Building risk assessment methodology for explosive and non-conventional terrorist attacks
Eur. Phys. J. Plus
(2024) 139:669
https://doi.org/10.1140/epjp/s13360-024-05422-6
Regular Article
Building risk assessment methodology for explosive and non-conventional terrorist
attacks
Marco Carbonelli1 , Riccardo Quaranta5,2,a
Andrea Malizia3 , Laura Gratta6
, Pasquale Gaudio2
, Daniele Di Giovanni2,4
, Grace P. Xerri2
,
1
2
3
4
Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Rome, Italy
Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy
Department of Biomedicine and Prevention, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy
Unicamillus-Saint Camillus International University of Health Sciences, Rome, Italy
5 The American University of Rome, Rome, Italy
6 Italian Risk Management Expert, Rome, Italy
Received: 26 March 2024 / Accepted: 2 July 2024
© The Author(s) 2024
Abstract An original methodology suitable for the assessment of the risk of a terrorist attack in a given site/building is proposed and
illustrated for the case of an explosive or non-conventional (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosive—CBRNe)
attack. The Building Risk Assessment Methodology discussed in this paper represents the arrival point of a detailed analysis and
research carried out during the past 5 years and provides the synthesis of different results obtained for the assessment of Building
Threats and Building Vulnerabilities. These two assessments were discussed in detail in other already published papers. The effort
presented in this work is to deploy a risk and impact assessment technique for buildings that can be adopted in any operating scenario
in the presence of explosive or non-conventional threats. The main target of the methodology is to provide a sufficiently accurate
estimate of the risk in a simple fashion. The methodology allows to manage the different kinds of risk related to the explosive and
non-conventional threats, and it is useful for identifying a ranking of risks for different buildings in different portions of territory
and for prioritizing actions and investments in preparedness, protection and resilience of critical areas and critical infrastructures.
In the paper, the results of two different case studies for three different threats will be considered, analyzed and compared.
1 Introduction
Risk assessment is a widely discussed and implemented methodology across various fields of human activities, spanning, for
example, from finance to civil protection and personal data protection.
One critical area where risk assessment techniques are vital is the protection of buildings, particularly in reference to terrorist
attack scenarios. The events of September 11, 2001, i.e., the attacks to the New York World Trade Center and to the Pentagon also
known as 9/11, have significantly increased awareness and stimulated extensive attention to this issue over the past decades. As
highlighted by many scholars, this event and its profound impacts and consequences have marked a key shift in the approach of
terrorist threats against buildings [1], raising the attention of both the general public and the specialists in this field.
Recent trends in terrorist activities show this shift from targeting exclusively institutional or high-value buildings to an increased
frequency of attacks on more accessible targets. In fact, prior to 9/11, terrorist actions were typically logistically complex, often
involving hostage situations or mass casualties at high-value sites. However, following the 9/11 events, terrorist strategies evolved
toward easier-to-execute attacks, although the lethality of such incidents remains significantly high [2].
It is evident that buildings have begun the preferred targets for terrorists, as they serve as central hubs of a country’s economic
activity and symbolize its wealth and culture. Thus, safeguarding buildings from terrorist attacks has become a crucial element of the
defense strategy adopted by Western countries. This strategy entails a comprehensive approach to building risk assessment, aiming
to mitigate vulnerabilities and introduce technical methods and measures fitted for building protection design with the objective of
protecting both individuals and properties by enhancing the security of the site’s exterior, the building perimeter and its internal
functions.
In this paper, a well-established approach to building risk assessment [3] is used, recalling the two foundational methods outlined
by the authors in the previous published works: the Building Threat Assessment Method (BTAM) [4] and the Building Vulnerability
Assessment Method (BVAM) [5]. Additionally, a method for conducting a Building Exposure Assessment Method (BEAM) is
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Table 1 Characterization of the
threats for the considered attacks
Eur. Phys. J. Plus
Parameter
(2024) 139:669
Type of attack
Explosion of a van bomb
Explosion of a suicide
belt bomb
Explosion of a
Cesium-137 dirty bomb
Type of material or
explosive employed
TNT
TNT
TNT and Cesium-137
Type of vector
Van
Belt bomb
Pick-up truck
Maximum amount of the
material employed
800 kg
5 kg
400-kg TNT and 90-g
Cesium-137
Specific location relative
to the structure suitable
for the application of
the threat
Area of entry for
shipping/delivery
vehicles
Access part of the
building,
corresponding to the
main entrance
External main parking
area of the building
introduced. These three methods are integrated into a comprehensive Building Risk Assessment Methodology (BRAM), which is
then applied to two case studies involving different building typologies.
To conduct a complete building risk assessment, the application of this methodology should be assigned to a specialized Assessment Team (AT) [4, 5]. This team should consist of engineers, architects and subject matter experts with the expertise to conduct
an accurate analysis of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosive (CBRNe) threats. Additionally, the involvement
of intelligence experts and direct access to intelligence information could be crucial for accurately estimating the final risk levels,
beginning with the assessment of threats, vulnerabilities and exposure levels.
2 Case studies
This study examines three threats proposed in a previous paper of the authors [4]. These threats include the detonation of a suicide
belt bomb, the detonation of a van bomb and the detonation of a Cesium-137 Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD), commonly called
dirty bomb. This approach follows a similar methodology described in [4, 5], providing a concrete basis for the analysis.
For each selected threat, the AT specified the parameters below:
•
•
•
•
Type of material or explosive employed,
Type of vector for the material or explosive employed,
Possible maximum amount of the material employed,
Possible specific location relative to the structure suitable for the application of the threat.
In this paper, the scenarios will be evaluated assuming t (...truncated)