitrust Law, International Comity, and Hartford Fire287 1. U.S. Antitrust Law and Its Extraterritorial Application. ............................................................. 287 2. International Comity Doctrine Pre-Hartford Fire .... 289 3. Hartford Fire and the Advent of the True Conflict Inquiry...................................................................... 292 4. Justice Scalia’s Dissent............................................ 293 a. Against Reliance on True Conflicts .................. 294 b. Prescriptive and Adjudicative Comity............... 294 5. The Doctrinal Fallout of Hartford Fire .................... 296 B. An In-Depth Account of the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation........................................................................ 298 1. Chinese Price-Coordination Prior to the Relevant Period in the Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation ........... 298 2. The PVC Regime..................................................... 299 3. American Plaintiffs File Suit ................................... 300 4. The Chinese Government Enters Proceedings as Amicus Curiae ......................................................... 302 5. Pre-Trial Motions..................................................... 302 6. Vitamin C I............................................................... 303 7. Animal Science......................................................... 304 8. Vitamin C II ............................................................. 305 a. The Majority Opinion........................................ 306 i. The True Conflict Inquiry ........................... 307 ii. The Mannington Mills Factors.................... 307 b. The Dissenting Opinion..................................... 309 II. ASSESSING THE VITAMIN C II HOLDING ..................................... 311 A. Legal Shortcomings in the Vitamin C II Holding .......... 311 B. Policy Deficiencies in the Vitamin C II Holding ........... 314 III. RECONFIGURING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY FRAMEWORK ........................................................... 315 A. Executive Input on True Conflict Questions.................. 316 1. Separation of Powers Considerations Justify Executive Input Rule ................................................................ 316 2. Means of Rule Implementation: Congressional Act, Policy Statement, or Judicial Practice?.................... 319 2023] DIVINED COMITY 283 a. Against Implementation via Statute .................. 320 b. Against Implementation via Coordinated Judicial Practice .............................................................. 321 c. For Implementation via the Antitrust Guidelines.......................................................... 321 i. Flexibility in Application ............................ 321 ii. Ease of Amendment .................................... 322 3. Deference: What Degree of Deference Should Courts Give Executive Branch Input on True Conflict Questions?................................................................ 322 a. Calls for Chevron Deference Towards Executive Input in Prescriptive Comity Cases ................... 323 b. Substantial, not Chevron Deference Better Realizes Comity’s Core Aspirations ................. 325 B. Reconfiguring the Multi-Factor Comity Tests............... 327 1. Factor (5) – Elevating Alcoa’s Place in Comity...... 329 2. Factor (3) – Interest-Balancing as a Tie-Breaker..... 331 3. (...truncated)