Empathy in the Zhuangzi

Dao https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-024-09945-8 Empathy in the Zhuangzi Youru Wang1 Accepted: 31 May 2024 © The Author(s) 2024 Abstract This article investigates elements of empathy in the Zhuangzi 莊子. It outlines four prominent aspects of current scholarship on empathy: different types of empathy, the other-centeredness of empathy, empathy as a process and the role empathy plays in responsiveness to others, and interaction between empathy and other capacities. Based on materials from the Zhuangzi that involve elements of empathy, I delegate them respectively to these four areas. While the Zhuangzi does not invent any specific term for an exclusive designation of the meaning of empathy, I attempt to show that the Zhuangzi does explore the phenomena of empathy to a great extent. It characterizes unique features of empathy, such as other-centeredness, perceptual directness, its function as listening, mirroring, qi 氣-connecting and receptivity, the issue of how to cultivate one’s empathic capacity in the everyday encounter with others, and especially how empathic capacity works closely with the Zhuangzian forgetfulness of oneself. Keywords Empathy · Other-centeredness · Daoism · Zhuangzi 莊子 · Ethics * Youru Wang 1 Department of Philosophy and World Religions, Rowan University, 201 Mullica Hill Rd, Glassboro, New Jersey 08028, USA 13 Vol.:(0123456789) Youru Wang 1 Introduction Contemporary scholarship has produced strong evidence for the link between empathy and other-directed, prosocial, or altruistic behavior for decades.1 It is one of the reasons for the ongoing outpouring of publications on various topics or aspects of empathy by scholars from either philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, or sociology. This article looks at the elements of empathy in the Zhuangzi 莊子, as Yong Huang has discerned the altruistic element of the Zhuangzi recently (Huang 2005: 408), but the element of empathy has not been investigated yet. Some may wonder if I can find from this ancient text any significant contributions or even useful information to the contemporary study of empathy, as it is common knowledge that the English term “empathy” and its German original “einfühlung” started to circulate only in the late 19th and early 20th century, and Western scholarship on empathy can roughly be tracked back to the Scottish sentimentalist philosophers such as Hume and Smith in the 18th century. My article does not aim to refute such doubts but simply lets facts and textual evidence speak for themselves while appealing to the interpretative force by using the best of contemporary theories of empathy without violating the textual integrity of the Zhuangzi. Below I outline four prominent respects of current scholarship on empathy: different types of empathy, the other-centeredness of empathy, empathy as a process and the role empathy plays in responsiveness to others, and interaction between empathy and other capacities. I connect those materials of the Zhuangzi involving elements of empathy to each of these four areas, to show that to a great extent the Zhuangzi has explored them, taken unique approaches to them, and can contribute to our contemporary conversations about them. 2 Different Types of Empathy As a general background, empathy is a phenomenon that has many faces (Maibom 2012; Read 2019: 3). It has been called a “plural capacity,” or “a host of different capacities, all merged under the umbrella term ‘empathy’” (Aaltola 2014: 243). Such a multifaceted phenomenon cannot be defined in a singular sense. Therefore, some scholars seem to take a broad approach, encapsulating many different ideas or aspects under the rubric of “empathy” (Maibom 2020: 6). Others think that there is no reason to delimit empathy to affective states only. “[I]t is possible to empathize with the cognitive, affective and conative experiences of the other, i.e., with his or her beliefs, perceptions, feelings, passions, volitions, desires, and intentions” (Zahavi 2017: 40). However, among these different aspects or dimensions of empathy, two are the most 1 Daniel Batson states: “The single arrow leading from internal response of empathy to altruistic motivation indicates not only that empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation but also that all motivation to help evoked by empathy is altruistic” (Batson 1991: 87). Nancy Eisenberg and Paul Miller assert “the validity of the assumption that empathic responding is an important source of prosocial (including altruistic) behavior” (Eisenberg and Miller 1987: 91). Michael Slote summarizes these experimental-psychological contributions as showing “that empathy plays a crucial enabling role in the development of genuine altruistic concern or caring for others” (Slote 2007: 13). 13 Empathy in the Zhuangzi widely categorized—affective empathy and cognitive empathy.2 As Heidi Maibom states, “[E]mpathy is either a way of relating cognitively to others, by taking up their perspective, or a way of being emotionally sensitive to them” (Maibom 2012: 260).3 While these two types are separately analyzed and defined, under many circumstances they “are all intimately connected” (Maibom 2020: 6), or copresent in cases of empathy. For example, in order to experience the full range of affective empathy, one needs “to have relatively intact cognitive empathetic abilities as well” (Maibom 2012: 254). As an ancient text, the Zhuangzi is far away from these modern analyses or categorizations of empathy, but it does seem to involve cases of both affective and cognitive empathy. Chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi includes the story of renowned funeral manager Mengsun Cai 孟孫才, who was able to cry with funeral-goers (renku yiku 人哭亦哭). This is an example of affective empathy because it is not based on a kind of involuntary emotional contagion but on his “special understanding” (tejue 特覺), which is other-oriented and suited (yi 宜) to people’s feeling and situation (18/6/80; S. Wang 1988: [1] 262) without going against reason (buguai renli 不乖人理 by Cheng Xuanying’s 成玄英 exegesis, in Guo 1961: 277).4 Other cases in the Zhuangzi seem closer to cognitive empathy and so-called perspective-taking. Chapter 7 of the Zhuangzi relates the parable of Emperor Hundun 混沌, who was born with no eyes, ears, nose, or mouth. As a reward for his generosity, emperors Shu 儵 and Hu 忽 carve seven holes into Hundun’s face in order to give him a more standard human appearance, but this misbegotten kindness only results in his death (21/7/33–35). A passage in a later chapter tells a similar story about how the insensitivity, lack of the understanding of the other, and blind compassion of Marquis of Lu 魯 caused a seabird’s death by treating it with a banquet only suited for humans (47/18/33–36). These two stories are negative examples but they nevertheless enjoin us to be necessarily empathic to the patient’s own desire, need, purpose, or living condition. They recommend that we shift to the patient’s perspective and no (...truncated)