Proximal intentions intentionalism

Philosophical Studies (2024) 181:879–891 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02118-6 Proximal intentions intentionalism Victor Tamburini1 Accepted: 31 January 2024 / Published online: 4 April 2024 © The Author(s) 2024 Abstract According to a family of metasemantics for demonstratives called intentionalism, the intentions of speakers determine the reference of demonstratives. And according to a sub-family I call proximal intentions (PI) intentionalism, the intention that determines reference is one that occupies a certain place—the proximal one—in a structure of intentions. PI intentionalism is thought to make correct predictions about reference where less sophisticated forms of intentionalism make the wrong predictions. In this article I argue that this is an illusion: PI intentionalism also suffers from predictive inadequacy. In Sect. 1, I present the problem of predictive inadequacy for intentionalism and an ad hoc response to it. In Sect. 2, I sketch a version of PI intentionalism that aims to provide the most principled response to this problem. In Sect. 3, I explain why PI intentionalism cannot solve the problem after all. In Sect. 4, I indicate where I think metasemanticists should go next. Keywords Demonstratives · Metasemantics · Reference · Intentionalism · Referential intentions 1 The problem of predictive inadequacy for intentionalism What makes it the case that a demonstrative pronoun such as ‘this’ or ‘that’ refers to a certain object when uttered by a speaker?1,2 A metasemantics for demonstratives is a theory that answers this question. Intentionalism is a broad family of metasemantics for demonstratives. Here is one formulation of intentionalism: the reference 1 Following King (2014) and Speaks (2016), I do not assume a referential semantics for demonstratives— that the compositional contribution of a demonstrative is an object. As I use ‘refer’, a demonstrative refers to a certain object just when its compositional contribution is identical with this object or determines it. To make their neutrality explicit, King and Speaks use ‘semantic value’ instead of ‘reference’. 2 I also stay neutral on the exact relata of the reference relation. It could hold between the utterance of a demonstrative and an object; or between a demonstrative-type, a context of utterance, and an object. * Victor Tamburini 1 Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, 5 The Scores, St Andrews KY16 9AL, UK 13 Vol.:(0123456789) 880 V. Tamburini of an uttered demonstrative d is object o only if the speaker intends to refer to o with d.3 Some authors take intentions to be the sole determinant of reference (Akerman, 2009; Bach, 1992; Kaplan, 1989b; Perry, 2009; Stokke, 2010), while some do not and further disagree about additional determinants (King, 2014; Reimer, 1992; Speaks, 2016). Various objections have been levelled against intentionalism, but in this article I focus on the issue of predictive adequacy—i.e. whether intentionalism makes the right predictions about the reference of demonstratives.4 Intentionalism is challenged by cases in which, intuitively, the referent is a certain object although the speaker does not intend to refer to this object. Here is the most notorious case of this sort, courtesy of David Kaplan: Suppose that without turning and looking I point to the place on my wall which has long been occupied by a picture of Rudolf Carnap and I say: (27) That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. But unbeknownst to me, someone has replaced my picture of Carnap with one of Spiro Agnew (adapted from Kaplan, 1978, p.239).5 Opponents of intentionalism may present the following argument on the basis of this case. The speaker intends to refer to Carnap’s picture, not Agnew’s picture. Yet intuitively the referent of the demonstrative is Agnew’s picture. Therefore intentionalism is false.6 Here is a common response to this argument. The argument mistakenly assumes that the speaker of the Carnap-Agnew case intends to refer to Carnap’s picture only. In fact, the speaker intends to refer to Agnew’s picture too. This further intention is usually presented as an intention to refer to the F, where the description ‘the F’ is satisfied by Agnew’s picture. For instance, it seems true that the speaker intends to refer to the picture behind him. The second step of the response consists in claiming that the intention about Agnew’s picture prevails in the determination of reference. This response to the Carnap-Agnew case may be called the ‘multiple intentions’ response. 3 According to this formulation, reference-determining intentions are intentions for a speaker to refer to an object with an expression. There is in fact some controversy surrounding the nature of referencedetermining intentions. Bach construes them as communicative, audience-directed intentions (Bach 2017). Others construe them as semantic intentions: intentions that demonstratives themselves refer to a certain object (King 2014; Viebahn 2020). I will not address this dispute here. 4 Here is a non-exhaustive list of objections to intentionalism: intentionalism is circular (Gauker 2008), it makes the interpretive task of the hearer impossible (ibid.), and it is psychologically implausible (Devitt 2022). 5 Similar cases are put forward in (Reimer 1991) and (Wettstein 1984). It is easy to generate counterexamples in the mould of Kaplan’s case: make the speaker point at another object than the one she has in mind, for whatever reason. This is not a failsafe recipe, but it generates a truckload of prima facie counterexamples to intentionalism. 6 Kaplan gives the following justification for the second premise: “I have said of a picture of Spiro Agnew that it pictures one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century” (Kaplan 1978, p.239). He adds that intuitively he spoke falsely in this case (Kaplan 1978, p.239). 13 Proximal intentions intentionalism 881 The multiple intentions response is unfortunately ad hoc. We are conveniently told that the intention about the intuitive referent is the reference-determining one, but no justification is given. What we need is a general theory that predicts the ascendancy of the intention about the intuitive referent in the Carnap-Agnew case. This is where PI intentionalism enters the stage. 2 Structured intentions and PI intentionalism Several intentionalists go beyond the multiple intentions response (Bach, 1992; King, 2013; Perry, 2009; Reimer, 1992). They first observe that the intention about Carnap’s picture and the intention about Agnew’s picture are part of a common structure of intentions, and that the intention about Agnew’s picture occupies a certain place—which may be called the proximal one—in this structure. They further propose that only proximal intentions determine reference. This is the view I call PI intentionalism. Let me sketch what I take to be the best version of PI intentionalism. This version (...truncated)