A JOURNEY TOWARDS A NEW EMBODIED PROBLEM OF EVIL

DOI 10.36446/af.e1163 A JOURNEY TOWARDS A NEW EMBODIED PROBLEM OF EVIL* Un viaje hacia un nuevo problema del mal encarnado Nataliia Reva a https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3931-3755 a Universidade Tecnológica Federal do Paraná in Curitiba, Brazil. Abstract Traditionally, the problem of evil revolves around the issue of reconciling the coexistence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God and evil. In response to this threat, philosophers use a generalized and abstract concept of evil to build a stronger argument against it. In this article, I challenge this method and advocate a practical approach to the problem of evil, emphasizing the importance of studying the concept of evil through concrete examples of its manifestations. I propose studying the latest from an embodied (phenomenological) perspective. Evil becomes a case of lived embodied experience that religion can help deal with. Thus, by introducing the concept of the body in the middle of the traditional Trilemma, I shift the questions toward the coexistence and interrelation of three separate subjects: God, Evil, and Human Agency. Such an embodied perspective offers a new look at the concept of evil, taking it out of a strictly abstract intellectual problematic circle and opening a possibility of methodological expansion and further interdisciplinary studies of the question. Key-words: Problem of Evil; Embodied Evil; Embodiment; Body; Human Agency. Resumen Tradicionalmente, el problema del mal gira en torno a la cuestión de conciliar la coexistencia del Dios omnipotente y omnibenevolente y el Mal. En respuesta a esta amenaza, los filósofos utilizan un concepto generalizado y abstracto del mal para construir un argumento más sólido en su contra. En este artículo, cuestiono este método y abogo por un giro práctico en el problema del mal y en la necesidad de estudiar el concepto del mal abordando ejemplos concretos de las manifestaciones del mal. Propongo estudiar lo último desde la perspectiva corporizada (fenomenológica). El mal se convierte en un caso de experiencia corporal vivida que la religión puede ayudar a abordar. Así, al introducir el concepto del cuerpo en medio del trilema tradicional, desplazo las cuestiones hacia la coexistencia e interrelación de tres sujetos separados: Dios, el Mal y la Agencia Humana. Esta perspectiva corporizada ofrece una nueva mirada al concepto del mal, sacándolo de un círculo problemático intelectual estrictamente abstracto y abre una posibilidad de expansión metodológica y estudios interdisciplinarios adicionales de la cuestión. * The research was funded by Fundação Araucária (Programa de Acolhida de Cientistas Ucranianos). ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 45(2) - pISSN 0326-1301 - eISSN 1851-9636 - CC: BY-NC - (noviembre 2025) 419-446 420 NATALIIA REVA Palabras clave: Problema del mal; Mal encarnado; Encarnación; Cuerpo; Agencia humana. I. Introduction or Point of Departure: Traditional Problem of Evil The problem of evil occupies a unique place in philosophical and, in particular, theological discussions. In two words, it is a longstanding intellectual challenge to reconcile the existence of evil with that of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. In this section, I will present an overview of the traditional problem of evil, focusing on two main approaches to this issue — doctrinal and apologetic —, discussing their proposed arguments, and showing examples. The doctrinal approach is based on the “argument from God” and recognizes God’s existence as an undoubtable truth. Almost all theists subscribe to some well-worked-out and comprehensive theology based on such assertion. Thus, the problem is viewed from the angle of whether an all-powerful and all-loving Creator would allow the existence of evil and, if so, for what reasons. Meanwhile, the apologetic approach arises from the observation that evil exists in our world, which forms the question of whether the presence of such vice in nature does not prove the absence of the omnipotent and omnibenevolent Creator. In other words, this approach starts with the “argument from Evil,” taking the existence of evil as a primary point to question God’s presence and power. The formulation of the problem can vary depending on the context. Nonetheless, it always comes upon a Trilemma: 1. Since God is omnipotent, he should be able to prevent all evil, 2. Since God is omnibenevolent, he should be willing to prevent all evil, 3. Yet, evil still exists (1-3) Thus, God is either unable to prevent all evil and therefore is not omnipotent, OR is unwilling to prevent all evil and therefore is not omnibenevolent. The trilemma presented makes us rethink our image of God, his causal relation to this world, and even (by some) doubt his forces. Such an image is unacceptable for theology, for which omnipotence and omnibenevolence are crucial features of the divine nature. Therefore, one of its main responses was to deny the existence of evil. The privation theory of evil fits this request. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and other ancient Greeks were convinced that evil does not exist in reality and that we should instead ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO 45(2) - (noviembre 2025) A JOURNEY TOWARDS A NEW EMBODIED PROBLEM OF EVIL 421 discuss the absence of Goodness (understood in the sense of cosmic harmony of nature). Although it dates back to Antiquity, the privation theory found its heyday in medieval theology. One of the brightest examples is St. Augustine’s theodicy. Augustine’s theodicy famously insisted that God, as the supreme Good, could not create anything inherently evil. Instead, evil is “the loss of good, lacking its own positive nature” (St. Augustine, 426/2015, p. 244). His argument frames evil not as a substance but as a deficiency, akin to disease being a privation of health or darkness, the absence of light. He explained it in the following way: For the Almighty God, who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things, being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works if He were not so omnipotent and good that He could bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, diseases and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present — namely, the diseases and wounds — go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance — the flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils — that is, privations of the good which we call health — are accidents. Just in the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good (quoted in Bourke, 1974, p. 65). Another way to respond to this attack on God’s almightiness is to argue that evil is allowed because it has a good purpose only a (...truncated)