Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets
nature climate change
Article
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0
Feasible deployment of carbon capture
and storage and the requirements of
climate targets
Received: 18 August 2023
Tsimafei Kazlou
, Aleh Cherp
1,2
3,4
& Jessica Jewell
1,2,5,6
Accepted: 23 July 2024
Published online: 25 September 2024
Check for updates
Climate change mitigation requires the large-scale deployment of carbon
capture and storage (CCS). Recent plans indicate an eight-fold increase in
CCS capacity by 2030, yet the feasibility of CCS expansion is debated. Using
historical growth of CCS and other policy-driven technologies, we show
that if plans double between 2023 and 2025 and their failure rates decrease
by half, CCS could reach 0.37 GtCO2 yr−1 by 2030—lower than most 1.5 °C
pathways but higher than most 2 °C pathways. Staying on-track to 2 °C
would require that in 2030–2040 CCS accelerates at least as fast as wind
power did in the 2000s, and that after 2040, it grows faster than nuclear
power did in the 1970s to 1980s. Only 10% of mitigation pathways meet these
feasibility constraints, and virtually all of them depict <600 GtCO2 captured
and stored by 2100. Relaxing the constraints by assuming no failures of CCS
plans and growth as fast as flue-gas desulfurization would approximately
double this amount.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) plays a key role in climate mitigation pathways, yet its feasibility is vigorously debated1–3. The recent
interest in CCS4–6, including negative emissions technologies—direct
air capture (DACCS) and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS)—is reflected in
plans to increase CCS capacity eight-fold from 2023 to 20307. However,
10 years ago, a similar wave of CCS plans5 largely failed8,9. Can the new
push bring CCS on track10–13 for the Paris climate targets?
Answering this question requires overcoming three challenges.
The first is anticipating how many CCS plans are likely to succeed. The
second is projecting medium-term growth of CCS, given the uncertainty about the drivers of, and barriers to, its uptake14,15. The third is
estimating feasible long-term growth rates that depend on the size of
the future CCS market16,17.
We address these challenges by building on the tradition of using
empirical evidence18–26 from historical technology analogues or reference cases27,28. Using advanced policy-driven technologies as reference
cases, we contribute with three methodological innovations. First, we
analyse historical failure rates of planned projects to estimate feasible
near-term (5–10 years) CCS deployment. Second, we use this estimate to project a range of medium-term (10–20 years) CCS expansion,
assuming quasi-exponential growth typical of early stages of technology deployment. Finally, we estimate the feasible range of long-term
(20–80 years) CCS growth rates based on the peak growth rates of
historical analogues. Thus, we develop an approach for projecting the
deployment of emerging policy-driven technologies across the first
three phases of the technology life-cycle—the formative phase29–31,
the acceleration phase19 and the stable growth phase19. Finally, we
compare our findings to CCS growth in the three recent IPCC scenario
ensembles32–34 and estimate the feasible range of CO2 captured and
stored with CCS over the 21st century.
We find that only a handful of climate mitigation pathways (10%,
IPCC categories C1–C4) depict CCS capacity growth compatible with
even the most optimistic assumptions when (1) CCS plans double
by 2025 and their failure rate decreases by half; (2) CCS expansion
Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation (CET), University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 2Department of Geography, Faculty of Social Sciences,
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 3Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University, Vienna, Austria. 4International
Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics, Lund University, Lund, Sweden. 5Division of Physical Resource Theory, Department of Space, Earth
and Environment, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden. 6Advancing Systems Analysis Program, International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxeburg, Austria.
e-mail:
1
Nature Climate Change | Volume 14 | October 2024 | 1047–1055
1047
Technology deployment
Article
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0
Formative phase
Acceleration phase
Stable growth phase
Saturation phase
Niche applications,
erratic growth
Increasing returns,
quasi-exponential growth
Balance of forces,
quasi-linear growth
Market limits,
stagnating growth
Faster stable growth
Maximum
growth rate
More optimistic
assumptions
Faster acceleration
More plans + lower failure rates
Acceleration rate
Slower stable growth
Take-off
Plans/failures
?
Slower acceleration
?
Less optimistic
assumptions
Fewer plans + higher failure rates
Time
Fig. 1 | Method for projecting the feasible deployment of policy-driven
technologies along the phases of technology growth using feasibility spaces.
To construct each feasibility space, we use a tailored set of metrics and reference
cases most appropriate to each of the first three phases of the technology lifecycle—formative, acceleration and stable growth (Methods and Table 1). For the
formative phase, we project feasible CCS deployment (Gt yr−1) based on project
plans and their failure rates; for the acceleration phase, the acceleration rate
of reference technologies; and for the stable growth rate, we use the maximum
growth rate at the inflection point of the S-curve normalized to the market size.
This approach can be applied not only to global but also to national and regional
targets, as well as to other climate mitigation and energy technologies. Error bars
are used to illustrate the uncertainty in feasible deployment over time.
in 2030–2040 is as fast as solar power expansion was in the 2010s
or nuclear power expansion was in the 1960s and 1970s; and (3) CCS
grows over the following decades as fast as the growth of nuclear in the
1970s and 1980s. Only 33% of pathways meet the first two constraints
and only 26% meet the last one. Virtually all pathways that meet all
three constraints depict <200 GtCO2 captured and stored by 2070 and
<600 GtCO2 by 2100 (at the 95th percentile). Under the less realistic
assumptions of a doubling of CCS plans by 2025, a zero failure rate and
growth similar to that of flue-gas desulfurization (FGD), this amount
could increase to 400 GtCO2 by 2070 and 1,100 GtCO2 by 2100, which
still stands in contrast to a large number of 1.5 °C- and 2 °C-compatible
pathways, which envision up to 700 GtCO2 captured and stored by 2070
and 1,400 GtCO2 by 2100.
For the formative phase, which we find can be complete by 2030,
we construct a feasibility space based on near-term CCS plans and
historical failure rates of past CCS (Supplementary Note 1) and early
nuclear power plans. For the acceleration phase, which we assume
would occur in 2030–2040, we construct a feasibility space (...truncated)